Randel v. Travelers Lloyds of Texas: Mandate-and-Forfeiture Limits on Remand and Appeal in Texas Insurance Prompt-Payment Litigation

I. Introduction

Parties: Randy and Debra Randel (insureds/plaintiffs–appellants) vs. Travelers Lloyds of Texas Insurance Company (insurer/defendant–appellee).
Forum: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reviewing the Southern District of Texas.

The dispute arose after a Fourth of July fire damaged the Randels’ home and contents. Travelers made multiple payments, the Randels invoked the policy’s appraisal process, and Travelers paid the appraisal award in full (and issued additional payment aimed at reducing statutory-interest exposure). Despite full payment, the Randels pursued breach-of-contract, bad-faith (statutory and common law), and Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act claims.

This was the second trip to the Fifth Circuit. After the first appeal (Randel v. Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., 9 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2021)), only a narrowed prompt-payment issue returned on remand. The key issues in this second appeal were:

  • whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Travelers on the remaining prompt-payment claim;
  • whether the district court properly treated the Fifth Circuit’s earlier mandate as foreclosing revived bad-faith claims; and
  • whether the Fifth Circuit should certify a Texas-law question to the Supreme Court of Texas concerning appraisal payment and “entitled-to-benefits” causation for bad faith.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Travelers and denied certification. The court held:

  1. The Randels forfeited their challenge to the prompt-payment summary judgment by (a) failing to timely oppose Travelers’s summary-judgment motion in the district court (their late response was struck and not appealed), and (b) failing in their opening appellate brief to address the district court’s dispositive rationale that the Prompt Payment Act clock never started because Travelers did not receive all reasonably requested documentation.
  2. The district court correctly limited proceedings on remand to the prompt-payment claim because the prior Fifth Circuit mandate remanded only that claim; additionally, under the “waiver doctrine,” issues not raised in the first appeal (the bad-faith claims) could not be revisited on remand or in a second appeal.
  3. Certification was unwarranted because the bad-faith claims were no longer live (making certification akin to an advisory opinion), and Texas law on appraisal-payment consequences for bad faith is clear under Ortiz and subsequent decisions; the Supreme Court of Texas’s denial of review in Knopp further counseled against certification.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appraisal, breach of contract, and “no damages left to litigate”

  • Randel v. Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., 9 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2021): The prior appeal framed the remand’s scope. It affirmed dismissal of contract and loss-of-use issues while remanding only the prompt-payment claim for dwelling and personal property in light of intervening Texas authority.
  • Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019): Quoted for the principle that payment of an appraisal award bars a breach-of-contract claim “premised on a failure to pay the amount of the covered loss.” It also underlies the later certification analysis that appraisal payment forecloses bad faith absent an independent injury.
  • Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019): Cited for the contract-law axiom that damages are an element of breach; once the insured has received full damages, “there is nothing left to litigate.”
  • Hinojos v. State Farm Lloyds, 619 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. 2021): Central to the first remand: the Prompt Payment Act analysis cannot turn on whether preappraisal payments were merely “reasonable”; instead, payments must “roughly correspond to the amount owed on the claim.”

2. Bad faith’s dependency on contract breach, and recognized exceptions

  • Liberty Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1996): The opinion relied on Liberty to explain why the bad-faith claims were non-viable once the breach-of-contract claim failed (and why remanding bad faith would be senseless).
  • Blum's Furniture Co., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, 459 F. App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2012) and Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1995): These authorities define the “only recognized exceptions” to the “no-bad-faith-without-breach” rule—independent injury or failure to timely investigate—though the panel noted no contention that they applied here.

3. Prompt Payment Act elements and the “clock”

  • Mainali Corp. v. Covington Specialty Ins. Co., 872 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2017): Used to state the core statutory framework: the insurer must pay within 60 days of receiving all documentation needed to resolve the claim; failure triggers the statutory penalty and attorney’s fees (Tex. Ins. Code §§ 542.058, 542.060).

4. Summary judgment review and appellate forfeiture

  • Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157 (5th Cir. 2021): Restates de novo review and standard summary-judgment inferences.
  • Ervin v. Sprint Commc'ns Co. LP, 364 F. App'x 114, quoting Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2005) and Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1986): Establish that appellate review is limited to matters presented to the district court; failing to oppose summary judgment can waive/forfeit arguments on appeal.
  • Vernon Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Par., 88 F.4th 588 (5th Cir. 2023): Reinforces that an appellant must address the district court’s analysis in the opening brief; raising new theories in a reply brief is too late.

5. Mandate rule, law of the case, and waiver doctrine on remand

  • Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2007): Sets de novo review of a district court’s interpretation of an appellate remand.
  • Pool v. City of Houston, 163 F.4th 284 (5th Cir. 2026): Provides the crisp formulation: on remand the district court must effect the mandate “and do nothing else.”
  • Franklin v. Regions Bank, 125 F.4th 613 (5th Cir. 2025): Explains the mandate rule as a corollary of law of the case, foreclosing relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided.
  • Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2012), quoting Med. Ctr. Pharm. v. Holder, 634 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2011) and Nw. Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1989): The “waiver doctrine” bars issues that could have been raised in the first appeal but were not; it also prevents those issues from being considered in a second appeal.
  • Indigenous Peoples of Coastal Bend v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 132 F.4th 872 (5th Cir. 2025): Clarifies the distinction between waiver and forfeiture, while acknowledging that the Fifth Circuit’s “waiver doctrine” label is often applied to forfeitures.

6. Certification standards, advisory opinions, and clarity of Texas law on appraisal-payment effects

  • In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2012): Certification is discretionary and used sparingly—only in exceptional cases.
  • Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013): Cited for Article III’s bar on advisory opinions; the court declined certification because the underlying bad-faith claims were “dead.”
  • Mirelez v. State Farm Lloyds, 127 F.4th 949 (5th Cir. 2025) and Biasatti v. GuideOne Nat'l Ins. Co., 601 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. 2020): Used to show the settled rule: appraisal payment forecloses breach of contract and common-law/statutory bad faith unless the insured suffered an independent injury.
  • Navarra v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 23-20582, 2024 WL 3174505 (5th Cir. June 25, 2024) and Wilhite v. Ark Royal Ins. Co., No. 24-20401, 2025 WL 2588992 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025): Unpublished Fifth Circuit applications of the Ortiz/Biasatti framework; Wilhite collects reaffirming cases.
  • Knopp v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 05-22-00749-CV, 2024 WL 3579432 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 30, 2024, pet. denied): The Randels pointed to it to argue the issue warranted certification; the Fifth Circuit viewed the Supreme Court of Texas’s denial of review as cutting against certification.
  • Guerrera v. United Financial Cas. Co., 161 F.4th 913 (5th Cir. 2025): Invoked for the proposition that a state high court’s denial of review counsels against certification.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Prompt Payment Act claim: forfeiture and failure to brief the dispositive ground

The district court granted summary judgment on a threshold Prompt Payment Act element: the statutory 60-day period did not begin because Travelers had not received “all items, statements, and forms reasonably requested and required under Section 542.055.” The Fifth Circuit did not reach a merits-heavy re-evaluation of the record because the Randels procedurally defaulted in two ways:

  • In the district court: They filed their summary-judgment response 41 days late; the response was struck; and they did not appeal the striking decision. Under Ervin v. Sprint Commc'ns Co. LP and related cases, arguments not presented below are not available on appeal.
  • In the Fifth Circuit: Their opening brief failed to address the only ground the district court relied on (whether the Prompt Payment Act clock started). Under Vernon Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Par., that omission forfeits the argument; a reply-brief attempt to supply it comes too late.

With no preserved challenge to the dispositive reasoning, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

2. Scope of remand: mandate rule and waiver doctrine bar revived bad-faith claims

The Fifth Circuit treated the remand question as straightforward. Its earlier judgment remanded only one item: “The prompt-payment claim relating to dwelling and personal property coverage is REMANDED.” Under Pool v. City of Houston, the district court had to implement that mandate and “do nothing else.”

The court also relied on the “waiver doctrine” of Lindquist v. City of Pasadena: issues that could have been raised in the first appeal but were not cannot be revived on remand or in a second appeal. Because the Randels did not appeal the adverse judgment on bad-faith claims in the first appeal (a point the earlier panel noted in a footnote), those claims were procedurally out of the case.

3. Certification: no live controversy and no genuine uncertainty in Texas law

The court declined certification for two independent reasons:

  • Justiciability: The question the Randels proposed related only to bad-faith claims that were no longer live; certification would effectively invite an advisory opinion, prohibited under Chafin v. Chafin.
  • Clarity of Texas law: The Fifth Circuit deemed Texas law settled—Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds and Biasatti v. GuideOne Nat'l Ins. Co. (as applied in Mirelez v. State Farm Lloyds and other Fifth Circuit decisions) foreclose bad-faith recovery for policy benefits already paid via appraisal absent an independent injury. The Supreme Court of Texas’s denial of review in Knopp v. State Farm Lloyds reinforced the court’s view that certification was unwarranted.

C. Impact

  • Appellate practice in insurance cases (and beyond): The decision underscores that appellate courts will affirm on forfeiture grounds when appellants fail to (a) timely oppose summary judgment or (b) engage the district court’s dispositive reasoning in the opening brief. This is especially consequential in Prompt Payment Act litigation where the “clock start” element can be case-dispositive.
  • Remand discipline: The opinion reinforces a strict application of the mandate rule: when the appellate court remands a single claim, the district court cannot reopen other claims—especially those abandoned in the first appeal.
  • Texas insurance “appraisal-payment” landscape: While unpublished and not creating new Texas substantive law, the opinion consolidates the Fifth Circuit’s view that Ortiz/Biasatti have made appraisal-payment consequences for bad-faith claims largely settled (absent independent injury), reducing the likelihood that federal courts will certify similar questions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Appraisal clause: A policy mechanism allowing the amount of loss to be set by appraisers (and sometimes an umpire). Once the insurer pays the appraisal award, breach-of-contract claims premised on underpayment are typically extinguished because the insured has received the policy benefits as valued.
  • Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act: A statute imposing deadlines on insurers; if they do not timely pay after receiving necessary information, they may owe statutory interest/penalties and attorney’s fees. A key practical fight is often when the 60-day clock starts.
  • Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is failing to raise an argument in time; waiver is intentionally giving it up. The Fifth Circuit applied both “forfeiture” principles (failure to oppose/brief) and a so-called “waiver doctrine” that bars issues not raised in a first appeal.
  • Mandate rule / law of the case: Once an appellate court sends a case back, the district court may address only what the appellate court authorized. Previously decided or abandoned issues stay decided.
  • Certification to a state supreme court: A federal court may ask a state high court to answer uncertain state-law questions, but only sparingly and only when the answer matters to a live dispute.

V. Conclusion

Randel v. Travelers Lloyds of Texas is a procedural-heavy but practically significant Fifth Circuit decision. It affirms that (1) Prompt Payment Act appeals can be lost through forfeiture—both by not timely opposing summary judgment and by failing to brief the district court’s dispositive rationale in the opening appellate brief; (2) the mandate rule and the “waiver doctrine” strictly confine remand proceedings, preventing revival of abandoned bad-faith claims; and (3) certification is inappropriate where the underlying claims are no longer live and Texas law is deemed settled under Ortiz and Biasatti.