R.C. 2335.39 Fee-Shifting Is Unavailable in Mandamus Actions (Ohio Supreme Court, Jan. 21, 2026 Case Announcements)

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s January 21, 2026 “Case Announcements” (2026-Ohio-156) is not a single merits opinion, but a docket-style release reporting outcomes in multiple matters. Even so, one procedural ruling contains a clear, operational rule for litigants in extraordinary-writ practice: in State ex rel. Staple v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (case No. 2024-0279), the court denied a request for attorney fees and expenses and stated that R.C. 2335.39 is inapplicable to mandamus actions. The announcement also reflects the court’s broader approach to original actions—frequent dismissals under internal rules, occasional issuance of “alternative writs,” and, in one case, the imposition of a vexatious-litigant restriction.

Summary of the Opinion (as announced)

In the “Motion and Procedural Rulings” section, the court denied an appellee’s motion for attorney fees and expenses in State ex rel. Staple v. State Emp. Relations Bd.. The court:

  • Denied fees under R.C. 2335.39 because “R.C. 2335.39 is inapplicable to mandamus actions,” citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2012-Ohio-4837, ¶ 46, and State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 2010-Ohio-3331.
  • Denied fees under R.C. 2323.51 because “the actions appellants State Employment Relations Board and City of Ravenna took on appeal were not frivolous.”

Separately, the announcement reports many original actions dismissed on motions to dismiss or under Rule 12.04, two instances where the court granted an “alternative writ” and set a Rule 12.05 schedule, and one case where the court declared a relator a vexatious litigator and restricted future filings in the Supreme Court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The fee ruling in State ex rel. Staple v. State Emp. Relations Bd. is expressly grounded in two prior extraordinary-writ decisions:

  • State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2012-Ohio-4837, ¶ 46
    As used in the announcement, Whitehead stands for the proposition that R.C. 2335.39 does not supply a fee-award mechanism in mandamus proceedings. By citing a specific paragraph, the court signals that the limitation is settled and directly controlling rather than newly announced.
  • State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 2010-Ohio-3331
    This citation reinforces the same boundary: whatever fee-shifting R.C. 2335.39 may authorize elsewhere, it does not extend to mandamus actions filed as original actions (or litigated in the extraordinary-writ posture reflected in this docket entry).

Taken together, the court’s use of these authorities is best read as a reaffirmation and application of an existing rule: a party seeking fees in mandamus cannot rely on R.C. 2335.39.

Legal Reasoning

The announcement’s reasoning is concise but structured in two steps:

  1. Statutory inapplicability (R.C. 2335.39): the court denies the request categorically, not for lack of proof or discretion, but because the statute does not apply in mandamus actions. That framing matters: it treats the fee request as legally unavailable, not merely unpersuasive.
  2. Frivolous-conduct standard not met (R.C. 2323.51): the court separately addresses the alternative basis for fees and finds that the appellants’ appellate conduct “was not frivolous,” defeating that route to recovery.

The broader January 21, 2026 announcements also reflect how the court polices extraordinary-writ dockets procedurally: frequent dispositive motion practice, dismissal mechanisms under Rule 12.04, and (when the court believes factual development is warranted) issuance of an “alternative writ” with an evidence-and-briefing schedule under Rule 12.05.

Impact

The immediate and practical impact of State ex rel. Staple v. State Emp. Relations Bd. is to foreclose a common fee-shifting argument in mandamus: litigants should not invest briefing in R.C. 2335.39 as an attorney-fee vehicle in mandamus actions, because the Supreme Court continues to treat it as inapplicable. Fee requests in mandamus must instead be grounded in other, genuinely applicable sources of authority (and, where relying on R.C. 2323.51, supported by a record showing “frivolous” appellate conduct—something the court found absent here).

Systemically, the announcements also suggest an enforcement posture toward repetitive or procedurally defective filings—illustrated by repeated dismissals and by the vexatious-litigant restriction imposed in State ex rel. A.G. v. Osowik (No. 2025-1137).

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandamus: a special court order compelling a public official or tribunal to perform a clear legal duty. It is not a general appeal; it is an extraordinary remedy.
  • Attorney-fee “fee shifting”: the default rule is that each side pays its own attorneys; a party needs a statute or rule authorizing fees. The court’s statement that R.C. 2335.39 is “inapplicable” means that statute cannot be used as the authorization in mandamus.
  • R.C. 2323.51 (frivolous conduct): permits fee awards when an opposing party’s conduct is frivolous. The court’s denial here indicates the threshold was not met on this record.
  • Alternative writ (Rule 12.05): an initial order requiring the respondent to justify the challenged conduct and setting an evidence/briefing schedule—used when the court decides the case should proceed rather than be summarily dismissed.
  • Rule 12.04 dismissal: a summary dismissal mechanism used in the Supreme Court’s original-action practice, reflected repeatedly throughout these announcements.
  • Vexatious litigator (as applied here): a restriction placed on a litigant’s ability to file new actions without prior leave, used to curb abusive or repetitive litigation (announced in State ex rel. A.G. v. Osowik).
  • Certified question: when a federal court asks the state supreme court to answer a state-law question; here, in Deditch v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the court “declines to answer the certified question.”

Conclusion

While 2026-Ohio-156 is primarily administrative, it contains a concrete, litigation-relevant reaffirmation: R.C. 2335.39 does not apply to mandamus actions, as the court again recognized in State ex rel. Staple v. State Emp. Relations Bd. by citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky Cty. Bd. of Commrs. and State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner. The announcements also underscore the court’s procedural management of extraordinary writs—rapid motion practice, frequent summary dismissals, selective issuance of alternative writs for factual development, and willingness (in an appropriate case) to restrict abusive filings through vexatious-litigant orders.