R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) “Good-Faith” Bar Applies Only to Whether Fees Are Awarded (and Must Be Timely Raised), Not to Reducing a Fee Amount

Case: State ex rel. Platt v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2026-Ohio-480 (Ohio Feb. 17, 2026) (per curiam).
Posture: Fee-application decision following an earlier merits opinion granting mandamus and awarding statutory damages and costs. See 2025-Ohio-2079.

1. Introduction

This decision addresses how the Supreme Court of Ohio calculates “reasonable attorney’s fees” in Ohio Public Records Act mandamus actions and, critically, the role of the statutory “good-faith” provision in former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c).

Parties. Relator Joseph J. Platt sought public records from respondents Montgomery County Board of Elections and its deputy director, Russell M. Joseph. In the earlier merits decision, the court granted a writ ordering production of two emails, awarded Platt costs and $1,000 in statutory damages, and determined that Platt was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, directing him to file an itemized application. 2025-Ohio-2079, ¶ 46.

Key issues in this fee decision.

  • What hourly rate is “reasonable” for Platt’s counsel (claimed at $690/hour)?
  • What evidence must a fee applicant provide to support a claimed market rate?
  • Whether respondents can use former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c)—their “good-faith exception”—to reduce fees after the court has already decided to award them.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court granted Platt’s attorney-fee application only in part, awarding $28,120 rather than the requested $48,507. It did so by:

  • Rejecting the requested $690/hour rate due to a lack of “satisfactory evidence” beyond counsel’s own affidavits that the rate matched prevailing market rates.
  • Adopting $400/hour because respondents conceded that rate was reasonable and the record lacked adequate support for a higher rate.
  • Accepting the hours as reasonable because respondents did not dispute them (67 hours for Hartman; 3.3 hours for Finney).
  • Holding that former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) does not authorize reducing an already-awarded fee and, in any event, was raised too late because the court had already determined fees would be awarded.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Drive the Result)

A. The prior merits decision in the same case: 2025-Ohio-2079

The fee decision is anchored to the earlier ruling granting the writ and determining that attorney fees would be awarded. See 2025-Ohio-2079, ¶ 45–46. That prior determination becomes outcome-determinative when respondents later attempt to invoke former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c): the court treats the statute as relevant only to the threshold whether to award fees, not to later how much to award.

B. Lodestar framework and fee-calculation methodology

The court applies the familiar “lodestar” method: reasonable hours × reasonable hourly rate. It cites Cruz v. English Nanny & Governess School, 2022-Ohio-3586, ¶ 47 for the lodestar starting point, and State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 2018-Ohio-5109, ¶ 3, relying on Bittner v. Tri-Cty. Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143 (1991), syllabus, for the proposition that the lodestar is an “initial estimate” that may be adjusted by professional-conduct factors.

While the opinion recognizes potential adjustment under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), it makes no adjustment because neither side argued for enhancement or reduction under those factors. The decision thereby signals a pragmatic approach: courts will not independently perform a full Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factor reweighing absent party-driven arguments.

C. The evidentiary burden to prove market rate: Blum v. Stenson

The critical rate-reduction turns on the fee applicant’s evidentiary failure under Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & fn. 11 (1984). Quoting Blum’s emphasized requirement, the court reiterates that the applicant must produce “satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”

Here, Platt offered only counsel affidavits asserting belief that $690/hour was consistent with large-metro Ohio rates, with no independent corroboration (e.g., third-party affidavits, surveys, prior awards). That evidentiary gap is the doctrinal lever that allows the court to reject the requested rate.

D. “Normal billing rate” as a proxy for market rate: Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C. and Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.

The court acknowledges that a firm’s ordinary billing rate may serve as an efficient shortcut for market rate, citing Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-1056, ¶ 11, which quotes Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414, 422 (3d Cir. 1993). But that principle does not help Platt because neither attorney attested that $690/hour was their “normal billing rate”; they stated only that they believed it was consistent with peers.

This is an important nuance: the “normal billing rate” proxy works only when the record shows it is indeed the lawyer’s customary rate, not merely an aspirational or case-specific figure.

E. Privilege and “good-faith” reliance: State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine

Respondents argued their withholding of one email was a reasonable reliance on State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine, 2013-Ohio-199. They emphasized that the earlier merits opinion observed that “[u]nder a strict reading of Lanham,” the email might fall within attorney-client privilege. 2025-Ohio-2079, ¶ 21.

The fee opinion, however, treats that reliance argument as procedurally and legally misdirected under former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c): regardless of how plausible the Lanham-based position may have been, it is relevant only to the initial decision whether fees should be awarded—not to reducing a fee amount after entitlement is already determined.

F. Statutory fee reduction and “public benefit”: State ex rel. Doe v. Smith

Respondents also cited State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 2009-Ohio-4149, asserting that limited public benefit can justify reducing fees. The court rejects that reliance as a statutory-version mismatch. Doe interpreted a prior version of R.C. 149.43 that explicitly allowed fee awards “subject to reduction” under former division (C)(2)(c).

Under the statute applied here, former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) functions as a bar to awarding fees if both enumerated conditions are met; it does not create an after-the-fact discretionary reduction mechanism. Thus, Doe’s “public benefit” reduction logic does not carry over to the renumbered/rewritten framework the court applied.

G. Costs treatment: State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino

Although not central to the fee calculation, the court notes it had already refunded filing-related costs to the prevailing party and therefore did not separately award them, citing State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 2018-Ohio-5109, ¶ 13.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three clean steps:

  1. Determine the legal basis for fees and the method. Fees were awarded under former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) (as the court notes, renumbering occurred later, but it applied the 2023 version). The court applies the lodestar method (rate × hours) and recognizes possible Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) adjustments.
  2. Fix a reasonable hourly rate based on evidentiary sufficiency. The court rejects $690/hour because Platt did not carry the Blum burden of producing satisfactory evidence beyond self-serving affidavits, and because counsel did not establish $690/hour as a normal billing rate. The court then selects $400/hour because respondents conceded it was reasonable and the record did not justify more.
  3. Reject statutory “good-faith” reduction arguments as both untimely and legally inapplicable. Former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) is framed as a threshold “shall not award” provision, not an authorization to reduce an award amount. Moreover, because the court had already decided in 2025-Ohio-2079 to award fees, respondents’ attempt to invoke the provision at the application stage came too late.

3.3 Impact

The decision’s practical and doctrinal impact is significant for Ohio public-records fee litigation:

  • Clarifies the function (and timing) of former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c). Litigants should treat the “good-faith” provision as a threshold entitlement issue to be raised before or during the court’s initial fee-entitlement determination—not as a post-entitlement tool for trimming the award.
  • Reinforces a demanding evidentiary record for premium hourly rates. If counsel seek a high rate, they should expect to provide independent corroboration (e.g., third-party affidavits, market surveys, prior comparable awards, proof of normal billing rate). Absent that, courts may adopt a lower rate—potentially even one suggested by the opposing party.
  • Limits reliance on older reduction-case law without statutory-fit analysis. The court’s treatment of State ex rel. Doe v. Smith signals that public-records fee arguments must be grounded in the currently applicable statutory text, not merely in older gloss developed under different language.
  • Encourages strategic precision in fee disputes. Respondents here conceded the hours and a $400 rate, which simplified the lodestar calculus and constrained the court’s analysis. Future parties may calibrate concessions to manage litigation risk.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Lodestar. A common method for calculating fees: (reasonable hourly rate) × (reasonable hours). It is the default “starting number.”
  • Prevailing market rate. The typical hourly rate charged in the relevant legal community for comparable work by lawyers with similar experience and reputation.
  • “Satisfactory evidence” (Blum standard). Proof beyond the lawyer’s own statement—such as independent affidavits, fee surveys, prior comparable awards, or documentation of actual customary billing rates.
  • Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors. A list of considerations for whether a fee is reasonable (time/labor, novelty, customary local fees, results obtained, etc.). Courts can adjust the lodestar based on these factors, but this opinion made no adjustment because the parties did not argue for one.
  • Former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) (“good-faith” provision). A statutory rule that can bar an award of fees entirely if a well-informed public office would reasonably believe (1) its conduct complied with the law and (2) the conduct served the public policy underlying the asserted authority. In this opinion, it is not a tool to reduce fees once entitlement has already been decided.

5. Conclusion

State ex rel. Platt v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2026-Ohio-480, delivers two core takeaways for Ohio public-records mandamus practice. First, premium hourly rates require premium proof: under Blum v. Stenson and Ohio’s lodestar jurisprudence, counsel must provide independent, satisfactory evidence that the requested rate matches market reality. Second, former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) operates as a threshold bar to awarding fees—not as a mechanism for post-entitlement reductions—and arguments invoking it must be timely raised before the court decides fee entitlement.