R.C. 2953.73(D) “Reasons” Requirement Satisfied by Stating a Statutory Ground for Accepting or Rejecting Postconviction DNA Testing

1. Introduction

In State v. Lash, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2746, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed how much explanation a trial court must provide when it rules on an application for postconviction DNA testing under Ohio’s postconviction DNA-testing statutes, R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81.

The applicant, Daverrick Lash, was convicted of aggravated murder and related charges. Years later, he sought postconviction DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71 et seq. The common pleas court denied the application in a short entry stating (in substance) that Lash had not shown DNA testing would be outcome determinative and that results would not be probative. The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court failed to provide an adequate explanation under R.C. 2953.73(D).

The central issue before the Supreme Court was narrow but consequential: whether R.C. 2953.73(D) is satisfied when the trial court’s order identifies a statutory reason for accepting or rejecting DNA testing (e.g., “not outcome determinative”), or whether the statute requires additional findings, analysis, or a more detailed explanation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District. It held:

  • A trial court’s order satisfies R.C. 2953.73(D)’s “reasons” requirement when it provides a statutory reason for accepting or rejecting an application for postconviction DNA testing.
  • The trial court’s statement that the requested testing would not be “outcome determinative” is a sufficient statutory reason because outcome-determinative status is a statutory criterion in R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (5) and is defined in R.C. 2953.71(L).
  • Appellate decisions requiring more detailed explanations than a stated statutory ground are “no longer good law” to the extent they impose extra-statutory demands.

The Court remanded to the Eighth District to conduct the review it had not reached: whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Lash’s application on the merits.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion’s holding is built on a combination of (i) general principles about trial-court explanation duties, (ii) statutory-interpretation methodology, and (iii) prior DNA-testing/postconviction case law:

A. Baseline rule: trial courts usually need not issue written opinions

  • State v. Francis, 2004-Ohio-6894 (plurality opinion): Quoted for the general proposition that, absent a specific requirement, whether to explain reasons is within the trial court’s discretion. The Lash majority uses Francis to frame R.C. 2953.73(D) as one of the exceptions where the legislature did impose an explanation requirement—but only to the extent stated by the statute.

B. Nature of review: discretion vs. statutory compliance

  • State v. Buehler, 2007-Ohio-1246: Cited for the rule that accepting or rejecting postconviction DNA testing is discretionary and reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lash distinguishes that standard from the separate legal question at issue here: what the statute requires in an order’s content.
  • State v. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, citing State v. Reed, 2020-Ohio-4255: Used to justify de novo review because statutory interpretation (whether an order complies with a statute) is a question of law.

C. Statutory criteria for accepting DNA testing

  • State v. Bonnell, 2018-Ohio-4069: Cited for the proposition that a trial court may not accept an application unless statutory criteria are met. Lash leverages this to emphasize that the statutory criteria themselves supply identifiable “reasons” for rejection; if a criterion is not met (e.g., outcome determinative), stating that failure states a statutory reason.

D. Plain-meaning interpretation of undefined statutory terms

  • Lingle v. State, 2020-Ohio-6788, citing Brecksville v. Cook, 1996-Ohio-171: Cited for the interpretive rule that undefined terms receive their plain and ordinary meaning. Lash uses these cases to interpret “reasons” to mean, essentially, a statement of explanation or justification—and concludes a statutory-ground statement qualifies.

E. Contrast with statutes that explicitly require findings and conclusions

  • State v. Lester, 41 Ohio St.2d 51, 56 (1975): Invoked to illustrate that when the General Assembly requires “findings of fact and conclusions of law” (as in R.C. 2953.21(D)), courts must provide them; summary denial is statutorily deficient without them. Lash uses Lester to argue that the General Assembly knows how to demand detailed explanation when it wants to, and it did not do so in R.C. 2953.73(D).

F. The Eighth District’s line of cases requiring more detail

The court of appeals relied on a set of Eighth District decisions for the proposition that failure to “provide an explanation” violates R.C. 2953.73(D):

  • State v. Conner, 2020-Ohio-4310
  • State v. Rawls, 2016-Ohio-7962
  • State v. Richard, 2013-Ohio-3918
  • State v. Smith, 2007-Ohio- 2369
  • State v. Ayers, 2005-Ohio-6972, rev'd on other grounds, 2007-Ohio-1385

The Lash majority does not parse each case’s facts; instead, it rejects the shared premise to the extent those cases required more than the statute demands. The majority expressly states that decisions “that have required more are no longer good law,” effectively disapproving an approach that treated R.C. 2953.73(D) as requiring a fuller narrative analysis rather than a statutory-ground explanation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

Step 1: Define what “reasons” means in R.C. 2953.73(D)

Because “reasons” is undefined, the Court applies plain-meaning principles (Lingle v. State, 2020-Ohio-6788; Brecksville v. Cook, 1996-Ohio-171). A reason is “a statement offered in explanation or justification.” Under that understanding, saying “the applicant has not shown DNA testing would be outcome determinative” is an explanatory statement, not a bare conclusion like “denied.”

Step 2: Read “reasons” in context—“as applied to” statutory criteria and procedures

The key statutory phrase is that reasons must be provided “as applied to the criteria and procedures” in R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81. The Court treats this as a linkage requirement: the order must tie the ruling to an enumerated statutory criterion. In the majority’s view, identifying which statutory requirement was not met accomplishes that linkage. Conversely, an order that gives no statutory hook—or provides a non-statutory rationale—would fail the requirement.

Step 3: “Outcome determinative” is a statutory criterion; stating it is sufficient

The order here explicitly referenced “outcome determinative,” a term defined for this statutory scheme in R.C. 2953.71(L) and required for acceptance under R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (5). The Court thus reasons that the trial court necessarily applied the statutory framework: it determined there was not a strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted Lash even if the DNA results had been presented (the definitional substance of “outcome determinative”).

Legislative-choice argument: comparison to R.C. 2953.21(D)

The Court reinforces its reading by contrasting R.C. 2953.73(D) with R.C. 2953.21(D), which expressly requires findings of fact and conclusions of law upon dismissal of a postconviction relief petition. Citing State v. Lester, 41 Ohio St.2d 51, 56 (1975), the Court reasons that the legislature’s omission of similar language in the DNA-testing statute signals that a less elaborate explanation suffices.

What the Court did not decide

The Supreme Court did not decide whether Lash should receive testing. It held only that the order was not statutorily deficient, and it remanded for the appellate court to decide whether the denial constituted an abuse of discretion under the usual standard (State v. Buehler, 2007-Ohio-1246).

3.3. Impact

A. Lower threshold for compliant trial-court entries

The practical rule is clear: a trial court can satisfy R.C. 2953.73(D) by identifying a statutory criterion and stating it was not met (e.g., “not outcome determinative”). More extensive explanation may be advisable, but it is not mandated by the statute as interpreted in Lash.

B. Appellate practice: fewer remands for “insufficient explanation”

Appellate courts (particularly in districts that followed the Eighth District’s approach) will have less room to reverse solely because the trial court did not “state its analysis.” Review will more often proceed directly to whether the trial court abused its discretion based on the record and statutory factors, rather than pausing at a threshold “entry adequacy” problem.

C. Doctrinal realignment within postconviction litigation

Lash sharpens the distinction between (i) statutes that require findings/conclusions (e.g., R.C. 2953.21(D)) and (ii) statutes requiring only “reasons” (here, R.C. 2953.73(D)). Litigants can be expected to argue from Lash whenever a statute uses “reasons” language without specifying findings of fact and conclusions of law.

D. Continued pressure point: meaningful abuse-of-discretion review

The majority acknowledges that a minimal entry might affect the ease of appellate review, but treats that as an abuse-of-discretion question rather than statutory noncompliance. This shifts the battleground from “entry is unlawful” to “entry is unreasonable/unsupported.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Postconviction DNA testing (R.C. 2953.71 et seq.): A statutory process allowing certain convicted persons to request DNA testing of biological evidence after trial, under defined eligibility and acceptance criteria.
  • “Outcome determinative” (R.C. 2953.71(L)): Not simply “helpful” evidence. It means that if the DNA results had been presented at trial (and were admissible), there is a strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted, when the DNA evidence is considered alongside all other admissible evidence.
  • “Reasons” requirement (R.C. 2953.73(D)): The trial court must say why it accepted or rejected the application, tied to the statutory criteria. Under Lash, stating a specific statutory ground (like lack of outcome determinativeness) is enough to satisfy the statute.
  • De novo vs. abuse-of-discretion review: Whether the entry meets statutory requirements is reviewed de novo (fresh, legal question). Whether denying testing was a good decision is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion (whether the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably within the statutory framework).

5. Conclusion

State v. Lash establishes a clarifying rule of statewide importance for postconviction DNA-testing litigation: R.C. 2953.73(D) is satisfied when the trial court’s order identifies a statutory reason for acceptance or rejection, such as that the requested testing would not be “outcome determinative.” The Court rejected a more demanding approach associated with several Eighth District cases, emphasizing statutory text, context, and the legislature’s demonstrated ability to require more detailed findings in other postconviction settings (notably R.C. 2953.21(D) and State v. Lester, 41 Ohio St.2d 51, 56 (1975)).

The decision’s immediate effect is procedural: fewer reversals based solely on “insufficient explanation” and more appellate focus on the merits under abuse-of-discretion review. The dissent (Brunner, J.) warns that the majority’s reading risks rote, minimally informative entries that may impede meaningful appellate review—highlighting an ongoing tension between administrative efficiency and transparency in postconviction adjudication.