Date: Feb 22, 2026

Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Court Clerks’ Discretionary Docket-Management Acts Without Explicit Judge Direction

1. Introduction

In Hubbuch v. Small (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) (summary order), pro se plaintiff Edward B. Hubbuch sued multiple employees of the Kings County Supreme Court clerk’s office—Charles A. Small, Joseph Leddo, Britney Redd, and unidentified staff—alleging violations of due process and equal protection in the handling of his state-court filings. Hubbuch asserted that clerk’s-office personnel reclassified motions, set lengthy return dates, entered judgment before a return period expired, and refused meetings and certain submissions.

The key appellate issues were (1) whether these clerk’s-office acts are protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity (thereby barring damages claims), and (2) whether the district court erred by dismissing with prejudice without granting leave to amend.

Although the panel emphasized that this disposition is a nonprecedential summary order, it offers a clear articulation of how the Second Circuit approaches quasi-judicial immunity for court staff performing docket- and filing-management functions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of Hubbuch’s complaint.
It held that the challenged clerk’s-office conduct—reclassifying motions, sealing filings administratively, reassigning motions among parts, rejecting/delaying filings, and refusing submissions—constituted judicial functions integrally related to ongoing litigation and thus was protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity as to damages claims.
It rejected Hubbuch’s proposed prerequisite that clerk immunity applies only when the clerk acts at the explicit direction of a presiding judge, explaining that such a requirement applies (if at all) to purely ministerial tasks, not discretionary adjudicative functions.
It held leave to amend was properly denied because the defect—absolute immunity—was substantive and not curable by better pleading.
In a footnote, the court treated Hubbuch’s challenge to dismissal of official-capacity claims as forfeited on appeal and noted that requests effectively seeking review of a state-court judgment would be barred by lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elecs..

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built almost entirely from established Supreme Court and Second Circuit immunity doctrine, deployed to answer a practical question: when clerk’s-office actions shape litigation procedure, are they “judicial” enough to warrant absolute immunity?

1) Core immunity framework: judicial and quasi-judicial immunity

Libertarian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106, 123 (2d Cir. 2020): cited for the baseline proposition that state judges are absolutely immune for damages arising from the performance of judicial functions. The panel uses it as the starting point to extend the same functional logic to court employees.
Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988): supplies the key phrase that court employees receive absolute immunity when performing “discretionary acts of a judicial nature.” This becomes central to rejecting Hubbuch’s “explicit judge direction” theory, because discretion (not mere obedience) is what characterizes the protected function.
Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1997): perhaps the most factually analogous authority cited. The panel relies on it for two propositions: (i) clerks are absolutely immune when exercising the court’s inherent power to control its docket and filings, and (ii) alleged interference with a litigant’s ability to pursue appellate rights can still be immune when the underlying conduct is a docket-management judicial function.
Dieujuste v. Sin, 125 F.4th 397, 399 (2d Cir. 2025): used in two ways. First, it supports the doctrinal explanation that clerk acts integral to the judicial process arise “directly from a case before the court.” Second, in footnote 2, it is cited for the important limitation that quasi-judicial immunity “extends only to actions against defendants in their individual capacities,” underscoring that immunity doctrine and official-capacity/Ex parte Young concepts are distinct.

2) Functional comparability and “authorization or approval”

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993): the Supreme Court’s functional test is the opinion’s “touchstone.” The panel quotes Antoine to frame immunity as turning on “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties” and on whether the official exercises “discretionary judgment” functionally comparable to that of judges. This is the doctrinal engine for concluding that docket and filing decisions can qualify even when performed by non-judges.
Gross v. Rell, 695 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2012): cited for the requirement that the judgments must be made with “the authorization or approval” of the judicial authority from which immunity derives. The panel interprets this requirement broadly: general delegation of docket-management authority within the court system can constitute the needed “authorization,” without a judge supervising “every discrete decision.”

3) Policy factors supporting absolute immunity

Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985): supplies a multi-factor checklist for deciding when absolute immunity is appropriate (harassment risk, safeguards, insulation, precedent, adversarial process, correctability on appeal). The panel finds these factors “weigh strongly” in favor of immunity for clerk docket-management actions occurring in adversarial litigation where procedural errors can be corrected on appeal.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967): invoked for the classic rationale that immunity protects judicial decision-makers from intimidation and retaliatory litigation, enabling independent function.

4) Distinguishing discretionary judicial acts from ministerial tasks

Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004): used for the formulation that immunity applies when the employee plays a “role . . . analogous to that of a judge,” and that acts “integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding” are protected. The panel uses Mitchell to end the inquiry once the function is adjudicative in nature.
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part): cited to reinforce the point that absolute immunity attaches to functions, and that “discretionary” decision-making is central to the concept.
Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d at 66-67 (again): also supplies the distinction that when an employee performs a purely ministerial task, courts may look for explicit judicial direction; but when the employee performs discretionary adjudicative tasks, the explicit-direction inquiry is unnecessary.

5) Appellate forfeiture and jurisdictional limits (footnote 2)

LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995): cited to justify treating an issue as forfeited when a pro se appellant raised it below but does not pursue it on appeal; the court will not “manufacture claims of error.”
Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elecs., 422 F.3d 77, 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2005): cited for the Rooker-Feldman principle that federal district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims effectively seeking review or rejection of state-court judgments.

6) Leave to amend doctrine in pro se cases

Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999): cited for the liberal pro se rule that leave to amend should generally be granted at least once when a valid claim might be stated.
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000): provides the limiting principle: leave may be denied when the defect is substantive and “better pleading will not cure it.” Immunity is treated as precisely that kind of defect here.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three decisive steps.

Step 1: Identify the governing test—function, not job title or supervision

Invoking Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., the panel frames quasi-judicial immunity as turning on whether the defendant performed a function comparable to judging—i.e., exercising discretionary judgment in resolving disputes and managing the adjudicative process. The opinion expressly rejects Hubbuch’s contention that a clerk must act at the explicit direction of a presiding judge; such a requirement would contradict Second Circuit precedent protecting “discretionary acts of a judicial nature” under Oliva v. Heller.

Step 2: Classify the challenged conduct as discretionary judicial functions

The panel groups Hubbuch’s allegations into five categories: reclassifying a motion, administratively sealing filings, reassigning motions among parts, rejecting/delaying time-sensitive filings, and refusing submissions. It holds these are “plainly” functions “integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding” (Mitchell v. Fishbein) and tied to the court’s inherent docket control (Rodriguez v. Weprin).

Critically, Hubbuch himself emphasized that clerk staff exercised discretion. That concession matters because it places the acts on the “judicial” side of the discretionary/ministerial line and makes it unnecessary to demand proof of explicit judicial instructions for each act.

Step 3: Confirm the policy basis for absolute immunity and the futility of amendment

The panel applies the Cleavinger v. Saxner factors and emphasizes the presence of appellate correction mechanisms and adversarial safeguards. The prospect of harassment and retaliatory suits if immunity were denied supports protecting docket-management discretion. Because immunity blocks damages claims as a matter of law, amendment adding “additional evidence” about the clerks’ independence or obstructive effect would not change the outcome; under Cuoco v. Moritsugu, leave to amend is properly denied.

C. Impact

Reinforces broad protection for docket- and filing-management discretion. The order confirms that reclassification of filings, assignment/reassignment among parts, and acceptance/rejection decisions—when discretionary and tied to adjudication—are treated as judicial functions for immunity purposes.
Clarifies the “explicit direction” argument. The decision rejects a litigant-friendly narrowing of immunity that would require direct judicial supervision for clerk protection. Instead, it treats general delegated authority as sufficient “authorization or approval” (Gross v. Rell) for discretionary adjudicative tasks.
Channels disputes into appellate/process remedies rather than damages suits. By stressing correctability on appeal (Cleavinger v. Saxner) and citing Rodriguez v. Weprin, the order signals that complaints about procedural handling should ordinarily be pursued through motions, appeals, or other court-supervised remedies—not § 1983 damages actions against clerk staff.
Highlights appellate forfeiture risk for pro se litigants. The reliance on LoSacco v. City of Middletown shows the court will not revive abandoned theories—here, official-capacity relief—if not argued on appeal.
Underscores jurisdictional limits when federal suits function as state-court appeals. The court’s reference to Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elecs. warns that federal district courts cannot be used to undo state-court judgments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Absolute judicial immunity: A doctrine that bars damages claims against judges for acts performed in their judicial capacity, even if the acts are alleged to be wrong or unconstitutional, so long as the judge acted within jurisdiction.
Absolute quasi-judicial immunity: The extension of absolute immunity to non-judges (e.g., court clerks) when they perform functions that are effectively judicial—especially discretionary tasks integral to case processing (docket control, filing decisions, scheduling).
Discretionary vs. ministerial acts: Discretionary acts require judgment or choice (e.g., how to classify a motion or manage a docket). Ministerial acts are rote or mandatory (e.g., stamping a filing as received when all conditions are met). Immunity attaches more readily to discretionary adjudicative functions; ministerial tasks may require closer scrutiny and sometimes explicit direction.
Individual-capacity vs. official-capacity suits: Individual-capacity claims seek to impose personal liability for damages; official-capacity claims effectively seek relief against the government entity and may involve different defenses and remedies. The panel notes (citing Dieujuste v. Sin) that quasi-judicial immunity addresses individual-capacity damages claims.
Forfeiture on appeal: If an appellant does not argue an issue in the appellate brief, the court may treat it as abandoned and decline to consider it (LoSacco v. City of Middletown), even for pro se litigants.
Rooker-Feldman doctrine: Federal district courts generally cannot review or overturn state-court judgments; such efforts must go through state appellate processes and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court if applicable (Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elecs.).

5. Conclusion

Hubbuch v. Small affirms that clerk’s-office decisions that shape the procedural course of litigation—when discretionary and integral to adjudication—are protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity for damages purposes, without requiring proof that a presiding judge explicitly directed each action. The court also reinforces that leave to amend is properly denied when immunity is a substantive bar, and it signals that litigants must pursue procedural grievances through court processes and appeals rather than collateral damages litigation against court staff.