Qualified Immunity When a CBA Provides “Just Cause” but No Post-Termination Hearing: Loudermill Not Clearly Established in the CBA Context

I. Introduction

In Carter v. Beebe (10th Cir. June 22, 2026), the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment to a discharged firefighter who claimed a denial of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, Benjamin Carter, was terminated by Fire Chief David Beebe of the Mountain View Fire Protection District (MVFPD) following the disciplinary procedures set out in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between MVFPD and Carter’s union. The CBA included a “just cause” requirement for discharge but “does not include a right to a post-termination hearing” and made the Fire Chief the final decisionmaker.

The central appellate issue was not whether Carter had a protected property interest (the parties did not dispute that point), but whether Chief Beebe violated clearly established law by failing to provide a post-termination hearing—thereby defeating qualified immunity.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that Carter failed to carry his burden on the second prong of qualified immunity: he did not identify Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, or other circuit precedent applying Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill to a collectively bargained disciplinary scheme like the CBA here. Because the asserted right to post-termination process beyond the CBA’s procedures was not “clearly established” with the required specificity, Chief Beebe was entitled to qualified immunity. The court therefore reversed and remanded.

The panel expressly did not decide Chief Beebe’s alternative argument that Carter “waived” additional process by negotiating and signing the CBA; instead, it resolved the case on the “clearly established law” ground.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Qualified Immunity Framework and the “Clearly Established” Requirement

  • Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2020): Provided the standard of review on interlocutory appeal—de novo review of the legal questions underlying qualified immunity.
  • Flores v. Henderson, 101 F.4th 1185 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015)): Reinforced that qualified immunity shields officials unless they violate clearly established rights; also reiterated that immunity is granted if the plaintiff fails either prong.
  • Est. of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451 (10th Cir. 2013); and Bowling v. Rector, 584 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 2009)): Set out the two-prong test (constitutional violation + clearly established law) and permitted courts to choose the order of analysis.
  • Arnold v. City of Olathe, 35 F.4th 778 (10th Cir. 2022): Cited (through Flores) for the proposition that failing either prong requires granting qualified immunity.
  • Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015): Central to the panel’s critique of Carter’s approach—general statements of law do not clearly establish “the violative nature of particular conduct.”
  • Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2017): Supplied the “on point” formulation—precedent must be materially similar or apply with “obvious clarity.”
  • City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9 (2021) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018)); and T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2017): Used to emphasize the Supreme Court’s repeated warning against defining clearly established law at too high a level of generality; the inquiry is situational and particularized.
  • Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101 (2d Cir. 2022): Cited for the observation that due process claims can be “particularly fertile ground for qualified immunity” because the specificity requirement is difficult to satisfy absent closely analogous precedent.

2. Procedural Due Process Doctrine

  • Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Cited for the general proposition that procedural due process constrains deprivations of property interests; it situates due process as a flexible inquiry, though the panel did not conduct a full Mathews balancing here because the dispute was resolved on clearly established law.
  • Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2011): Supplied the two-step due process inquiry (protected interest + adequate process) and reiterated that some form of pre-deprivation hearing is required before discharge where a property interest exists.
  • McClure v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 228 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2000): Mentioned (in a footnote) for dicta about what a “full post-termination hearing” often entails (e.g., counsel and cross-examination), illustrating what Carter claimed he lacked—though the merits of what process was constitutionally required were not ultimately resolved.

3. The Plaintiff’s Anchoring Precedent and Its Limits Here

  • Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985): Carter’s primary “clearly established law” authority. Loudermill held that once state law confers a property interest (there, a statute allowing dismissal only “for cause”), the state cannot define away the federal constitutional minimum procedures for deprivation—rejecting the “bitter with the sweet” approach.
  • Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part): Quoted within Loudermill for the proposition that while government need not create a property interest, it cannot authorize deprivation of that interest without appropriate safeguards once conferred.
  • Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927 (10th Cir. 2018): Used for the “every reasonable official would have understood” formulation—supporting the panel’s view that it was not obvious that a bargained-for CBA procedure stands on the same footing as a state statute for Loudermill purposes.

4. Underlying District Court Decision (Background Context)

  • Carter v. Mountain View Fire Prot. Dist., No. 23-CV-02348, 2025 WL 2780916 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2025): Provided the factual and procedural background. The district court treated the CBA’s “just cause” clause as creating a property interest and held that the absence of meaningful post-termination process violated due process, denying qualified immunity and granting Carter summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the clearly-established-law issue.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion is best understood as a qualified immunity specificity decision rather than a definitive pronouncement on the minimum procedures constitutionally required for terminations under CBAs.

  1. Narrowing the dispute to prong two. The court “focus[ed] on the second element” of due process only insofar as it related to qualified immunity, because the protected property interest was undisputed on appeal and because the parties’ appellate dispute centered on the need for a post-termination hearing.
  2. Accepting (without deciding) that Carter’s constitutional theory might be plausible. The panel acknowledged Carter’s argument “may have merit on the first step of qualified immunity analysis—constitutional violation,” signaling that a post-termination hearing requirement might be arguable under general due process principles, especially given Loudermill’s rejection of “bitter with the sweet.”
  3. But rejecting “clearly established” status absent precedent applying Loudermill to a CBA. The decisive move was doctrinal: Carter relied on Loudermill and broad due process statements, but he “has not cited a Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, or other circuit case that has applied Loudermill to a CBA.” The court emphasized that a contract between a union and a public employer is not the same as a state statute. That distinction mattered because the qualified immunity question is not whether the plaintiff’s position is theoretically sound, but whether existing precedent put the unconstitutionality of Chief Beebe’s reliance on the CBA “beyond debate” and with sufficient particularity.
  4. Concluding a reasonable official could rely on the negotiated disciplinary scheme. Given the absence of on-point authority, the panel held Carter failed to show that “every reasonable official would have understood” the CBA’s bargained-for process was unconstitutional. Therefore, Chief Beebe was entitled to qualified immunity.

C. Impact

Although labeled nonprecedential (binding only under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), the decision carries meaningful persuasive implications:

  • For public employers and officials operating under CBAs: The ruling supports the practical proposition that an official who follows a CBA’s disciplinary procedures may be insulated by qualified immunity from damages claims alleging additional post-termination procedures—unless there is specific precedent clearly requiring more in the CBA context.
  • For unions and employees: Plaintiffs bringing procedural due process challenges will likely need to identify case law that is not merely about general due process requirements, but that addresses the interaction between negotiated CBA procedures and constitutional minima. Absent such authority, qualified immunity may defeat damages claims even where the underlying due process argument is substantial.
  • For litigation strategy: The court’s choice to decide only prong two encourages defendants to press qualified immunity early and frames plaintiffs’ burden as primarily a precedent-matching exercise—especially in “fertile ground” due process cases.
  • For future doctrinal development: The panel left open the merits question: whether and how Loudermill applies when “just cause” protection arises from a CBA rather than statute. Future published cases may address whether a CBA can validly omit post-termination process and what constitutes “appropriate procedural safeguards” in that setting.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural due process (employment context): If the government takes away a protected job interest (like employment that can only be terminated for “just cause”), it must use fair procedures—typically notice of the charges and an opportunity to respond before termination, and often a more robust opportunity to contest the decision afterward.
  • Property interest: Not property like land—rather, a legal entitlement to continued employment (commonly created by “for cause” or “just cause” limits on termination).
  • Qualified immunity: Even if a constitutional violation occurred, an individual official is not liable for damages unless existing law made it clear—at the time—that the official’s specific conduct was unlawful.
  • “Clearly established” law: Not a general principle (“due process requires fairness”), but prior decisions that would make the unlawfulness of the particular conduct obvious to reasonable officials in the same situation.
  • “Bitter with the sweet”: The rejected idea that the government can grant a benefit (like for-cause employment) while simultaneously dictating that the benefit can be taken away with fewer procedures than the Constitution would otherwise require.
  • Why “statute vs. CBA” mattered here: Loudermill involved a state statute conferring the property interest and limiting procedures. This case involved a negotiated contract. The court held that, for qualified immunity purposes, it was not already settled that Loudermill applies in the same way to a CBA.

V. Conclusion

Carter v. Beebe stands for a targeted but consequential proposition: absent on-point precedent applying Loudermill-style procedural requirements to a collectively bargained disciplinary framework, a public official who follows a CBA that provides “just cause” protection but no post-termination hearing does not violate clearly established law and is entitled to qualified immunity.

The decision underscores the modern qualified-immunity emphasis on specificity and signals that, in due process litigation involving CBAs, plaintiffs must bridge the gap between general constitutional doctrine and the distinct legal posture of negotiated employment procedures.