Qualified Immunity in School-Use-of-Force Encounters: No Clearly Established Bar Where a Suspect Actively Resists and Attempts to Seize Weapons; Internally Contradictory Deposition Testimony Alone Cannot Create a Fact Dispute

Case: Ethan Ennes v. Presque Isle Cnty., Mich. (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2026) (unpublished)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a violent classroom incident involving Ethan Ennes, an 18-year-old student with severe disabilities (including autism and cerebral palsy), and Dave Schmoldt, a sheriff’s deputy assigned as the school safety officer. After Ennes threw objects, threatened staff, and physically fought with Schmoldt—allegedly including punches, head impacts against the floor, and choking—Ennes sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (i) excessive force (in the classroom struggle and later handcuffing) and (ii) false arrest, plus various Michigan tort claims. Ennes also brought a Monell-type claim against Presque Isle County for failure to train/supervise.

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding qualified immunity on the federal claims, governmental immunity on state claims, and no municipal liability. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that Schmoldt was entitled to qualified immunity on both excessive-force theories because Ennes failed to identify clearly established precedent making Schmoldt’s conduct unlawful in the circumstances confronted—namely an actively resisting student who threatened violence, injured the officer, and attempted to seize the officer’s taser and firearm. The court also rejected the false-arrest claim because Schmoldt had probable cause under Michigan’s resisting/obstructing statute. Finally, the court held the County was not deliberately indifferent because Schmoldt received annual use-of-force and handcuffing training tailored to the school setting. State-law claims failed for substantially the reasons given by the district court.

Judge Bush concurred separately, emphasizing an evidentiary gatekeeping point at summary judgment: Ennes’s internally contradictory deposition testimony on a key fact (standing vs. sitting when kicked) could not, by itself, create a genuine dispute of material fact absent an explanation or corroboration.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning was structured around well-established summary judgment and qualified-immunity frameworks, and around Sixth Circuit excessive-force and tight-handcuffing lines of cases:

  • Viewing facts at summary judgment.
    • Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th 391, 400 (6th Cir. 2022): reaffirmed that courts view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant on summary judgment; the panel applied this baseline lens (while the concurrence stressed limits when testimony is self-contradictory).
    • Adams v. Blount County, 946 F.3d 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2020): de novo review of summary judgment.
  • Qualified immunity—clearly established law.
    • D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018): clearly established law must make it clear to the officer that the conduct is unlawful in the specific situation confronted; the court framed the inquiry in these terms.
    • Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 367-68 (6th Cir. 2022): unpublished opinions cannot define clearly established law; the court used this to discount Ennes’s reliance on unpublished cases.
  • Force against a resisting suspect.
    • Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2015): recognizes that officers may use reasonable force to subdue a suspect who resists arrest; the court used this as the general backdrop and distinguished the plaintiff’s cited cases as involving gratuitous force after restraint.
    • Cases Ennes cited but the court distinguished because the suspects were restrained or posed no comparable safety risk:
      • Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 955, 959-60 (6th Cir. 2013)
      • Bennett v. Krakowski, 671 F.3d 553, 558-60 (6th Cir. 2011)
      • Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 897 (6th Cir. 2004)
      • Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 297 (6th Cir. 2002)
      The panel treated these precedents as factually inapt because Schmoldt’s force occurred during active resistance and escalating danger (including attempts to grab weapons).
    • Coley v. Lucas County, 799 F.3d 530, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2015): established that minimally resistant and “fully restrained” pretrial detainees have a right to be free from gratuitous chokeholds. The court held Coley did not clearly establish unlawfulness here because Ennes was not fully restrained and was actively resisting, threatening, and attempting to obtain weapons.
  • Tight handcuffing.
    • Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009): recognizes Fourth Amendment limits on unduly tight/excessively forceful handcuffing; the panel accepted the general principle but found the “clearly established” inquiry unsatisfied on these facts.
    • Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 614 (6th Cir. 2015): tight handcuffs can violate the Fourth Amendment, but the court distinguished Baynes because the plaintiff there was compliant and nonthreatening, unlike Ennes.
    • Getz v. Swoap, 833 F.3d 646, 655 (6th Cir. 2016): officers have “additional leeway” in responding to handcuffing complaints when the detainee resisted or threatened the officer; this case supported the conclusion that Schmoldt’s failure to stop mid-transport to adjust cuffs (while being followed by a person who had threatened him) was not clearly unlawful.
  • False arrest and probable cause.
    • Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 483 (6th Cir. 2020): false-arrest claim fails if there was probable cause for any offense.
    • United States v. Jones, 55 F.4th 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2022): probable cause requires only a “reasonable ground for belief.”
    • People v. Nichols, 686 N.W.2d 502, 504-05 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004): cited to support probable cause for Michigan resisting/obstructing based on assaultive conduct toward an officer.
  • Municipal liability / failure to train.
    • Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700-01 (6th Cir. 2006): deliberate indifference is required for a failure-to-train/supervise claim; the court applied this standard to reject liability given record evidence of annual training.
    • Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 550 (6th Cir. 2024): used to reinforce that a training record can defeat deliberate indifference.
  • Concurrence—internally contradictory testimony.
    • Bush v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 683 F. App’x 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2017): relied upon for the proposition that a plaintiff’s internally contradictory deposition testimony cannot, by itself, create a genuine dispute of material fact.
    • Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899, 906 (6th Cir. 2006): “sham affidavit” principle by analogy—parties cannot create a fact dispute by contradicting earlier sworn testimony.
    • Hammitte v. Livesay, 436 F.2d 1134, 1137 (6th Cir. 1971): distinguished as involving corroboration/record context that could rationally explain contradictions.
    • Rodgers v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 442, 448 (6th Cir. 2002): if an essential element lacks proof, other disputes become immaterial.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Excessive force during the classroom struggle. The court did not resolve whether each alleged use of force happened exactly as Ennes described; instead, it focused on the qualified-immunity “clearly established” step. Ennes’s best authorities involved “gratuitous” violence against people who were already handcuffed, pinned while handcuffed, restrained on the ground, or otherwise posing no serious safety risk (Martin, Bennett, Champion, Phelps). The panel treated those cases as inadequate to place Schmoldt on notice because the encounter here—an actively resisting person who threatened to kill the officer, bit and gouged him, and attempted to seize a taser and firearm—presented materially different, heightened dangers.

On the chokehold theory, the court assumed arguendo that a jury could infer a chokehold occurred, but held that Coley v. Lucas County clearly established only a right of minimally resistant and “fully restrained” detainees to be free from chokeholds. Because Ennes was neither fully restrained nor minimally resistant, Coley did not clearly govern.

(b) Tight handcuffing. The panel accepted the general premise from Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp. that excessively forceful handcuffing can violate the Fourth Amendment. But it emphasized that the “clearly established” inquiry is context-dependent. Baynes v. Cleland involved a compliant, nonthreatening arrestee—unlike Ennes, who had just fought, threatened to shoot the officer, and tried to take weapons. In that setting, Getz v. Swoap supplied the key doctrinal move: officers have “additional leeway” in responding to cuff complaints when a detainee resisted or threatened them. The court also credited the exigent context of transport while a threatening third party followed, concluding there was no clearly established duty to stop roadside and adjust the cuffs under these circumstances.

(c) False arrest. The court resolved the false-arrest claim at the probable-cause threshold. Under M.C.L. § 750.81d(1), it is a felony to assault/batter/resist/obstruct an officer while knowing or having reason to know the officer is performing duties. The court held probable cause existed based on Ennes’s physical attack, injuries inflicted on Schmoldt, and weapon-grabbing attempts, bolstered by Ennes’s statement “fuck you, you fucking cop,” which supported knowledge of Schmoldt’s status.

(d) Municipal liability (failure to train/supervise). Applying Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., the court required “deliberate indifference” and found it lacking because Schmoldt had annual use-of-force and handcuffing training tailored to the school setting—evidence that, under Mosier v. Evans, tends to defeat deliberate indifference.

(e) Concurrence—summary-judgment evidence control. Judge Bush’s concurrence highlighted a practical summary-judgment constraint: even where courts generally credit a nonmovant’s evidence, “internally contradictory” deposition testimony on a key event (whether Ennes was seated calmly or standing/advancing when kicked) cannot alone create a triable issue. Without explanation or corroboration, the contradiction collapses the plaintiff’s ability to show a genuinely disputed material fact on provocation and the inception of force.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished and thus nonbinding, the decision is significant in three recurring litigation settings:

  • School-based police encounters involving disability. The opinion underscores that disability, while relevant to reasonableness in principle, does not itself supply “clearly established” limits absent factually similar precedent—particularly where the subject actively resists and attempts to seize an officer’s weapons.
  • “Clearly established” specificity and the restraint distinction. The case reinforces a common Sixth Circuit dividing line: precedents condemning force used after restraint or against nonthreatening individuals may not clearly govern force used mid-struggle where threats and resistance persist.
  • Evidentiary discipline at summary judgment. The concurrence highlights a defense-favorable tool: arguing that a plaintiff’s self-contradictory deposition on a key fact cannot, without more, create a genuine dispute. If adopted broadly, this approach can narrow cases that otherwise survive on credibility contests alone.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: a rule that shields officers from damages unless (1) they violated the Constitution and (2) existing case law made it clear—given similar facts—that their conduct was unlawful. General statements of law are often not enough; courts look for factually comparable precedents.
  • “Clearly established” law: not whether the conduct seems wrong in hindsight, but whether prior decisions would have put a reasonable officer on notice that the specific conduct in the specific circumstances was unconstitutional.
  • Probable cause: a practical, low threshold—reasonable grounds to believe a crime occurred. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Monell / municipal liability (failure to train): a county is not automatically liable for an employee’s actions. The plaintiff must show, among other elements, that the county was “deliberately indifferent”—roughly, that it disregarded an obvious risk by failing to train or supervise.
  • Genuine dispute of material fact: a disagreement about facts that could change the outcome under the law. The concurrence stresses that a party cannot create such a dispute solely through irreconcilably inconsistent sworn testimony on a critical point unless the inconsistency is explained or supported by other evidence.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the officer and county, holding that (i) no clearly established precedent made the officer’s mid-struggle force or his handling of handcuff complaints unlawful given active resistance and weapon-seizure attempts, (ii) probable cause defeated false arrest under Michigan’s resisting/obstructing statute, and (iii) documented annual training defeated deliberate indifference for municipal liability. The concurrence adds a pointed evidentiary lesson: internally contradictory deposition testimony on a key fact, without explanation or corroboration, cannot alone forestall summary judgment.