Qualified Immunity Bars Stigma-Plus Claims Premised on Lost Private Contracts (and Appellate Record Failures Can Independently Require Affirmance)

Introduction

In McCurdy v. Unruh (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 2026) (unpublished “Order and Judgment”), Judd McCurdy and Western Kansas Ag, Inc. (“WKAI”) sued Wallace County Sheriff Marshall Unruh, the Wallace County Sheriff’s Department, and Paul Niblock (a former co-owner turned competitor) alleging a campaign to harm McCurdy’s reputation and business. Plaintiffs asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (i) denial of procedural due process under a “stigma-plus” theory and (ii) § 1983 conspiracy, plus related state-law claims.

The central appellate issues Plaintiffs attempted to press were whether they adequately pleaded a “stigma-plus” procedural due process claim and whether Sheriff Unruh was entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal, relying on multiple grounds: appellate waiver, failure to provide an adequate appendix/record, and—on the merits—qualified immunity because no clearly established law supported Plaintiffs’ specific stigma-plus theory tying reputational harm to loss of private contracts/business opportunities.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Waiver: Plaintiffs did not challenge independent dismissal grounds as to (a) the Wallace County Sheriff’s Department (lack of capacity to be sued under Kansas law), (b) Niblock (not acting under color of state law), or (c) the § 1983 conspiracy claim. Those dismissals were therefore affirmed as waived.
  • Record/appendix failure: Plaintiffs failed to include the operative complaint in the appendix, contrary to Tenth Circuit rules. The court stated this omission is an independent ground for affirmance when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
  • Qualified immunity: Even assuming Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a protected interest, they failed to show the asserted right was clearly established. Specifically, they cited no case adopting a stigma-plus theory where the “plus” is the loss of private contracts attributable to third-party private actions rather than a state-imposed change in legal status.

The judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Appellate waiver and issue preservation

The court invoked Platt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 960 F.3d 1264, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2020), for the proposition that issues not adequately raised and argued on appeal are treated as waived. This was decisive because Plaintiffs challenged only two points (stigma-plus pleading and qualified immunity) while leaving untouched other independent dismissal rationales. Under Platt, unchallenged bases support affirmance without reaching the merits.

2) Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards and the record required for review

The panel reiterated the de novo standard for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals from Spinelli v. Coherus Biosciences, Inc., 167 F.4th 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2026), and the plausibility requirement of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It also referenced Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th 1251, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2025), noting that appellate review is usually confined to “the four corners of the complaint.”

That doctrinal point drove a practical one: because the complaint is the key document under review in a 12(b)(6) appeal, failing to include it in the appendix undermines the court’s ability to adjudicate the issues. The court relied on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Tenth Circuit rules (including 10th Cir. R. 10.4 and 30.1; Fed. R. App. P. 30; Fed. R. App. P. 28) to hold it “need not remedy” an inadequate appendix and may decline to consider issues lacking record support—here, going further to say the omission constituted an independent ground for affirmance.

3) “Stigma-plus” procedural due process framework

For the governing standard, the court cited Al-Turki v. Tomsic, 926 F.3d 610, 614, 617 (10th Cir. 2019), and traced the requirement of a reputational “stigma” plus a legally recognized “plus” to Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976). The cited language emphasizes that reputational injury alone is not actionable as a federal procedural due process violation; there must be a change in legal status—i.e., a right or status recognized by law is “distinctly altered or extinguished.”

4) Qualified immunity and the “clearly established” inquiry

The qualified-immunity framework came from Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., 147 F.4th 1206, 1219, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 2025), stressing that the right must be “beyond debate” and defined in the specific context, not at a high level of generality. The court also cited Surat v. Klamser, 52 F.4th 1261, 1271 (10th Cir. 2022), for the discretion to resolve qualified immunity on either prong first—here, the panel chose the “clearly established” prong.

5) Cases Plaintiffs relied on—and why they did not establish the right asserted

The opinion referenced several decisions Plaintiffs cited as allegedly supporting their theory but found them inapposite to the precise asserted “plus” (loss of private contracts/business opportunities):

  • Cypress Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F.3d 1435, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1998) (reputational harm alone insufficient).
  • Greenwood v. N.Y., Off. of Mental Health, 163 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (loss of clinical staff privileges at a state hospital—closer to state-conferred status).
  • Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1532-34 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (even where defamation allegedly led to loss of employment/residence, it did not clearly establish the specific right necessary to overcome qualified immunity).

6) Contrary authority rejecting “private opportunity” stigma-plus theories

The panel emphasized that existing precedent runs against Plaintiffs’ approach, citing:

  • Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1989) (loss of potential employment opportunities is “too intangible” to constitute deprivation of a liberty or property interest).
  • URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (no deprivation where injuries derive from private contracts between private parties entailing private obligations).

Finally, to underscore the qualified-immunity defect in Plaintiffs’ cited authorities, the panel relied on Segler v. City of Detroit, No. 23-1897, 2024 WL 5135735, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024), for the proposition that failure to identify any case adopting the specific stigma-plus linkage—state defamation as “stigma” with third-party private action as the “plus”—is fatal to defeating qualified immunity.

Legal Reasoning

1) Layered affirmance: waiver, record default, and merits

The opinion is structured as a layered affirmance. First, waiver narrowed what remained reviewable. Second, even as to what remained, the panel indicated it could affirm because Plaintiffs failed to provide the operative complaint, a core document in a 12(b)(6) appeal. Third, the panel nonetheless addressed qualified immunity to show that, even overlooking those defects, Plaintiffs’ remaining federal theory failed on clearly established law.

2) Stigma-plus requires a state-linked “plus” that changes legal status, not merely market consequences

The panel accepted the baseline doctrine that reputational harm by itself is not a procedural due process deprivation. Under Al-Turki and Paul v. Davis, the “plus” must be a distinct alteration or extinguishment of a legal right/status. Plaintiffs’ theory attempted to treat lost private contracts as the “plus.” But the panel concluded that—at least for qualified-immunity purposes— Plaintiffs could not show that such a theory is recognized, much less clearly established.

3) Qualified immunity turns on specificity

Applying Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., the court framed the dispositive inquiry as whether it was clearly established that this specific kind of stigma-plus injury (defamation by a state actor leading to private counterparties terminating contracts) constitutes a due-process deprivation of a protected property interest. Because Plaintiffs could not identify precedent adopting that specific linkage, and because cited authority tended to reject “private opportunity” theories, the panel held Unruh was entitled to qualified immunity without deciding definitively whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Impact

  • Reinforcement of narrow “clearly established” framing in stigma-plus cases: The decision signals that plaintiffs must identify precedent recognizing not just stigma-plus generally, but the particular alleged “plus” mechanism—especially where the alleged injury flows through private market reactions (customers, contracting partners, employers) rather than direct state-imposed legal disability.
  • Appellate practice warning: The court treated the failure to include the operative complaint in the appendix as independently sufficient to affirm. Future appellants in the Tenth Circuit should expect strict enforcement of record/appendix obligations in Rule 12(b)(6) appeals.
  • Strategic pleading implications: Plaintiffs pursuing stigma-plus theories may need to allege and substantiate a “plus” that looks more like state action altering legal status—e.g., loss of a government job, revocation of a license, formal debarment, removal of privileges, or another state-created entitlement—rather than economic fallout arising from private contracting decisions.
  • Unpublished but persuasive: Although designated nonprecedential, the opinion may be cited for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1, and its practical guidance on qualified immunity and appellate record requirements can influence briefing and district court litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
A case can be dismissed at the pleading stage if the complaint does not allege enough specific facts to make the claim plausible, even assuming the alleged facts are true.
“Stigma-plus” procedural due process
Defamation by a government official (“stigma”) is not, by itself, a federal constitutional violation. There must also be a “plus”: a concrete change in a legal right or status recognized by law (for example, losing a government job or license in connection with the defamation). Mere reputational harm or lost business opportunities usually are not enough.
Qualified immunity
Even if an official’s conduct may be unconstitutional, the official is shielded from damages unless prior case law made it clear—beyond debate— that the specific conduct in the specific context violated the Constitution.
Appellate waiver
If an appellant does not meaningfully challenge an independent reason the district court gave for dismissal, the appellate court can affirm on that basis alone.
Appendix/record requirements
On appeal—especially in a pleading-stage dismissal—the appellate court must be able to examine the operative complaint. If the appellant fails to provide it, the court may affirm or decline to consider the issue.

Conclusion

McCurdy v. Unruh affirms dismissal of § 1983 claims through a combination of procedural and substantive doctrines: (1) waiver for unbriefed issues, (2) strict enforcement of appendix/record rules—with omission of the complaint treated as independently dispositive, and (3) qualified immunity because Plaintiffs did not identify clearly established law supporting a stigma-plus theory in which the “plus” is the loss of private contracts or business opportunities attributable to private parties’ reactions. In the broader legal landscape, the decision underscores that stigma-plus claims remain tightly constrained by the requirement of a state-linked alteration of legal status and by the demanding specificity required to overcome qualified immunity.