PUCO’s Exclusive Jurisdiction Extends to Producer Tort Claims Implicating Tariff-Based Gas-Nomination Reconciliation

I. Introduction

In E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Croce, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-75, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed a writ of prohibition barring a Summit County common pleas judge from proceeding with a class action brought by Ohio natural-gas producers against East Ohio Gas Company, d.b.a. Dominion Energy Ohio (“Dominion Energy”).

The producers (Landmark 2 Limited Liability Company, Moore Resources, L.L.C., and Moore Well Services, Inc.) alleged that Dominion Energy sold or used “excess” gas delivered into Dominion’s pipeline system beyond what competitive “choice suppliers” nominated, without compensating the producers. They pleaded tort and quasi-contract theories (unjust enrichment, conversion, and statutory civil claims tied to theft).

The central issue was jurisdictional: whether the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction because the dispute turns on the interpretation and application of Dominion Energy’s PUCO-approved energy-choice pooling-service tariff, including its nomination and reconciliation provisions, and thus constitutes a complaint about a “practice affecting or relating to” utility service under R.C. 4905.26.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over the producers’ class-action claims because resolving them requires determining whether Dominion Energy correctly carried out the tariff’s reconciliation process—an issue committed to PUCO under R.C. 4905.26. Applying the two-part framework from Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 2008-Ohio-3917, the Court concluded:

  • PUCO’s administrative expertise is required because the dispute depends on tariff interpretation and whether Dominion’s reconciliation “practice” is unreasonable or insufficient.
  • The conduct challenged (receiving gas into the system, measuring/pooling it, and reconciling nominations to deliveries) is “normally authorized” utility practice reflected in PUCO-approved tariffs and regulations.

Consequently, the common pleas court “patently and unambiguously” lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; a writ of prohibition properly issued to stop the case and require vacatur of prior orders. The Court also reaffirmed that PUCO’s inability to award damages does not defeat exclusive jurisdiction, because damages may be pursued later in a court of common pleas if PUCO first finds the type of misconduct contemplated by R.C. 4905.26, consistent with State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan, 2024-Ohio-1960.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The tariff-as-law principle

The Court emphasized that tariffs are not mere private documents; once approved by PUCO, they bind like law. It relied on:

  • Migden-Ostrander v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2004-Ohio-3924 (defining tariffs and their role as PUCO-filed schedules and service rules).
  • In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg, 2012-Ohio-5270 (PUCO’s statutory authority to review/approve tariffs and the rule that an approved tariff has “the same binding effect as a law”).

These cases support the Court’s framing: if the producers’ entitlement turns on how a tariff governs nominations and reconciliation, the dispute is presumptively within PUCO’s remit.

2. The PUCO exclusivity line and the Allstate framework

The Court situated its holding within Ohio’s longstanding division between (i) PUCO’s exclusive authority over rates/services/practices and (ii) common pleas jurisdiction over “pure” tort/contract claims not requiring PUCO expertise:

  • State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2000-Ohio-379 (PUCO exclusive jurisdiction over rates, charges, classifications, and service; courts generally excluded except Supreme Court review).
  • State ex rel. Ohio Edison Co. v. Shaker, 1994-Ohio-450 (PUCO exclusivity does not eliminate common pleas jurisdiction over “pure tort and contract claims”).
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 2008-Ohio-3917 (adopting the two-part test: PUCO expertise required? act complained of normally authorized?; labels do not control).
  • Pacific Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Illum. Co., 2003-Ohio-3954 (8th Dist.) (source of the two-part formulation later adopted in Allstate).
  • DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp., 2012-Ohio-5445 (pleading tort/contract labels cannot evade PUCO exclusive jurisdiction where substance is service-related).

Croce reinforces the “substance over form” approach: conversion/unjust enrichment claims can still be PUCO-exclusive if they are, in substance, an attack on tariff-governed measurement and reconciliation practices.

3. Prohibition as the enforcement mechanism for exclusivity

The Court treated prohibition as the appropriate remedy when a common pleas court proceeds in an area of PUCO exclusivity:

  • State ex rel. Doe v. Capper, 2012-Ohio-2686; State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 2022-Ohio-2427; and State ex rel. Federle v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2019-Ohio-849 (elements of prohibition; clear-and-convincing burden; “patently and unambiguously” eliminates need to show no adequate legal remedy).
  • State ex rel. Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2010-Ohio-2450 (prohibition granted where claim was service-related).
  • State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan, 2024-Ohio-1960 (when PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction, prohibition compels the trial judge to stop and to vacate prior orders; also clarifies the R.C. 4905.26 / R.C. 4905.61 sequencing).
  • State ex rel. Harsh v. Oney, 2014-Ohio-458 (availability of appeal is immaterial if jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking).

Croce underscores that prohibition is not merely a discretionary procedural shortcut; it is a structural tool enforcing legislative allocation of subject-matter jurisdiction to PUCO when the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction is clear.

4. Property-rights and easement cases distinguished

The producers and the trial judge argued that PUCO cannot decide “property-rights controversies,” analogizing to easement disputes. The Court distinguished:

  • In re Complaint of Wilkes v. Ohio Edison Co., 2012-Ohio-609 (PUCO lacked exclusive jurisdiction where dispute involved competing property rights in an easement; PUCO expertise not required).
  • Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-5220 (scope of an easement requires judicial interpretation of the instrument, not PUCO expertise).
  • Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 2009-Ohio-2524 (where complaint primarily concerned application of a PUCO-regulated vegetation-management plan, PUCO exclusivity applied).

The Court treated the producers’ asserted “title” theory as ultimately subordinate to the threshold tariff question: whether Dominion’s measurement and reconciliation practice under a PUCO-approved tariff was correctly implemented. That characterization moved the case from the “property instrument interpretation” side (courts) to the “regulated practice under tariff” side (PUCO).

5. Riley limited by later jurisdiction doctrine

The producers relied heavily on State ex rel. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Riley, 53 Ohio St.2d 168 (1978), where a class action for alleged conversion/breach of PUCO-approved propane storage agreements was not prohibited. The Court minimized Riley on two grounds:

  • Riley predates Allstate, which now guides the exclusivity inquiry in a “substance over labels” framework.
  • Riley involved contracts between the utility and customers; here, there was no producer–Dominion contract governing the dispute, and the tariff supplied the operative rules.

The practical effect is to narrow Riley to its context and to prioritize the modern tariff/practice-focused exclusivity analysis.

6. Summary-judgment evidence and waiver

On the procedural objection that Dominion Energy did not reattach exhibits to its summary-judgment motion, the Court applied waiver principles:

  • Sanders v. FirstEnergy Corp., 2004-Ohio-3214 (7th Dist.) (improper summary-judgment evidence may be considered absent objection).
  • Stegawski v. Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc., 37 Ohio App.3d 78 (8th Dist. 1987) (failure to move to strike/otherwise object waives Civ.R. 56(C) defects).

This reinforces that jurisdictional prohibition can be decided on the face of the tariff and complaint, and that evidentiary form objections must be timely.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory anchor: R.C. 4905.26 as the touchstone

Although Allstate provides the analytic tool, the Court expressly treated R.C. 4905.26 as controlling. R.C. 4905.26 mandates that PUCO hear complaints alleging, among other things, that “any regulation, measurement, or practice affecting or relating to any service” is unreasonable, unjust, or insufficient.

The Court characterized the producers’ claims as exactly that type of complaint: Dominion’s “measurement or practice of reconciling measurements” connected with a PUCO-regulated service (the energy-choice pooling service governed by the tariff). By framing the dispute as an R.C. 4905.26 “practice” claim, the Court made common pleas jurisdiction unavailable regardless of tort labels.

2. Application of Allstate: expertise and normal authorization

Expertise. The Court reasoned that adjudicating the producers’ claims requires determining whether Dominion “carried out the reconciliation process set forth in Section 12 of the tariff correctly or incorrectly.” Tariff interpretation and utility practice review are within PUCO’s “administrative expertise,” particularly where “measurement” and “reconciliation” are technical and systemwide.

Normally authorized practice. The Court held that receiving gas into a pipeline system, measuring and pooling volumes, and reconciling nominated volumes to delivered volumes are practices “normally authorized” for a public utility—reinforced by PUCO approval of the tariff and by regulatory requirements that tariffs address nomination and measurement. The Court cited Adm.Code 4901:1-13-14(A)(1) and (4) to show that PUCO regulations require tariff treatment of nomination and measurement issues.

Importantly, the Court treated the producers’ “Dominion acted unlawfully/outside the tariff” theory as a merits contention that does not defeat PUCO exclusivity—mirroring its approach in State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan, 2024-Ohio-1960, where “whether the shutoff was lawful” was left for PUCO as a merits question.

3. “Patent and unambiguous” lack of jurisdiction

Once the Court concluded PUCO exclusivity applied, it held the common pleas court “patently and unambiguously” lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. That finding eliminated the need to show an inadequate remedy by appeal (State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 2022-Ohio-2427; State ex rel. Harsh v. Oney, 2014-Ohio-458). The Court rejected the argument that disagreement among jurists (trial judge plus an appellate dissenter) negates “patent and unambiguous” lack, emphasizing de novo review (State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lucas Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 2021-Ohio-1241).

4. Damages pathway preserved: R.C. 4905.26 first, damages later

Responding to concerns that PUCO cannot award damages, the Court invoked State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan, 2024-Ohio-1960, to reaffirm a sequencing model: PUCO first determines whether the utility committed the R.C. 4905.26-type misconduct; if so, subsequent damages litigation may proceed in common pleas court under the applicable damages statute discussed in Corrigan (there, R.C. 4905.61).

While Croce involved tort and theft-related damages statutes rather than the specific R.C. 4905.61 claim at issue in Corrigan, the Court’s reasoning signals that exclusivity turns on who decides the regulated-practice predicate—not on whether the initial forum can supply all remedies.

C. Impact

1. Expanded clarity for non-retail disputes touching tariffs

The Court acknowledged the case was “a closer question” than State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan, 2024-Ohio-1960, because it does not center on a retail-customer relationship. Nonetheless, it held PUCO exclusivity applies. This is the opinion’s most consequential move: it extends (or at least clarifies) that tariff-governed “measurement” and “practice” disputes can be PUCO-exclusive even when brought by upstream producers rather than retail customers.

2. Litigation channeling and class action strategy

The decision channels putative class actions alleging “conversion” or “unjust enrichment” based on nomination/reconciliation differences into PUCO’s complaint process first. Plaintiffs’ counsel can expect utilities to frame similar claims as challenges to “measurement” and “reconciliation” practices “affecting or relating to” service. Conversely, plaintiffs will try to plead around PUCO by identifying truly external conduct (e.g., acts not dependent on tariff interpretation), but Croce makes that harder when the dispute’s proof requires reading and applying tariff provisions.

3. Strengthening the “merits vs. jurisdiction” separation

A key practical consequence is doctrinal: arguments that the utility acted unlawfully, outside the tariff, or beyond nominations are treated as merits questions for PUCO when the conduct is part of a tariff-regulated operational system. This reduces the ability of trial courts to retain jurisdiction by characterizing the alleged act as “unauthorized.”

4. Procedural leverage: prohibition and vacatur

By reaffirming that prohibition can compel a trial judge to cease exercising jurisdiction and to vacate prior orders (following State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan, 2024-Ohio-1960), the opinion gives utilities an aggressive procedural mechanism to stop discovery and class certification proceedings early when PUCO exclusivity is plausible.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of prohibition
An extraordinary order from a higher court stopping a judge from acting when the judge lacks jurisdiction. It is used to prevent courts from hearing cases that the law assigns exclusively to another tribunal (here, PUCO).
Subject-matter jurisdiction
A court’s legal power to hear a type of dispute. If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its orders are voidable and the case must be heard in the proper forum.
PUCO exclusive jurisdiction
The General Assembly assigned PUCO primary authority over complaints about utility “rates,” “service,” and certain “practices” related to service. Courts generally cannot decide those issues first.
Tariff
A rulebook filed with and approved by PUCO that sets rates, terms, and operational rules for utility service. Once approved, it has binding legal effect, similar to law (In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg, 2012-Ohio-5270).
Energy Choice Program / choice supplier
A regulatory program allowing customers to buy gas commodity from competitive suppliers while the utility continues to provide distribution service.
Nomination and reconciliation
“Nomination” is the volume a choice supplier tells the utility it plans to deliver/needs for customers. “Reconciliation” is the tariff-governed adjustment process aligning nominated volumes to actual deliveries—typically by credits/negative adjustments across accounting periods.
Summary judgment
A decision without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, the decisive questions were jurisdictional and could be resolved from the complaint and tariff.
“Patently and unambiguously” lacks jurisdiction
A high-confidence jurisdictional defect. If satisfied, the party seeking prohibition need not prove it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.

V. Conclusion

E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Croce cements a jurisdictional rule with practical bite: when tort-style claims (including conversion and unjust enrichment) are, in substance, complaints that a public utility’s tariff-governed measurement and nomination-reconciliation “practice” is unreasonable, unjust, insufficient, or otherwise unlawful, PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction under R.C. 4905.26. The decision limits attempts to bypass PUCO by relabeling tariff disputes as private torts, treats “unauthorized conduct” arguments as merits issues for PUCO, and confirms prohibition (with vacatur) as the mechanism to enforce exclusivity.