Public Service Law § 228 Does Not Shield Landlords from Labor Law § 240(1) Claims by Telecommunications Workers; Minor Drilling to Run Wi‑Fi Cabling Is Not an “Alteration”

1. Introduction

Hearns v Blended Family LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 02373 [1st Dept Apr. 21, 2026]) addresses the boundary between (i) statutory protections afforded to cable television installations under Public Service Law § 228 and (ii) the scope of New York’s “Scaffold Law,” Labor Law § 240(1), in the context of a telecommunications technician’s work.

The plaintiff, a Verizon telecommunications field technician, claimed injury from a ladder fall while installing Wi‑Fi service for a daycare tenant (Blended Family LLC) in a mixed-use building owned by Abeken Apartments LP. The work required access to a telecommunications equipment room located in the building’s residential basement area, separate from the tenant’s leased space.

The appeal centered on three core issues:

  • Whether Public Service Law § 228 barred a Labor Law § 240(1) claim against the building owner (as Supreme Court held).
  • Whether the plaintiff’s Wi‑Fi-related cabling work constituted protected “altering” or other covered activity under Labor Law § 240(1).
  • Whether the owner was entitled to conditional contractual indemnification from the tenant under the lease, consistent with General Obligations Law § 5-322.1.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Department affirmed the order, but clarified important doctrine:

  • The Court held Supreme Court erred in concluding that Public Service Law § 228 categorically insulated Abeken from Labor Law § 240(1) liability, because the plaintiff was not performing cable television installation and Verizon is not governed by the Public Service Law provisions at issue.
  • Nonetheless, the Court held the Labor Law § 240(1) claims were properly dismissed against both Abeken and Blended Family because the work was not construction-related and the alleged drilling of two holes to run wire did not amount to a statutory “alteration.”
  • The Court left intact Supreme Court’s denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment on common-law negligence (as to Abeken), noting factual disputes regarding whether Abeken furnished the ladder.
  • The Court affirmed conditional contractual indemnification for Abeken against Blended Family, finding the lease provision triggered and not void under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 due to a savings clause allowing partial indemnity.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 52-53 [2004]

Supreme Court relied on Abbatiello to conclude that Public Service Law § 228 barred the owner’s exposure under Labor Law § 240(1). The First Department accepted Abbatiello as the relevant starting point—but limited its reach. It emphasized that the statutory protection arises from the cable-specific policy and framework of the Public Service Law. Because the plaintiff here was a telecommunications worker installing Wi‑Fi (not “cable television facilities”), the Court held the Public Service Law did not apply to “shield” Abeken.

In effect, the decision reads Abbatiello as cable-TV specific, not a general immunity for landlords whenever a technician is performing communications-related work.

Mananghaya v Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 165 AD3d 117, 124 [1st Dept 2018], lv dismissed 33 NY969 [2019]

Mananghaya supplies the First Department’s governing test for whether work qualifies as “altering” under Labor Law § 240(1): the work cannot be “simple, routine,” cosmetic, or decorative; it must effect “a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure,” including significantly changing the way an important component functions (even if not permanent).

Applying this framework, the Court treated the plaintiff’s “drilling two holes” as insufficiently transformative to satisfy the “significant physical change” requirement.

Castaneda v Amsterco 67, LLC, 220 AD3d 406, 406 [1st Dept 2023]

The Court invoked Castaneda as a close analogy: drilling anchors into a façade to attach pest-control netting and placing spikes did not qualify as an “alteration.” That precedent supports a line of First Department cases refusing to equate limited drilling/attachment work with a statutory “alteration,” even where tools are used and the building is physically affected.

Rhodes-Evans v 111 Chelsea LLC, 44 AD3d 430, 432 [1st Dept 2007]

Rhodes-Evans further anchors the result in communications infrastructure context: splicing fiber optic cable into a pre-existing cable box was not an alteration under Labor Law § 240(1). By citing it, the Court reinforces that many telecom/cabling tasks—particularly those integrating into existing systems—often fall outside § 240(1).

Hernandez v Argo Corp., 95 AD3d 782, 783 [1st Dept 2012]

On indemnity, the Court relied on Hernandez for the proposition that an indemnification clause is not void under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 where it includes a “savings clause” permitting indemnification only to the extent of the indemnitor’s fault (or otherwise allowing partial liability). This precedent supports the outcome that Abeken could obtain conditional indemnification pending a determination of negligence allocation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Public Service Law § 228: Cable-TV protection is not a blanket landlord shield

The Court parsed the statutory predicate for landlord non-interference: Public Service Law § 228(1) addresses “installation of cable television facilities.” It then emphasized the statutory scope point: “a telecommunications company such as Verizon is not governed by the Public Service Law” (citing Public Service Law §§ 213(1), 228).

The doctrinal move is significant: the Court separated “telecommunications/Wi‑Fi service installation” from “cable television facilities” and thereby denied the owner a categorical statutory escape hatch. The owner could be a proper § 240(1) defendant in principle—just not on these facts given the activity analysis below.

2) Labor Law § 240(1): No coverage without construction-related activity / qualifying “alteration”

The Court returned to the threshold requirement: § 240(1) protects workers engaged in “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing” of a building or structure. It focused on “altering,” applying the Mananghaya definition.

The plaintiff described drilling two holes to route cable between spaces and through drop ceilings. The Court held this was not an “alteration,” aligning the activity with Castaneda and Rhodes-Evans. In other words, minor penetrations and cable routing—even if requiring ladders and tools—did not amount to a “significant physical change” to the building’s configuration/composition or an important component’s function.

This analysis resolved the § 240(1) claim for both the owner and tenant without reaching deeper questions of control over the accident site or ladder adequacy, because the statute simply did not apply to the work.

3) Negligence: factual disputes on ladder furnishing and responsibility

Although § 240(1) failed, the Court noted Supreme Court correctly denied plaintiff summary judgment on negligence issues against Abeken due to factual disputes— especially whether the superintendent provided the ladder and what role, if any, Abeken had in furnishing equipment that allegedly shifted.

4) Contractual indemnification: triggered broadly, but payable only conditionally

The Court upheld that the lease indemnity provision was triggered because the claim arose “by reason of work performed at the behest of Blended Family in and about the demised premises,” and “as a result of Blended Family’s occupation and alteration of the demised premises.” Even though the accident location was in the residential basement area, the Court treated the work as sufficiently connected to the tenant’s requested installation project.

Crucially, the Court preserved the statutory limitation: because factual questions remained as to Abeken’s negligence, indemnification was properly conditional, and the clause was not void under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 given a savings clause (per Hernandez v Argo Corp.).

C. Impact

  • Narrowing landlord reliance on Public Service Law § 228: The decision signals that owners cannot reflexively invoke § 228 to defeat § 240(1) exposure whenever communications work is involved; the protection is tethered to “cable television facilities” and the governing statutory scheme.
  • Reinforcement of a high bar for “altering” in cabling/telecom work: By treating two drilled holes and cable routing as non-alteration, the Court strengthens a predictable defense position in many Wi‑Fi/telecom installation cases: absent structural reconfiguration or a significant functional change, § 240(1) may not apply.
  • Contract drafting and litigation posture: The decision underscores the value of savings clauses in indemnity provisions to survive General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 scrutiny and supports conditional indemnity where owner negligence is unresolved.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Labor Law § 240(1) (“Scaffold Law”): Imposes strict(ish) liability on certain owners/contractors for elevation-related risks, but only when the worker is engaged in enumerated, construction-type activities (e.g., “altering”).
  • “Altering”: Not any physical change. The change must be more than routine and must significantly change the building’s configuration/composition or how an important component functions (the Mananghaya standard).
  • Public Service Law § 228: A cable-television-focused rule preventing landlord interference with installation of “cable television facilities.” This case clarifies it does not automatically apply to telecommunications/Wi‑Fi installations by entities outside that framework.
  • Contractual indemnification: A lease clause shifting loss from one party to another. Courts may enforce it “conditionally” pending fact-finding on fault.
  • General Obligations Law § 5-322.1: Bars agreements requiring one party to indemnify another for the other’s own negligence in construction-related contexts. A “savings clause” can preserve enforceability by limiting indemnity to the extent permitted by law (often, to the indemnitor’s fault).

5. Conclusion

Hearns v Blended Family LLC delivers a two-part doctrinal message. First, it limits the reach of Public Service Law § 228, holding it does not categorically shield landlords from Labor Law § 240(1) claims where the work is telecommunications/Wi‑Fi installation rather than cable television facilities governed by the Public Service Law. Second—and outcome-determinative—it reaffirms a stringent definition of “altering” under Labor Law § 240(1): minor drilling and cable routing incidental to service installation does not constitute the kind of construction-related alteration that triggers Scaffold Law protections.

The decision also highlights practical risk allocation: while § 240(1) may be unavailable in many telecom installation falls, negligence theories may persist, and carefully drafted lease indemnity clauses with savings language can still provide owners meaningful (conditional) protection pending findings of fault.