Psychological Parenthood Requires a Multifactor Assessment, Not a Recency-Only Test

Case: In re O.S., No. 25-370
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Decision date: November 10, 2026
Disposition: Vacated in part and remanded.

1. Introduction

In In re O.S., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia clarified how courts must assess a claim to psychological parenthood when a former caregiver’s contact with a child has been interrupted. A circuit court cannot replace the established, multifactor definition of a psychological parent with a controlling inquiry into whether the relationship is “recent and ongoing.” It must evaluate the nature and duration of the relationship, the caregiver’s parental functions, and the legal parent’s consent and encouragement, while resolving material conflicts in the evidence.

The case concerned C.S., the deceased father’s long-term partner, who claimed that she had helped raise O.S. and sought recognition as the child’s psychological parent and permission to visit. The circuit court rejected both requests because contact had stopped approximately seven months earlier. The Supreme Court vacated those portions of the order, but did not itself recognize C.S. as a psychological parent or award visitation.

The decision also reinforces a distinct principle: establishing psychological parenthood does not automatically establish entitlement to visitation. Any visitation must serve the child’s best interests. Issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the ruling principally clarifies and applies existing doctrine rather than creating a new category of parental rights.

2. Background and Procedural History

The caregiving relationship and the father’s death

O.S.’s biological parents previously shared custody, although the record did not clearly establish the arrangement’s details. Around 2022, O.S. began living full time with her father. C.S. also lived in that household. The mother’s parental rights were eventually terminated for abandonment.

When the father’s declining health required hospitalization in October 2024, O.S.’s biological brother obtained temporary guardianship from the family court. C.S. opposed that appointment and sought guardianship herself. The father died later that month.

At a contested guardianship hearing, substance-use concerns led the family court to order drug testing. The brother tested positive for oxycodone, and C.S. tested positive for THC and methadone. A Child Protective Services worker reported that both appeared to be under the influence. The Department of Human Services subsequently filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that their substance abuse harmed or threatened O.S.’s welfare.

These were allegations and reported observations, not appellate findings resolving abuse or neglect. The Supreme Court expressly limited its review because the record did not clearly disclose the disposition of the underlying abuse and neglect issues.

The competing evidence

By January 2025, O.S. had been placed with her maternal grandparents. C.S. sought recognition as a psychological parent and initially opposed that permanent placement. At the May 2025 hearing, however, her counsel clarified that she sought visitation rather than custody, suggesting approximately one weekend per month.

C.S. testified that she had been the father’s partner for approximately eight years, had known O.S. since the child was about three, and had helped care for her for at least three years. Her claimed responsibilities included:

  • Feeding, bathing, and clothing the child;
  • Helping with schoolwork and playing with her daily;
  • Attending medical and dental appointments;
  • Providing emotional support, including assistance with the mother’s absence;
  • Purchasing items for the child and attending church with her; and
  • Supervising the child when the father was absent.

She maintained that the father consented to and encouraged their relationship. She also pointed to a March 2023 DHS safety plan that designated her to supervise O.S. while the child was in the father’s care.

Other testimony complicated that account. The brother disputed that the father and C.S. were engaged and testified that the father had other girlfriends. The maternal grandmother described her own longstanding involvement with O.S. and testified that the child feared C.S., while conceding that she had no corroborating evidence of that fear. She also reported school absences while O.S. was in C.S.’s care. A DHS worker testified that O.S. preferred living with the grandparents and had requested visits only with her brother.

C.S. explained that she had a methadone prescription through a medication-assisted treatment program and a valid medical cannabis card. She also acknowledged briefly staying, during surgical recovery, at the home of O.S.’s uncle, a convicted sex offender, but stated that she brought no children there. The Supreme Court did not resolve these matters or determine their ultimate significance.

The circuit court’s ruling

The circuit court concluded that a psychological-parent relationship needed to be “recent and ongoing.” Because C.S.’s contact with O.S. had ended in October 2024, it denied psychological-parent status and considered itself unable to grant visitation. Significantly, it acknowledged that the interruption had occurred “through no fault” of C.S.

The court also approved continued placement with the maternal grandmother and her husband and identified adoption as the appropriate permanency plan. Those matters, together with its determinations concerning sibling contact, were outside the issues presented on appeal.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court identified two central defects in the circuit court’s decision:

  1. Misapplication of the governing definition: The court concentrated on the interruption in contact instead of assessing the full set of psychological-parent factors.
  2. Insufficient factual findings: It failed to resolve conflicting testimony and make necessary credibility findings concerning C.S.’s role in O.S.’s life.

The Supreme Court therefore vacated the denial of psychological-parent status and visitation. On remand, the circuit court must first determine whether C.S. satisfies the established definition. If she does, it must separately determine whether visitation would serve O.S.’s best interests.

The Supreme Court expressly declined to decide psychological-parent status itself because the necessary factual findings were missing. Its partial vacatur left the unchallenged placement and sibling-contact determinations undisturbed.

4. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re K.S., 253 W. Va. 154, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)

This case supplied the standards of appellate review in abuse and neglect proceedings. Substantive rulings receive abuse-of-discretion review; supporting factual findings receive clear-error review; and legal questions, including statutory interpretation, receive de novo review.

That division explains the remedy. The Supreme Court could independently correct the circuit court’s misunderstanding of psychological-parent law, but it could not replace missing credibility findings with its own assessment of disputed testimony.

In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996)

The Court relied on this decision for the principle that children may have a right to continued association with people with whom they have formed close emotional bonds, provided continued contact serves their best interests. This supplies the child-centered foundation for considering contact with someone who is not a biological or adoptive parent.

The significance is not that every affectionate relationship creates enforceable visitation rights. Rather, established emotional bonds can warrant legal consideration, subject to the child’s welfare.

State ex rel. C. H. v. Faircloth, 240 W. Va. 729, 815 S.E.2d 540 (2018)

The opinion cited this case to disclose that the holding of In re Jonathan G. had been modified on other grounds. It did not explain that separate modification or use it as an independent basis for the result. Its role here is consequently limited: it qualifies the citation history without displacing the continued-association principle quoted by the Court.

In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011)

This decision reiterated, through a syllabus point quoting Honaker v. Burnside, that a child may have continued visitation rights with a stepparent or half-sibling even though custody generally belongs with a natural parent absent abandonment, misconduct, or neglect.

Its relevance is the distinction between custody and continued contact. Recognition of an important relationship need not require transferring the child’s home or displacing the permanent caregiver. That distinction was particularly pertinent because C.S. ultimately sought visitation alone.

Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989)

This decision provided the main explanation of the best-interests inquiry. Visitation is concerned primarily with the benefit to the child, not the satisfaction of the visiting adult. Continuing an earlier close relationship may contribute to emotional well-being.

The Court also invoked its discussion of stability. Stability does not necessarily mean ending contact with everyone outside a child’s current household; severing a significant relationship can itself be destabilizing. This reasoning requires an individualized assessment rather than an assumption that continued placement and continued contact are incompatible.

In re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005)

This was the central substantive authority. It defines a psychological parent as someone who, through continuing day-to-day interaction, meets a child’s psychological and physical parental needs and provides emotional and financial support. The relationship must be substantial rather than temporary and must begin with the legal parent’s or guardian’s consent and encouragement.

The opinion emphasized four principal components drawn from that authority:

  1. A significant relationship between the adult and child;
  2. A substantial duration;
  3. The assumption of caregiving duties and provision of emotional and financial support; and
  4. The legal parent’s or guardian’s consent, encouragement, and fostering of the relationship.

The decision also recognizes that psychological parenthood can develop either while sharing a household with the child and legal parent or while living with the child without that parent.

Separately, In re Clifford K. cautions that psychological-parent status does not automatically permit intervention in a custody proceeding under West Virginia Code § 48-9-103(b). The Court used that distinction by analogy: recognition of the relationship and entitlement to a particular legal remedy are separate questions.

In re Visitation & Custody of Senturi N.S.V., 221 W. Va. 159, 652 S.E.2d 490 (2007)

This decision explains that a psychological parent typically has lived with the child, interacted daily, and essentially served as a second parent with the legal parent’s consent. It also supplies an important limiting principle: caring for a child, even regularly and affectionately, is not enough by itself.

Otherwise, teachers, babysitters, daycare providers, and family friends might claim parental status merely because they formed trusting relationships with children. Its inclusion makes clear that the remand was not an endorsement of C.S.’s claim; she still had to establish a genuinely parental relationship.

V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000)

The Court quoted this New Jersey decision for the underlying rationale of psychological-parent doctrine: children have a strong interest in maintaining connections with adults who love and provide for them. It reinforced the doctrine’s child-centered purpose, while West Virginia precedent supplied the governing test.

B. Legal Reasoning

The circuit court substituted a shortcut for the required inquiry

The central error was not simply noticing that contact had stopped. It was treating that interruption as decisive without evaluating the relationship’s other legally relevant characteristics. The definition’s reference to continuing day-to-day care describes the parental relationship that must be established; the circuit court effectively converted it into a standalone requirement of uninterrupted recent contact.

The Supreme Court found that approach especially concerning because the circuit court acknowledged that C.S. was not responsible for the separation. A change in guardianship or placement may interrupt contact without answering whether a substantial parental relationship previously developed.

The ruling nevertheless does not make recency irrelevant or establish that psychological-parent status survives every separation indefinitely. Its narrower instruction is that the interruption cannot substitute for a complete application of the governing definition.

Credibility findings were essential

C.S.’s testimony, if credited, addressed several psychological-parent factors: daily caregiving, emotional and material support, a relationship lasting years, and the father’s encouragement. Her designation as a DHS safety resource also provided relevant evidence of a caregiving role, although it did not independently establish psychological parenthood.

The circuit court needed to assess that evidence against the competing accounts. The brother’s testimony disputed aspects of the household relationship, while other testimony raised concerns about the child’s experiences and present wishes. Without findings explaining what testimony was accepted and why, the appellate court could not determine whether the correct test had been satisfied.

Status and visitation require separate decisions

The remand establishes a sequential inquiry:

  1. Psychological-parent status: Did the relationship meet the established legal definition?
  2. Visitation: If so, would contact benefit this child under the circumstances?

The first question concerns the nature of the relationship. The second concerns the appropriateness of continued contact. Evidence may overlap, but recognition of a parental bond does not resolve questions about safety, stability, the child’s preferences, or the likely emotional consequences of visitation.

The Supreme Court neither discounted those concerns nor decided how they should be weighed. It required the circuit court to address them through the correct framework rather than ending the inquiry at the absence of recent contact.

C. Potential Impact

More complete trial-court findings. Courts evaluating psychological-parent claims should address the substantive relationship factors and resolve material factual disputes. A conclusory reference to the definition will not suffice when the reasoning rests on a single, incomplete consideration.

Closer scrutiny of interrupted relationships. The decision is particularly relevant where hospitalization, death, guardianship, or placement changes separate a child from a former caregiver. Such separation does not itself conclusively answer whether a qualifying relationship existed.

Continued limits on nonparent claims. The opinion retains the distinction between substantial parental functioning and ordinary caregiving. It does not create general visitation rights for former partners or other caring adults.

Protection of the child-centered inquiry. Neither an adult’s attachment nor recognition as a psychological parent guarantees contact. The ultimate visitation decision must remain directed toward the child’s welfare.

No automatic disruption of permanency. The Court left the existing placement and sibling-contact determinations intact. The decision therefore illustrates that a limited visitation dispute can require further adjudication without reopening every aspect of the child’s permanency arrangements.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Psychological parent
An adult who has actually filled a substantial parental role in a child’s daily life, with the legal parent’s or guardian’s consent and encouragement. Affection or occasional assistance alone is insufficient.
Multifactor assessment
A decision based on several legally relevant features of the relationship, rather than a single shortcut such as when the adult last saw the child.
Best interests of the child
A child-focused evaluation of whether a proposed arrangement supports the child’s welfare, including emotional well-being, safety, and stability.
De novo review
The appellate court independently decides a legal question without deferring to the lower court’s legal interpretation.
Credibility findings
The trial court’s determinations about which testimony is believable and what facts that testimony establishes.
Vacated in part and remanded
Only the challenged portions of the order were set aside, and those issues were returned to the circuit court for further proceedings. C.S. did not receive an appellate award of status or visitation.

6. Conclusion

In re O.S. requires courts to assess psychological parenthood through the established relationship-based factors, not a recency-only test. It also requires adequate factual and credibility findings before that assessment can be meaningfully reviewed.

The decision’s significance lies equally in its limits: it did not declare C.S. a psychological parent, award visitation, or disturb O.S.’s placement. It required a legally sound determination of status followed, if appropriate, by a separate assessment of whether visitation would benefit the child.