PSJVTA Deemed-Consent Jurisdiction Justifies Recall of Mandate and Reinstatement of a Vacated ATA Money Judgment

1. Introduction

This long-running Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, damages action was brought by U.S. citizens (and estates/survivors) injured in terrorist attacks in Israel against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”). After a seven-week trial, the plaintiffs won a $655.5 million judgment (Oct. 1, 2015). The Second Circuit later vacated that judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction and ordered dismissal. Subsequent congressional enactments attempted to address jurisdictional hurdles in ATA suits against the PLO/PA, culminating in the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (“PSJVTA”), which “deems” consent to personal jurisdiction upon specified post-enactment conduct.

On remand after the Supreme Court’s decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 606 U.S. 1 (2025), the Second Circuit confronted three practical questions:

• Whether to recall its 2016 mandate directing dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction;
• Whether the original 2015 money judgment was unsalvageable as “void” because jurisdiction was lacking when entered;
• Whether, even if revived, the defendants were entitled to a new trial due to allegedly improper expert testimony.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Key holdings:

• PSJVTA applies to this pending posture (as Congress stated it “shall apply to any case pending on or after August 30, 2016”) and can supply a constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court in Fuld.
• Recalling the mandate is appropriate under the Second Circuit’s equitable, factor-based approach (supervening change in law; preservation; lack of meaningful repose concerns; equities favor efficiency/fairness).
• The 2015 judgment is not beyond revival merely because personal jurisdiction was absent when entered; later legal developments and defendants’ post-enactment conduct can cure a prior personal-jurisdiction deficiency for purposes of reinstating the judgment.
• Defendants are not entitled to a new trial; the challenged expert testimony did not constitute reversible error under Rule 702/Daubert standards, and any arguable overreach was adequately mitigated by the trial record and jury instructions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drive the Result)

A. Supreme Court Fifth Amendment pivot and statutory deference

• Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 606 U.S. 1 (2025)
  The controlling catalyst. The Second Circuit had previously treated Fifth Amendment due process as coextensive with Fourteenth Amendment limits, but Fuld held Fifth Amendment due process “permits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry” given federal sovereign authority and foreign-policy-linked predicates. The panel uses Fuld to reject its earlier constitutional barrier and to treat PSJVTA as within any “outer limits” the Fifth Amendment might impose.
• Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)
  Quoted via Fuld to underscore judicial deference where Congress and the President act on “sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs.” This supports the court’s reasonableness framing: PSJVTA embodies a political-branches balance that weighs heavily against defendants’ due process objections.
• Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
  Used to articulate the “strongest of presumptions” and “widest latitude” when both political branches align—here, as Congress and the President enacted PSJVTA. While not a jurisdiction case, it supplies separation-of-powers rhetoric: defendants shoulder a heavy burden to show unconstitutionality.
• Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
  Cited for a “reasonableness” inquiry concept; the Second Circuit assumes arguendo such an inquiry under the Fifth Amendment and then finds it satisfied (U.S. interest, plaintiffs’ interest, defendants’ lack of undue burden).

B. Mandate recall: finality vs extraordinary circumstances

• Taylor v. United States, 822 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2016)
  Establishes inherent power to recall a mandate, reviewable for abuse of discretion. Frames recall as exceptional but available.
• Sargent v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 75 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996)
  Supplies the core multi-factor rubric: supervening change in law; preservation; no substantial lapse; equities. The panel expressly applies these factors and finds each favors recall.
• Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)
  Cited (via Waldman II) for the “profound interests in repose” and for mandate recall as an “extraordinary remedy” used sparingly. The panel distinguishes by noting defendants do not truly obtain repose because plaintiffs can proceed in a stayed parallel action.
• Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Waldman II), 925 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
  Prior denial of recall under ATCA; provides the “extraordinary remedy” framing and acknowledges that new law “might warrant” recall in some circumstances—now found to be such a circumstance given PSJVTA + Fuld.
• Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 886 F.2d 1526 (9th Cir. 1989)
  Persuasive authority: an abrupt change in law can justify recall to avoid “patently unfair” outcomes. Used to bolster the equity/legitimacy of recall when Congress changes the legal landscape promptly and materially.
• Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
  Invoked to ground recall in equity jurisprudence—recall as a tool “to avoid injustice.”

C. Separation of powers limits on Congress “reopening” final judgments

• Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)
  Central boundary: Congress cannot command courts to reopen final judgments by retroactively dictating the law applicable to a completed case. The panel uses Plaut to clarify that PSJVTA cannot force recall—but it can inform a court’s discretionary, comity-based choice.
• Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 665 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2011)
  Reinforces Plaut: a statute requiring an Article III court to set aside a final judgment entered before enactment would violate separation of powers. The panel positions its action as judicial discretion, not legislative compulsion.
• Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010)
  Addressed and limited: the panel notes Buono concerned reevaluating continuing injunctive relief, not reopening final money judgments, and reiterates the Court’s warning that Congress may not reopen final judgments.
• Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 (2016)
  Cited (in footnote) for due process interests in “fair notice and repose” with retroactive legislation. The panel distinguishes PSJVTA because its retroactive effect depends on defendants’ knowing post-enactment conduct and because defendants lack a genuine repose interest given ongoing parallel litigation.

D. “Void judgment” and curing jurisdictional defects

• Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)
  Provide the foundational principle: a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction violates due process. The panel accepts the premise but rejects the defendants’ conclusion that such a judgment can never be revived after later jurisdictional curing.
• Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57 (2020) (per curiam)
  Defendants relied on “absolutely void” language. The panel narrows its force by pointing to established doctrines (waiver/forfeiture; post-judgment conduct; statutory expansions on appeal; mandate recall) demonstrating that earlier jurisdictional defects are not invariably fatal.
• Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)
  Crucial conceptual pivot: personal jurisdiction is an individual right that can be waived. This undercuts the defendants’ “immutable voidness” theory by showing jurisdictional objections can be lost by later party conduct.
• Shatsky v. Palestine Liberation Org., 955 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2020) and Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
  Reinforce that personal jurisdiction is a “forum objection” that can be forfeited at any stage, including by failing to press it on appeal—supporting the broader principle that post-judgment conduct can affect jurisdictional consequences.
• Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016)
  The panel’s key rebuttal: a defendant can forfeit a personal-jurisdiction argument even after judgment-related proceedings, demonstrating that a “void at entry” label does not mechanically bar later enforcement once circumstances (or party conduct) change.
• Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604 (1978); United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986); Sandefur v. Cherry, 718 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1983)
  These authorities illustrate a jurisdiction “salvage” principle: where Congress expands jurisdiction, courts apply it to cases on direct review to avoid wasteful dismissal/refilling. The panel analogizes this dynamic to PSJVTA’s jurisdictional cure here.
• United Republic Ins. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2003) and Universal Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. (Universal IV), 312 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2002)
  Particularly important because they involve post-judgment finality: once a district court reaches final judgment, “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming,” and courts should “salvage jurisdiction where possible.” The panel uses this to justify reinstating (rather than restarting) the case once a valid jurisdictional basis exists.

E. Expert testimony / trial fairness / harmless error

• Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
  Frame the district court’s gatekeeping role and the “flexible” reliability inquiry; support deference to trial court methodology decisions.
• United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011); Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2009)
  Establish “considerable discretion” and “manifest error” standard for appellate review of expert rulings.
• United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536 (2d Cir. 2022) and Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2010)
  Provide harmless error framing: even if some testimony skirts boundaries, reversal requires prejudice “important” relative to the whole record.
• United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008)
  Supplies the caution about experts becoming conduits for hearsay and the “thinning line” between helpful structural testimony and impermissible substitution for fact proof. The panel acknowledges the line but finds the record (including underlying admitted documents and jury freedom to reject) avoids reversible error.
• United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Mustafa, 406 F. App'x 526 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Paracha, 313 F. App'x 347 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gentile, 233 F. App'x 86 (2d Cir. 2007)
  Cited to confirm that expert testimony about organizational structure, leadership, and operational practices of criminal/terrorist organizations is routinely admissible and helpful to jurors.
• Felder, 993 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2021) and Fiataruolo v. United States, 8 F.3d 930 (2d Cir. 1993)
  Support the proposition that juries may accept or reject expert opinions, and that proper jury instructions can mitigate risk of undue weight.
• Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, 843 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 2016) and Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 53 F. Supp. 3d 191 (D.D.C. 2014)
  Defendants’ best comparator: exclusion of similar expert (Eviatar) as unreliable/hearsay conduit. The panel distinguishes: here, the subject matter was organizational relationships and policy, supported by trial-admitted documents; in Gilmore the expert’s inference about a specific murder was murkier and depended on inadmissible hearsay.
• Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024)
  Used to note Rule 704(b)’s mental-state restriction is limited to criminal cases—so civil experts are not categorically barred from opinions touching mental states, so long as otherwise admissible.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. PSJVTA’s retroactive reach is textual and conduct-conditioned

The opinion treats the retroactivity question as largely answered by statutory text: PSJVTA “shall apply to any case pending on or after August 30, 2016,” a date transparently keyed to this litigation’s procedural posture. The court rejects the defendants’ attempt to reframe Fuld as permitting only prospective application: the relevant “considered judgment” exists (in 2019), and Congress expressly chose to attach deemed-consent consequences to post-enactment conduct while making the rule applicable to already-pending cases.

Importantly, the court emphasizes notice and choice: PSJVTA put the PLO/PA on clear notice that certain post-enactment actions would trigger personal jurisdiction in pending ATA cases; the district court found they engaged in that predicate conduct; thus defendants cannot plausibly claim unfair surprise.

B. Recalling the mandate is discretionary but justified under Second Circuit factors

Applying Sargent, the court finds:

• Supervening change in governing law: PSJVTA plus the Supreme Court’s Fuld constitutional validation of PSJVTA’s jurisdictional mechanism “calls into serious question” the earlier dismissal-for-no-jurisdiction mandate.
• Issue preserved: personal jurisdiction was litigated throughout.
• Time/repose: while many years have passed, defendants lack a true repose interest because dismissal was without prejudice and a parallel, stayed action exists; denying recall would mostly impose duplicative litigation costs, not finality.
• Equities: judicial economy and fairness to victims (aging, deaths, retrial burdens) strongly favor recall; recalling the mandate produces a single, final resolution rather than restarting the same case.

The court also carefully avoids a Plaut problem: it does not treat Congress as “ordering” reopening; it treats PSJVTA as supplying a lawful jurisdictional basis that the judiciary may choose to apply via its own mandate-recall power.

C. The “void judgment” argument fails because jurisdiction can be “salvaged” post hoc

The court accepts the baseline due process axiom that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is defective. But it rejects the absolutist inference that such a judgment can never be revived after later jurisdictional curing.

The reasoning is pragmatic and doctrinal:

• Personal jurisdiction is waivable/forfeitable (Ins. Corp. of Ireland; Shatsky; Pemex), showing that post-judgment conduct can alter the legal effect of earlier jurisdictional defects.
• Courts salvage jurisdiction after final judgment where feasible (United Republic Ins.; Universal IV), especially to avoid waste and preserve final adjudications.
• Congressional jurisdiction expansions apply to cases on review (Andrus; Union Gas; Dedham Water; Sandefur), reinforcing the norm that jurisdictional grants can cure pending defects rather than forcing pointless restarts.

In the panel’s framing, PSJVTA supplied the missing jurisdictional foundation consistent with Fifth Amendment due process (as determined by the Supreme Court), and defendants’ post-enactment conduct satisfied the statute’s predicates—so reinstatement is both lawful and efficient.

D. No new trial: expert testimony rulings within discretion and not prejudicial

The court rejects claims that experts Eviatar and Shrenzel were mere “lay interpreters” or hearsay conduits. While acknowledging Mejia’s warning about the line between permissible structural expertise and impermissible factual narration, the panel stresses:

• terror/organized-structure expertise is commonly admissible in federal practice (Locascio; Mustafa; Paracha);
• here, the experts relied “primarily on documents admitted in evidence” (e.g., intelligence reports, payroll records, convictions, official reports), unlike the hearsay-dependent record in Gilmore;
• the jury received explicit instructions not to accept expert opinions merely because of expert status.

3.3. Impact

A. ATA/PSJVTA litigation: a roadmap for reviving dismissed cases

The immediate doctrinal impact is that, within the Second Circuit, PSJVTA (as upheld in Fuld) can justify reopening and reinstating judgments previously lost on personal-jurisdiction grounds—particularly where:

• the statutory predicates are satisfied by defendants’ post-enactment conduct,
• the case falls within PSJVTA’s “pending on or after August 30, 2016” scope, and
• equities strongly disfavor forcing victims to relitigate from scratch when the merits were already tried to verdict.

B. Finality doctrine: “repose” is contextual, not talismanic

Although mandate recall remains “extraordinary,” this opinion signals that the “finality” objection carries less force when the prior disposition was procedural (dismissal without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction) and where denying recall would merely channel the same dispute into a duplicative parallel action.

C. Jurisdictional “voidness”: a narrower practical bite in revived, conduct-triggered consent regimes

The opinion’s most consequential move is its rejection of an absolute “once void, always void” theory for personal jurisdiction in this posture. By analogizing to waiver/forfeiture and salvage-of-jurisdiction cases, the court creates space for Congress (within constitutional bounds) to design conduct-triggered consent mechanisms that can reach back to pending cases and support reinstatement of earlier judgments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Personal jurisdiction: the court’s power over a defendant. Without it, a judgment normally cannot bind the defendant.
• PSJVTA “deemed consent”: Congress provided that if the PLO/PA engage in certain post-enactment actions (e.g., certain payments tied to incarcerated/deceased terrorists; certain U.S. activities), they are treated as having “consented” to being sued in U.S. federal courts for ATA claims.
• Fifth vs Fourteenth Amendment due process (jurisdiction): Fourteenth Amendment limits state-court jurisdiction (and federal courts applying state-like territorial principles). The Supreme Court in Fuld held Fifth Amendment due process allows greater flexibility for federal courts, especially where Congress and the President act in a foreign-policy/national-security space and the jurisdictional predicates meaningfully relate to the United States.
• Recall of mandate: an appellate court’s rare power to withdraw its final instruction (mandate) to the lower court, usually to prevent injustice after major legal changes.
• “Void judgment”: a judgment is often called “void” if entered without jurisdiction. This opinion explains that labels do not end the analysis; later events (like waiver, forfeiture, or a lawful jurisdictional cure applied to a pending case) can permit enforcement or reinstatement in some settings.
• Rule 702/Daubert gatekeeping: trial judges must ensure expert testimony is relevant and reliable, but appellate courts give substantial deference and reverse only for significant error causing prejudice.

5. Conclusion

Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org. (2026) operationalizes the Supreme Court’s Fuld decision by (1) recalling a long-final mandate, (2) applying PSJVTA’s conduct-triggered deemed-consent jurisdiction to a pending ATA case, and (3) reinstating and affirming a substantial pre-PSJVTA money judgment despite the district court’s original lack of personal jurisdiction. The opinion’s broader significance lies in its synthesis of (a) flexible Fifth Amendment territorial jurisdiction in foreign-policy-sensitive contexts, (b) equitable mandate-recall doctrine focused on efficiency and fairness rather than formal repose, and (c) a practical rejection of absolutist “voidness” arguments where Congress has provided a constitutionally valid jurisdictional cure tied to defendants’ knowing post-enactment conduct.