Protective-Order Violations and Repeated Surveillance Can Establish Specific Intent for Felony Stalking in Wyoming

Introduction

In Brent Douglas Gayman v. The State of Wyoming, 2026 WY 49, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed Brent Gayman’s conviction for felony stalking and misdemeanor violation of a protection order. The case arose from a deteriorating marital relationship between Mr. Gayman and his estranged wife, Rebecca Gayman, after she left the family home and later obtained a stipulated protection order against him.

The central appellate issue was whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Gayman acted with the specific intent to harass Ms. Gayman and engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass her, particularly where some incidents occurred before the protection order was entered.

Summary of the Opinion

The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Gayman’s felony stalking conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Court concluded that a rational jury could infer specific intent to harass from Mr. Gayman’s repeated conduct before and after entry of the protection order.

The Court emphasized that post-order conduct alone was sufficient: Mr. Gayman repeatedly drove by the residence, parked near it, allegedly used a shared garage to leave annotated and lewd materials, surveilled the home with binoculars, circled Ms. Gayman’s workplace, watched her from a nearby parking lot, and left a suicide note on her vehicle. These actions, many of which directly violated the protection order, supported the jury’s finding of a continuous course of conduct intended to harass.

The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Bray v. State

Bray v. State was the most important precedent in the Court’s analysis. The Court relied on it for the elements of felony stalking and for the principle that conduct occurring before a no-contact or protection order may help establish the “course of conduct” necessary for felony stalking. In Bray v. State, the defendant approached the victim’s property twice despite warnings and a court order, threatened violence, and later attempted to take the victim’s dog. The Wyoming Supreme Court held those incidents demonstrated continuity of purpose and supported an inference of intent to harass.

In the present case, the Court found Mr. Gayman’s conduct comparable to, and even more extensive than, the conduct in Bray v. State. The repeated surveillance, communications, and workplace conduct supported the conclusion that this was not accidental or isolated behavior.

Kobielusz v. State

Kobielusz v. State was cited for the general sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. Under that standard, the appellate court does not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility. Instead, it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and asks whether a jury could reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bittleston v. State

Bittleston v. State was cited for the proposition that felony stalking is a specific intent crime. The State must show that the defendant acted with intent to harass and engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass, with felony status arising when the conduct violates a protection order.

Storey

Storey reinforced that direct evidence of intent is not required. In that case, numerous calls and text messages over a short period, including offensive and hostile content, allowed the jury to infer a specific intent to harass. The Court used Storey to support the principle that repeated communications or conduct may create a sufficient pattern even without explicit threats of violence.

Dean v. State

Dean v. State was cited for the rule that specific intent may be proven by reasonable inferences drawn from the character of the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances. This principle was important because Mr. Gayman argued that the State failed to prove his subjective intent to harass.

Fox v. State

Fox v. State supported the related rule that intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. Because defendants rarely announce an intent to harass, courts permit juries to infer intent from conduct, repetition, context, and consequences.

Jones v. State

Jones v. State was cited for two related principles: first, that intent may be inferred from acts, words, conduct, and surrounding circumstances; and second, that it is the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.

Hawes v. State

Mr. Gayman relied on Hawes v. State, where the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a stalking conviction because the evidence did not establish a course of conduct. One of the two encounters in Hawes v. State was a chance encounter, undermining the inference of continuity and intent.

The Court rejected the analogy. Unlike Hawes v. State, Mr. Gayman’s conduct consisted of repeated, purposeful acts: surveillance, driving by the residence and workplace, prohibited contact, and leaving materials where Ms. Gayman would find them. The conduct was not accidental or isolated.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied Wyoming’s felony stalking statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506. Under the statute, stalking requires a “course of conduct,” meaning a pattern of acts over time showing continuity of purpose. “Harass” means conduct directed at a specific person that the defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress, fear for safety, or fear of property destruction.

The Court reasoned that Mr. Gayman’s actions satisfied these requirements. His behavior was directed specifically at Ms. Gayman, occurred repeatedly, and included several acts expressly prohibited by the protection order. The Court also noted testimony that his conduct was abusive, threatening, scary, and frightening.

Importantly, the Court held that the jury could consider pre-protection-order conduct as part of the broader course of conduct. But even setting aside the earlier incidents, the post-order conduct independently established the required pattern and intent.

Impact

This opinion strengthens Wyoming stalking law in several ways:

• It confirms that specific intent to harass may be inferred from repeated conduct and surrounding circumstances.
• It confirms that pre-protection-order conduct may help establish the broader course of conduct supporting felony stalking.
• It makes clear that surveillance, repeated drive-bys, indirect communications, and workplace monitoring can collectively support a stalking conviction.
• It underscores that violations of a protection order are powerful circumstantial evidence of intent to harass.

Future stalking prosecutions in Wyoming may rely on this case where the defendant’s conduct consists of repeated nonviolent but intimidating acts, especially where those acts occur despite a court order.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Specific intent: The State had to prove Mr. Gayman intended to harass, not merely that his actions upset Ms. Gayman. Intent can be inferred from behavior.
• Course of conduct: A repeated pattern of acts showing a shared purpose. One isolated accidental encounter usually is not enough.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: On appeal, the question is not whether the justices personally believe the defendant is guilty, but whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Circumstantial evidence: Evidence that indirectly proves a fact. For example, repeated surveillance can indirectly prove intent to harass.

Conclusion

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Gayman’s felony stalking conviction because the State presented sufficient evidence of a repeated, targeted course of conduct intended to harass Ms. Gayman. The decision confirms that Wyoming courts may consider both pre-order and post-order conduct when evaluating stalking, and that repeated violations of a protection order can strongly support an inference of specific intent.

The case is significant because it clarifies how stalking may be proven through patterns of surveillance, indirect contact, and repeated intimidating behavior, even without direct evidence that the defendant expressly intended to harass.