Proportional Cash-to-Drug Conversion Using Tested Purity; Bare Denials Fail to Create Rule 32 Sentencing Disputes

Case: United States v. Moore, et al. (consolidated appeals including Ellis Lekieth Hull)
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date: 2025-03-12
Disposition: Sentences affirmed (unpublished; “Not Recommended for Publication”)

I. Introduction

These consolidated appeals arose from a short-lived (January–March 2, 2023) drug-trafficking conspiracy operating in and around Kalamazoo, Michigan. Investigators—prompted by a confidential informant’s report that Terrance Moore and Ellis Hull coordinated sales using a shared “dope phone”—conducted surveillance, executed a “trash pull,” obtained search warrants, and searched Terrance Moore’s rented Hazard Avenue house and a rented Nissan Altima.

The search yielded large quantities of drugs (including fentanyl, hydrocodone, and methamphetamine), trafficking paraphernalia, and firearms. The government charged three defendants—Darnell Daishan Moore, Terrance Jamal Moore, and Ellis Lekieth Hull—each of whom pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C) (with Terrance’s plea specifying 50g+ of pure methamphetamine under § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii)).

On appeal, the defendants challenged discrete sentencing issues: cash-to-drug conversion methodology and purity assumptions; leadership enhancement; firearm enhancement and Rule 32 dispute resolution; relevant-conduct attribution; substantive reasonableness; and the handling of Hull’s schizophrenia in the variance/departure analysis.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Applying the abuse-of-discretion framework for sentencing review from Gall v. United States, the Sixth Circuit affirmed all sentences as procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court held:

• Cash conversion: It was not clearly erroneous to convert seized cash into drug weight using the proportions of drug types found at the stash house, and to treat the methamphetamine component as “actual” methamphetamine where lab testing showed purity. The district court also “erred on the side of caution” by using a conservative (higher) price-per-ounce.
• Leadership: A §3B1.1(c) enhancement for Terrance was supported by evidence that he controlled the conspiracy’s “hub” (the rented Hazard house) and directed customer communications, pricing, and delivery logistics through messages and the shared phone.
• Firearms / Rule 32: The firearm enhancement for Darnell was properly applied based on evidence of his own firearm-related communications and the foreseeability of Terrance’s firearms; there was no improper burden shifting. The Rule 32(i)(3)(B) claim failed under plain-error review because the district court sufficiently addressed the issue and, under circuit precedent, a defendant must offer more than a bare denial to place PSR facts “in dispute.”
• Mental health variance/departure: The district court considered Hull’s schizophrenia, rejected a departure (unreviewable absent a mistaken belief about authority), and reasonably declined a variance after finding Hull “fully engaged” and not operating with “significantly reduced mental capacity.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Standards of review and sentencing framework

• Gall v. United States: Anchored the appellate posture: sentencing reviewed for “reasonableness” under abuse of discretion, with procedural and substantive components. The panel repeatedly framed its analysis through Gall’s “significant procedural error” checklist.
• United States v. Morgan: Reinforced the procedural/substantive dichotomy in Sixth Circuit practice.
• United States v. Brooks: Supplied the mixed standard for Guidelines issues: de novo review for legal interpretations, clear error for factual findings.
• United States v. Jones: Provided both (i) the presumption that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable and (ii) the abuse-of-discretion lens for reasonableness challenges.
• United States v. Parrish and United States v. Sexton: Constrained substantive-reasonableness arguments that merely ask the appellate court to reweigh § 3553(a) factors.

2. Drug-quantity approximation and cash-to-drug conversion

• United States v. McReynolds: Confirmed clear-error review for factual drug-quantity determinations.
• United States v. Crowe: Used as a plain-language reminder that quantity drives severity under §2D1.1.
• United States v. Sandridge and United States v. Johnson: Supplied two guardrails for approximation: minimal reliability and “err on the side of caution.”
• United States v. Russell and United States v. Warman: Established that seized funds can be converted into drug quantities, but the government must prove the attributable money and conversion ratio by a preponderance.
• United States v. Mahaffey (quoting United States v. Brannon): Framed the “competent evidence” requirement: approximations survive if supported by competent record evidence.
• United States v. Gilliam-French: Helped the panel reject the notion that controlled-buy samples are necessarily the correct benchmark for broader drug activity—supporting the district court’s choice to look to the seizure’s composition.
• United States v. Murillo-Almarez: Supported the acceptability of arithmetic methodologies (money divided by typical street price) for conversion calculations.
• United States v. Frazier and United States v. Lucio: Discussed and distinguished—Frazier as inapposite (not cash conversion), and Lucio as factually different and not undermining the district court’s “plausible basis” here.

3. Leadership-role enhancement

• United States v. Washington and United States v. Robinson: Emphasized the district court’s superior position to assess “factual nuances” of leadership and endorsed deferential review of the organizer/leader conclusion where supported by record evidence.

4. Firearm enhancement, foreseeability, burdens, and Rule 32

• United States v. Wheaton, United States v. Darwich, United States v. Wilson (quoting United States v. West): Established that firearm-possession findings are factual and reviewed for clear error, with the clear-error “definite and firm conviction” formulation.
• United States v. Gardiner (quoting United States v. Emuegbunam): Supplied the four-part plain-error test governing the unpreserved Rule 32 claim.
• United States v. Lang: Was pivotal to the Rule 32(i)(3)(B) analysis: a defendant must present “some evidence beyond a bare denial” to truly dispute PSR factual allegations and require more elaborate factfinding.
• United States v. Catalan (quoting United States v. Hill), plus United States v. Rios (citing United States v. Penaloza): Set the government’s initial burden (possession during offense/relevant conduct) and then the defendant’s rebuttal burden under the “clearly improbable” standard once the presumption arises.
• United States v. Hough (via Darwich): Provided the presumption that a weapon, once shown possessed, is connected to the offense.
• United States v. Woods: Supplied the rule that a co-conspirator’s firearm possession can be attributed through relevant conduct if reasonably foreseeable.
• United States v. Greeno, abrogated on other grounds by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen: Used for the procedural point that the defendant must come forward with evidence (not mere argument) to show the connection is clearly improbable; Bruen’s abrogation did not affect that burden principle.
• United States v. Cochran: Distinguished: there, a hidden gun under a co-conspirator’s car seat was not foreseeable; here, guns were displayed/accessibly present in the stash house and linked to stash-house drug trafficking.
• United States v. Mack: Cited as an example of upholding firearm-enhancement factfinding where the district court considered record facts.

5. Relevant conduct and particularized findings (plain-error posture)

• United States v. Donohue and United States v. Boyd: Supported the panel’s refusal to find plain error in the absence of an objection requesting particularized findings at sentencing.
• United States v. Louchart: Reinforced that limiting admissions in a guilty plea does not bar the government from relying on related conduct to support the sentence.

6. Mental health departures/variances and explanation obligations

• United States v. Coleman: Controlled appellate jurisdiction: denials of departures are generally unreviewable unless the court mistakenly believes it lacks authority.
• United States v. Johns: Provided the procedural-error principle that a sentence may be unreasonable if the court “wholly fails” to address legitimate mitigating arguments.
• United States v. Judge (quoting United States v. Vonner): Framed the adequacy-of-explanation inquiry as whether the record shows the judge listened, considered the evidence, and accounted for the defendant’s circumstances.
• United States v. Elliott: Supported the substantive reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence where the district court weighed schizophrenia and criminal history.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Cash-to-drug conversion: proportionality, purity, and “competent evidence”

The opinion’s central sentencing principle is pragmatic: when cash is seized in a stash-house search and the seized drugs are lab-tested, the district court may approximate the cash’s drug equivalent by (i) allocating the cash among drug types in proportion to the seized drugs and (ii) using the tested purity to determine whether “actual” methamphetamine (not “mixture”) applies. This approach satisfied the Guidelines’ approximation directive (U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 cmt. n.5) and the Sixth Circuit’s reliability/caution requirements from United States v. Sandridge and United States v. Johnson.

The panel rejected two common defense moves:

• “Only controlled buys show what was sold.” The court held no authority requires actual sales evidence to justify using the seizure’s composition as a proxy for the conspiracy’s scale and mix—particularly where there was additional corroboration (trash pull meth residue, individually packaged baggies, large quantities of meth).
• “Treat it as mixture to be cautious.” Caution does not mean ignoring uncontroverted lab purity. The court found caution satisfied by using a conservative price point (higher price per ounce yields fewer ounces for the same cash).

2. Leadership enhancement: “hub” control plus operational direction

For §3B1.1(c), the court emphasized functional authority rather than formal titles. Terrance’s rental of the Hazard house—characterized as the conspiracy’s “hub”—combined with communications showing he controlled pricing and directed co-conspirators’ customer interactions, supported organizer/leader status under the factors in §3B1.1 cmt. n.4. The panel’s reliance on messaging evidence reflects an evidentiary trend: leadership can be proven through digital logistics (pricing, delivery, and customer routing) even absent testimony from co-conspirators.

3. Firearm enhancement: correct burden sequencing and foreseeability

The court’s firearm analysis carefully tracked burden allocation. After the government establishes possession during the offense (or relevant conduct), a presumption arises that the weapon was connected to the drug crime (United States v. Darwich). The defendant must then show it is “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected (United States v. Catalan). The panel found no improper burden shifting when the judge pressed defense counsel to substantiate the claim of non-connection: that inquiry aligns with the defendant’s rebuttal burden.

On foreseeability, the panel distinguished United States v. Cochran by focusing on visibility/accessibility. Firearms present “out in the open” in a stash house supporting ongoing trafficking made possession by the co-conspirator reasonably foreseeable.

4. Rule 32(i)(3)(B): when a PSR fact is truly “disputed”

The opinion reinforces a practical procedural rule from United States v. Lang: a defendant must produce some evidence beyond a bare denial to convert a PSR assertion into a factual “dispute” requiring further resolution. Here, the district court also made on-the-record findings (photos with guns, firearm location, “I need my gun” message), which further undercut any Rule 32 violation claim—especially under plain-error review.

5. Mental health: departure unreviewability, variance discretion, and record-based engagement

The court separated (i) departures (largely unreviewable under United States v. Coleman absent a mistaken view of authority) from (ii) variances (reviewable for reasonableness). On the merits, the district court did not “wholly fail” to address mitigation (United States v. Johns): it considered schizophrenia, found insufficient evidence of unusual degree or significantly reduced capacity, found no proof of manipulation by Terrance, and still recommended mental-health treatment. Under United States v. Judge and United States v. Vonner, that record sufficed.

C. Impact

• Sentencing proof in stash-house cases: The decision signals that where drugs are seized and tested at a stash house, courts may treat that seizure as a representative snapshot for converting contemporaneously seized cash—especially when supported by ancillary indicators (trash pull residue, packaging, admissions of routine storage).
• “Actual” vs “mixture” methamphetamine: Defendants seeking “mixture” treatment need affirmative evidence undermining purity testing or showing that sales involved non-pure product; mere absence of prior tested sales samples will not defeat reliance on lab results from the seizure.
• Firearm enhancements remain sticky: Open possession in a stash location plus communications about retrieving a gun can make it difficult to show “clearly improbable” non-connection. Foreseeability is easier to establish where the firearm is visible and the premises function as a drug hub.
• Rule 32 practice point: The opinion underscores that counsel should submit affidavits, call witnesses, or otherwise provide evidence when contesting PSR allegations—especially for enhancements—rather than relying on argumentative denials.
• Mental health mitigation: The decision reinforces that schizophrenia (even when diagnosed) does not automatically translate into a departure/variance; defendants should be prepared to show degree (“unusual”) and functional impairment at the time of the offense (“significantly reduced mental capacity”) and to tie it causally to the offense conduct.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Converted drug weight: The Guidelines use a common metric to aggregate multiple drug types. Courts convert each drug (and sometimes cash proceeds) into an equivalent weight figure to produce a single base offense level under §2D1.1.
• “Actual” methamphetamine vs methamphetamine “mixture”: “Actual” refers to the pure drug content; mixture refers to the entire weight of a substance containing methamphetamine. “Actual” typically yields harsher guideline calculations at the same gross weight.
• Approximating quantity (U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 cmt. n.5): When seized amounts do not capture the operation’s full scale, a judge may estimate using reliable indicators like typical prices and financial evidence (e.g., cash believed to be drug proceeds).
• Relevant conduct (U.S.S.G. §1B1.3): In a conspiracy, a defendant can be held accountable at sentencing for co-conspirators’ acts that are within the jointly undertaken activity, further the activity, and are reasonably foreseeable—even if not charged as separate counts.
• Leadership enhancement (U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c)): A two-level increase applies if the defendant organized/managed/supervised at least one other participant. Evidence can include control over premises, pricing decisions, directing others’ tasks, or managing customer flow.
• Firearm enhancement (U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1)) and “clearly improbable”: Once weapon possession is shown during the drug offense, the burden shifts to the defendant to show it is clearly improbable the weapon was connected (e.g., a hunting rifle stored away for sporting purposes).
• Departure vs variance: A departure is a Guidelines-authorized adjustment (often less reviewable on appeal). A variance is a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors (reviewed for reasonableness).
• Rule 32(i)(3)(B): The sentencing court must resolve disputed PSR matters that affect sentencing. But under Sixth Circuit precedent, a defendant must do more than deny; they must produce evidence to create a real factual dispute.
• Standards of review: “Clear error” is highly deferential for factfinding; “plain error” is even harder to satisfy for unpreserved issues; “abuse of discretion” governs the overall reasonableness of sentencing decisions.

V. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion affirms a sentencing toolkit frequently used in modern drug conspiracy cases: proportionate conversion of seized cash into drug quantity grounded in the seizure’s drug mix and lab-tested purity; leadership findings supported by control of a stash-house hub and digital communications; firearm enhancements sustained through proper burden sequencing and foreseeability analysis; and a clear procedural message that PSR disputes require evidence, not just argument. For mental-health mitigation, the decision illustrates that district courts retain broad discretion to deny departures and variances when the record does not show unusual severity, significantly reduced capacity, or concrete exploitation tied to the offense—so long as the court meaningfully considers the argument on the record.