Property-in-Washington Nexus Required to Recognize Foreign-Country Money Judgments Absent Personal Jurisdiction

Case: Alterna Aircraft V B Ltd. v. SpiceJet Ltd., No. 103759-7 (Wash. Apr. 9, 2026) (en banc)
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Washington
Author: González, J. (majority); Madsen, J.P.T. (dissent)

1. Introduction

This decision addresses a threshold question at the intersection of cross-border judgment recognition and constitutional limits on state-court power: when a judgment creditor seeks recognition in Washington of a foreign-country money judgment under the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, chapter 6.40A RCW, must the creditor establish a Washington jurisdictional nexus?

The parties are a foreign judgment creditor, Alterna Aircraft V B Ltd. (an Irish aircraft lessor), and a foreign judgment debtor, SpiceJet Ltd. (an Indian airline). After Alterna obtained an English money judgment of roughly $12 million arising from aircraft lease defaults, Alterna filed in King County Superior Court to recognize the English judgment under chapter 6.40A RCW. SpiceJet specially appeared and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under CR 12(b)(2), asserting it had no Washington contacts and no assets here.

The superior court and the Court of Appeals held that Washington personal jurisdiction (and the presence of property) was not required to recognize a foreign-country money judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and announced a new Washington rule: absent general or specific jurisdiction, the judgment creditor must establish that the judgment debtor has property in Washington before recognition may be granted.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Holding: “In the absence of general or specific jurisdiction, a debtor must have property in Washington before a foreign country judgment may be recognized under chapter 6.40A RCW.”
  • Disposition: Reversed and remanded. The trial court denied the CR 12(b)(2) motion based on a legal error (treating recognition as jurisdiction-free). The Supreme Court ordered further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing to determine whether SpiceJet has property in Washington sufficient to support jurisdiction.
  • Key doctrinal move: Recognition under chapter 6.40A RCW is not “ministerial” like filing a sister-state judgment under chapter 6.36 RCW; it is a judicial act that culminates in an enforceable Washington judgment and therefore requires an adequate jurisdictional basis.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Court’s Decision)

1) Washington standards for review and jurisdictional motions

  • Brown v. State, 155 Wn.2d 254 (2005): Cited for de novo review of constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. It supports the Supreme Court’s independent reassessment of the jurisdictional and statutory framework.
  • State v. LG Elecs., Inc., 186 Wn.2d 169 (2016): Central to the procedural posture. The Court relies on it for: (i) the de novo review of personal jurisdiction rulings; (ii) the “prima facie showing” standard when a CR 12(b)(2) motion is decided without an evidentiary hearing; and (iii) the principle that jurisdictional challenges may be renewed after discovery.
  • FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954 (2014) and MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 60 Wn. App. 414 (1991): These reinforce the procedural framework for early jurisdictional challenges and the prima facie burden.

2) Washington’s foreign-judgment recognition background

  • Tonga Air Servs., Ltd. v. Fowler, 118 Wn.2d 718 (1992): Used to situate recognition/enforcement of foreign judgments as “largely a matter of state law,” historically grounded in common law and bounded by constitutional limits. This case anchors the majority’s view that chapter 6.40A RCW operates against a background assumption of jurisdictional constraints.

3) U.S. Supreme Court due process and jurisdiction doctrine

  • Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977): The key jurisdiction case. The majority draws two propositions: (i) mere presence of unrelated property is insufficient to adjudicate an underlying controversy unless minimum contacts are satisfied; and (ii) in rem/quasi in rem jurisdiction is limited to the property supporting jurisdiction and does not impose personal liability when the owner is not before the court. The majority relies heavily on Shaffer’s conceptual separation between “determining a debt” and “realizing on a debt,” particularly the oft-cited footnote 36.
  • Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945): Provides the “minimum contacts” due process baseline. The majority uses it (via Shaffer and other cases) to justify the requirement of a forum nexus for state-court power.
  • Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999): Quoted (through First Inv. Corp. v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd.) for the principle that jurisdiction is a prerequisite to certain forms of judicial action, supporting the “jurisdiction first” framing.

4) Ministerial vs discretionary acts (full faith and credit comparison)

  • SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 168 Wn.2d 593 (2010) (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. City of Seattle, 137 Wash. 455 (1926)): Used to define “ministerial” acts. This definition is crucial to the majority’s rejection of the analogy to sister-state judgment filing. Recognition under chapter 6.40A RCW is deemed non-ministerial because it involves judicial evaluation and discretion under RCW 6.40A.030 and .040.

5) Split of authority on recognition without forum nexus

The majority acknowledges a national split, directly engaging both sides before choosing the “nexus required” approach.

  • Cases allowing recognition without personal jurisdiction/property:
    • Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42 (2001): Cited as adopting the view that due process does not require personal jurisdiction or in-forum property for recognition.
    • Abu Dhabi Com. Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contracting & Fin. Servs. Co., 117 A.D.3d 609 (2014): Another New York decision permitting recognition without an assets-in-forum prerequisite.
    • Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Iowa 2002): Cited as following Lenchyshyn and collecting similar authorities.
  • Cases requiring at least property (or jurisdiction) for recognition/confirmation:
    • Dynaresource de Mex. S.A. de C.V. v. Goldgroup Res. Inc., 667 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App. 2023): Quoted for the proposition that it is “antithetical” to allow recognition suits where the debtor has no ties—no attachable assets and no personal jurisdiction. This case becomes the majority’s most direct policy-and-due-process analog.
    • Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assur. Co., 260 Mich. App. 144 (2003): Cited as adopting a property/jurisdiction nexus requirement and drawing from the Restatement.
    • First Inv. Corp. v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2012): Cited (with Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.) for the proposition that jurisdiction is necessary before confirming certain foreign arbitral awards, reinforcing the structural requirement of adjudicative power before judicial recognition/confirmation.
  • Additional authority referenced in the majority’s conceptual framework:
    RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (A.L.I. 1987): The majority uses its tripartite taxonomy—jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce—to frame why recognition is not “jurisdiction-free.”

6) The dissent’s counter-tradition (comity and the Uniform Act’s design)

  • Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895): The dissent’s anchor for the traditional comity approach—if the foreign proceedings were fair and the rendering court competent, merits are not retried and the judgment should be respected.
  • In re Est. of Toland, 180 Wn.2d 836 (2014): Cited to note Washington does not follow Hilton’s reciprocity requirement.
  • State v. Bartholomew, 104 Wn.2d 844 (1985): Used by the dissent for the proposition that “shall” creates a duty, supporting the dissent’s view that RCW 6.40A.030(1) obligates recognition when statutory conditions are met—without adding an extra jurisdictional hurdle.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Recognition as an “action” that requires adjudicative authority

The majority starts from first principles: courts must act only where they have jurisdiction. It then reads RCW 6.40A.050 as creating two procedural paths:

  • RCW 6.40A.050(1): If recognition is sought “as an original matter,” the creditor must file “an action seeking recognition.” For the majority, this is dispositive: filing an “action” asks a Washington court to enter a judgment, which ordinarily requires jurisdiction over the defendant (or at least over property supporting in rem/quasi in rem jurisdiction).
  • RCW 6.40A.050(2): If recognition is sought in a pending action, it may be raised by counterclaim/cross-claim/defense; then jurisdiction “stands or falls” with that underlying case.

2) Rejecting the “full faith and credit” analogy

Alterna urged the court to treat foreign recognition like sister-state recognition. The majority distinguishes:

  • Sister-state judgments: Under U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 and chapter 6.36 RCW, Washington provides a largely administrative route: filing an authenticated judgment with the clerk (RCW 6.36.025), after which it becomes enforceable as a Washington judgment.
  • Foreign-country judgments: Not constitutionally compelled by full faith and credit. Under chapter 6.40A RCW, a judge must evaluate mandatory and discretionary nonrecognition grounds (RCW 6.40A.030, .040), so recognition is not “ministerial” in the SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire sense.

3) Due process, property, and the meaning of Shaffer footnote 36

The court treats recognition as an “action to realize on a debt,” not merely a ceremonial act. Because recognition in Washington makes the judgment enforceable “like a judgment rendered by a Washington court” (RCW 6.40A.060(2)), the majority sees constitutional consequences: a recognized judgment can trigger Washington enforcement tools without any later statutory “second look” at recognition.

Against this backdrop, the majority reads Shaffer v. Heitner footnote 36 as supporting the fairness of allowing collection where property exists, but not as authorizing recognition in a jurisdiction with no nexus at all. The court thus adopts a minimum requirement: if there is no general or specific personal jurisdiction, there must be property in Washington.

4) Application to this case and remand

Because the trial court denied the CR 12(b)(2) motion based on a legal premise (no jurisdiction required), it never made the necessary factual findings about in-state property. The Supreme Court notes the record is thin—Alterna did not identify the alleged King County property, and later references to Boeing-related contracts/claims did not establish that SpiceJet had “contract- or claims-based property rights in Washington State.”

The Supreme Court remands for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a property nexus exists sufficient to support recognition.

C. Impact

1) A new Washington threshold requirement for foreign-country recognition actions

The most immediate impact is procedural and strategic: creditors seeking recognition under chapter 6.40A RCW must now establish one of the following at the outset (or risk CR 12(b)(2) dismissal):

  • general personal jurisdiction in Washington; or
  • specific personal jurisdiction in Washington; or
  • property in Washington sufficient to supply an in rem/quasi in rem jurisdictional nexus.

2) Pleading and proof consequences

  • More particularized allegations: Bare assertions that a debtor has “cognizable interests” in Washington are less likely to suffice, especially where the court anticipates an evidentiary hearing on property.
  • Earlier jurisdictional litigation: Debtors can press jurisdiction challenges at the recognition stage, not merely at enforcement.
  • Forum selection pressure: Creditors may increasingly file recognition actions only in states where assets can be shown, or where personal jurisdiction is clearly available.

3) Tension with Uniform Act “parity” goals and possible legislative response

The dissent warns the majority’s rule “undermines what the statute was designed to accomplish,” emphasizing that RCW 6.40A.030(1) says a court “shall recognize” a qualifying judgment and already embeds due process checks (e.g., RCW 6.40A.030(2), (3), and RCW 6.40A.040). That disagreement tees up potential legislative clarification if Washington wishes to align more closely with jurisdictions following Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc..

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Recognition vs. enforcement: “Recognition” is the court’s decision to treat a foreign-country money judgment as valid and give it domestic effect. “Enforcement” is using legal tools (garnishment, execution, liens, etc.) to collect. The majority treats recognition as sufficiently consequential—because it produces an enforceable Washington judgment under RCW 6.40A.060(2)—that it demands a jurisdictional nexus.
  • Personal jurisdiction (general/specific): General jurisdiction allows suit for any claim (typically where a corporation is “at home”). Specific jurisdiction allows suit when the claim arises from the defendant’s forum-related conduct. If neither exists, the court may still act against property in the state (in rem/quasi in rem), but only within limits.
  • In rem / quasi in rem jurisdiction: Jurisdiction based on property in the forum. After Shaffer v. Heitner, property presence alone does not automatically justify adjudicating unrelated disputes; but it can support proceedings aimed at “realizing on” an already-established debt—i.e., collection where assets are found.
  • Minimum contacts: The due process idea (from Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington) that a defendant must have a sufficient relationship with the forum before its courts can exercise power over the defendant.
  • CR 12(b)(2) and “prima facie” showing: A defendant can move early to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. If the court decides the motion without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction (per State v. LG Elecs., Inc.).
  • Comity: A tradition (associated with Hilton v. Guyot) of respecting foreign judgments when rendered by competent courts with fair procedures, not because the Constitution compels it, but because respect promotes international order and reciprocity. The dissent views chapter 6.40A RCW as codifying a comity-based gateway that should not be narrowed by extra, non-textual jurisdictional requirements.

5. Conclusion

Alterna Aircraft V B Ltd. v. SpiceJet Ltd. establishes a significant Washington limitation on foreign-country money judgment recognition: when neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction exists, the creditor must show the debtor has property in Washington as a prerequisite to recognition under chapter 6.40A RCW.

The majority frames this as a constitutionally grounded jurisdictional constraint and rejects treating foreign recognition as akin to the ministerial filing of sister-state judgments under chapter 6.36 RCW. The dissent, grounded in Hilton v. Guyot and the Uniform Act’s “shall recognize” language, views the new rule as inconsistent with the statute’s goal of functional parity once statutory due process checks are satisfied.

On remand, the practical battleground will be evidentiary: what qualifies as “property in Washington” (especially intangible contract or claim rights), and what showing suffices to establish that nexus at the recognition stage.