Progress in Recovery Does Not Preclude Parental Stagnation: Individualized Safety and Timely Reunification

Case: In re R.A., Juvenile, No. 26-AP-249
Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
Decision date: November 6, 2026
Disposition: Termination of mother’s parental rights affirmed.

Precedential status: This entry order was issued by a three-justice panel. Its express notice states that such decisions are not to be considered precedent before any tribunal. Accordingly, the decision applies existing law; it does not establish a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

This case concerns whether a parent’s progress in addressing substance use prevents termination of parental rights when other substantial barriers to safe reunification remain. It also addresses how a court may consider safety risks associated with an abusive partner without improperly attributing that partner’s conduct to the parent who experienced the abuse.

J.M., the mother of R.A., appealed an order terminating her parental rights. She argued that the family division failed to evaluate her separately from the child’s father, violated her procedural due-process rights, and incorrectly found that her parenting progress had stagnated. The Vermont Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed.

The decision’s central lesson is that progress toward one important reunification objective does not necessarily establish sufficient improvement in overall parenting capacity. The court must examine the individual parent’s circumstances, the child’s safety, and whether parenting can resume within a reasonable time measured from the child’s perspective.

2. Background and Procedural History

Initial intervention and reunification requirements

R.A. was born in June 2023. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) already knew mother because an older child had previously entered DCF custody, partly because of mother’s drug use. Mother relapsed on cocaine and fentanyl in February 2024. During a DCF home visit, she also reported that father had destroyed her apartment while she and R.A. were inside.

The State filed a child-in-need-of-care-or-supervision (CHINS) petition in April 2024. Mother stipulated to its merits in June, acknowledging that her substance use exposed R.A. to harm. The disposition order sought reunification with either parent.

Mother’s reunification requirements extended beyond abstaining from illicit drugs. They included mental-health assessment and treatment, relapse prevention, random drug screening, parenting education, participation in the child’s medical and dental care, emotional regulation, lawful conduct, safe boundaries, and engagement with DCF.

Progress and continuing concerns

Mother consistently attended weekly supervised visits and maintained a loving relationship with R.A. She also engaged respectfully with DCF and achieved a period without illicit drug use. These improvements were expressly recognized by the family division.

Other concerns persisted. Mother pleaded guilty to DUI and simple assault in May 2025. Her efforts to enter or complete substance-use treatment were affected by alcohol use and relapse. At the final hearing, she lacked a treatment provider, was not consistently participating in recovery groups, and continued using alcohol and marijuana.

Mother did not complete a mental-health assessment. Family Time Coaching ended because of nonattendance, and she missed enough child-abuse-prevention classes that she did not expect to complete the course. She did not attend R.A.’s medical or dental appointments, and her visits never increased beyond the supervised arrangement.

Housing also remained unresolved. Mother experienced periods of unstable housing and homelessness. Although she moved into her father’s home in March 2026, she did not tell DCF, leaving the home’s suitability unestablished at the hearing.

Safety concerns included continued contact with father. In May 2026, mother reported that he had grabbed her throat and choked her after they had been drinking. Although she denied that they remained a couple, the trial court found it likely that they continued to be involved and hoped to reunite.

The termination proceedings

The State petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights in December 2025. Following hearings in April and May 2026, the family division found changed circumstances through parental stagnation and determined that termination served R.A.’s best interests.

R.A. had lived with her foster family since March 2024. The foster parents met her needs, provided emotional security, and were willing to adopt her. Mother acknowledged that she was not yet ready to parent but requested additional time. Father’s rights were also terminated, but he did not appeal; only mother’s termination was before the Supreme Court.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed on three principal grounds:

  1. Mother received an individualized assessment. The family division distinguished her progress and circumstances from father’s. Its safety findings concerned the consequences of her own conduct and continuing associations, not responsibility for father’s violence.
  2. The due-process argument did not justify reversal. Mother did not demonstrate preservation of the argument below or identify a missing procedural safeguard. She had notice, appointed counsel, and a full evidentiary hearing. The record also contradicted her contention that separation resulted simply from her experience of domestic abuse.
  3. The evidence supported stagnation despite partial progress. Improvement in illicit-drug use did not eliminate unresolved concerns about treatment, mental health, housing, parenting involvement, and safe relationships.

The court also upheld the determination that mother could not resume parenting within a reasonable time, considering R.A.’s young age, extended placement, and need for permanence.

4. Analysis

A. Governing statutory framework

Termination sought after an initial disposition requires two distinct determinations. Under 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b), the court must first find changed circumstances warranting modification of the existing disposition. It must then determine under 33 V.S.A. § 5114 whether termination serves the child’s best interests.

The inquiries are related but not interchangeable. Establishing stagnation does not automatically establish that termination is appropriate. Conversely, a child’s successful foster placement does not dispense with the threshold requirement of changed circumstances.

Here, the family division found the underlying facts by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court reviewed factual findings for clear error and examined whether those findings supported the court’s conclusions. It did not conduct a new evidentiary hearing or independently reassess witness credibility.

B. Precedents cited and their influence

In re K.F., 2004 VT 40, ¶ 8, 176 Vt. 636 (mem.)

This authority supplied the two-stage structure for post-disposition termination: changed circumstances followed by a best-interests determination. It organized the analysis and prevented parental shortcomings from being treated as sufficient, without a separate examination of the child’s interests. The family division satisfied that structure by addressing stagnation before evaluating R.A.’s relationships, adjustment, parental involvement, and prospects for timely reunification.

In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504, 515 (1990)

This case explains that changed circumstances are most often established when a parent’s ability to care properly for the child has stagnated or deteriorated over time. Its importance is that the State need not prove a wholly new crisis. Continued inability to provide safe care, despite the passage of time and an opportunity to work toward reunification, may satisfy the threshold requirement.

In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998) (mem.)

The court relied on this decision for two propositions: the most important best-interests consideration is whether the parent can resume parenting within a reasonable period, and appellate courts uphold supported conclusions and findings that are not clearly erroneous. It therefore supplied both the substantive focus on timely parenting capacity and the restrained standard of appellate review.

In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175, 178 (1993)

This precedent supported deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations. Mother disputed the finding that she and father remained involved, but the Supreme Court declined to reweigh her testimony. The citation matters because her disagreement with the trial court’s interpretation of the relationship did not itself establish reversible error.

Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

Mother invoked this federal class action concerning mothers and children separated because the mothers experienced domestic abuse. As described in the opinion, the federal court held that procedural due process was infringed when an agency removed or unnecessarily delayed returning a child solely because the father abused the mother, without evidence that the mother had abused or neglected the child. The affected mothers were entitled to appointed counsel.

The Supreme Court distinguished that situation. Mother had stipulated that her illicit-drug use left R.A. without proper parental care, and the termination findings addressed her own unresolved parenting and safety issues. Moreover, she already had appointed counsel and an evidentiary hearing. The decision therefore did not reject the protection against treating victimization alone as neglect; it found that the protection did not require reversal on this record.

In re C.B., 2020 VT 80, ¶ 9, 213 Vt. 215

This authority establishes that an issue generally must be raised below to preserve it for appeal. Mother failed to demonstrate preservation of her due-process claim. The citation identifies an independent procedural obstacle to appellate relief, separate from the court’s additional explanation that her argument lacked factual and procedural support.

In re K.G., 2023 VT 51, ¶ 43, 218 Vt. 419

This decision supported the conclusion that notice, an opportunity for a hearing, and appointed counsel provided due process in the juvenile proceeding under consideration. Mother received those safeguards and identified no additional procedure she had been denied. The opinion used this authority to answer her procedural claim, not to announce that these safeguards resolve every conceivable constitutional challenge.

In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994)

This was the principal authority addressing mother’s partial-progress argument. It explains that stagnation may be shown by the passage of time without improvement in parenting capacity and that some progress in some aspects of a parent’s life does not preclude changed circumstances. It allowed the court to recognize mother’s recovery efforts while still concluding that her overall ability to provide safe care had not improved sufficiently.

In re D.M., 2004 VT 41, ¶ 7, 176 Vt. 639 (mem.)

This case directs attention to whether the individual parent has demonstrated the improvement contemplated when the children were removed. It reinforced both central themes of the opinion: individualized assessment and meaningful improvement in parenting capacity. The relevant question was not simply whether mother had stopped using particular drugs, but whether the anticipated changes necessary for safe reunification had occurred.

C. Why progress in recovery did not defeat stagnation

Mother’s strongest argument was that she had improved the condition principally responsible for removal: illicit-drug use. The court accepted that this was genuine progress. It nevertheless rejected the premise that improvement in the original problem necessarily resolves the entire reunification inquiry.

The case plan identified several interconnected conditions necessary for safe parenting. Mother’s recovery lacked ongoing treatment and consistent relapse-prevention support. Her mental-health assessment remained incomplete. Housing suitability had not been established. Parenting services had not been completed, visits had not expanded, and she had not participated in important aspects of R.A.’s care.

These were not treated merely as failures to complete a checklist. The court connected them to mother’s continuing inability to provide safe, stable, and informed care. Her own acknowledgment that she was not ready to parent further supported the finding that progress had not translated into present parenting capacity.

The reasoning is therefore narrower than a rule permitting termination whenever a parent misses a case-plan requirement. The material question is whether unresolved requirements reflect continuing barriers to caring properly for the child.

D. Individualized assessment and domestic-abuse-related risks

The court distinguished between blaming mother for father’s violence and considering child-safety risks arising from her continuing contact with unsafe individuals. It found that the family division had done the latter.

The trial court expressly credited mother’s achievements, including her visits, respectful engagement, emotional regulation during most of the case, and period without illicit drugs. Those findings differed substantially from its assessment of father, who had not meaningfully engaged with the reunification process. This separate treatment undermined mother’s claim that the parents had been evaluated as an undifferentiated unit.

The opinion also addressed mother’s failure to disclose problems with the original visitation arrangement. Maternal grandmother sometimes supervised while under the influence of alcohol, and father appeared despite instructions not to attend. Mother was not held responsible for their actions, but her failure to inform DCF was relevant to whether safety concerns were being communicated and managed.

This distinction requires careful application. The decision does not establish that experiencing abuse, remaining in contact with an abusive partner, or struggling to leave a relationship automatically constitutes neglect. Its reasoning depends on individualized findings about parenting capacity and risk to the child.

The Supreme Court also declined to resolve mother’s allegations that DCF itself had improperly blamed her. Its conclusion was that, whatever DCF’s views, the judicial findings supporting termination did not improperly attribute father’s abuse to mother.

E. Procedural due process: preservation and substance

The due-process analysis had several layers. First, mother did not show that she had presented the issue to the family division. Second, she identified no additional procedural protection she had been denied despite receiving notice, counsel, and an evidentiary hearing. Third, the factual premise of her argument was unsupported: the proceeding did not originate simply because she was a domestic-abuse victim.

These independent considerations limit the constitutional significance of the ruling. The court did not comprehensively decide when an agency’s treatment of a domestic-abuse survivor becomes unconstitutional. It concluded that this particular argument, on this record and procedural posture, did not warrant reversal.

F. Best interests and the child’s timeframe

The family division considered R.A.’s relationships, adjustment, mother’s role, and the likelihood of timely reunification. Mother’s loving relationship with R.A. mattered, but it did not outweigh all other considerations. Weekly supervised visits had not developed into greater responsibility for the child’s daily care.

R.A. looked to her foster family for comfort and support, was well adjusted to that home and daycare, and had her needs met there. Most importantly, mother remained unable to parent after an extended period of placement, while R.A.’s young age made permanence especially significant.

The reasonable-time inquiry thus operated from the child’s perspective. Mother’s desire for more time was understandable, but the court evaluated whether further delay was compatible with R.A.’s developmental and emotional needs. The foster family’s willingness to adopt supported a realistic prospect of permanence; it did not replace the required statutory analysis.

G. Potential impact and limits

Because this is a nonprecedential panel decision, it cannot establish a binding rule for future cases. Its practical value lies in illustrating how established Vermont authorities apply to a record containing both meaningful progress and persistent barriers to reunification.

  • For parents and counsel: Evidence should connect recovery and service participation to actual readiness to provide safe care, while constitutional objections should be raised in the trial court.
  • For agencies: Records should distinguish the parent’s own conduct from another person’s misconduct and identify how unresolved concerns affect the child.
  • For trial courts: Findings should acknowledge progress, separately assess each parent, and explain why remaining problems prevent timely reunification.
  • For domestic-abuse-related cases: Victimization alone must not be substituted for an individualized assessment of neglect, parenting capacity, and child safety.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

CHINS
A proceeding to determine whether a child needs court protection because adequate care or supervision is lacking. That determination does not itself terminate parental rights.
Disposition order
The court’s plan following the CHINS determination, setting the placement goal and the steps expected toward that goal.
Changed circumstances
A sufficient change to justify revisiting an existing disposition. A parent’s prolonged failure to develop necessary parenting capacity can qualify even without a new emergency.
Parental stagnation
Insufficient improvement in the ability to care properly for the child over time. It does not require a complete absence of personal progress.
Clear and convincing evidence
A demanding evidentiary standard requiring a firm conviction that the facts are established, higher than the ordinary civil standard.
Clearly erroneous review
Appellate review that respects supported trial-court factual findings rather than deciding the evidence anew.
Preservation
Raising an issue in the trial court so that it can be addressed there before being presented on appeal.
Procedural due process
The requirement of fair procedures before the State deprives someone of a protected interest. The safeguards examined here included notice, counsel, and a meaningful hearing.
Reasonable time
The period within which parenting must become feasible, assessed in light of the particular child’s age, circumstances, and need for stability—not solely the parent’s preferred schedule.

6. Conclusion

In re R.A., Juvenile illustrates that genuine progress in recovery can coexist with legally sufficient parental stagnation. The decisive issue was whether mother’s improvements had produced the capacity to care safely for R.A. within a timeframe consistent with the child’s needs.

The affirmance rested on individualized findings, unresolved barriers to reunification, and a separate best-interests assessment. Its significance is explanatory rather than precedential: it applies existing Vermont law while emphasizing both fair treatment of each parent and the child’s need for timely permanence.