“Procure” in Solicitation of Murder for Hire Embraces Unilateral Agreements (No Shared Intent Required)

1. Introduction

In People v. Shepherd, 2026 IL 131240, the Supreme Court of Illinois resolved a recurring “sting-operation” question in the context of solicitation of murder for hire under 720 ILCS 5/8-1.2(a) (West 2010): when the defendant offers payment to a jailhouse informant (or undercover agent) who never truly intends to carry out the killing, has the defendant “procure[d] another” within the meaning of the statute?

Defendant Christian L. Shepherd was convicted of two counts of solicitation of murder for hire and (merged) counts of solicitation of first degree murder after offering compensation to fellow inmate Daniel Robinson to facilitate multiple killings, including witnesses and detectives connected to Shepherd’s pending charges. Robinson reported the solicitation, recorded conversations, and never intended to commit or facilitate the murders. On appeal, Shepherd argued the evidence was insufficient because “procure” allegedly requires a bilateral agreement—i.e., shared genuine intent between solicitor and solicited party.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the offense is satisfied by a unilateral agreement: the defendant’s intent and conduct control; the other party’s secret lack of intent does not defeat liability.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that “a defendant procures another for purposes of solicitation of murder for hire regardless of the true intent of the other individual” and that “a unilateral agreement can support a conviction” under 720 ILCS 5/8-1.2(a). The court therefore affirmed Shepherd’s convictions and consecutive sentences.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

People v. Devine, 2023 IL 128438

Cited for the standard of review: because Shepherd’s sufficiency challenge turned on statutory meaning (what “procure” requires), review was de novo. The citation framed the case as an interpretation dispute rather than a fact dispute.

People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512

Provided the core interpretive objective: ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. The court used Simpson to anchor the analysis in orthodox textualism rather than policy-driven redefinition of “procure.”

People v. Easley, 2014 IL 115581

Reinforced that the best indicator of intent is the statutory language given its plain and ordinary meaning—supporting the court’s move to ordinary dictionary definitions and contextual statutory comparison.

People v. Fair, 2024 IL 128373

Supplied a methodological step: interpret the text “as a whole” and in connection with “other relevant statutory provisions.” This justified the court’s comparison of solicitation of murder for hire with conspiracy and other solicitation offenses, and its discussion of sentencing provisions concerning paid killings.

People v. Foster, 99 Ill. 2d 48 (1983)

Foster was central to the bilateral/unilateral distinction:

  • It confirmed that conspiracy in Illinois requires a bilateral agreement, so an agreement with a government agent feigning agreement cannot support conspiracy.
  • It also noted Illinois solicitation embraces a unilateral theory, meaning the defendant’s culpable intent and act of solicitation suffice even if the other party is feigning or never intends to commit the offense.

Shepherd used Foster as the doctrinal bridge: solicitation-type offenses are not defeated by the other party’s secret lack of intent.

People v. Kauten, 324 Ill. App. 3d 588 (2001)

Quoted for the relationship between solicitation and conspiracy: solicitation is “often *** the proximate cause of a conspiracy.” This supported the court’s conceptual mapping—solicitation is an earlier-stage, defendant-driven offense that does not require the mutuality demanded by conspiracy.

People v. Breton, 237 Ill. App. 3d 355 (1992)

Breton was the key appellate authority directly on point. The appellate court relied on it, and the Illinois Supreme Court effectively endorsed its rule that procurement “where a defendant agrees with a government agent feigning agreement is sufficient to support a conviction of solicitation of murder for hire.” Shepherd treats Breton as consistent with statutory text and with the general unilateral nature of solicitation offenses.

People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504 (2009)

Cited for the canon that undefined statutory terms are presumed to carry their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. This enabled the court to consult Black’s Law Dictionary and Merriam-Webster for “procure.”

Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493 (2000)

Addressed defendant’s argument about relying on a statute’s “title.” The court used this case to clarify it was not improperly using a title to override clear text; instead, it referenced the statute’s name/label (“solicitation of murder for hire”) as confirming what the operative language already shows—an offense structured around the defendant’s intent and compensatory inducement.

People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d 79 (2005)

Cuadrado supplied an important limitation: “solicit” and “procure” are not interchangeable in charging and definition. The Shepherd court used Cuadrado to reject a simplistic conflation, while still holding that the distinction between the two words is not about bilateral intent; it is about the compensation-based mechanism that elevates the conduct to “for hire.”

People v. Smith, 2025 IL App (1st) 220116

Cited as additional contemporary support that solicitation of murder for hire may be proven even when the purported “hiree” is not a genuine participant. Its inclusion signaled the court’s alignment with an emerging and consistent appellate trend.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statutory question: what does “procures another” require?

The governing text provides that a person commits solicitation of murder for hire when, with intent that first degree murder be committed, “he or she procures another to commit that offense pursuant to any contract, agreement, understanding, command, or request for money or anything of value.” The dispute was whether “procure” implies a bilateral meeting of minds (as in conspiracy), or whether it can be satisfied by the defendant’s unilateral attempt to obtain a killer for pay.

(b) Ordinary meaning of “procure”

Using Cardamone’s approach, the court adopted dictionary meanings emphasizing obtaining by special effort or means. It then located the “special effort or means” within the statute itself: payment or promise of value. Nothing in the ordinary meaning of “procure” requires that the other person truly intends to perform—only that the defendant undertakes the act of obtaining/trying to obtain another through compensatory inducement.

(c) Structural and contextual cues in section 8-1.2(a)

  • Defendant-focused mens rea and actus reus: the statute foregrounds the defendant’s “intent that the offense of first degree murder be committed” and then asks what the defendant did (procured another) and how (through an arrangement involving money/value). The statute does not add a requirement about the other party’s intent.
  • Contrast with conspiracy language: conspiracy requires the defendant “agrees with another,” which naturally imports mutuality. Section 8-1.2(a) does not use this bilateral phrasing and does not qualify “contract, agreement, [or] understanding” to require genuine reciprocal criminal intent.

(d) Harmonizing “procure” with solicitation doctrine (and distinguishing it from conspiracy)

The court accepted the legislature’s broader architecture: conspiracy is bilateral; solicitation is unilateral. It placed solicitation of murder for hire on the solicitation side of the ledger—consistent with Foster and Breton—rather than importing conspiracy’s mutuality requirement into a differently worded offense.

(e) “Procure” vs. “solicit”: the distinction is compensation and method, not mutual intent

Shepherd rejected defendant’s claim that because the legislature used “procure” (not “solicit”), it must have intended a conspiracy-like bilateral requirement. Relying on Cuadrado, the court emphasized that “procure” and “solicit” differ, but the difference is functional:

  • Solicitation of murder is accomplished by “commands, encourages, or requests” to commit murder.
  • Solicitation of murder for hire is accomplished by obtaining another through a money/value-based arrangement—i.e., paying or promising to pay pursuant to an “agreement, understanding, command, or request” involving compensation.

On this view, “procure” marks the for-hire inducement, not a heightened mutuality requirement.

(f) Legislative policy reflected in sentencing structure

The court reinforced its reading by pointing to how Illinois law treats compensation-driven homicide conduct as uniquely severe: murder sentencing can be enhanced to life if the defendant “procured another” to commit the murder for money/value, and solicitation of murder for hire carries a higher sentencing range than solicitation of murder. This context supported the inference that the legislature intended to punish the act of attempting to buy a murder—a danger present whether or not the “hiree” is genuine.

(g) Application to Shepherd

Because Shepherd offered and provided compensation (credit card access, vehicle title, and discussion of logistics) to Robinson under the belief Robinson would facilitate the murders, the evidence satisfied section 8-1.2(a) as construed. Robinson’s feigned agreement did not negate procurement.

3.3. Impact

  • Clarifies liability in informant/undercover scenarios: defendants cannot escape section 8-1.2(a) merely because the “hitman” is an informant or undercover officer without actual intent to kill.
  • Aligns statewide charging and proof standards: the opinion consolidates and elevates the appellate rule reflected in Breton (and supported by People v. Smith), reducing uncertainty and appellate litigation over “bilateral intent” arguments.
  • Preserves the doctrinal boundary between conspiracy and solicitation-for-hire: prosecutors need not prove a true meeting of criminal minds (conspiracy-style) for a procurement-for-hire charge; the focus remains the defendant’s intent plus compensatory procurement conduct.
  • Increases practical exposure for defendants who “put money on the table”: the act of offering/arranging payment becomes the pivotal aggravating conduct, even if the plan is impossible to complete because law enforcement is involved from the outset.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Unilateral vs. bilateral agreement: A bilateral agreement requires both sides genuinely agree to commit the crime (typical conspiracy concept). A unilateral approach allows conviction based on the defendant’s intent and actions even if the other party is pretending (common in solicitation).
  • Mens rea / actus reus: Mens rea is the required mental state (here, intent that first degree murder be committed). Actus reus is the prohibited act (here, procuring another through a money/value arrangement).
  • Sufficiency of the evidence (as framed here): Although “sufficiency” often concerns factual disputes, Shepherd’s claim depended on the legal definition of “procure,” making it primarily a statutory interpretation question.
  • Merger of convictions: The five solicitation of first degree murder counts “merged” into the two solicitation of murder for hire convictions, reflecting that the more specific/aggravated offense (for-hire) subsumed the lesser solicitation counts for sentencing purposes.
  • Jailhouse informant feigning agreement: A cooperating inmate may appear to accept an offer to commit a crime while actually intending to report it. Shepherd holds that this feigned participation does not defeat “procurement” for the for-hire solicitation statute.

5. Conclusion

People v. Shepherd establishes a clear statewide rule: solicitation of murder for hire under 720 ILCS 5/8-1.2(a) does not require proof that the person offered compensation genuinely intended to commit the murder. “Procure” is satisfied when the defendant, with intent that first degree murder be committed, seeks to obtain another to commit the killing through a money-or-value-based arrangement—even if the “hiree” is an informant or undercover agent.

The decision strengthens the statute’s deterrent function against commodifying homicide, preserves the doctrinal line between conspiracy (bilateral) and solicitation (unilateral), and gives prosecutors and courts a workable, text-centered test focused on the defendant’s intent and compensation-driven conduct.