Probable Cause to Seize an Unattended Cellphone Pending a Warrant, and Inevitable Discovery for Pocket Contents During Inventory of Seized Clothing

Case: United States v. Leroy Irvin (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) (not precedential)
Posture: Appeal from denial of a Franks hearing and denial of suppression motions following a conditional guilty plea

Introduction

This Third Circuit decision reviews a cluster of Fourth Amendment challenges arising from a late-night shooting in a Pittsburgh housing complex. After Shotspotter reports and a 911 call, officers encountered Leroy Irvin bleeding inside an apartment building. Police performed a rapid entry/sweep, later secured and searched the apartment by warrant, seized an unattended iPhone found in a public hallway, and recovered a large roll of cash from Irvin’s pants pockets while he was being treated for gunshot wounds.

Irvin pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute fentanyl, but preserved appellate review of (1) the denial of a Franks hearing and (2) suppression issues tied to the apartment search, the iPhone seizure, and the pocket search of his pants.

Key issues:

  • Whether Irvin made the “substantial showing” required for a Franks hearing based on alleged falsehoods/omissions in search-warrant affidavits.
  • Whether evidence from the apartment should be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful warrantless entry/sweep.
  • Whether cash found in Irvin’s pants pockets should be suppressed as the product of a warrantless search.
  • Whether police could seize an unattended iPhone from a public hallway on probable cause pending a later warrant to search its contents.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that Irvin did not establish the necessary predicate for a Franks hearing because the challenged affidavits did not contain materially false statements or omissions made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, particularly given the District Court’s credibility findings and determination that a firearm was visible from the apartment doorway.

On suppression, the panel concluded: (1) the apartment warrant was supported by probable cause and not tainted by the initial sweep because the firearm was observed from outside the apartment; (2) the cash from the pants pockets was admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine because the pants would have been lawfully inventoried; and (3) seizure of the iPhone from a public hallway was constitutional because officers had probable cause to believe it contained evidence of the shooting, even though a warrant was required later to examine its contents.

Important limitation: the disposition is “NOT PRECEDENTIAL” and “does not constitute binding precedent,” though it may still be persuasive in later cases.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 1 54 (1 978).
    The foundational rule: a defendant may obtain a hearing to challenge a warrant affidavit only after making a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit included a false statement (or omission) made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, and that the falsehood/omission was material to probable cause. The court applied this framework to Irvin’s claims about both the apartment warrant and the iPhone-related warrant.
  • United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 235 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2022).
    Cited for the standard of review on denial of a Franks hearing: clear error for the finding on reckless disregard/false statement, and de novo for questions of law. This deference mattered because the District Court made explicit credibility findings crediting Detective Lippert.
  • United States v. Kramer, 75 F.4th 339, 342 (3d Cir. 2023).
    Provides the suppression review framework: factual findings for clear error, legal issues reviewed plenarily, and the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Government when suppression is denied.
  • Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
    Though the panel stated it did not need to decide exigency, it highlighted the District Court’s observation that the scene looked like a “potentially an active shooter situation,” and used Brigham City to underscore the established principle that protecting life/avoiding serious injury is a classic exigency that can justify warrantless action.
  • United States v. Bradley, 959 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 2020), and Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
    These cases supply and anchor the inevitable-discovery doctrine: unlawfully obtained evidence may be admitted if the Government proves by a preponderance that it inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. The court applied this to the cash found in Irvin’s pockets because the pants would have been seized and inventoried.
  • Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).
    Supports the inventory-search principle: reasonable, good-faith inventory procedures satisfy the Fourth Amendment. The District Court credited testimony that inventorying was routine to protect property and preserve evidence, supplying the “lawful means” for inevitable discovery.
  • Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987).
    Cited for the requirement that probable cause be “immediately apparent” when officers seize evidence without a warrant under the plain-view logic. The panel used it to uphold seizure (not search) of the iPhone because officers had immediate probable cause to believe it held evidence of the shooting.
  • Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462-63 (2011).
    Cited alongside Hicks to reinforce the broader Fourth Amendment framework governing warrant requirements and exceptions, particularly in fast-moving scenarios where police act on probable cause and later seek warrants for more intrusive steps (like searching digital contents).

Legal Reasoning

1) No Franks hearing: no material, reckless falsehood/omission shown

Irvin’s theory was that affidavits misleadingly implied lawful observation of a firearm (rather than observation during an allegedly unlawful entry) and that the iPhone warrant falsely stated the phone’s owner was unknown. The Third Circuit treated the District Court’s credibility and “visibility” findings as decisive: Detective Lippert credibly testified he saw the firearm from the doorway within seconds of arrival, before speaking with other officers. That supported the conclusion that the affidavit was not materially false or misleading on how the firearm was seen.

Likewise, the panel rejected the iPhone-affidavit challenge because possession is not ownership: Irvin dropping the iPhone established only that he had it immediately prior, and the presence of another phone (a Samsung) in the apartment made ownership genuinely unclear. Without a demonstrable false statement or recklessly omitted fact material to probable cause, Franks relief was unavailable.

2) Apartment evidence: no taint, warrant supported by probable cause

Irvin framed the apartment warrant as “fruit” of an unjustified warrantless entry/sweep. The panel largely bypassed the exigency debate because, on the credited facts, the key fact used in the warrant application—the firearm—was seen from outside the apartment, so it was not a product of the initial entry. With that, the warrant stood on untainted observations, and suppression was unwarranted.

The opinion nevertheless signals agreement with the District Court’s commonsense assessment of the scene as potentially involving an active shooter, which aligns with Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart’s recognition of the “need to protect or preserve life” exigency.

3) Pants-pocket cash: inevitable discovery via inventory

Even assuming the pocket search at the scene was problematic, Irvin conceded the pants themselves were evidence and could be seized. The Government then proved (and the District Court credited) that Pittsburgh police would have performed a routine inventory search of the seized clothing to protect property and preserve evidence. Under United States v. Bradley and Nix v. Williams, that made discovery of the cash inevitable by lawful means; Colorado v. Bertine supported the validity of the inventory practice when conducted pursuant to reasonable procedures in good faith.

4) iPhone seizure: probable cause to hold pending a warrant to search contents

The panel drew a key line: seizing a phone to prevent loss/destruction is different from searching its digital contents. Here, the iPhone was unattended in a public hallway, near an unfolding shooting scene, and officers did not know whether Irvin was a victim or participant. Detective testimony supported probable cause that communications on the phone could reveal participants, threats, or planning. Because that evidentiary connection was “immediately apparent,” the seizure was upheld under the principles reflected in Arizona v. Hicks, with the later warrant requirement preserved for any content search.

Impact

  • Device seizures in violent-crime scenes: The opinion supports the practical proposition that, where officers have immediate probable cause tying a phone to a shooting investigation, they may secure (seize) the device found in a public/common area pending a warrant to search it—especially where the suspect’s role (victim vs. perpetrator) is unclear.
  • “Taint” arguments depend on factfinding: Suppression attacks premised on an initial warrantless entry may fail if key facts in the warrant affidavit can be sourced to an independent, lawful vantage point (here, visibility from the open doorway) credited by the trial court.
  • Inevitable discovery is strengthened by routine practice evidence: The decision illustrates how testimony about standardized inventory practices, credited by the district judge, can salvage evidence even when an on-scene search is contested.
  • Nonprecedential but instructive: While not binding, the case may be cited persuasively in later Third Circuit litigation involving quick police actions at shooting scenes, plain-view vantages, inventory procedures, and the seizure/search distinction for cellphones.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Conditional guilty plea: a guilty plea that preserves the right to appeal specified pretrial rulings (here, Franks and suppression).
  • Franks hearing: a special evidentiary hearing to challenge a search warrant by showing the affidavit included material lies (or material omissions) made intentionally or recklessly.
  • Probable cause: a fair probability, based on facts, that evidence of a crime will be found in a place or item.
  • Exigent circumstances: emergencies that can justify acting without a warrant (e.g., immediate threats to life).
  • Inevitable discovery: even if police obtained evidence improperly, it can still come in if the Government shows the same evidence would have been found lawfully anyway.
  • Inventory search: an administrative search of lawfully seized property (often after arrest or impoundment) under standardized procedures, aimed at safeguarding property and protecting police from claims of loss.
  • Seizure vs. search (phones): taking custody of a phone to preserve evidence is distinct from searching its digital contents; the latter generally requires a warrant even when seizure is justified by probable cause.

Conclusion

United States v. Leroy Irvin affirms three recurring Fourth Amendment lessons in a shooting-scene context: (1) Franks relief is difficult without concrete, material proof of intentional or reckless deception; (2) suppression “taint” claims can collapse when courts credit independent lawful observation supporting a warrant; and (3) evidence may remain admissible through inevitable discovery and routine inventory procedures. The decision also underscores a practical investigative rule: where probable cause is immediately apparent, police may seize an unattended cellphone to preserve evidence pending a warrant to search its contents.