Probable Cause to Prosecute Survives Fabrication Allegations When Unchallenged Evidence Independently Supports Constructive Gun Possession

I. Introduction

Case: Jevarreo Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date: August 13, 2026

Officers Robert Garduno and Anthony Spicuzza arrested Jevarreo Kelley-Lomax after a gun was found beneath the front passenger seat he had been occupying in a rented SUV at a gas station. Kelley-Lomax lacked a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and a Concealed Carry License. He was charged under Illinois’s aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (2018), but a state judge granted a directed verdict at trial for insufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about the gun.

Kelley-Lomax then brought Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the basis of probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that undisputed facts established both probable cause to arrest and probable cause to prosecute, even assuming factual disputes about fabricated or omitted evidence.

Key issues: (1) whether probable cause to arrest for constructive possession requires evidence supporting knowledge of the gun; (2) whether a grand jury indictment and judicial probable-cause determinations can be overcome when officers allegedly fabricated or omitted facts; and (3) how the Seventh Circuit’s two-step framework (from Beauchamp) operates when probable cause arguably exists without the challenged statements.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that probable cause is a complete defense to both false arrest and malicious prosecution in this context. For false arrest, the officers had probable cause because Kelley-Lomax was seated above a hidden gun and admitted he lacked authorization to carry; Illinois recognizes joint constructive possession, and exculpatory possibilities (someone else placed the gun; the car was rented by his licensed brother; the gun was not visible) did not negate probable cause.

For malicious prosecution, the court applied the presumption that indictments and judicial probable-cause determinations are valid, requiring Kelley-Lomax to satisfy the two-prong test from Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville. The court assumed prong one could be met (a jury could find reckless false statements/omissions), but held prong two failed: after removing the allegedly fabricated information, probable cause remained based on the gun under his seat and his lack of a license. The court emphasized that the second prong asks whether probable cause still exists without the falsehoods—not whether the falsehoods could have influenced the decision-makers.

Judge Lee concurred on false arrest but dissented on malicious prosecution, arguing probable cause to prosecute must cover each element (including knowledge) more rigorously than probable cause to arrest, and that proximity alone to a hidden gun is insufficient under Illinois constructive possession principles.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary judgment and review standards

  • Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2003): Provided both the de novo review frame for summary judgment and, crucially, the two-prong test for overcoming presumptive probable cause in malicious prosecution when judicial determinations (including indictments) exist.
  • Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): Cited for the principle that summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant cannot establish an essential element on which it bears the burden.

2. Probable cause as a complete defense; distinguishing arrest vs prosecution

  • Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2019): Probable cause defeats a false arrest claim.
  • Lee v. Harris, 127 F.4th 666 (7th Cir. 2025): Probable cause defeats malicious prosecution; also used to show that doubts and alternative explanations do not necessarily negate probable cause.
  • Washington v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860 (7th Cir. 2024): Central to malicious prosecution analysis—indictment as prima facie probable cause; articulated application of the Beauchamp test and “strip the falsehoods, add omissions, then reassess probable cause.”
  • Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150 (2d Cir. 2021): Quoted for the proposition that probable cause to prosecute should not be conflated with probable cause to arrest.
  • Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2013): Used for the doctrinal separation between probable cause to arrest and probable cause to charge/prosecute; supplied the “ordinary care and prudence” formulation for probable cause to prosecute.

3. Probable cause as “fluid,” based on totality and common sense

  • Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013): Probable cause “deals not with hard certainties”; requires only a substantial chance of criminal activity; also used for viewing facts from the arresting officer’s perspective.
  • Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979): Probable cause exists when facts support belief a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.
  • United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2020): Emphasized that the inquiry is limited to facts known at the time officers acted.
  • United States v. Breit, 429 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005): Probable cause depends on totality and common-sense interpretations.
  • Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2018): Officers’ interpretations need not be correct, only reasonable.

4. Constructive possession and “proximity” limits in criminal guilt vs probable cause

  • People v. Brown, 164 N.E.3d 1187 (Ill. 2020): Defined Illinois constructive possession as immediate and exclusive control over area plus knowledge.
  • Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2021): Explained Illinois joint possession; quoted People v. Hill, 589 N.E.2d 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), that others’ access does not defeat “exclusive dominion and control” for constructive possession in a joint possession scenario.
  • People v. Bailey, 776 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), and People v. Crumpton, 263 N.E.3d 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024): Cited by Kelley-Lomax for criminal sufficiency principles; the court treated them as addressing conviction-level proof rather than probable cause.
  • United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190 (7th Cir.) (cert. denied, 513 U.S. 862 (1994)): Invoked for the “mere proximity” principle in guilt determinations, which the majority deemed not dispositive at the probable-cause stage.

5. Malicious prosecution after formal process; indictments; fabrication framework

  • Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2019): Indictment as prima facie probable cause; overcoming requires evidence that law enforcement obtained the indictment through improper or fraudulent means.
  • Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017): Clarified Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for pretrial detention both before and after formal legal process; reinforced the relevance of continuing probable cause in malicious prosecution-type claims.

6. Dissent’s additional authorities (and the fault line)

  • Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1999) (as amended Jan. 7, 2000): Cited by the dissent for the proposition that not every element must be supported by specific evidence to arrest.
  • United States v. Jones, 418 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2005): Cited by the dissent to argue a grand jury charge implies probable cause as to each charged action/element.
  • Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2014): Dissent used it to stress probable cause depends on state-law elements of the predicate offense.
  • People v. Wise, 182 N.E.3d 656 (Ill. 2021): Dissent relied on it for the “knowledge + immediate and exclusive control” constructive possession definition.
  • People v. McIntyre, 962 N.E.2d 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), People v. Day, 366 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), and People v. Davis, 365 N.E.2d 1135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977): Dissent marshaled these for Illinois’s repeated “proximity alone is insufficient” principle.
  • United States v. Brown, 724 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2013), and Lindsey v. Macias, 907 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2018): Dissent invoked these to emphasize proximity limits in possession analysis.
  • Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2019), and Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): Dissent cited for the clearly established prohibition on deliberately falsified probable-cause showings, relevant to qualified immunity.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. False arrest: probable cause to arrest for constructive possession

The majority treated the false arrest question as a practical, time-of-arrest inquiry. Because Kelley-Lomax did not challenge the vehicle search (that revealed the gun) or the initial detention, the key question was whether officers reasonably believed he possessed the gun. The court held they could:

  • He occupied the front passenger seat above the firearm.
  • The gun was accessible in the immediate area of his seat, even if not initially visible.
  • He admitted he lacked authorization to carry.
  • Illinois permits joint constructive possession; others’ access does not negate the inference at the probable-cause stage.

Importantly, the court drew a sharp line between (a) what might create reasonable doubt at trial and (b) what negates probable cause. The fact that the SUV was rented by his brother (who allegedly was licensed) and the firearm was concealed were treated as innocence-consistent facts that do not “destroy probable cause.”

2. Malicious prosecution: applying the Beauchamp two-prong test

Because there was an indictment and a judicial probable-cause determination at a bail hearing, Kelley-Lomax faced a presumption that probable cause supported the prosecution. Under Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville (as reiterated in Washington v. City of Chicago), he had to show:

  1. Fabrication/omission with the requisite culpability: knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly false statements or omissions to the judicial officer.
  2. Materiality to probable cause: after removing falsehoods (and adding material omissions), probable cause would not exist.

The court found substantial inconsistencies (e.g., whether dispatch reconnected with the caller, whether the caller described one suspect or two, whether the men’s clothing matched a “black puffy coat,” and what the surveillance video showed). It therefore assumed prong one could be satisfied.

The decisive move came at prong two: the court held the proper test is not whether the alleged fabrications could have influenced the judge or grand jury, but whether probable cause still exists on the remaining evidence. Stripped of the disputed narrative about the 911 caller’s description and the surveillance video, probable cause persisted because the gun was found under the seat Kelley-Lomax occupied and he lacked a license.

3. The dissent’s competing conception of “probable cause to prosecute”

Judge Lee agreed probable cause supported the arrest, but argued probable cause to prosecute requires element-by-element support, including the “knowingly” component of constructive possession under Illinois law. In his view, once alleged misrepresentations about the caller/video are removed, the only link between Kelley-Lomax and the gun is proximity to a hidden firearm in a car he did not control, while another person on scene (his brother) had lawful authority—facts the dissent considered insufficient to establish probable cause as to knowledge under Illinois constructive possession jurisprudence.

C. Impact

1. Strengthening “strip-the-falsehoods” summary judgment in malicious prosecution cases

The majority’s application of Washington v. City of Chicago and Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville underscores that even significant fabrication disputes may not reach a jury if probable cause remains on untainted facts. Practically, this pushes plaintiffs to do more than show deception—they must show that, absent deception, the remaining evidence could not support probable cause.

2. Constructive possession probable cause in vehicle gun cases

The opinion signals that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, the combination of (a) a gun located under the seat recently occupied by a suspect and (b) the suspect’s lack of licensing can be enough not only for arrest but also to sustain probable cause through prosecution—even where the gun is concealed and the vehicle is not owned/controlled by the suspect. This may influence charging decisions and civil-rights litigation posture in “gun in car” scenarios.

3. The fault line remains: how “element-specific” probable cause to prosecute must be

The dissent frames a significant doctrinal tension: whether probable cause to prosecute must be more strictly element-sensitive than probable cause to arrest, particularly regarding mens rea (“knowingly”). Future panels may be asked to reconcile Illinois constructive possession nuances with the federal probable-cause standard applied to Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims after Manuel v. City of Joliet.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Probable cause: a reasonable, common-sense basis to suspect a crime—less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It tolerates uncertainty and competing explanations.
  • False arrest (Fourth Amendment): a claim that police arrested someone without probable cause. If probable cause existed, the claim generally fails.
  • Malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment in this context): after Manuel v. City of Joliet, the Fourth Amendment is violated when a person is subjected to legal process and pretrial detention without probable cause; indictments create a presumption of probable cause that plaintiffs must overcome.
  • Constructive possession: possession inferred from control over the area where an item is found plus knowledge the item is there—distinct from holding the item (actual possession).
  • Joint possession: more than one person can legally be deemed to possess the same contraband; others’ access doesn’t necessarily defeat possession.
  • Beauchamp test (two prongs): (1) show intentional/knowing/reckless falsity or omission; (2) show that without it, probable cause would not exist.
  • Directed verdict vs probable cause: a directed verdict reflects failure of trial proof (beyond a reasonable doubt), which does not automatically imply the earlier presence of probable cause was lacking.

V. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for officers on both false arrest and malicious prosecution, holding that probable cause existed throughout the process. The court’s most consequential clarification is methodological: in malicious prosecution claims challenging indictments and judicial probable-cause findings, courts apply the second prong of Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville by removing alleged falsehoods and asking whether probable cause still remains—not by asking whether the falsehoods might have influenced the decision-makers.

Substantively, the opinion treats a firearm found under the seat most recently occupied by an unlicensed passenger as sufficient to maintain probable cause through prosecution, despite facts consistent with innocence (concealment of the gun, lack of vehicle ownership/control, and another occupant’s licensing). The dissent highlights a live and important debate: whether probable cause to prosecute must be more element-specific—particularly as to knowledge—than the majority’s approach allows.