Date: Mar 3, 2026

Probable Cause Defeats Retaliatory-Arrest and False-Arrest Claims Even When State “In-the-Presence” Limits Are Alleged; Municipal Liability Requires an Identified Policy or Custom

Introduction

In Lillie Middlebrooks v. Scott Kasmar (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s amended civil-rights complaint arising from her warrantless arrest by Rome, Georgia police officers.

Parties. Plaintiff-Appellant Lillie M. Middlebrooks sued Sergeant Scott Kasmar, Major Chris DeHart, Private First Class Chris Ridling, Assistant Chief Rodney Bailey (all in their individual capacities), and municipal entities including the City of Rome and Floyd County.

Core factual setting. Officers responded to an incident involving a nursing home property and emergency medical personnel. The officers relied on witness statements, information that Middlebrooks had been “physically banned” from the nursing home property, and body-worn camera footage of the encounter and arrest. Middlebrooks maintained that the police lacked probable cause to arrest her for criminal trespass and obstruction, emphasizing (i) an allegedly insufficient prior trespass warning and (ii) that officers did not personally witness the misdemeanor trespass.

Key issues on appeal. The appeal focused on whether Middlebrooks plausibly stated federal claims for (1) First Amendment retaliation (retaliatory arrest), (2) false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983, (3) Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, (4) Title VI race discrimination, and whether the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal causes of action.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

The district court properly considered body camera footage at the motion-to-dismiss stage under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine.
Officers had probable cause to arrest Middlebrooks for criminal trespass and obstruction, defeating her First Amendment retaliatory arrest, false arrest, and false imprisonment theories.
Middlebrooks failed to plead municipal liability against the City of Rome and Floyd County because she did not identify a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.
Her First Amendment retaliation theory against “Chaffer” failed for lack of plausible but-for causation.
After dismissal of all federal claims, the district court acted within its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pleading, review standards, and use of video evidence

Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003): De novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals anchored the appellate posture.
Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2007): Required the court to accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them favorably to the plaintiff.
Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1990): Reinforced liberal construction of pro se pleadings, while not relieving the plaintiff of plausibility requirements.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Supplied the “plausibility” framework, rejecting conclusory allegations and formulaic recitations.
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012): Allowed affirmance on any ground supported by the record.
Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2024): Central to the court’s procedural analysis; it permitted consideration of body camera footage at dismissal where the footage was (i) central to the claims and (ii) undisputed in authenticity. The Middlebrooks panel applied this to treat the video as part of the pleadings context for probable-cause analysis.

2) § 1983 framework and First Amendment retaliatory arrest

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988): Restated § 1983’s basic elements—deprivation of a federal right by someone acting under color of state law.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006): Provided the retaliatory-prosecution/retaliation causation logic that probable cause tends to show the action would have occurred absent retaliation. The panel used Hartman’s reasoning to reinforce that probable cause undermines but-for causation in retaliation claims.
Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1986): Supplied the “affirmative causal connection” requirement for § 1983 claims.
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019): Key to the holding; it requires a retaliatory arrest plaintiff to plead and prove absence of probable cause, and it frames causation in but-for terms.
Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473 (11th Cir. 2016): Gave the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part test for First Amendment retaliation (protected speech, adverse action, causal connection).
DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2019): Reinforced the “absence of probable cause” requirement for retaliatory arrest claims within the circuit.

3) False arrest/false imprisonment and probable cause

Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724 (11th Cir. 2010): Probable cause is an absolute bar to federal false arrest claims.
Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2009): False imprisonment (absent misidentification) likewise turns on lack of probable cause.

4) Defining probable cause; collective knowledge; investigation; and handling conflicting evidence

United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999 (11th Cir.1992): Provided the standard definition of probable cause (“reasonable belief” based on known facts and circumstances).
Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010): Supported the “collective knowledge” doctrine—probable cause can rest on reasonably trustworthy information known across officers.
Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2019): Crucial to the panel’s response to Middlebrooks’s “defective warning” and “officer didn’t witness it” arguments; the court emphasized that conflicting evidence or potential defenses do not necessarily vitiate probable cause under a totality-of-the-circumstances review.
Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425 (11th Cir. 1998): Grounded the requirement that an arresting officer conduct a reasonable investigation.
Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137: Cited for probable cause principles as applied to the officers’ assessment of facts; the panel relied on it in tandem with Gonzalez (1992) when concluding probable cause existed for trespass.

5) State “in-the-presence” misdemeanor arrest limits vs. the Fourth Amendment

United States v. Gonzalez, 107 F.4th 1304 (11th Cir. 2024): The most consequential doctrinal anchor in the opinion. The panel used it to reject Middlebrooks’s premise that the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to witness a misdemeanor. Even if Georgia law imposes “in the officer’s presence” limitations for warrantless misdemeanor arrests, the Fourth Amendment analysis remains a totality-of-the-circumstances probable-cause inquiry.

6) Equal protection, Title VI, and municipal liability

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985): Supplied the baseline principle that similarly situated persons should be treated alike.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001): Limited Title VI’s private enforceability to intentional discrimination (as framed by the panel).
Elston v. Talladega County Board of Education, 997 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1993): Supported the court’s view that Title VI (statutory) intentional-discrimination analysis may “duplicate exactly” equal protection analysis because both prohibit intentional discrimination.
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Central to rejecting municipal liability absent an official policy/custom; also rejected respondeat superior.
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004): Provided the circuit’s three-part municipal-liability test (violation, deliberate-indifference policy/custom, causation).
Depew v. City of St. Mary's, Ga., 787 F. 2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1986): Explained that a policy/custom generally requires a persistent, widespread practice—often framed as continued failure to prevent known violations.
Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2011): A single incident is insufficient to prove a policy or custom.
Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991): Required evidence of a long-standing and widespread practice known to policymakers and not stopped.
Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc): Required identification of the specific policy/custom that caused the deprivation.

7) Retaliation causation (motivating factor and but-for) and the “Chaffer” allegation

Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2008): Addressed the need for plausible facts that protected speech was a motivating factor.
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019): Reappeared to supply but-for causation; the panel found no plausible but-for causal link where nonretaliatory explanations controlled (no black officers available; ambulance already dispatched).

8) Supplemental jurisdiction

Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 55 F.4th 863 (11th Cir. 2022): Confirmed district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of all claims within original jurisdiction, guided by economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Legal Reasoning

1) Incorporation-by-reference and body camera footage at Rule 12(b)(6)

A notable feature of the court’s approach is its early procedural ruling: body camera footage could be considered on a motion to dismiss because it was “central to” Middlebrooks’s claims (retaliation, false arrest, false imprisonment) and its authenticity was undisputed, tracking Johnson v. City of Atlanta. This matters because probable cause is often fact-intensive; the court treated the video as an objective source allowing it to evaluate what officers knew and observed.

2) Probable cause as the “gatekeeper” that defeats multiple constitutional theories

The opinion organizes the case around a single hinge: probable cause at the time of arrest. Once the panel concluded probable cause existed for criminal trespass and obstruction, three federal theories fell together:

First Amendment retaliatory arrest: Under Nieves and DeMartini, absence of probable cause is required; probable cause undercuts but-for causation under Hartman.
False arrest: Probable cause is an absolute bar under Brown v. City of Huntsville.
False imprisonment: Depends on absence of probable cause under Case v. Eslinger.

3) Rejecting the state-law “in-the-presence” argument under the Fourth Amendment

Middlebrooks’s core counterargument was that Georgia law requires an officer to witness a misdemeanor for a warrantless arrest. The panel did not decide the contours of Georgia arrest authority as such; instead, it separated state-law arrest constraints from the federal constitutional standard. Relying on United States v. Gonzalez, 107 F.4th 1304 (11th Cir. 2024), the court reiterated that the Fourth Amendment contains no “misdemeanor in-the-presence” requirement. Thus, even if a warrantless arrest could be challenged under state law, it may remain constitutionally permissible if supported by probable cause.

4) Totality of circumstances and “defenses don’t vitiate probable cause”

The panel treated alleged defects in the criminal trespass warning, and the lack of direct officer observation of the trespass, as arguments that sounded in defenses or evidentiary disputes. Citing Paez v. Mulvey, it emphasized that potential defenses and conflicting evidence do not necessarily defeat probable cause, so long as it remains reasonable under the totality of circumstances to conclude a crime was committed.

5) Application to the pleaded record: why probable cause existed

The court’s probable-cause conclusion rested on a blend of (i) witness information and (ii) Middlebrooks’s own statements, assessed against the video:

Criminal trespass: Officers spoke to witnesses who reported Middlebrooks had trespassed into the nursing home’s property and parking lot, and Sergeant Kasmar confirmed she had been “physically banned.” Middlebrooks also admitted she went over to EMTs in the parking lot. These facts were deemed sufficient for a reasonable belief of trespass.
Obstruction: Body camera footage showed Middlebrooks resisted placing her arms behind her back, sat on the ground, and refused to move to the police car—conduct the panel treated as supporting probable cause for obstruction.

6) Equal protection and Title VI: municipal-liability pleading failure

On the discrimination theories, the panel’s analysis did not turn on whether Middlebrooks alleged differential treatment in the abstract. Instead, it turned on who she sued. Because she sued the City of Rome and Floyd County, she had to satisfy Monell-style municipal liability—identifying an official policy/custom and showing it was the moving force. Citing McDowell and Grech, the panel held she did not identify any policy, practice, or custom that caused the alleged deprivation, and therefore failed prongs (2) and (3) of municipal liability.

Regarding Title VI, the panel invoked Alexander v. Sandoval and Elston v. Talladega County Board of Education to treat Title VI’s intentional discrimination requirement as materially coextensive with equal protection in this setting. That framing made the municipal-liability deficiency dispositive.

7) Retaliation claim against “Chaffer”: failure of but-for causation

Applying Bailey v. Wheeler and Smith v. Mosley, the panel held Middlebrooks did not plausibly allege causation. Under Nieves, the retaliatory motive must be a but-for cause; the court found alternative explanations defeated plausibility: no black officers were available, and an ambulance had already been dispatched.

8) Supplemental jurisdiction: discretion after federal claims fall out

Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss state-law claims without prejudice after dismissing all federal claims with prejudice. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., the district court had broad discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction, and the panel found no abuse of that discretion.

Impact

Probable cause remains the central barrier to retaliatory-arrest litigation: The opinion reinforces the practical reality that, in the Eleventh Circuit, retaliatory arrest claims typically rise or fall on the absence (or presence) of probable cause under Nieves and DeMartini.
State-law arrest limitations are not automatically Fourth Amendment violations: By applying United States v. Gonzalez, 107 F.4th 1304 (11th Cir. 2024), the panel underscores that litigants cannot convert alleged noncompliance with a state misdemeanor arrest rule into a federal constitutional claim without confronting probable cause.
Body camera footage can be case-dispositive at the pleading stage: The application of Johnson v. City of Atlanta signals that where video is central and undisputed, it can sharply limit the range of plausible factual disputes at Rule 12(b)(6), accelerating dismissal of claims dependent on contested encounter narratives.
Municipal liability remains difficult without policy/custom allegations: The decision reiterates that suing a city or county for discrimination or unconstitutional policing requires more than alleging wrongdoing by individual officers; plaintiffs must plead a specific policy/custom and causal linkage under Monell, McDowell, and Grech.
State claims often return to state court: The affirmance under § 1367(c)(3) reflects the common federal practice—once federal claims are dismissed early, state tort claims are typically left for state courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: A practical, common-sense standard: whether the facts known to police would lead a reasonable officer to believe the person committed a crime. It is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and it can exist even when some evidence conflicts or a defense might later be raised.
Incorporation-by-reference (considering video on a motion to dismiss): Normally, courts decide Rule 12(b)(6) motions based on the complaint. But if a document (including video) is central to the claims and authenticity is undisputed, the court may consider it without converting the motion to summary judgment.
Retaliatory arrest (First Amendment) and the “absence of probable cause” requirement: A plaintiff claiming she was arrested to punish her speech usually must show there was no probable cause for the arrest. If probable cause exists, courts presume the arrest would have happened anyway, making it harder to prove retaliation caused the arrest.
Monell municipal liability: Cities and counties are not automatically liable for what their employees do. To hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must connect the constitutional violation to an official policy or a widespread, persistent custom that caused the violation.
Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts may hear related state-law claims in the same case. But if all federal claims are dismissed, the court may decline to keep the state claims, often dismissing them without prejudice so they can be pursued in state court.

Conclusion

Middlebrooks v. Kasmar is a tightly reasoned, probable-cause-centered affirmance. The Eleventh Circuit treated probable cause as dispositive of retaliatory arrest, false arrest, and false imprisonment claims; rejected efforts to constitutionalize Georgia’s “in-the-presence” misdemeanor arrest constraints; required concrete Monell allegations to proceed against municipal entities on equal protection and Title VI theories; and approved the district court’s decision to send remaining state claims back to state court by declining supplemental jurisdiction.