Pro Se Appellate Waiver Under Rule 28 and the Futility of Amending Claims Barred by Eleventh Amendment and Absolute Judicial Immunity

Introduction

In Runkle v. State of Colorado (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026), Amy M. Runkle, proceeding pro se, sued the State of Colorado and three Denver District Court judges (Michael Martinez, Bruce Jones, and Darryl Shockley). Her pleadings, while initially referencing the termination of parental rights, primarily challenged state-court filing restrictions and judicial case-management actions—alleging that judges deemed her state-court claims frivolous, restricted her ability to file, discarded filings, and ordered her detained for a compelled mental health evaluation. After dismissal in federal district court and denial of leave to amend, she appealed.

The Tenth Circuit’s order (nonprecedential) is significant for two recurring federal-courts themes: (1) pro se appellants must still comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28, and inadequate briefing can forfeit review; and (2) immunity doctrines (Eleventh Amendment and absolute judicial immunity) can make amendment futile, independently supporting dismissal and denial of leave to amend.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s final judgment dismissing the case and denying leave to file a lengthy proposed amended complaint. While the district court had relied on multiple jurisdictional and immunity-based grounds (including the domestic relations exception and Rooker-Feldman), the appellate court emphasized that:

  • Ms. Runkle’s opening brief failed to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 because it did not clearly identify issues or provide supported legal argument with citations.
  • Even construing her filings liberally, she did not meaningfully challenge the district court’s key legal rulings—especially that Eleventh Amendment immunity and absolute judicial immunity barred her claims—so the court affirmed.
  • Because immunity sufficed to dispose of the case, the court did not need to resolve service-of-process disputes.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Appellate briefing requirements and waiver

  • Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denv., 784 F.3d 1364 (10th Cir. 2015): The court quoted Nixon’s core appellate principle that the appellant’s “first task” is to explain why the district court was wrong, and that narratives of injustice cannot substitute for legal argument. This framing supplied the immediate basis for affirmance where the opening brief did not engage the district court’s legal conclusions.
  • Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005): Garrett provided the controlling rule for pro se briefing failures—courts may construe filings liberally, but cannot act as counsel, research arguments, or fill Rule 28 gaps. The panel leaned on Garrett to treat inadequately briefed issues as waived and to justify affirming without reaching the merits of undeveloped claims.

2) Eleventh Amendment immunity

  • Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732 (10th Cir. 2024): Cited for de novo review of Eleventh Amendment issues and for reinforcing that sovereign immunity is a threshold bar when applicable.
  • K. A. v. Barnes, 134 F.4th 1067 (10th Cir. 2025): Used both for the Eleventh Amendment proposition (states and arms of the state are generally immune from damages in federal court) and for the Rooker-Feldman articulation (discussed below). The opinion’s footnote quotation also notes the extension of state immunity to officials sued in their official capacities when the entity is an arm of the state.

3) Absolute judicial immunity

  • Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 2000): The magistrate judge and the Tenth Circuit relied on Whitesel’s classic statement: judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for judicial acts unless performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Because the alleged conduct (rulings, restrictions, case-management decisions) was judicial in nature, immunity rendered the proposed amendment futile.
  • PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2010): Cited for de novo review of Rooker-Feldman and absolute immunity, supporting the panel’s posture that these are legal bars appropriately resolved at the pleading stage.

4) Subject-matter limits: domestic relations exception and Rooker-Feldman

  • Leathers v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 2017): Quoted for the domestic relations exception—federal courts lack power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. While the appeal was affirmed primarily due to immunity and inadequate briefing, Leathers contextualized why federal courts are cautious where claims functionally seek to re-litigate or unwind domestic-relations outcomes.
  • K. A. v. Barnes, 134 F.4th 1067 (10th Cir. 2025): Quoted for the Rooker-Feldman rule barring claims by a state-court loser asserting the state judgment itself violates federal rights—relevant given the challenge to state-court filing restrictions and related orders.

5) Futility of amendment; alternative grounds to dispose

  • Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty., 41 F.4th 1196 (10th Cir. 2022): Cited for de novo review of a denial of leave to amend on futility grounds, which was central because the proposed amended complaint was screened for legal viability, not length or detail.
  • Est. of Cummings ex rel. Montoya v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 881 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 2018): Invoked to justify not deciding service/jurisdictional issues once another non-merits ground (immunity) sufficed to dismiss—illustrating a pragmatic sequencing principle in federal adjudication.

Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 28 noncompliance and forfeiture

The panel did not deny that Ms. Runkle described serious hardship; it held that hardship narratives do not satisfy appellate burdens. Her opening brief omitted core Rule 28 components—identified issues, developed argument, and supporting authorities/record cites. Under Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer and Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denv., such deficiencies allow the court to deem issues waived or inadequately presented and to affirm without constructing arguments on the litigant’s behalf.

2) Immunity doctrines independently foreclosed the case

The court further explained that even if it “look[ed] past” the briefing defects, Ms. Runkle still failed to challenge the district court’s dispositive conclusions that:

  • The Eleventh Amendment barred claims against Colorado and against state judges sued in their official capacities (as framed by Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Anderson and K. A. v. Barnes).
  • The judges were protected by absolute judicial immunity for alleged misconduct consisting of judicial acts (as stated in Whitesel v. Sengenberger).

Those immunity rulings made the proposed amendment futile under the framework referenced by Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty.: even a more detailed complaint cannot proceed if the law bars the claims categorically.

3) No need to decide service issues

Although Ms. Runkle argued in her reply that she attempted service on the judges, the court relied on Est. of Cummings ex rel. Montoya v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc. to bypass service/jurisdiction sequencing disputes because immunity provided a sufficient, non-merits basis to affirm.

Impact

  • Appellate practice in pro se cases: The decision reinforces that liberal construction does not excuse Rule 28 compliance. In practice, pro se appellants must directly address the district court’s legal reasons (especially immunity and jurisdiction) or risk affirmance for inadequate briefing.
  • Immunity as a futility filter: The order underscores that Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity are not merely defenses; they can determine whether amendment is legally pointless. This encourages early resolution of claims targeting state entities and judicial officers for judicial acts.
  • Challenges to state-court filing restrictions: While the panel did not squarely decide the constitutional merits of filing restrictions, the reasoning signals that federal claims aimed at undoing or recharacterizing state-court restrictions may be blocked by immunity and (in some cases) by Rooker-Feldman or domestic-relations limits, depending on how relief is framed.
  • Nonprecedential but persuasive: The opinion is designated nonbinding except for law-of-the-case/res judicata/collateral estoppel, yet it may be cited for persuasive value; it consolidates standard Tenth Circuit approaches to pro se briefing and immunity-based futility.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Eleventh Amendment immunity: A rule that generally prevents private individuals from suing a state for money damages in federal court (and often bars suits against state officials in their official capacities when the state is the real party in interest).
  • Absolute judicial immunity: Judges are usually protected from civil liability for actions they take as judges (e.g., rulings, case-management, orders), unless they acted with no jurisdiction at all.
  • Futility of amendment: A court may deny permission to amend a complaint if the new version would still be dismissed as a matter of law—no amount of added facts can overcome the legal barrier.
  • Rooker-Feldman doctrine: Federal district courts generally cannot function as appellate courts reviewing state-court judgments. If the injury claimed is essentially the state judgment itself, the federal suit is barred.
  • Domestic relations exception: Federal courts typically do not issue or modify divorce, alimony, or child-custody decrees; claims that effectively seek those results are often outside federal jurisdiction.
  • Rule 28 briefing requirements: An appeal must identify issues and provide developed arguments supported by legal authority and record citations; otherwise, the appellate court may treat issues as waived.

Conclusion

Runkle v. State of Colorado reaffirms a practical but consequential principle: on appeal, even pro se litigants must squarely confront the district court’s legal grounds for dismissal, particularly immunity and jurisdictional bars, or they risk affirmance for inadequate briefing under Rule 28. Substantively, the order highlights how Eleventh Amendment immunity and absolute judicial immunity can render proposed amendments legally futile, providing a decisive basis to terminate federal suits targeting state entities and judges for judicial acts—regardless of the plaintiff’s asserted constitutional injuries.