Analysis
1. Matters Outside the Proper Scope of the Appeal
The court first narrowed the appeal to issues actually decided below. Gobin’s arguments concerning service were immaterial because the district court had not dismissed for defective service. His challenge to removal was not preserved because he had not moved to remand. His contention that the district court examined a superseded complaint was factually incorrect: the dismissal expressly addressed the amended complaint.
Under Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., an appellate court ordinarily reviews alleged errors committed by the trial court and will not decide an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
2. First Amendment: No State Action
The Free Speech Clause restrains government, not private parties. Gobin alleged that Nadella acted as Microsoft’s CEO; he did not allege that Nadella was a government official or that the government directed, compelled, or participated in the account deactivation.
Applying Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, the court identified three limited circumstances in which private conduct may become state action:
- The private party performs a function traditionally and exclusively performed by government;
- The government compels the challenged conduct; or
- The government acts jointly with the private party.
None was pleaded. Although Packingham v. North Carolina described social media as the “modern public square,” that phrase addressed the importance of social media to public discourse; it did not make platform operators government actors. Consistent with Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, operating a social-media platform is not a traditional and exclusive governmental function.
Thus, even accepting Gobin’s account of censorship, private moderation alone did not support a First Amendment claim.
3. ADA Claims
Title V: Retaliation
Title V protects a person from retaliation for opposing an ADA violation or participating in an ADA proceeding. Under Dupree v. Owens, an ADA retaliation claim requires harm following the assertion of rights under another ADA provision.
Gobin did not allege that LinkedIn deactivated his account because he had requested an ADA accommodation, complained of ADA discrimination, or participated in an ADA proceeding. His advocacy concerned human rights and technology companies, not the prior assertion of ADA rights. The required protected activity and causal sequence were therefore missing.
Title II: Public Entities
Title II applies to state and local governments and their instrumentalities. Nadella, sued as a private corporate executive, was not alleged to be a “public entity.” The claim therefore fell outside Title II’s statutory scope.
Title III: Disability Discrimination
Gobin alleged that the deactivation was based on “inherent bias” against him as a disabled person. The court treated that assertion as a conclusion rather than a supporting fact. The complaint did not allege statements, differential treatment, platform policies, or other circumstances plausibly linking the suspension to disability.
The opinion did not resolve broader questions about when a website qualifies as a “place of public accommodation.” It dismissed the claim on the narrower ground that discriminatory causation had not been plausibly pleaded.
4. Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 prohibits disability discrimination in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. As reflected in Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis and U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., federal funding is a threshold condition.
Because Gobin did not allege that Microsoft or the relevant program received federal financial assistance, his passing reference to the Rehabilitation Act could not state a claim.
5. EAPPA: No Private Right of Action
The court applied the framework described in Love v. Delta Air Lines, drawing upon Alexander v. Sandoval. A private right to enforce a federal statute must be created by Congress; courts do not infer one merely because a plaintiff falls within the population the statute seeks to protect.
The EAPPA contains no individual “rights-creating” language. Its structure instead assigns enforcement and coordination functions to the Attorney General, the Federal Trade Commission, and public law-enforcement bodies. Under Turbeville v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., statutory silence combined with an express governmental enforcement structure strongly indicates that Congress did not authorize private lawsuits.
6. Consumer Review Fairness Act
The Consumer Review Fairness Act invalidates certain contract provisions that restrict consumer reviews. It assigns enforcement to the Federal Trade Commission and authorized state officials. The statute does not allow an individual consumer to sue directly.
The court relied in part on Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., which recognizes that the Federal Trade Commission Act itself has no private right of action. Because the Consumer Review Fairness Act incorporates that public enforcement model, Gobin could not enforce it personally.
7. Georgia “Elder Law”
The amended complaint referred generally to Georgia “Elder Law” without identifying a statute, a recognized civil cause of action, or its elements. A court cannot determine whether pleaded facts support relief when the legal claim itself is unspecified.
GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, identified as overruled in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, supported the requirement that a complaint give sufficient notice of the legal and factual basis for relief. Gobin’s appellate reference to O.C.G.A. § 30-5-1 did not cure what was absent from the operative complaint.
8. Pleading Standards and Pro Se Status
The court reviewed the dismissal de novo under Hill v. White and accepted well-pleaded facts as true under Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez. Under Powell v. Lennon, Gobin’s pro se complaint was entitled to liberal construction.
Liberal construction, however, does not eliminate Rule 8’s requirement of a plausible claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly rejects labels, conclusions, and speculative allegations, while Ashcroft v. Iqbal requires sufficient factual matter to make entitlement to relief plausible on its face. Gobin’s assertions of conspiracy, bias, and censorship lacked the factual allegations needed to satisfy the relevant statutory elements.
9. Denial of Further Amendment
The ordinary rule, reflected in Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., is that leave to amend should be freely granted when justice requires. Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit and Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ. recognize that a pro se litigant ordinarily should receive at least one opportunity to amend before dismissal with prejudice when a better-drafted complaint might state a claim.
Amendment is unnecessary when futile. Under Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., Cockrell v. Sparks, and Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, futility exists when the amended complaint would still be subject to dismissal.
Gobin’s proposed “Statement of Claim” added a request for $2 million and categories of damages, but it did not allege state action, protected ADA activity, disability-based causation, federal funding, or a privately enforceable statutory right. The proposed amendment therefore could not save the claims.
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. supplied the general abuse-of-discretion standard for amendment rulings, while futility was reviewed de novo.
10. Supplemental Appellate Materials
The court denied Gobin’s request to supplement the appellate record or obtain judicial notice of additional documents. The district court’s dismissal order was already in the record, and the other materials would not assist resolution of the issues. The court cited CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City and Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc..