Private Bail Recovery Agents Are Not State Actors for § 1983 Absent State Compulsion or Joint Law-Enforcement Participation (11th Cir.)

1. Introduction

In Lillie Middlebrooks v. Bond, James Bond, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam, non-argument calendar; not for publication) affirmed dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s federal civil-rights claims arising from her apprehension by private bail recovery agents after a bench warrant issued. The key dispute was whether the bonding company and its agents—who seized the plaintiff and transported her to jail—acted “under color of state law,” a required element for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The parties were Lillie M. Middlebrooks (plaintiff-appellant) and Bond, James Bond, Inc. (“BJB”) (defendant-appellee). After Middlebrooks failed to appear for a scheduling hearing, a Floyd County judge issued a bench warrant. BJB’s bail recovery agents went to Middlebrooks’s home, verified her identity, arrested her, searched her and her sister for weapons, called for EMS when the sister was injured, and delivered Middlebrooks to the Floyd County jail. Middlebrooks sued alleging two Fourth Amendment violations under § 1983 and a Georgia false-imprisonment claim. The district court dismissed the federal claims for lack of state action and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on two independent grounds:

  • No state action: BJB and its bail recovery agents were not state actors under any recognized Eleventh Circuit test (public function, state compulsion, nexus/joint action). Without state action, Middlebrooks could not state a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction properly declined: After dismissing all federal claims, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Georgia law claim.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is a careful application of well-established § 1983 “state action” doctrine and supplemental-jurisdiction principles, anchored in the following authorities:

1) Pleading-stage and jurisdictional review standards

  • Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023): Supplied the de novo standard for reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. This matters because the panel independently assessed whether the complaint plausibly alleged state action.
  • Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Lab'ys, Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 532 (11th Cir. 2015): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for review of a decision declining supplemental jurisdiction.

2) The core § 1983 “under color of state law” requirement

  • Andre v. Clayton County, 148 F.4th 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2025): Stated the two elements of a § 1983 claim (constitutional deprivation + under color of state law). The panel used Andre to frame why the case turned on state action.
  • Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982): Provided the foundational Supreme Court articulation that “under color of state law” requires action attributable to the state—i.e., state action.

3) The three Eleventh Circuit tests for converting private conduct into state action

  • Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992): Identified the three tests—public function, state compulsion, and nexus/joint action—and emphasized that finding state action by private actors is “rare.”
  • Willis v. Univ. Health Servs., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993): Elaborated the substance of each test; the panel repeatedly relied on Willis to structure its analysis and to define the doctrinal thresholds.
  • Langston v. ACT, 890 F.2d 380, 385 (11th Cir. 1989): Supplied the “significant encouragement, either overt or covert” formulation for the state compulsion inquiry.
  • Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 308 (11th Cir. 1987): Supported rejection of nexus/joint action where the private actor did not receive state “instructions, direction, aid, comfort, succor, or anything else” in carrying out the challenged conduct.

4) Bail recovery as a private undertaking

  • Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 40 (5th Cir. 1931): Cited for the proposition that bail bonding and a bondsman’s seizure of a principal—when done without law enforcement assistance—rests on private authority rather than state power. (As an old Fifth Circuit decision, it is frequently treated as persuasive and, where applicable, part of the circuit’s inherited body of law.)
  • Harper v. State, 790 S.E.2d 552, 555 n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016), rev'd on other grounds, 810 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 2018): Used as state-court support for characterizing bail bonding, absent law enforcement involvement, as private conduct.

5) Supplemental jurisdiction after federal dismissal

  • Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004): Expressly “encouraged” dismissal of remaining state claims when federal claims are dismissed—central to the affirmance.
  • Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 55 F.4th 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2022): Reinforced that it is “rare” for a district court to err by declining supplemental jurisdiction once the federal anchor claims are gone.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The public function test: bail recovery is not an exclusive state prerogative

The court held that BJB’s conduct did not satisfy the public function test because “a bail bondsman’s seizure of a principal is not a function that is traditionally reserved to the exclusive prerogative of the state.” The panel emphasized the source of authority: the bondsman’s right to retrieve a principal “arises from a private right of contract” rather than from the criminal procedure apparatus itself. By citing Fitzpatrick v. Williams and Harper v. State, the court treated the lack of law enforcement assistance as a key boundary separating private bail recovery from state action.

2) The state compulsion test: a bench warrant did not “significantly encourage” the bonding company

Middlebrooks relied in part on the bench warrant’s language that she be “re-arrested by any Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff, or other lawful arresting officer of Georgia.” The Eleventh Circuit held that this order did not amount to “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,” under Langston v. ACT. The warrant authorized governmental re-arrest by governmental actors; it did not direct, coerce, or meaningfully encourage BJB to deploy private agents. The decision to retrieve Middlebrooks was characterized as “BJB’s alone.”

3) The nexus/joint action test: calling EMS is not joint law-enforcement participation in the seizure

The panel rejected nexus/joint action because the agents “did not receive any instructions, direction, aid, comfort, succor, or anything else” from the state in making the arrest, tracking Jaffe v. Smith. The only contact with law enforcement alleged in the complaint was to summon EMS for the sister’s injuries—not to enlist police assistance to arrest Middlebrooks or to execute the warrant. That factual detail mattered: the opinion draws a line between (i) incidental contact with state services and (ii) state participation in the challenged seizure. Only the latter can plausibly transform private conduct into state action.

4) Supplemental jurisdiction: discretionary dismissal of the state claim followed ordinary circuit practice

After affirming dismissal of all federal claims, the panel relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and Eleventh Circuit guidance in Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co. and Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty. to conclude the district court acted well within its discretion by declining supplemental jurisdiction over the Georgia false-imprisonment claim.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is practically significant in three recurring litigation contexts:

  • § 1983 claims against bail bondsmen and bounty hunters: The opinion reinforces that plaintiffs must plead more than the existence of a warrant or subsequent transfer to jail. They must allege facts showing that the bondsmen were either performing an exclusively governmental function, were compelled or significantly encouraged by the state, or acted jointly with the state in the seizure. Mere private apprehension followed by delivery to law enforcement is not enough.
  • What counts as “joint action”: The panel implicitly narrows “nexus” arguments by treating an EMS call (and related law enforcement contact) as collateral to the arrest rather than evidence of joint participation. Future litigants will likely need allegations of coordinated planning, directed execution, police presence, or police assistance in the apprehension itself.
  • State-law claims after federal dismissal: The decision signals (again) that where federal claims fall early, state tort claims will commonly be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, especially at the pleading stage.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Under color of state law” / “state actor” (for § 1983): A defendant is liable under § 1983 only if the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state. Private misconduct—even if wrongful—generally does not become a federal civil-rights violation unless the state is responsible for it in a legally meaningful way.
  • Public function test: A private party can be treated like the government only when it performs a task that only the government has traditionally and exclusively done. The court held bail recovery is not such a task.
  • State compulsion test: The state must coerce or strongly encourage the private party’s conduct. A warrant authorizing police to re-arrest did not compel a private bonding company to act.
  • Nexus/joint action test: The private party and the state must be intertwined in the specific challenged conduct—essentially acting together. Incidental contact with public services (like calling EMS) is not enough.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts can hear related state claims when there is a live federal claim. If the federal claims are dismissed, courts usually dismiss the state claims too, leaving them for state courts.

5. Conclusion

Middlebrooks v. Bond, James Bond, Inc. reaffirms a clear rule within Eleventh Circuit doctrine: private bail recovery agents do not become state actors merely because a bench warrant exists, because they later deliver the arrestee to jail, or because they contact public services incidentally. Absent facts showing exclusive governmental function, meaningful state compulsion, or genuine joint participation by law enforcement in the seizure, § 1983 claims based on such apprehensions will fail at the pleading stage. The opinion also underscores the routine practice—endorsed by circuit precedent—of dismissing state-law claims once the federal foundation for jurisdiction is gone.