Prior Successful Internal Relocation Rebuttal (and Harmless-Error Review) in Domestic-Violence Asylum and CAT Claims

1. Introduction

Mierna Chilel-Chilel, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States unlawfully in April 2018 and conceded removability. She sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging severe domestic abuse and threats by her husband, Ezekiel Gonzalez, and contending that Guatemalan authorities failed to protect her.

The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, finding (among other things) lack of nexus, non-cognizable proposed social groups, and—critically—an ability to relocate safely within Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) largely affirmed, but took a streamlined approach: it assumed the cognizability of “Guatemalan women in a domestic relationship” and assumed past persecution, yet held the government rebutted any presumption of future persecution because Chilel-Chilel could reasonably relocate within Guatemala. The Third Circuit denied the petition for review.

Key issues included: (i) whether substantial evidence supported the BIA’s internal-relocation finding rebutting presumed future persecution; (ii) whether the BIA applied the correct “safe and reasonable” relocation standard; and (iii) whether the record compelled CAT relief, including the requirement of likely torture with government consent or acquiescence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Asylum/Withholding: Even assuming a cognizable social group and past persecution, substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that Chilel-Chilel could avoid future persecution by relocating within Guatemala. The court also treated any failure to use the word “reasonable” in the BIA’s relocation discussion as, at most, harmless error.
• CAT: Substantial evidence supported denial because the feared harm depended on a chain of contingencies (whether the abuser would learn of her return, remain interested, find her, and inflict harm rising to “torture”), and because she failed to show likely torture with government consent or acquiescence.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Standard of review and deference

• Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020): The court invoked Nasrallah for the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard—agency fact findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. This framed the entire petition as an uphill battle: the question was not whether relocation (or torture risk) could be debated, but whether the record compelled the opposite result.
• Toure v. Att'y Gen., 443 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2006), quoting Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc): These cases supplied the Third Circuit’s expectation that agency conclusions “flow in a reasoned way” from record evidence and are not “arbitrary and conjectural.” Here, the panel used them to validate the BIA’s articulation of “specific, cogent” reasons supporting relocation.

Asylum vs. withholding relationship

• Thayalan v. Att'y Gen., 997 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2021): Cited for the conventional rule that failure to meet the asylum standard generally forecloses withholding, because withholding imposes a higher burden. Once relocation rebutted asylum’s future-persecution component, withholding fell with it.

Harmless error in agency reasoning

• Li Hua Yuan v. Att'y Gen., 642 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 2011): The petitioner argued the BIA only assessed whether relocation would be “safe,” not “safe and reasonable,” as required by regulation. The court relied on Li Hua Yuan to treat the omission of the word “reasonable” as harmless where the BIA’s discussion effectively addressed reasonableness (e.g., prior relocation and family support).

CAT: likelihood of torture; contingent chains of events

• Galeas Figueroa v. Att'y Gen., 998 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2021): Cited for CAT’s core requirements: (i) “more likely than not” torture upon return; and (ii) torture “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence” of a public official.
• Denis v. Att'y Gen., 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011): Used to reject CAT claims built on a speculative chain of contingencies. The court analogized Chilel-Chilel’s theory (abuser will learn, seek, find, harm, and that harm will qualify as “torture”) to the kind of uncertain sequence Denis found insufficient.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) The court’s “assume-and-decide” posture on social group and past persecution

A notable feature is how the BIA—and then the Third Circuit—resolved the case without definitively settling all disputed asylum elements. The BIA “assum[ed] the cognizabil[ity]” of the proposed group “Guatemalan women in a domestic relationship” and assumed past persecution, yet still denied because the government rebutted the presumption of future persecution through internal relocation. This approach matters strategically: even strong showings on social group and past harm may not carry the case if relocation evidence is robust.

(B) Internal relocation as a rebuttal to presumed future persecution

Under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) and 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), once past persecution is established (or assumed), the applicant receives a presumption of well-founded fear (and of future threat for withholding), but the government may rebut it by showing the applicant can avoid future persecution by relocating, and that relocation is reasonable.

The Third Circuit held substantial evidence supported the relocation finding because:

• Demonstrated ability to relocate in the past: Chilel-Chilel lived away from Gonzalez with her parents for extended periods and later lived with her sister in Guatemala City (six to seven hours away).
• Threats without pursuit: While Gonzalez made threatening calls, he did not appear at her parents’ or sister’s homes or otherwise pursue her there.
• Temporal distance and diminished interest: She last had contact with Gonzalez in 2018 and did not know his whereabouts; her daughter remained in Guatemala and Gonzalez had not attempted contact.
• Family support: The agency considered the presence of family who could assist her relocation.

Given the deferential standard, these record-based factors were enough for the panel to conclude the contrary result was not “compelled.”

(C) “Safe” versus “safe and reasonable”: harmless error as a practical doctrine

The petitioner argued the BIA applied the wrong standard because it spoke in terms of “safe” relocation rather than “safe and reasonable.” The court rejected this challenge, reasoning that the BIA’s discussion effectively covered reasonableness considerations (prior successful relocation; supportive family) even if it did not use the precise word. Invoking Li Hua Yuan v. Att'y Gen., the court treated any linguistic omission as harmless.

Doctrinally, this underscores that courts may credit substance over form in agency explanations—so long as the underlying reasoning reflects the regulatory factors in a way that permits meaningful review.

(D) CAT: “more likely than not” torture, and the acquiescence requirement

For CAT, the court emphasized two independent shortcomings:

• Likelihood of torture: The feared scenario depended on multiple uncertain steps—Gonzalez learning of her return, remaining motivated, locating her, inflicting severe harm, and that harm rising to “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment” under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2). Citing Denis v. Att'y Gen., the court held the record did not compel finding these contingencies were “more likely than not.”
• Government consent or acquiescence: The petitioner did not show Gonzalez was a government official. And while police once told her to “take care of the issue herself,” the court held substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that this did not compel a finding of state acquiescence to torture.

The court also treated relocation as relevant to CAT risk (8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii)): if the applicant can relocate away from the feared torturer, the probability of torture decreases.

3.3 Impact

• Relocation can be dispositive even when other elements are assumed in the applicant’s favor. The decision illustrates a common agency/court pathway: bypass difficult social-group debates and deny on relocation, which is fact-intensive and reviewed deferentially.
• Prior successful relocation is powerful evidence. Applicants who have lived elsewhere in-country—especially for months or years—may face a substantial hurdle unless they can show changed circumstances, tracking capability, country-wide reach, or other reasons relocation is no longer safe or reasonable.
• Harmless-error review reduces the leverage of “magic words” arguments. The panel signaled that failure to recite “reasonable” is unlikely to matter if the analysis substantively addresses reasonableness.
• CAT claims must overcome “contingency chains.” Courts may treat multi-step predictions about a private actor’s future conduct as too speculative absent concrete evidence; internal relocation further undercuts likelihood.
• Nonprecedential but persuasive value. While not binding, the decision reflects how the Third Circuit applies its established review framework to domestic-violence-based claims, particularly where time has passed since the last threat/contact.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Asylum vs. withholding of removal: Asylum requires a “well-founded fear” of persecution on a protected ground; withholding requires a higher probability (“more likely than not”). If you cannot meet asylum’s standard, you usually cannot meet withholding’s (Thayalan v. Att'y Gen.).
• Particular social group (PSG): A protected category under asylum law based on “membership in a particular social group.” Disputes often arise over whether a proposed group is legally “cognizable.” Here, the BIA assumed cognizability for one group to decide the case on relocation instead.
• Past persecution presumption: If past persecution is shown, the applicant is presumed to fear future persecution. The government can rebut by showing safe and reasonable internal relocation (among other grounds).
• Internal relocation (“safe and reasonable”): The idea that, within the home country, the person can live somewhere the persecutor cannot or will not reach—and that doing so is practical under the person’s circumstances (e.g., family support, past ability to move, distance).
• Substantial evidence review: A very deferential appellate standard: the court affirms unless the record would force any reasonable decision-maker to reach the opposite conclusion (Nasrallah v. Barr).
• CAT torture and acquiescence: CAT requires proof that torture is more likely than not, and that officials would be involved or would “consent or acquiesce.” Official inaction alone does not automatically equal acquiescence; it must meet the legal threshold applied by the agency and reviewed deferentially.
• Harmless error: Even if an agency’s wording is imperfect, a court may affirm if the mistake did not affect the outcome and the reasoning shows the correct concept was applied (Li Hua Yuan v. Att'y Gen.).

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s denial of Chilel-Chilel’s petition turns on a pragmatic, fact-driven principle: even where a domestic-violence asylum claim is analyzed under an assumed cognizable group and assumed past persecution, the government can defeat relief by showing the applicant can safely—and, in substance, reasonably—relocate internally. The court further reinforced two limiting doctrines: (i) appellate deference under substantial-evidence review; and (ii) CAT’s resistance to speculative “chain of contingencies” theories, especially when relocation is feasible and government acquiescence is not shown.