Date: Jan 31, 2026

Prior Restraints and Courtroom Exclusion Are Unconstitutional When a Victim’s Identity Is Already Public and the Press Is Punished for Refusing a Gag

1. Introduction

In LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, INC v. DIST. CT. (CHASING HORSE) (CIVIL), the Supreme Court of Nevada addressed two emergency restrictions imposed during an ongoing criminal trial in Clark County: (1) a district court “amended decorum order” prohibiting specified media petitioners from publishing the identity of an alleged victim and other publicly available information; and (2) the exclusion of those petitioners from the courtroom during the alleged victim’s testimony after they refused to agree to the nonpublication condition.

The petitioners—Las Vegas Review-Journal, Inc. and individual journalists—sought extraordinary writ relief against the Eighth Judicial District Court and the presiding judge. The real parties in interest were the criminal defendant (Nathan Chasing Horse) and the State of Nevada.

The core issues were whether the district court’s nonpublication restriction constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First Amendment, and whether the court could exclude the press from a criminal proceeding as a consequence of refusing to submit to that restraint—particularly where the alleged victim’s name had already entered the public domain through publicly filed grand jury transcripts and disclosure in open court.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court exercised original jurisdiction and granted mandamus relief. It held that:

The decorum order’s restriction on publishing the alleged victim’s identity was an unjustified prior restraint because the name had already appeared in publicly filed transcripts and had been disclosed in open court, diminishing any “interest of the highest order” in preserving anonymity.
The district court’s exclusion of petitioners from the courtroom—based on their refusal to agree not to publish the name—violated the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and was not narrowly tailored to any legitimate overriding interest.

The Court directed issuance of a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate the January 13, 2026 amended decorum order to the extent it restricted publication of the alleged victim’s identity and publicly available information, and to refrain from excluding petitioners on the basis of refusal to submit to those restrictions. The alternative request for prohibition was denied as unnecessary given the mandamus relief.

The Court also emphasized statewide implications and indicated a fuller opinion would follow, but entered this order to provide immediate relief during ongoing trial proceedings.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Writ Jurisdiction and Standards

D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (123 Nev. 468, 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736-37 (2007)) supplied the foundational mandamus standard: mandamus is available to control a manifest abuse of discretion or arbitrary/capricious exercise of discretion, and entertaining a writ is discretionary.
Johanson v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (124 Nev. 245, 248-49, 182 P.3d 94, 96 (2008)) supplied both: (a) the function of prohibition (to arrest proceedings in excess of jurisdiction) and (b) the pragmatic reason for accepting writ review of gag orders—later appellate review is often inadequate because the injury is immediate and irreparable.
Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (120 Nev. 222, 224, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 841, 844 (2004)) reiterated the extraordinary nature of writ relief and the requirement of no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.

Prior Restraint Doctrine and “Highest Order” Interests

Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (134 Nev. 40, 43-46, 412 P.3d 23, 26-28 (2018)) framed the Court’s modern Nevada standard: prior restraints are presumed unconstitutional; the proponent bears a heavy burden; and gag orders are justified only when (1) the restrained activity poses a clear and present danger or serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest, (2) the order is narrowly drawn, and (3) less restrictive alternatives are not available (quoting Johanson v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.). It also furnished the irreparable injury rationale for immediate review of even “short-lived” gag orders.
Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole (463 U.S. 1303, 1304 (1983)) was quoted (via the 2018 Las Vegas Review-Journal decision) for the proposition that even a brief gag order in a matter of public concern is a substantial prior restraint causing irreparable First Amendment injury.
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart (427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)) supplied the classic statement that prior restraints are “the most serious and the least tolerable” First Amendment infringements.
The Fla. Star v. B.J.F. (491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989)) reinforced two key points adopted by the Court: (a) the protected interest must be of the “highest order” to justify punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy, and (b) the State must apply such prohibitions evenhandedly, not selectively against the press.

Public Record / Prior Disclosure and the Fading of Privacy Interests

Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Ct. (430 U.S. 308 (1977)) was used as a close analogue: the Supreme Court vacated an injunction barring publication where the juvenile court had permitted public attendance at a hearing, undermining any later claim of secrecy.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975)) supplied the principle that privacy interests “fade” when the information already appears on the public record.
Doe v. City of N.Y. (15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994)) supported the conclusion that one cannot reasonably expect constitutional privacy protection in matters of public record.
McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co. (532 F.2d 69, 77-78 (8th Cir. 1976)) reinforced that there is no constitutional privacy harm when the allegedly private information is already a matter of public record.

Public Access to Criminal Proceedings and Closure Standards

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)) anchored the First Amendment right to attend criminal trials as implicit in free speech and press guarantees, rooted in historical openness.
Branzburg v. Haye.s (408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)) was quoted within Richmond Newspapers to emphasize that freedom of the press would be undermined without access.
Stephens Media, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (125 Nev. 849, 859, 221 P.3d 1240, 1247 (2009)) was cited for Nevada’s strong presumption of openness and the high bar to overcome it.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. (464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)) supplied the controlling closure test quoted by the Court: openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest supported by findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Why the Nonpublication Restriction Was an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint

The Court treated the decorum order’s prohibition on publishing an alleged victim’s identity as a classic prior restraint: a court order forbidding publication before it occurs. Under Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart and Nevada’s own framework in Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., such restraints are presumptively unconstitutional and demand the proponent carry a “heavy burden.”

The district court’s stated interest was victim privacy. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reject privacy as an interest in the abstract; instead, it held the interest could not be “of the highest order” on these facts because:

The alleged victim’s name appeared throughout publicly filed grand jury transcripts.
The State had already disclosed the alleged victim’s name in open court during trial.

These circumstances triggered the logic of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn and Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Ct.: once information is placed in the public record or publicly aired in open proceedings, privacy-based secrecy rationales substantially weaken, and courts cannot plausibly reimpose confidentiality by restraining publication.

The Court also found the order practically ineffective and underinclusive: others were present during disclosure and testimony, yet the record did not show the same restraints were imposed on everyone. Citing The Fla. Star v. B.J.F. (via its evenhandedness requirement), the Court reasoned that selective restrictions aimed at the press do not credibly advance the asserted privacy objective.

(B) Why Excluding the Press for Refusing the Gag Violated the Right of Access

The Court then addressed courtroom exclusion. Under Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia and Nevada precedent like Stephens Media, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., criminal trials are presumptively open. Closure (or partial closure by excluding particular press actors) requires an overriding interest and narrow tailoring per Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal..

The district court excluded petitioners because they refused to agree not to publish the alleged victim’s name. The Nevada Supreme Court treated this as constitutionally impermissible for two reinforcing reasons:

No valid overriding interest existed because the underlying nonpublication condition was itself an unjustified prior restraint; a court cannot manufacture an “overriding interest” out of enforcing an unconstitutional order.
The exclusion was not narrowly tailored given the prior public disclosure of the name—meaning exclusion could not realistically protect anonymity—and functioned instead as punishment for declining to submit to an unconstitutional restriction.

3.3 Impact

Although styled as an expedited order with a fuller opinion promised, the decision meaningfully sharpens Nevada’s operational rules for trial courts handling victim-identifying information and press access:

Once identity information is in publicly filed records or disclosed in open court, trial courts face a near-insurmountable hurdle in justifying publication bans on “privacy” grounds; the “highest order” requirement will generally not be met.
Courts cannot use access as leverage to compel speech restraint. Excluding reporters because they refuse a gag converts courtroom access into a coercive tool and risks transforming closure into an enforcement mechanism for prior restraint.
Evenhandedness matters. Selectively burdening the press while others remain free to disseminate the same information undermines the asserted interest and makes narrow tailoring harder (or impossible) to show.
Writ review will remain a primary vehicle for challenging gag orders and access restrictions in real time, because the Court reaffirmed that these orders are often not independently appealable and cause irreparable First Amendment harm while in effect.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Prior restraint: A government order that blocks speech before it happens (e.g., “you may not publish this name”). Courts treat this as the most constitutionally suspect form of speech restriction.
“Interest of the highest order”: A competing governmental or private interest so compelling that it can justify extraordinary limits on truthful publication. Ordinary reputational or generalized privacy concerns typically do not qualify—especially after public disclosure.
Narrowly tailored / less restrictive alternatives: The court must use the smallest, most precise measure that actually protects the interest and must prefer alternatives that burden speech and access less (for example, protective procedures that do not prohibit publication—where constitutionally permissible).
Presumption of openness: Criminal trials are generally open to the public and press. Closing the courtroom (or excluding some observers) requires specific findings of an overriding interest and a closure method limited to what is essential.
Writ of mandamus: An extraordinary order from a higher court directing a lower court to correct a clear abuse of discretion or to perform a required act, typically used when ordinary appeals are inadequate.

5. Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court held that a district court may not impose a publication ban on an alleged victim’s identity where that identity has already been placed in the public domain through publicly filed records and open-court disclosure, and may not exclude the press from the courtroom as a consequence of refusing to accept such a gag. Grounded in both Nevada and United States Supreme Court precedent, the decision reinforces two linked constitutional commitments: prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional and rarely justified, and criminal trials are presumptively open with closure permitted only under strict, narrowly tailored conditions.