1. Introduction
The Sixth Circuit’s published decision addresses how the Fair Labor Standards Act’s computer-employee exemption applies to a technology professional whose principal contributions involve system design and technical documentation rather than writing code. It also considers whether an employment offer expressing compensation as an hourly rate establishes a contractual right to payment for every hour worked when the employee subsequently receives fixed weekly compensation.
Loren Bennink developed extensive expertise in Cincinnati Bell’s interactive voice response system, or IVR—the automated telephone system that routes callers through programmed menus. Initially working through an outside service provider, he helped develop the system, document its architecture, and connect it to company databases. Cincinnati Bell hired him directly in 2016.
His offer letter specified compensation of $75 per hour if he declined medical coverage, which he did. It also described employment as at will and twice stated that the offer did not constitute an employment contract. For almost his entire employment, Bennink received compensation equivalent to $3,000 weekly, regardless of his hours.
After assuming substantial additional responsibilities, including integrating Hawaii Telecom’s contact-center operations, Bennink sometimes worked extremely long days. He left in June 2023 and sued for statutory overtime and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Cincinnati Bell on both claims.
The appellate court affirmed. Its central conclusion is that qualifying computer work includes substantive system design, development, and documentation even when another employee performs the programming. Its separate contract analysis emphasizes mutual assent, sufficiently definite compensation terms, and the significance of the parties’ actual course of dealing.
3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning
A. The statutory text controls the computer-employee inquiry
The FLSA generally requires overtime compensation at one and one-half times an employee’s regular rate for hours exceeding forty in a workweek. Section 213(a)(17), however, exempts qualifying computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, and similarly skilled workers whose primary duties satisfy the statute.
The court confined its analysis to § 213(a)(17)(B), covering:
“design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs” based on and related to user or system design specifications.
Cincinnati Bell did not rely on the separate categories addressing systems-analysis techniques under subsection (A) or machine operating systems under subsection (C). That limitation matters: the decision establishes the sufficiency of Bennink’s duties under subsection (B), not the requirements of every branch of the exemption.
The statute also imposes a minimum compensation rate of $27.63 per hour for employees compensated hourly. Although the parties disputed whether Bennink was hourly or salaried, both agreed that his compensation rate exceeded that threshold. The court therefore focused on his duties rather than resolving that characterization for purposes of the FLSA claim.
B. Congress’s changes foreclose importing superseded requirements
The court traced the exemption’s development. In 1990, Congress directed the Department of Labor to address certain computer workers within the professional exemption. The resulting regulations included requirements involving independent discretion and highly specialized knowledge.
In 1996, Congress enacted the separate statutory computer-employee exemption. It adopted the earlier regulations’ list of qualifying activities but omitted their language concerning education, independent judgment, and highly specialized knowledge. The court treated those omissions as meaningful.
Consequently, a court cannot reject an otherwise qualifying employee simply because the employee lacks a computer-science degree, formal coding instruction, or the credentials associated with older professional-exemption formulations. The statutory occupational language and specified duties still matter; the decision does not exempt every employee who uses technology. It instead rejects additional prerequisites absent from the governing text.
C. Agency regulations remain informative, not automatically controlling
The court independently assessed the Department of Labor’s definition of “primary duty” in 29 C.F.R. § 541.700. It accepted that definition because it persuasively reflected the statutory term, not because ambiguity required deference to the agency.
Under that definition, primary duty means the employee’s principal, main, major, or most important duty, assessed in light of the job as a whole. Time spent is relevant but not dispositive. This approach avoids converting a qualitative inquiry into an inflexible time-percentage test.
D. IVR design and technical documentation were qualifying computer work
The court readily classified the IVR as a computer system. It automatically routed calls through programmed choices while drawing information from databases and other systems. That its functionality depended on several constituent systems did not change its character.
Bennink’s work also satisfied the required connection to user or system design specifications. He gathered input from departments using or supporting the IVR, identified operational needs, considered technical constraints, and proposed how calls should flow through the system.
His documentation performed two related functions. It explained the system’s existing operation and guided future changes. Programmers used his work to understand what needed to be implemented, while Bennink updated the documentation as the system evolved. The court therefore rejected his characterization of the work as merely producing “complicated flowcharts.”
The distinction is substantive rather than visual: a flowchart can embody computer-system design when it determines how the system should respond to users. Conversely, the decision does not suggest that every diagram or instruction document constitutes exempt technical documentation.
Nor did Bennink’s reliance on programmers defeat the exemption. The statute lists design, development, and documentation separately from other computer activities. An employee can shape a system’s operation without personally translating those decisions into executable code.
E. Mixed responsibilities did not displace Bennink’s primary duty
The court acknowledged that some of Bennink’s responsibilities did not fit neatly within the exemption. He coordinated teams, negotiated deadlines and budgets, managed vendor relationships, and prepared technology launches. These activities did not automatically become exempt merely because they occurred in an IT setting.
Nevertheless, the record established that IVR design, development, and documentation were central to his employment. His accumulated IVR expertise helped explain both his initial hiring and his later responsibility for the Hawaii Telecom integration. His deposition described substantial technical and operational contributions.
The court therefore found the qualifying duties primary despite the absence of an exact time breakdown. The reasoning is record-specific: it does not excuse an employer from proving the exemption where genuinely disputed evidence leaves the employee’s principal responsibilities uncertain.
F. The contract claim required proof beyond an hourly figure
The contract claim was analytically independent of the FLSA claim. An employee exempt from statutory overtime may still possess contractual compensation rights. Bennink’s theory sought $75 for every hour worked, rather than the FLSA’s time-and-a-half premium.
The court first rejected the offer letter as an independently enforceable contract. The letter twice disclaimed contractual status, and Bennink testified that he did not think there had been a meeting of the minds when it was exchanged. Those facts prevented him from establishing mutual assent through the letter alone.
The court then considered whether the subsequent at-will relationship nevertheless included the asserted compensation term. Ohio recognizes the contractual nature of at-will employment, but enforcing a particular provision still requires sufficiently definite terms supported by evidence of agreement.
The letter’s “per hour” language gave Bennink’s position an obvious textual foundation. Nevertheless, the court found that it did not resolve whether the stated rate would operate as an hourly payment obligation for all hours or as the basis for fixed compensation. The letter did not specify overtime treatment or weekly hours, and Bennink identified no later assurances establishing an all-hours promise. His expectation that employment would replicate his prior contracting terms was insufficient.
Finally, the court supplied an alternative rationale. Since October 2016, Bennink had received fixed compensation equivalent to $3,000 weekly. He reviewed statements identifying that weekly amount, knew he could not enter more than forty hours, and knew the company classified him as exempt. His workload complaints did not raise compensation objections. On those facts, the court concluded that his continued employment reflected agreement to the salary arrangement, even assuming a different initial understanding.
This is not a holding that at-will employees lack enforceable pay agreements or that disclaimers invariably defeat wage promises. The decision rests on this disclaimer, this testimony, the absence of additional assurances, and this sustained course of dealing.
5. Potential Impact and Limits
A. Greater clarity for noncoding technology roles
The opinion provides significant guidance for roles combining technical design, business requirements, system documentation, and implementation coordination. An employee need not be the person writing code if the employee’s principal work substantively determines how a computer system operates.
That principle may be relevant to systems designers, technical business analysts, and similar hybrid professionals. Titles alone remain insufficient: employers must establish the actual statutory duties, their primary importance, and applicable compensation requirements.
B. A continuing boundary around routine support
The contrast with employees implementing predetermined specifications remains essential. Routine installation, scripted troubleshooting, ordinary project coordination, and general technology use do not become exempt merely because the workplace is technically sophisticated.
C. Evidence of importance may matter more than precise timekeeping
The decision confirms that hiring history, responsibility for critical projects, testimony, and descriptions of substantive work can establish a primary duty without an exact time allocation. But materially different or conflicting evidence could still require trial.
D. Independent judicial evaluation of agency interpretations
The opinion illustrates how courts may continue using sound agency guidance after the rejection of automatic ambiguity-based deference. The Department’s primary-duty interpretation remained influential because the court independently found it persuasive.
E. Compensation drafting and course of dealing remain consequential
The contract analysis highlights the risks of combining an hourly expression with fixed weekly payment without clearly explaining the relationship between them. Future disputes may turn on explicit all-hours promises, overtime provisions, later communications, objections to payment practices, or other evidence absent here.
The alternative contract holding should also remain distinct from statutory wage law. Continued employment cannot authorize noncompliance with FLSA rights applicable to a nonexempt employee. Here, the statutory claim failed because Bennink was exempt; the course-of-dealing analysis concerned his separate contractual entitlement.