Primary Assumption of Risk Does Not Bar Claims for Negligent Mounting Assistance that Unreasonably Enhances Horseback-Riding Risks

1. Introduction

Small v. Riding High Dude Ranch, Inc. arises from a guest’s participation in advanced trail riding at a dude ranch. The plaintiff, an experienced rider, alleged that a ranch wrangler negligently assisted her while mounting a horse from the ground by forcefully pushing her right leg over the horse, causing a “pop” in her knee and later-diagnosed ligament and meniscus injuries. The defendant moved for summary judgment on two core grounds: (1) primary assumption of risk barred liability because mounting and riding risks are inherent in horseback riding; and (2) plaintiff’s proof of causation was speculative given that she completed the ride and later fell while entering a vehicle.

The Third Department framed the dispute around a familiar but fact-sensitive boundary in New York recreational-injury law: when does conduct during a sporting/recreational activity remain an “inherent risk” assumed by the participant, and when does an employee’s conduct “unreasonably enhance” that risk so that the defendant may remain liable?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division affirmed denial of summary judgment. It agreed that the defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff was experienced and that mounting with wrangler assistance from the ground is a generally accepted practice—facts that ordinarily support application of primary assumption of risk in horseback-riding cases.

However, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact by describing that the wrangler lifted and pushed her leg with more force than expected, coinciding with immediate sensations of injury, and by pointing to deposition testimony in which the wrangler conceded that the technique described (placing the rider’s foot in his hands and pushing the leg over) was inconsistent with the ranch’s training, policies, and procedures. Those facts created a jury question whether the wrangler’s conduct unreasonably increased the risks.

On causation, the court held the plaintiff’s proof was not fatally speculative: circumstantial evidence and the sequence of symptoms could permit a logical inference that the mounting assistance caused the knee injury, even though the plaintiff completed the ride, did not immediately seek treatment, and experienced a subsequent fall.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Summary judgment framework
  Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. (68 NY2d 320 [1986]) supplies the baseline requirement that the moving party must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
  Vega v Restani Constr. Corp. (18 NY3d 499 [2012]) reinforces the court’s obligation to view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw reasonable inferences without weighing credibility.
  The Third Department also cited its own recent applications of these principles, Lubrano-Birken v Ellis Hosp. (229 AD3d 873 [3d Dept 2024]) and Ali-Hasan v St. Peter's Health Partners Med. Assoc., P.C. (226 AD3d 1199 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 906 [2024]), to underscore that credibility disputes (e.g., the wrangler’s lack of recollection versus plaintiff’s detailed account) are not resolved on summary judgment.
• Primary assumption of risk—definition and calibration to the plaintiff
  Stanhope v Burke (220 AD3d 1122 [3d Dept 2023]) and Sara W. v Rocking Horse Ranch Corp. (169 AD3d 1342 [3d Dept 2019]) are cited for the doctrine’s core proposition: voluntary participants consent to commonly appreciated risks inherent in the activity, limiting the defendant’s duty.
  Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc. (225 AD3d 1030 [3d Dept 2024], affd 44 NY3d 212 [2025]) adds an important refinement used here: assumption-of-risk analysis is measured against the particular plaintiff’s skill and experience. The plaintiff’s admitted experience mattered to the prima facie showing—but it did not end the analysis once evidence suggested risk enhancement.
• Horseback riding—what is “inherent”
  Dalton v Adirondack Saddle Tours, Inc. (40 AD3d 1169 [3d Dept 2007]) and Stanhope v Burke are relied upon for the proposition that falls and injuries from a horse’s sudden or unintended actions are inherent risks of horseback riding, as is the general risk of injury incident to mounting/dismounting.
• The “unreasonably enhanced risk” limitation
  The court anchored the limiting principle in Grady v Chenango Val. Cent. Sch. Dist. (40 NY3d 89 [2023]) and reiterated through Stanhope v Burke and Fritz v Walden Playboys M.C. Inc. (217 AD3d 1293 [3d Dept 2023]): participants do not assume concealed risks or those unreasonably enhanced by a defendant’s conduct.
• Mounting assistance cases—why this case goes to a jury
  The Third Department placed this dispute in a line of “mounting assistance” decisions where employee conduct, rather than horse behavior or a fall, supplies the claimed mechanism of injury:
  • Sara W. v Rocking Horse Ranch Corp. (169 AD3d 1342 [3d Dept 2019])—triable issues may exist when wranglers’ actions in assisting riders can heighten the inherent risks.
  • Valencia v Diamond F. Livestock, Inc. (110 AD3d 1334 [3d Dept 2013])—assistance/direction by staff can create factual questions as to enhanced risk.
  • Corica v Rocking Horse Ranch, Inc. (84 AD3d 1566 [3d Dept 2011])—a key analog cited in the holding section: when the employee’s conduct arguably increases the risk beyond what is inherent, summary judgment is inappropriate.
  • Jones v Smoke Tree Farm (161 AD3d 1590 [4th Dept 2018]) and Georgiades v Nassau Equestrian Ctr. at Old Mill, Inc. (134 AD3d 887 [2d Dept 2015])—reinforce statewide consistency that negligent mounting procedures or direction can defeat assumption-of-risk defenses at the summary judgment stage.
  These authorities supplied the court’s roadmap: the relevant question is not whether mounting is risky (it is), but whether the wrangler’s particular method and level of force could be found to have made the activity more dangerous than the inherent baseline.
• Proximate cause—circumstantial proof and “not mere speculation”
  The court relied on Weichsel v State of New York (231 AD3d 1459 [3d Dept 2024]) for the rule that causation may be proven entirely through circumstantial evidence so long as competing causes are sufficiently remote, permitting a verdict based on logical inference rather than speculation.
  It supported that principle with Mulligan v R&D Props. of N.Y. Inc. (162 AD3d 1301 [3d Dept 2018]) and Acton v 1906 Rest. Corp. (147 AD3d 1277 [3d Dept 2017]).
  Critically, Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth. (39 NY3d 443 [2023]) is cited for the plaintiff-friendly clarification that she need not “positively exclude every other possible cause.” This undercut the defendant’s theory that the later vehicle-entry fall necessarily broke causation.

B. Legal Reasoning

The decision proceeds in two steps consistent with New York practice on summary judgment and assumption of risk.

1. Defendant’s prima facie showing: The defendant established foundational facts that typically activate primary assumption of risk: the plaintiff’s substantial riding experience; her participation in “advanced” riding; her written liability release acknowledging horseback riding can cause injury; and that mounting from the ground with wrangler assistance was a common ranch practice supported by expert opinion. This was enough to shift the burden.
2. Plaintiff’s triable issues—risk enhancement and causation:
   • Risk enhancement: The plaintiff’s description focused not on a horse’s behavior or a fall, but on the wrangler’s applied force and method. The wrangler’s testimony was pivotal: although he did not recall the incident, he conceded that the plaintiff-described technique conflicted with the ranch’s training/policies. That concession (coupled with his inability to directly rebut the plaintiff’s account) created a factual dispute whether the wrangler’s conduct unreasonably increased the inherent risks—precisely the type of issue that assumption-of-risk doctrine leaves to the factfinder.
   • Proximate cause: The defendant sought to reframe causation around the plaintiff’s later fall and the absence of immediate medical treatment. The court treated those points as classic credibility/weight issues for a jury, not dispositive as a matter of law. The plaintiff’s account of immediate symptoms during mounting, plus later swelling, pain, reporting to staff, and cessation of riding, provided a coherent narrative allowing a logical inference of causation without requiring elimination of all alternative causes.

C. Impact

1) Reinforcement of the “employee assistance” carve-out. This opinion strengthens the practical point that, in equine-recreation cases, defendants cannot rely on assumption of risk merely by characterizing the event as “mounting” or “riding.” If the alleged mechanism is negligent assistance—especially a technique that deviates from training/policy—summary judgment becomes difficult because the core issue is whether the defendant increased the risk beyond what is inherent.

2) Policy/procedure evidence becomes high-value at summary judgment. The wrangler’s concession that the described technique was inconsistent with training/policies functioned as an “objective” anchor for plaintiff’s story even without direct corroboration. Future litigants will likely focus discovery on written procedures, training materials, and staff admissions to frame conduct as a departure that enhanced risk.

3) Causation may survive despite intervening events. By applying Weichsel v State of New York and Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., the court signals that defendants cannot convert later incidents (like a subsequent fall) into automatic causation defeats. Where the plaintiff can present a temporally and symptomatically consistent sequence, causation commonly remains for the jury.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Primary assumption of risk: A doctrine limiting what a defendant must do to protect participants in sports/recreation. If a risk is inherent in the activity and commonly appreciated, the participant is treated as having consented to it, so the defendant’s duty is limited.
• Inherent risk vs. enhanced risk: “Inherent” means integral to the activity (e.g., a horse may move unpredictably; mounting can be unstable). “Enhanced” means the defendant’s conduct made things more dangerous than the inherent baseline (e.g., a wrangler uses an improper technique or excessive force).
• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling granted only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Courts do not decide who is more believable at this stage.
• Proximate cause (circumstantial proof): The plaintiff can prove causation through a reasonable chain of inference from facts (timing, symptoms, reports, medical findings). She does not have to disprove every alternative cause; she must show her theory is more than speculation.

5. Conclusion

Small v. Riding High Dude Ranch, Inc. is a pointed application of New York’s assumption-of-risk doctrine to horseback riding where the alleged injury mechanism is not the horse or a fall, but staff-provided mounting assistance. The Third Department held that evidence of unexpected, excessive force—especially where the method appears inconsistent with the defendant’s own training and policies—can permit a finding that the defendant unreasonably enhanced inherent risks, precluding summary judgment. The opinion also confirms that proximate cause in such cases may be established by circumstantial evidence and need not eliminate every other possible cause, leaving competing narratives for the jury.