Prevailing-Party Fees Require Enduring, Judicially Sanctioned Relief—Voluntary Compliance and Intervening Legislation Do Not Suffice

Introduction

In DRNY v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Disability Rights New York (“DRNY”), New York’s designated Protection and Advocacy (“P&A”) agency, sued the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) and its Commissioner to enforce federal access-to-records rights under multiple “P&A Acts.” DRNY alleged that DOCCS “denied or delayed” access to records for 32 incarcerated individuals and one person who died in custody.

During the litigation, DOCCS produced many records. Separately, New York enacted—and later amended—state legislation requiring state facilities to provide the P&A agency copies of requested records free of charge. After that law took effect, DOCCS produced the remaining records it had. The district court ultimately entered judgment for DOCCS on the remaining claims and later denied DRNY’s motion for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs, concluding DRNY was not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). DRNY appealed only the fee denial.

The Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order (expressly non-precedential), applying Supreme Court and Second Circuit “prevailing party” doctrine: a plaintiff cannot recover § 1988 fees absent enduring, judicially sanctioned relief that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Holding: DRNY was not a “prevailing party” for § 1988(b) purposes and therefore was not entitled to attorney’s fees.
  • Key reasons:
    1. A district court’s reconsideration/clarification order that does not alter the judgment and does not grant enduring relief is, at most, a favorable legal statement—insufficient to create prevailing-party status.
    2. DOCCS’s later production of records and changed practices lacked the necessary judicial imprimatur; voluntary compliance—even if prompted by a lawsuit—does not confer prevailing-party status.
    3. Intervening external events (here, enactment of a new state law) that moot a dispute do not retroactively transform earlier, non-dispositive orders into enduring judicial relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2019)

The court relied on Lilly v. City of New York for the standard of review: fee decisions are reviewed deferentially, while the legal question of “prevailing party” status is reviewed de novo. This framing matters because DRNY’s appeal targeted the predicate legal determination that it prevailed; once the panel rejected that premise, the deferential posture on the ultimate fee denial largely followed.

Perez v. Westchester County Department of Corrections, 587 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009)

Perez v. Westchester County Department of Corrections is cited for the proposition that prevailing-party status is a legal question reviewed without deference. The citation underscores that the panel was independently evaluating whether the litigation produced the kind of judicially sanctioned, enduring change that § 1988 demands.

Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192 (2025)

Lackey v. Stinnie supplied the opinion’s central rule: a plaintiff prevails only when a court grants enduring judicial relief that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship, and the change must be both judicially sanctioned and enduring.

The panel also invoked Lackey to reject the idea that mootness caused by “external events”—such as repeal/enactment of legislation—can convert interim litigation developments into a conclusive adjudication of rights. This directly answered DRNY’s theory that the district court’s earlier clarification plus DOCCS’s subsequent production effectively gave DRNY what it wanted.

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987)

The court used Hewitt v. Helms to draw a sharp line between (a) enforceable relief and (b) favorable language. Even if the district court’s reconsideration order corrected or refined a legal proposition (regarding whether physical inspection is required before copying), Hewitt teaches that “a favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the plaintiff” does not make the plaintiff a prevailing party.

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources supplies the “judicial imprimatur” requirement and rejects “catalyst theory” fee recovery: a defendant’s voluntary change in conduct—even if it accomplishes the plaintiff’s goals—does not trigger prevailing-party fees absent a judicially sanctioned alteration in the parties’ relationship (e.g., a judgment, consent decree, or comparable enforceable order).

The panel applied Buckhannon to DRNY’s argument that it “prevailed” because DOCCS ultimately produced records and adopted a no-inspection copying practice. Without an order compelling that outcome, the change remained voluntary (and, on this record, likely attributable to the new state law), so it could not support a fee award.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Section 1988 demands more than progress in litigation. The panel treated the fee inquiry as turning on whether DRNY obtained an “enduring” and “judicially sanctioned” change. The procedural history cut against DRNY: the district court denied DRNY’s summary judgment motions, granted DOCCS’s motions (at least in part), and ultimately entered judgment that left DRNY without the declaratory and injunctive relief it requested.
  2. The reconsideration order was clarification, not enforceable relief. DRNY focused on the November 2020 reconsideration order, in which the district court clarified it was not imposing a categorical physical-inspection prerequisite; rather, it had held DOCCS complied because DRNY’s request did not sufficiently identify the records sought, and “sufficient identification” was the prerequisite to obtaining copies without inspection. The Second Circuit found no “enduring judicial relief” in that clarification because:
    • the district court expressly said the clarification did not alter its partial grant of summary judgment to DOCCS; and
    • the final merits order concluded DRNY was not entitled to a declaration or permanent injunction establishing a right to copies without inspection.
    Under Hewitt v. Helms, favorable language without a plaintiff-side judgment does not suffice.
  3. Voluntary production and policy change lacked judicial imprimatur. DOCCS ultimately produced the records. But the court treated the production and any practice change as a voluntary change in conduct lacking the “judicial imprimatur” required by Buckhannon.
  4. Intervening legislation and mootness do not retroactively create prevailing-party status. The record suggested DOCCS changed conduct to comply with New York’s new law (effective after enactment and amendment), not because of a court order. When the district court dismissed remaining claims as moot (among other grounds), that mootness was driven by “external events,” and under Lackey v. Stinnie those events do not transform earlier, non-dispositive rulings into enduring relief.

Impact

Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, the decision illustrates how lower courts in the Second Circuit are likely to apply the Supreme Court’s post-Lackey articulation of prevailing-party doctrine in § 1988 litigation—especially where:

  • plaintiffs obtain practical benefits (records production, changed practices) without a judgment or enforceable court order; and/or
  • the dispute becomes moot due to intervening statutes or policy shifts attributable to external legal changes rather than judicial relief.

For civil-rights and institutional-reform litigants (including P&A agencies), the fee consequences are concrete: to preserve a plausible path to § 1988 fees, parties may need to seek relief that is unmistakably judicially sanctioned (e.g., a consent decree, stipulated judgment, or other order that grants enforceable, enduring relief), rather than relying on voluntary compliance or legislative change.

The opinion also signals that “clarifying” language—especially where the court ultimately enters judgment against the plaintiff—will rarely support fees, even if the clarification helps future litigants or refines the legal landscape in a meaningful way.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prevailing party (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b))
A party who wins in a way the court recognizes through enforceable relief—typically a judgment or comparable order—producing a real, lasting change in the parties’ legal rights or obligations.
Judicial imprimatur
A court-backed stamp of approval—something more than a defendant deciding to change on its own. Under Buckhannon, voluntary change (even if prompted by a lawsuit) is not enough.
Enduring judicial relief
Relief that lasts and is enforceable, not merely interim commentary or a procedural ruling. Lackey emphasizes that enduring, judicially sanctioned relief is the hallmark of prevailing-party status.
Mootness
A case becomes moot when events eliminate the live dispute so a court cannot grant meaningful relief. Here, production of records and an intervening state statute were treated as external developments that removed the controversy—without creating a plaintiff-side judicial victory.
Eleventh Amendment grounds
A doctrine limiting when states and state agencies can be sued in federal court. The district court referenced it among grounds for denying the declaratory/injunctive relief DRNY sought; the Second Circuit’s fee analysis turned primarily on the absence of enduring judicial relief.
Summary order (Second Circuit)
A disposition that resolves the parties’ appeal but, as stated at the outset, “DO[ES] NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT,” even though it may be cited under applicable rules.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of fees because DRNY did not obtain an enduring, judicially sanctioned alteration of its legal relationship with DOCCS. The district court’s reconsideration clarification did not change the judgment or grant enforceable relief, DOCCS’s later compliance lacked the judicial imprimatur required by Buckhannon, and intervening state legislation and ensuing mootness did not retroactively manufacture a prevailing-party victory under Lackey. The decision underscores a practical lesson for § 1988 litigants: meaningful outcomes achieved through voluntary change or external events may still leave plaintiffs unable to recover fees unless the result is embodied in enduring judicial relief.