Date: Jun 22, 2026

Preston v. Hiraoka: Meaningful Appellate Review Requires Kelepolo-Based Consideration of Bond or Alternative Security to Stay Ejectment Possession Judgments

I. Introduction

Preston v. Hiraoka (Haw. June 16, 2026) arises from an intra-family ejectment dispute concerning multiple homes located on ʻāina hoʻoilina in Hauʻula and tied to a 999-year State homestead lease executed in 1938 between the Territory of Hawaiʻi and Mary Kapuna Takemoto. The defendants-appellants—Mary Takemoto’s descendants (collectively, “Nā ʻOhana”)—occupied three of four homes on the property; the plaintiff-appellee, Anthony Mark Lakana Takemoto (“Anthony”), as personal representative of an estate, lived in the fourth.

The District Court of the First Circuit entered a judgment for possession and issued a writ of possession. While the merits were on appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) denied a motion to stay enforcement pending appeal. Nā ʻOhana then sought extraordinary relief in the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court, asserting that the ICA’s denial effectively deprived them of meaningful appellate review—particularly because their appeal raised subject matter jurisdiction concerns (i.e., whether the district court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, could adjudicate an ejectment dispute that arguably placed title at issue).

The key issue in the original proceeding was procedural but consequential: when an appellate court considers a stay pending appeal of a possession judgment in ejectment, it must actually apply the stay framework—including the factors set out in Kelepolo—and must consider bond or alternative security in a manner that preserves meaningful appellate review.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court (per curiam) granted mandamus and, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, ordered a stay of enforcement of the district court’s judgment for possession and writ of possession during the pendency of the appeal.

Crucially, the Court held that the ICA’s denial order did not apply the governing principles of Kelepolo v. Fernandez and amounted to a manifest abuse of discretion because the ICA (1) set no supersedeas bond, (2) allowed no alternative security, and (3) failed to evaluate the relevant factors that Kelepolo requires courts to consider when deciding whether and on what conditions to stay a possession judgment pending appeal.

The Court granted a conditional stay: Nā ʻOhana could remain in possession during appeal provided they continued paying their proportionate share of property expenses (lease rent to the State, real property taxes, and utilities for the homes they occupy). If Anthony contended they were not paying, he could move the ICA to vacate or modify the stay under HRAP 8(a), supported by admissible evidence.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Kelepolo v. Fernandez

Kelepolo v. Fernandez, 148 Hawaiʻi 182, 468 P.3d 196 (2020) was the Court’s central authority. Preston treats Kelepolo as establishing a structured approach to stays pending appeal of possession judgments in ejectment:

The supersedeas bond is limited to the amount recoverable for the temporary deprivation of property use during the appeal.
Delay damages must be shown with adequate certainty (not speculation or unproven assertions).
A bond may not be used to discourage appeals; courts may need to consider factors such as financial ability, hardship, and public interest.
Courts have inherent authority to allow reduced bonds or alternative security sufficient to maintain the status quo.

In Preston, the Supreme Court faulted the ICA for quoting Kelepolo only to highlight limits on bond amounts while failing to engage Kelepolo’s broader requirement: evaluate whether a stay is necessary for meaningful appellate review and, if so, determine an appropriate bond or alternative security. The Court characterized a “no stay / no bond / no alternative security” disposition as effectively equivalent to an excessive bond, because it denies the appellant any realistic path to preserve the status quo pending appeal.

2. Lindsey v. Normet

The Court cited Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) for the proposition that an excessive supersedeas bond can be constitutionally infirm. Preston uses Lindsey by analogy: when a court’s approach functionally prevents appellate review—either by imposing an excessive bond or by offering no mechanism to stay—serious fairness concerns arise.

3. Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP v. Kim

Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP v. Kim, 153 Hawaiʻi 307, 537 P.3d 1154 (2023) supplied the mandamus standard: a petitioner must show a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of other adequate means to obtain it. Preston applied Womble to conclude that, because the ICA provided no route to a stay (no bond set, no alternative security considered), Nā ʻOhana lacked an adequate remedy and therefore satisfied the mandamus prerequisites.

4. Midkiff v. de Bisschop

Midkiff v. de Bisschop, 58 Haw. 546, 574 P.2d 128 (1978) was cited in the parties’ stay briefing as a governing stay authority. While Preston’s analysis ultimately centers on Kelepolo, the citation underscores that Hawaiʻi courts possess equitable tools to preserve the status quo during appellate proceedings and that stays in property disputes have longstanding doctrinal roots in Hawaiʻi jurisprudence.

5. Aames Funding Corp. v. Mores; U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Castro

The Court referenced jurisdictional constraints relevant to the underlying appeal:

Aames Funding Corp. v. Mores, 107 Hawaiʻi 95, 110 P.3d 1042 (2005) (citing HRS § 604-5(d)) for the proposition that district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over questions where title to real property is in question.
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Castro, 131 Hawaiʻi 28, 313 P.3d 717 (2013) (citing DCRCP 12.1) regarding the requirement that a defendant asserting a title-based defense must file an affidavit setting forth the source, nature, and extent of the title claimed.

While Preston did not decide the jurisdiction question (it was pending on appeal), it treated the presence of a serious jurisdictional challenge as part of the public interest in meaningful appellate review—especially when a court of limited jurisdiction may have acted beyond its authority.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The doctrinal move: “No stay” can be the functional equivalent of an excessive bond

Preston’s most important procedural holding is that when an appellate court refuses to stay a possession judgment and refuses to set a bond or consider alternative security, it can effectively deprive appellants of meaningful appellate review. The Supreme Court treated this as comparable, in practical effect, to a regime that demands an excessive bond as the price of review.

2. Kelepolo is not optional: courts must evaluate the relevant factors

The Court emphasized that the ICA “should have addressed”:

whether Anthony’s requested bond (based on asserted rental value and projected appeal duration) was appropriate;
whether those damages were shown with “adequate certainty” as Kelepolo requires;
whether a full bond would impose an undue financial burden and discourage the appeal;
whether alternative security could maintain the status quo; and
the public interest—here heightened by asserted ancestral land interests and a jurisdictional challenge.

3. Conditional stay as alternative security tailored to the property’s realities

Rather than require a substantial bond tied to unproven “rental value” damages, the Court approved alternative security that mirrored the status quo: continued payment of lease rent, property taxes, and utilities for the units occupied. This both: (a) reduced the risk of uncompensated deterioration of the property’s financial obligations, and (b) avoided pricing the appeal out of reach.

4. Availability of damages later mitigates prejudice to the appellee

The Court also reasoned that Anthony was not without protection: if he prevails, he may seek delay-related money damages in the district court where damages had been reserved. This supported the conclusion that a full supersedeas bond was not necessary to protect Anthony’s interests at the stay stage.

5. Why mandamus (and supervisory jurisdiction) were warranted

Applying Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP v. Kim, the Court concluded:

Nā ʻOhana had a “clear and indisputable right” to an avenue for a stay consistent with Kelepolo.
They lacked any adequate alternative remedy because the ICA’s order gave no workable mechanism to maintain the status quo pending appeal.

The Court therefore granted mandamus and directly ordered the stay (rather than merely remanding for the ICA to reconsider), reflecting a readiness to use HRS § 602-4 supervisory authority to prevent irreparable disruption of possession before appellate review is completed.

C. Impact

Appellate-court process requirement: ICA (and, by implication, trial courts when first asked) must meaningfully apply Kelepolo’s factor-based framework; a cursory denial that ignores alternative security considerations risks being labeled a manifest abuse of discretion.
Practical protection of appellate review in ejectment: Where eviction/ejectment would moot the lived reality of the dispute (especially in long-term, family-occupied property), Preston strengthens the principle that stays should be structured to preserve the status quo without imposing prohibitive financial conditions.
Alternative security gains prominence: The decision legitimizes ongoing payment of proportionate property obligations as a concrete, administrable substitute for large, speculative bond demands—particularly where damages are unresolved or unproven.
Jurisdictional challenges as public-interest weight: Even without deciding jurisdiction, the Court treated a serious claim that a limited-jurisdiction court acted beyond its authority as a factor favoring meaningful appellate review and thus favoring a stay.
Mandamus as a check on stay denials: Parties facing imminent loss of possession now have a clearer pathway to extraordinary relief when an appellate court’s stay ruling forecloses meaningful review by refusing both bond-setting and alternative security.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Ejectment: A lawsuit to recover possession of land and, often, damages for unlawful withholding. As noted in the opinion (citing Kelepolo), ejectment traditionally requires the plaintiff to establish a right to possession grounded in title.
Subject matter jurisdiction: A court’s legal authority to decide a type of case. Under HRS § 604-5(d), district courts generally cannot decide “real actions” or cases where title to real estate is in question. If the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, its judgment would be vulnerable on appeal.
Stay pending appeal: A pause on enforcement of a judgment while the appeal is decided. Without a stay, a possession judgment can be executed immediately, potentially causing eviction before appellate review.
Supersedeas bond: Money (or security) posted to protect the appellee from losses caused by delaying enforcement during an appeal. In possession cases, Kelepolo limits the bond to delay damages for temporary deprivation of use and requires a reasonable, adequately certain showing.
Alternative security: Non-bond measures that still protect the appellee and preserve the status quo (e.g., continued payment of taxes, rent, and utilities), used when a full bond is unnecessary or would effectively block an appeal.
Mandamus: An extraordinary writ ordering a court or official to perform a duty where the petitioner has a clear right to relief and no adequate alternative remedy. Preston holds mandamus may be appropriate when an appellate stay denial leaves no path to preserve meaningful appellate review.
“Meaningful appellate review”: The idea that an appeal should not be rendered practically useless by procedures that force immediate, irreversible consequences (like loss of possession) before the appellate court can decide whether the lower court acted lawfully.

V. Conclusion

Preston v. Hiraoka establishes a practical, enforceable procedural safeguard in Hawaiʻi ejectment appeals: appellate courts must apply Kelepolo v. Fernandez in a way that preserves meaningful appellate review by setting an appropriate supersedeas bond or permitting alternative security; a denial that provides no mechanism to maintain the status quo may constitute a manifest abuse of discretion correctable by mandamus.

The decision is particularly significant in disputes involving long-occupied family homes on inherited or ancestral land and where the underlying appeal raises non-frivolous jurisdictional questions. It signals that Hawaiʻi appellate courts must balance protection of appellees with the constitutional and systemic imperative that access to appellate review not be defeated by unattainable or ill-considered stay conditions.