Preserving “Retribution” Error in Supervised-Release Revocations Requires a Specific § 3553(a)(2)(A) Objection

Case: United States v. Antonio Miguel Carrow (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) (per curiam, not for publication)
Posture: Appeal from a 24-month revocation sentence (upward variance from 8–14 months).

I. Introduction

Antonio Miguel Carrow began supervised release in October 2024 after serving a sentence for drug-trafficking and a firearm offense. Within the first year, his probation officer filed multiple violation reports alleging: refusal to comply with recommended treatment, repeated presumptive-positive drug tests (methamphetamine/amphetamine) with admissions of use, leaving an approved residence without notice, and failure to report as instructed.

The parties jointly proposed a disposition reflecting a Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months: a 9-month prison term with no further supervised release. The district court rejected the joint request, conducted a revocation hearing, accepted Carrow’s guilty pleas to all five violations, and imposed a 24-month term—an upward variance—emphasizing Carrow’s criminal history and his conduct during supervision.

On appeal, Carrow raised two issues:

• Procedural unreasonableness: the district court impermissibly considered “retribution” under § 3553(a)(2)(A) in a revocation sentence.
• Substantive unreasonableness: 24 months was greater than necessary under the permissible § 3553(a) factors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Procedurally, it held that Carrow failed to preserve the specific § 3553(a)(2)(A) claim, triggering plain-error review, and the record did not “clearly” or “obviously” show the district court relied on retribution. Substantively, it held the district court did not abuse its discretion: the court identified permissible goals (notably deterrence and public protection), justified the variance based on Carrow’s history and supervision conduct, and the sentence remained well below the 60-month statutory maximum.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Retribution is off-limits in revocation: Esteras v. United States

The legal fulcrum is the Supreme Court’s rule in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), which the panel quoted for two propositions:

• At revocation, courts must consider “forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation),” but may not consider the “backward-looking purpose of retribution.”
• Preservation matters: absent a specific objection alerting the court to possible reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A), appellate review is for plain error. Esteras also explains why: a targeted objection gives the district court a chance to clarify that it is not relying on forbidden considerations.

2. Plain error framework: United States v. Olano

To operationalize Esteras’ preservation rule, the panel invoked United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), for the requirement that error be “clear” or “obvious.” In practice here, that meant Carrow could prevail only if the record showed the district court relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A) “either expressly or by unmistakable implication.”

3. Substantive reasonableness and deference

The panel applied the Eleventh Circuit’s familiar substantive-reasonableness framework:

• United States v. Grushko (abuse-of-discretion standard).
• United States v. Tome (challenger bears the burden to show unreasonableness).
• United State v. Shabazz and United States v. Cubero (due deference to the district court’s weighing of factors).
• United States v. Crisp (unjustified reliance on a single factor can signal unreasonableness).
• United States v. Gomez and United States v. Irey (abuse-of-discretion formulations: ignoring key factors, relying on improper factors, or clear error of judgment).
• United States v. King (variance not presumed unreasonable).
• United States v. McBride and United States v. Williams (reversal only with a definite and firm conviction of clear error in weighing factors).
• United States v. Dougherty (a sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness).

Collectively, these cases shaped a high-deference review in which an above-range revocation sentence can be sustained if the district court ties the variance to permissible statutory purposes and articulates a case-specific rationale.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural reasonableness: distinguishing “retribution” from permissible revocation considerations

Revocation sentences are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which authorizes consideration of certain § 3553(a) factors but excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A)—the “seriousness of the offense / respect for the law / just punishment” triad associated with retribution. Carrow argued the district court crossed that line by remarks about “disrespect” and that he owed the government and law “a payment.”

The panel rejected the claim on two linked grounds:

• Preservation failure: Carrow made only a general procedural-reasonableness objection and did not “make the district court aware” that it might be relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A). Under Esteras v. United States, that forfeiture triggered plain-error review.
• No clear or obvious reliance on forbidden retribution: In context, the panel read the “payment” and “disrespect” remarks as directed to Carrow’s supervision conduct (including “too much new criminal activity” and absconding) rather than punishment for the underlying 2017 offenses. The court also emphasized that the district judge gave “much plainer consideration” to deterrence, a permissible “forward-looking” objective.

This is an important nuance: the opinion does not deny that certain words (“payment,” “disrespect for the law”) can sound retributive; it holds that, without a targeted objection and in light of the broader colloquy, those phrases did not unmistakably prove reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A).

2. Substantive reasonableness: explaining and justifying an upward variance in a revocation context

On substance, the panel focused on (i) the district court’s stated reliance on proper factors and (ii) record-based justification for going above the 8–14 month range. Key elements included:

• History and characteristics / supervision performance: the court tied the variance to Carrow’s “pre-existing criminal history” and “conduct…since he’s been on supervision.”
• Deterrence and public safety: the district court’s remarks about accident statistics were treated as responsive to Carrow’s statement he totaled his car and as expressing concern he might drive under the influence—supporting deterrence and public protection.
• Statutory ceiling: the 24-month sentence was “well below” the 60-month statutory maximum, which the panel treated as reinforcing reasonableness.

The panel’s approach reflects a consistent theme in Eleventh Circuit review: upward variances are upheld where the district court articulates a plausible, permissible rationale anchored in the defendant’s conduct and risk profile, even when the violations are characterized by the defense as “technical.”

C. Impact

Although “not for publication,” the decision illustrates how Esteras v. United States is likely to operate in day-to-day revocation practice:

• Preservation rule has teeth: Defendants must object with enough specificity to flag § 3553(a)(2)(A) reliance, not merely argue general procedural error. This effectively requires counsel to use the statutory hook (or the “retribution” label) contemporaneously at the revocation hearing.
• Context controls: Courts of appeals may read “respect for the law”-adjacent language as permissible if it is plausibly tied to supervision compliance, deterrence, or public protection—especially when the district court does not discuss the underlying offense conduct.
• Upward variances remain viable: The opinion reinforces that a district court can upwardly vary on revocation where the defendant’s post-release conduct shows escalating risk (drug use, absconding, noncompliance), and where the court explains why the advisory range does not suffice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release vs. imprisonment: Supervised release follows prison and is intended to support reintegration and reduce recidivism; revocation addresses breaches of trust and future risk, not “just deserts” for the original crime.
• § 3583(e) and the missing factor: When revoking supervised release, Congress authorized consideration of many § 3553(a) factors but omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness/respect/just punishment). That omission is why “retribution” is impermissible at revocation.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court used the right process (proper factors, correct calculations, adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the result (the sentence length) is within the range of reasonable outcomes.
• Plain error: If a party fails to make a specific objection, the appellate court will correct only obvious mistakes that clearly affected the outcome. Ambiguity usually defeats relief.
• Guideline range on revocation: Revocation ranges are advisory policy statements; a court may vary upward if it explains why the defendant’s conduct warrants a harsher sanction.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Antonio Miguel Carrow underscores two practical rules in the post-Esteras v. United States landscape: (1) to preserve a claim that a revocation court relied on impermissible “retribution,” a defendant must specifically object that the court is invoking § 3553(a)(2)(A); and (2) on substantive review, the Eleventh Circuit will defer to a district court’s upward variance when the court ties the sentence to permissible forward-looking purposes—particularly deterrence and public safety—and grounds the variance in the defendant’s supervision conduct and criminal history.