Preservation and Ripeness on Interlocutory Review: Constitutional Challenges to Virtual Voir Dire Require a District-Court Ruling

1. Introduction

State v. Buttars, 2026 UT 10, arises from the Third Judicial District’s Standing Order requiring that, “absent extraordinary circumstances and prior approval from the presiding judge,” jury selection be conducted virtually (with prospective jurors appearing remotely on a screen while the court, counsel, and parties are physically present in the courtroom).

David Bruce Buttars, a criminal defendant awaiting retrial after a prior reversal, moved for in-person jury selection. He argued that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to have prospective jurors physically present during voir dire and that this constitutional objection itself constituted “extraordinary circumstances” justifying an exception to the Standing Order. The State stipulated to in-person jury selection (without conceding the constitutional claims). The trial judge granted the request but, because the Standing Order requires presiding-judge approval, referred the matter to the presiding judge, who denied the exception for failure to show “extraordinary circumstances.”

Buttars then sought interlocutory review, presenting a single issue: whether the Standing Order’s virtual jury selection violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Utah Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the petition as improvidently granted, concluding that the constitutional issue had not been ruled on below and therefore was not yet reviewable in this posture.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court dismissed Buttars’ interlocutory petition as improvidently granted because the only issue presented—whether the Standing Order is unconstitutional—had not been adjudicated by the district court and was not decided by the presiding judge. The presiding judge properly limited her decision to whether “extraordinary circumstances” justified an exception under the Standing Order and declined to reach the constitutional merits.

The dismissal was without prejudice. The court explained that Buttars may raise the constitutional challenge in the district court; if the district court rules on it, either party may seek interlocutory review of that ruling. The court also provided procedural guidance given the Standing Order’s unusual structure and the comparatively “not well trodden” appellate path.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2005 UT 63

The court relied on Houghton v. Dep't of Health for a central constraint of interlocutory review: “on interlocutory appeal, we review only those specific issues presented in the petition.” Buttars’ petition presented only the constitutional question; because there was no ruling on that question, the court had nothing to review within the petition’s stated scope. Houghton thus anchored the court’s refusal to broaden the appeal into a different issue (e.g., whether “extraordinary circumstances” existed) that Buttars did not raise.

State v. Richins, 2025 UT 10

Buttars invoked State v. Richins to argue that the court could review an order stemming from the presiding judge’s administration of the Standing Order. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the general jurisdictional premise from Richins: when a presiding judge enters an order in a case, that order can be “appealable like any other order.”

But Richins ultimately distinguished Buttars’ situation rather than supporting review. In Richins, the appellate issue matched the order under review: the parties appealed the presiding judge’s extraordinary-circumstances determination, giving the Supreme Court a concrete ruling to assess. In Buttars, by contrast, the presiding judge did not rule on constitutionality, and Buttars did not challenge the extraordinary-circumstances denial. Thus, Richins validated appealability of presiding-judge orders generally but underscored that appellate review still depends on an actual, contested ruling on the issue presented.

State v. Centeno, 2023 UT 22

The court cited State v. Centeno for the preservation/ripeness principle that, “generally, the district court must have had an opportunity to rule on a constitutional claim before that claim may be brought on appeal.” Centeno supported the court’s conclusion that Buttars’ constitutional challenge was premature because no lower-court decision had addressed it.

State v. Buttars, 2020 UT App 87

The court referenced the earlier appellate history: Buttars had been tried and convicted; the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial in State v. Buttars, 2020 UT App 87. This context mattered chiefly to clarify posture (pretrial in the retrial) and why jury selection procedures were an immediate practical concern, but it did not drive the Supreme Court’s dispositive reasoning.

Secondary Authorities and Rules

• BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“extraordinary circumstances”): used by the presiding judge to define the Standing Order’s threshold and by the Supreme Court to confirm she properly confined herself to that inquiry.
• Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(i)(2): the court noted that if Buttars challenges the Standing Order’s constitutionality in district court, he must notify the Administrative Office of the Courts—an important procedural instruction for future litigants.
• UTAH CODE § 78A-3-101(1): referenced in a footnote explaining the Supreme Court’s expansion to seven justices and the use of sitting Court of Appeals judges at argument; not doctrinally relevant, but clarifies institutional context.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s core is procedural: appellate courts decide issues that have been decided below, especially on interlocutory review where the petition narrowly frames the questions presented. The court proceeded in three steps:

1. Identify the sole issue presented: Buttars asked only whether the Standing Order is unconstitutional.
2. Confirm absence of a lower-court ruling: The district court granted in-person voir dire based on the parties’ stipulation and did not reach the constitutional claim; the presiding judge, consistent with her role under the Standing Order (as explained in State v. Richins), limited her decision to whether “extraordinary circumstances” existed.
3. Conclude review is premature: Without an adjudication of constitutionality, there is nothing to affirm, reverse, or analyze on the merits. The court therefore dismissed as improvidently granted—while preserving a clear route to review if the constitutional question is properly presented and decided in the district court.

Importantly, the court did not imply any view on whether virtual jury selection is constitutional. The decision is best read as an instruction about how to litigate and appeal such a question within Utah’s procedural architecture.

3.3. Impact

The opinion’s likely influence is procedural and institutional rather than substantive:

• Channels constitutional challenges into the correct forum: Litigants seeking to attack district standing orders (including jury-selection practices) must obtain a district-court ruling on the constitutional claim before expecting appellate review—particularly on interlocutory posture.
• Clarifies the presiding judge’s limited function: The presiding judge’s approval role under the Standing Order is framed as a gatekeeping determination about “extraordinary circumstances,” not as a vehicle for adjudicating constitutional validity.
• Shapes strategic framing of interlocutory petitions: If a party wants review of the presiding judge’s denial, the petition must squarely challenge the extraordinary-circumstances determination. If a party wants constitutional review, they must first secure a district-court merits ruling and then petition on that ruling.
• Procedural compliance warning: The explicit reminder about Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(i)(2) signals that constitutional challenges implicating court administration require notification to the Administrative Office of the Courts; failure to do so may derail or delay litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Interlocutory review: An appeal taken before the case ends (before final judgment). It is limited to the specific issues the appellate court agrees to hear, and it typically requires an actual ruling on those issues.
• Dismissed as improvidently granted: The appellate court initially agreed to hear the interlocutory appeal but later determines it should not have—often because the issue is not properly teed up (here, because there was no lower-court ruling on the constitutional question).
• Preservation/ripeness: Courts generally require that an issue—especially a constitutional one—be raised and decided in the trial court first. This creates a concrete ruling and record for appellate review.
• Standing Order and “extraordinary circumstances” exception: A district-wide rule governing procedure (virtual voir dire) that permits deviations only when a party shows unusual, case-specific facts warranting an exception—and only with presiding-judge approval.
• Voir dire: The jury-selection process, including questioning prospective jurors to ensure impartiality.

5. Conclusion

State v. Buttars, 2026 UT 10, establishes a clear procedural lesson: a litigant cannot obtain interlocutory appellate review of the constitutionality of a virtual-jury-selection standing order unless the district court has actually ruled on that constitutional challenge. While presiding-judge orders under the Third District Standing Order may be appealable, the appeal must match the ruling made—typically an “extraordinary circumstances” determination—unless and until the district court adjudicates constitutionality. The decision preserves future merits review but requires litigants to follow the proper sequence, including compliance with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(i)(2)’s notice requirement.