Preponderance Burden and Non-Arbitrary § 982 Forfeiture: Computational Errors Require Vacatur and Honeycutt “Mastermind” Theories Require Record Findings

I. Introduction

United States v. Joff Stenn Wroy Philossaint (11th Cir. July 2, 2025) arose from a fraudulent scheme to obtain Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) funds through false applications and related loan-forgiveness submissions. The defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

At sentencing, the district court imposed imprisonment and supervised release, ordered $3.85 million in restitution, and entered a criminal forfeiture money judgment of $673,210. The sole appellate issue was whether the forfeiture amount was properly calculated.

The government conceded the $673,210 figure resulted from a computational mistake, but urged affirmance anyway by arguing the defendant could have been held liable for a much larger amount (up to the scheme’s total proceeds) under a “leader/mastermind” concept discussed in Honeycutt v. United States.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the forfeiture order and remanded. It held:

  • The forfeiture amount was the product of an admitted computation error and therefore was clear error requiring vacatur.
  • The court declined to affirm on the government’s alternative Honeycutt-based “mastermind” theory because the record lacked the necessary factual development and findings (and, as to § 982(a)(1), the government did not litigate the relevant theory below).
  • As a matter of circuit law, the government bears the burden to prove forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) and § 982(a)(2) by a preponderance of the evidence.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and computational error

  • United States v. Gladden, 78 F.4th 1232 (11th Cir. 2023): supplied the appellate framework—factual findings underlying forfeiture are reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions de novo. The court used Gladden’s definition of clear error to underscore that a court’s mistake must be corrected when the reviewing court is left with a “definite and firm conviction” of error.
  • United States v. Hoffman-Vaile, 568 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2009): directly supported the dispositive holding that a mathematical miscalculation in the forfeiture money judgment is clear error requiring vacatur and remand.

2. Burden of proof for § 982 forfeiture

  • Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995): reinforced that forfeiture is “part of the sentence,” which helps justify applying the customary sentencing proof standard (preponderance) rather than a trial standard (beyond a reasonable doubt) to forfeiture determinations.
  • United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1999): provided intra-circuit support for using the preponderance standard for criminal forfeiture (there under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2)), which the court extended here to § 982(a)(1) and § 982(a)(2).
  • Sister-circuit cases marshaled to align § 982 with the dominant approach: United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 1994) (all § 982(a)(1)); United States v. Garbacz, 33 F.4th 459 (8th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Cherry, 30 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2003) (both § 982(a)(2)). These cases mattered because the Eleventh Circuit used them to expressly “agree” and to announce a clear burden rule for both provisions.

3. Honeycutt, “masterminds,” and the scope of forfeiture statutes

  • Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017): the government’s primary alternative theory. Honeycutt rejected joint and several liability under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) and emphasized forfeiture limited to “property” the defendant “obtained.” The opinion also discussed a hypothetical where a “marijuana mastermind” could “obtain” proceeds indirectly (e.g., through an intermediary), implying broader exposure for a true scheme controller.
  • United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2021): cabined Honeycutt, explaining it “narrowly” addresses whether a defendant can be ordered to forfeit property acquired only by a co-conspirator. Philossaint used this to resist the government’s attempt to treat Honeycutt as a universal rule for all forfeiture regimes without statutory-text analysis.
  • Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399 (2020): invoked for the interpretive method—start with the text. This underpinned the panel’s key move: distinguishing § 982(a)(1) from Honeycutt because § 982(a)(1) lacks “obtained”/“proceeds” language.
  • United States v. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2020): critical to the court’s explanation that § 982(a)(1) is different from Honeycutt’s statute. Waked Hatum stated that because § 982(a)(1) contains neither “proceeds” nor “obtained,” Honeycutt’s “tainted property” requirement does not apply in the same way to money-laundering forfeiture.
  • United States v. Seher, 562 U.S. 1344, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009): provided the Eleventh Circuit’s description of what property is “involved in” a § 1956 offense for § 982(a)(1): the laundered funds (“corpus”), plus commissions/fees and facilitating property. Philossaint cited Seher to show that § 982(a)(1) can reach beyond “proceeds obtained,” but refused to apply that theory sua sponte because it was not litigated or fact-found below.
  • United States v. Young, 104 F.4th 1307 (11th Cir. 2024): adopted the notion that Honeycutt’s bar on joint-and-several forfeiture applies only to co-conspirators who never possessed the tainted proceeds. The Philossaint panel used Young to emphasize the absence of findings that Philossaint possessed more than the conceded amount.
  • United States v. Elbeblawy, 839 F. App'x 398 (11th Cir. 2021): an unpublished case the government cited for the proposition that conspiracy “masterminds” may “jointly acquire” proceeds. The panel implicitly discounted its utility: the government did not connect that proposition to specific record findings establishing Philossaint as such a mastermind.

4. Role enhancements vs forfeiture findings

  • United States v. Moya, 18 F.4th 480 (5th Cir. 2021): used to illustrate that a Guidelines leadership enhancement does not automatically make a defendant the Honeycutt “mastermind” for forfeiture purposes; forfeiture still turns on possession/obtaining and evidence.
  • United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006): reinforced that “loss” and forfeiture are distinct calculations even though both may use the preponderance standard. This helped the court reject the idea that restitution or Guidelines findings alone can substitute for forfeiture findings.

5. “Reasonable estimate” does not mean “arbitrary number”

  • United States v. Mazkouri, 945 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2019): the government’s support for affirming an under-explained forfeiture amount was distinguished. In Mazkouri, the defendant’s own admissions ensured the forfeiture figure could not exceed what he personally gained; here, the contested amount potentially exceeded what Philossaint personally obtained absent findings.
  • United States v. Al-Sharairei, 130 F.4th 656 (8th Cir. 2025): cited for the proposition that forfeiture need not be mathematically exact, but the Philossaint panel used it to stress the limit: a forfeiture amount cannot be selected “arbitrarily.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The dispositive holding: clear error from a conceded computation mistake

The forfeiture order stated it was based on (i) proceeds received by Philossaint’s three companies plus (ii) 10% kickbacks. But the government’s own earlier objection to the PSI acknowledged Philossaint received kickbacks on only some loans (19 of 33), while the forfeiture motion and resulting order erroneously treated kickbacks as if received on every funded loan. With the government conceding the mismatch on appeal, the panel treated the error as a straightforward Hoffman-Vaile computational mistake, requiring vacatur.

2. Why the court refused to “save” the judgment via the Honeycutt hypothetical

The government’s fallback was: even if $673,210 was calculated incorrectly, it is still below what a “mastermind” could be forced to forfeit (up to $3.85 million), so the error is harmless. The panel rejected that approach because forfeiture is statute- and evidence-driven:

  • As to § 982(a)(1) (money laundering): the statutory text differs from Honeycutt’s “obtained/proceeds” language; Eleventh Circuit precedent (Waked Hatum; Seher) frames § 982(a)(1) as reaching property “involved in” laundering (corpus, fees, facilitating property). But the government did not litigate that theory below, the PSI did not quantify laundered corpus/facilitation amounts, and the district court made no such findings—so the appellate court would not apply § 982(a)(1) sua sponte on an undeveloped record.
  • As to § 982(a)(2) (wire fraud affecting a financial institution): the text matches Honeycutt, so the “obtained” requirement matters. The panel emphasized that Honeycutt/Young turn on whether the defendant possessed or obtained proceeds directly or indirectly. Here, the record lacked findings that Philossaint obtained more than about $549,226.30. Nor did the district court find that he was the Honeycutt-type mastermind who indirectly “obtains” all proceeds routed through intermediaries.

3. Role enhancement is not a forfeiture finding

The district court applied a two-level aggravating role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), but the panel held that such an enhancement does not automatically establish the factual predicates for expanded forfeiture under Honeycutt. The panel relied on Moya (and cited Hamaker) to separate sentencing-guidelines leadership concepts from the statutory “obtained/possessed” inquiry and the need for specific forfeiture findings.

4. The new, explicit burden rule for § 982(a)(1) and § 982(a)(2)

A notable doctrinal contribution is the panel’s express agreement with sister circuits that the government must prove forfeiture under both § 982(a)(1) and § 982(a)(2) by a preponderance of the evidence. While consistent with prior Eleventh Circuit approaches in analogous contexts (Dicter), the opinion states the rule directly for these provisions.

C. Impact

1. Practical consequences for forfeiture litigation

  • No “harmless” arithmetic in money judgments: even where the government believes a higher forfeiture could have been justified, a money judgment must match the methodology and evidence actually adopted. If the figure is wrong, vacatur is likely.
  • Government must build and present the correct statutory theory at sentencing: where both § 982(a)(1) (money laundering “involved in” property) and § 982(a)(2) (fraud “obtained” proceeds) are available, litigants should expect courts to demand statute-specific proof and findings rather than allowing post hoc rationales on appeal.
  • Honeycutt “mastermind” arguments require evidence and findings: the government cannot rely on generalized “leader” labels or Guidelines enhancements. It should present evidence showing how the defendant indirectly obtained proceeds (e.g., control of accounts, direction of payment flows, authority over intermediaries) and request explicit findings.

2. Doctrinal clarifications within the Eleventh Circuit

  • The opinion underscores a text-first approach (Babb v. Wilkie) to determining Honeycutt’s reach, reinforcing the split between: § 982(a)(2) (Honeycutt-like “obtained” language) and § 982(a)(1) (broader “involved in” language).
  • By expressly adopting the preponderance burden for § 982(a)(1) and § 982(a)(2), the decision reduces uncertainty in future forfeiture disputes, especially where defendants argue for heightened proof standards.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Criminal forfeiture (money judgment): an order requiring a convicted defendant to pay the government a sum representing forfeitable property connected to the crime; it is part of the sentence.
  • “Proceeds the person obtained” (§ 982(a)(2)): focuses on what the defendant personally gained or controlled, directly or indirectly. After Honeycutt, courts are cautious about forcing one conspirator to pay for proceeds only another conspirator acquired.
  • “Property involved in” money laundering (§ 982(a)(1)): broader than “proceeds obtained.” It can include the laundered funds themselves, laundering fees/commissions, and property used to facilitate laundering.
  • Joint and several liability (forfeiture context): making one defendant responsible for the entire amount regardless of what he obtained. Honeycutt rejected this for statutes keyed to what “the person obtained.”
  • Clear error: a highly deferential standard, but it still requires reversal when a mistake (including a math mistake) is plain and material.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: “more likely than not.” In forfeiture sentencing, this is the government’s burden to show the amount and nexus required by the statute.

V. Conclusion

Philossaint establishes (and reinforces) three key points for Eleventh Circuit forfeiture practice: (1) forfeiture under § 982(a)(1) and § 982(a)(2) must be proven by the government by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) computational mistakes in a forfeiture money judgment are clear error requiring vacatur and remand; and (3) appellate courts will not affirm a flawed forfeiture amount based on an un-litigated or un-found Honeycutt “mastermind” theory—especially where the statutory basis and factual predicates differ between money laundering forfeiture (“involved in”) and fraud forfeiture (“obtained” proceeds).