Premises-Safety Experts Must Demonstrate Field-Specific Expertise and Reliable Methods

1. Introduction

In Park Wind Apartments, LLC v. Mayze, the Mississippi Supreme Court reinforced the trial court’s responsibility to scrutinize both the qualifications and methodology of a proposed premises-safety expert. A witness’s experience in policing or security, membership in professional organizations, and completion of short online courses did not establish expertise in the walking-surface and lighting conditions at issue. Nor did reviewing documents, consulting codes, interviewing residents, and inspecting the property establish a reliable specialized methodology on this record.

The Court unanimously overturned a tenant’s favorable jury verdict because Kenneth Goodrum had been permitted to offer expert opinions without the necessary foundation. Applying its recent decision involving the same witness, the Court concluded that the error was prejudicial because the unqualified testimony addressed the ultimate issues in the litigation.

The decision concerns the admissibility and influence of expert testimony—not a final determination that the apartment owner was free from negligence. Whether the property conditions caused a compensable injury remains for retrial.

2. Background and Procedural History

The property conditions and alleged injury

Glenda Mayze rented an apartment at Park Wind Apartments. Her only route from the apartment to the parking lot involved a sidewalk between two buildings. A disconnected downspout allowed rainwater to flow toward that sidewalk, part of which had subsided. Water, mud, and debris accumulated in the depressed area during rain. According to the opinion, Park Wind had received complaints but had not repaired either the downspout or the sidewalk before the incident.

The Court’s factual narrative places the incident on July 20, 2022. Leaving for work during a nighttime storm, Mayze saw water on the sidewalk and stepped to its right to avoid it. She testified that exterior lighting was not functioning and that she encountered a concealed “jagged edge” in the mud, slipped, and twisted her right knee.

Medical causation was potentially contested. Before the incident, Mayze had experienced significant knee problems, including prior injuries and treatment for a possible meniscal tear. Following the incident, an MRI disclosed a torn meniscus, and she underwent surgery. The Supreme Court recounted this history but did not decide whether the sidewalk incident caused or aggravated the condition.

The disputed expert testimony

Mayze sued Park Wind for negligent maintenance and related allegations involving an unreasonably dangerous condition. To support her case, she offered Goodrum as a premises-safety expert.

Park Wind sought to exclude him, challenging his qualifications, the usefulness and reliability of his testimony, and his delivery of what it characterized as disguised legal conclusions. The trial court denied the motion, describing him in its pretrial ruling as qualified in “premises security.” When Mayze offered him at trial, Park Wind questioned him outside the ordinary presentation of his substantive testimony and renewed its objection.

Goodrum acknowledged that most of his relevant case experience involved security rather than safety. His principal employment background was military service and law enforcement. Although he cited organizational memberships, online certificates, and experience through his own consulting business, he lacked the subject-specific training and experience the Supreme Court considered necessary for his proposed opinions.

Goodrum nevertheless testified that Park Wind had notice of dangerous conditions, had created those conditions, and should have repaired the drainage, lighting, and sidewalk. He also characterized the jagged edge as a hidden condition. His sources included a property assessment report, depositions, resident interviews, codes, and his inspection.

Verdict and appeal

The jury found for Mayze. Park Wind sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial or remittitur. It supplemented its post-trial submissions with an intervening Court of Appeals decision rejecting Goodrum’s qualifications in another premises-liability action. The trial court denied relief without analysis or citation.

Although Park Wind raised several appellate issues, the Supreme Court addressed only the admission of Goodrum’s expert testimony, finding that issue dispositive.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Court identified two fundamental defects under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702:

1. Insufficient qualifications: Goodrum had not demonstrated the knowledge, skill, experience, or education necessary to testify as an expert about the walking surfaces and lighting involved.
2. Insufficient specialized methodology: His investigative activities did not demonstrate reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge beyond what an ordinary person could employ.

The Court also held that the error was prejudicial. Goodrum had been allowed to present unqualified expert opinions on central liability questions, giving those opinions an authority they had not earned. Following its earlier decision involving Goodrum, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Kelly, 358 So. 3d 1054 (Miss. 2023)

This decision supplied the principal analytical framework. It established abuse-of-discretion review and articulated Rule 702’s twofold inquiry: the witness must possess appropriate qualifications, and the proposed specialized knowledge must assist the factfinder through relevant testimony grounded in reliable methodology.

The Court repeatedly returned to this framework when assessing both Goodrum’s background and his actual investigative work. The decision therefore treats qualifications and methodology as distinct requirements; satisfying one would not excuse failure to establish the other.

Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So. 3d 742 (Miss. 2011)

Cited through Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Kelly, this case supported the abuse-of-discretion standard governing expert-evidence rulings. That standard gives trial judges latitude, but it does not insulate an admission decision unsupported by the necessary evidentiary foundation.

Scarborough v. Logan, 395 So. 3d 381 (Miss. 2024)

This case supplied the requirement that an erroneous evidentiary ruling must cause prejudice, harm, or an adverse effect on a substantial right before reversal is warranted. It framed a separate question beyond admissibility: whether admitting Goodrum’s testimony mattered sufficiently to require a new trial.

Chaupette v. State, 136 So. 3d 1041 (Miss. 2014)

Quoted through Scarborough v. Logan, this decision furnished the underlying formulation of the prejudice requirement. Its role was procedural rather than substantive: it connected evidentiary error with the conditions for appellate relief.

Clark v. State, 315 So. 3d 987 (Miss. 2021)

Quoted through Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Kelly, this case supplied the two-part Rule 702 formulation. Its emphasis on knowledge, skill, experience, or education required examination of Goodrum’s actual competence, while its assistance requirement directed attention to whether his testimony contributed specialized understanding.

Worthy v. McNair, 37 So. 3d 609 (Miss. 2010)

This authority established that the scope of a witness’s knowledge, rather than an artificial classification by title, governs admissibility. It prevented labels such as “premises safety” or “premises security” from substituting for a substantive qualification analysis.

The principle also limits the decision’s reach: the Court did not establish that a particular professional title or academic degree is invariably required. The controlling question remains whether the witness actually possesses expertise relevant to the proposed testimony.

Thompson v. Carter, 518 So. 2d 609 (Miss. 1987)

The Court invoked this case for the proposition that an expert must be shown to know “a great deal” about the subject of the testimony. It reinforced the distinction between general familiarity with safety issues and genuine expertise concerning walking surfaces, drainage-related hazards, or lighting.

Watts v. Radiator Specialty Co., 990 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 2008)

This decision explained why erroneous expert qualification can be especially consequential: jurors commonly give greater weight to testimony presented under the authority of expertise. The Court used that concern to connect the deficient admission decision with its prejudicial effect.

Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007)

Quoted through Watts v. Radiator Specialty Co., this case supplied the discussion of jurors’ deference to expert witnesses and their credentials. Here, that reasoning underscored the danger that judicial recognition as an expert could elevate opinions lacking a demonstrated specialized foundation.

Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., 701 So. 2d 1093 (Miss. 1997)

Through its discussion of the earlier Goodrum litigation, the Court quoted this case’s warning about the public trust placed in police officers and the resulting harm when an officer gives expert testimony without proper qualification. Goodrum’s law-enforcement background made that concern relevant.

The point was not that police experience disqualifies a witness. Rather, the credibility associated with that experience cannot substitute for expertise in an unrelated technical subject.

Pilot Travel Centers, LLC v. Womack, 412 So. 3d 508 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), rev’d, 418 So. 3d 1222 (Miss. 2025)

The Court of Appeals had previously examined Goodrum’s proposed premises-safety expertise. It concluded that his asserted qualifications did not establish expertise in that field and that his testimony lacked the necessary specialized knowledge and reliable principles or methods. Nevertheless, it treated the admission error as harmless.

This was the decision Park Wind brought to the trial court’s attention in its supplemental post-trial submission. It provided a close factual comparison because it concerned the same witness and substantially similar foundational deficiencies.

Pilot Travel Centers, LLC v. Womack, 418 So. 3d 1222 (Miss. 2025)

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s subsequent decision was the closest controlling precedent. It agreed that Goodrum was unqualified but rejected the Court of Appeals’ harmless-error conclusion, holding that his testimony was unhelpful and prejudicial and ordering a new trial.

In the present case, the Court expressly reached the same conclusion. The earlier decision thus controlled both major components of the result: exclusion under Rule 702 and reversal because the improperly admitted testimony addressed ultimate issues.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Expertise must fit the particular opinions offered

The Court examined Goodrum’s background against the actual subjects of his testimony. His military and law-enforcement experience, together with predominantly security-related consulting, did not establish competence to evaluate the walking-surface and lighting conditions involved in this accident.

This distinction matters because premises litigation encompasses different disciplines. Knowledge about preventing criminal activity does not necessarily establish knowledge about surface deterioration, slip resistance, drainage, or illumination. A broad professional label cannot bridge those differences.

The Court also found Goodrum’s short online training and certificates inadequate. One certificate concerned a tool he did not use in this investigation. The weakness was therefore not simply the absence of a degree, but the absence of a persuasive connection between his claimed preparation and the opinions he delivered.

B. Investigation is not necessarily specialized analysis

Goodrum described consulting codes, reviewing records, interviewing residents, and inspecting the premises. Those activities may supply factual information, but the Court found no demonstrated specialized method that transformed that information into reliable expert conclusions.

For example, Goodrum acknowledged that he had not tested slip resistance, used a tribometer, or tested the lighting. The opinion also described limited use of a level and measuring tape, notwithstanding its earlier account that he admitted not taking measurements of the slipping area. The reasoning did not depend on resolving that tension: even the inspection described by the Court failed to demonstrate specialized analysis.

The decision should not be read as requiring sophisticated equipment in every premises case. Nor does it categorically invalidate visual inspections or documentary reviews. Its narrower lesson is that the proponent must show why the chosen methods require relevant expertise and reliably support the particular conclusions offered.

C. Expert testimony must add something beyond ordinary understanding

The Court emphasized that an ordinary person could read the materials Goodrum reviewed and undertake the activities he described. His observation that an unlit area is dark did not demonstrate specialized knowledge about lighting.

This reasoning addresses the assistance requirement of Rule 702. Expert status is not justified merely because a witness assembles facts and announces a conclusion. The proposed testimony must help jurors understand or decide something through knowledge beyond their ordinary experience.

Likewise, invoking building codes, fire codes, or accessibility standards does not itself establish expertise. The opinion did not decide that any particular code applied or was violated. The relevant defect was the absence of a demonstrated expert foundation for Goodrum’s use of those materials.

D. The Court’s gatekeeping role cannot be delegated to the jury

Goodrum’s answers during questioning exposed substantial weaknesses in both his credentials and his methods. The Court nevertheless treated those weaknesses as grounds for exclusion, not merely matters affecting the weight jurors should give his testimony.

The distinction is important. Cross-examination may test admissible expertise, but it does not replace the judge’s preliminary responsibility to determine whether the witness qualifies as an expert and has employed reliable methods.

E. Opinions on central liability questions made the error prejudicial

Goodrum did not confine himself to describing physical conditions. He opined that Park Wind had notice, created dangerous conditions, and should have made specified repairs. Those conclusions bore directly on the disputed negligence claim.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Pilot Travel Centers, LLC v. Womack, the Court characterized admission of this unqualified testimony on ultimate issues as an error that “can never be harmless.” In context, that strong statement concerns the particular combination of inadequate expertise and opinions addressing the case’s central issues.

The opinion should not be expanded into a rule that every expert-evidence error automatically requires reversal. It expressly recognized the general prejudice requirement. Nor did it announce a blanket prohibition on otherwise admissible expert testimony touching an ultimate issue.

F. The remedy preserved unresolved questions for retrial

The Court ordered a new trial rather than judgment for Park Wind. It did not decide whether the property was unreasonably dangerous, whether Park Wind’s conduct breached a duty, or whether the incident caused Mayze’s meniscal injury.

Although Park Wind had also objected that Goodrum offered disguised legal conclusions, the Court did not develop an independent holding resolving that objection. Its stated grounds were inadequate qualifications, deficient methodology, and resulting prejudice.

6. Likely Impact

• More focused qualification inquiries: Trial courts should connect each proposed opinion to the witness’s demonstrated knowledge and experience rather than accept broad descriptions of “safety” expertise.
• Closer scrutiny of consulting credentials: Memberships, certificates, and prior litigation work may be relevant, but they do not independently establish competence.
• Better-developed methodological foundations: Parties offering experts should explain how an inspection, test, standard, or analytical process supports each conclusion.
• Greater attention to prejudice: The risk of reversal is particularly substantial when an improperly qualified witness opines on notice, dangerousness, responsibility, or other central liability questions.
• Importance of a clear record: Park Wind’s pretrial motion, questioning of Goodrum, renewed objection, and post-trial submissions created a detailed record for appellate review.

The ruling does not make expert testimony indispensable in every premises-liability action or prevent proof through admissible lay testimony and documents. It regulates the circumstances in which a party may give a witness’s conclusions the additional authority of expert status.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 702 gatekeeping

The judge must determine whether a proposed expert has suitable expertise and will provide reliable, useful specialized testimony before the jury hears it.

Qualifications versus methodology

Qualifications concern what the witness knows. Methodology concerns how the witness reached the opinion. Both must be adequate.

Abuse of discretion

An appellate court gives the trial judge substantial latitude, but may intervene when an evidentiary decision exceeds the limits imposed by the governing rules.

Harmless error

An error that does not cause legally significant prejudice ordinarily does not justify reversing a judgment. The Court found this error prejudicial.

Ultimate issue

A central question the factfinder must resolve, such as whether a defendant was responsible for an allegedly dangerous condition.

Voir dire of an expert

Questioning a proposed expert to test qualifications and the basis for the intended testimony.

Tribometer

An instrument used to evaluate friction or slip resistance. Goodrum did not use one; the opinion did not require its use in every case.

Reversed and remanded

The appellate court set aside the judgment and returned the case to the trial court. Here, it directed a new trial.

8. Conclusion

Park Wind Apartments, LLC v. Mayze reinforces a practical Rule 702 principle: expertise must be demonstrated, matched to the subject, and exercised through reliable specialized methods. Credentials and ordinary investigative activity cannot substitute for that foundation.

Its principal significance lies in enforcement. When an unqualified witness receives the authority of expert status and offers opinions on central liability issues, the resulting prejudice can require a new trial. The underlying negligence claim remains unresolved, but the evidentiary boundary is clear.