Pre-Discovery Summary Judgment Against Pro Se Confined Plaintiffs Requires Meaningful Notice and a Real Opportunity for Rule 56(d) Discovery

1. Introduction

Brian Damon Farabee, a long-term confined psychiatric patient diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, sued Virginia hospital and behavioral-health officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the ADA, alleging (among other things) denial of clinically recommended treatment (including DBT), unnecessary physical and chemical restraints, isolation, forced medication, and related constitutional violations. The defendants were Dr. Robert Gardella (psychiatrist), Dr. Christy F. McFarland (psychologist), and Daniel Herr (DBHDS official who transferred Farabee to Western State Hospital).

The core appellate issue was procedural: whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment before any discovery and after issuing Roseboro notices that did not ensure a meaningful understanding of Rule 56’s requirements—especially Rule 56(d) discovery protections—given Farabee’s pro se status, institutionalization, and claimed limits (education, access to legal materials, and mental illness).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by granting pre-discovery summary judgment where Farabee repeatedly indicated discovery was needed and the court was on “fair notice” that the summary judgment record was likely insufficient. The panel emphasized that Rule 56(d) relief is “broadly favored” and “liberally granted” in the circuit, and that technical noncompliance with Rule 56(d) procedures may be excused—particularly for pro se litigants—when the court has not adequately advised them and when the need for discovery is apparent.

The court therefore:

• Reversed the district court’s denial of Farabee’s requests for discovery;
• Vacated the summary judgment rulings (including qualified immunity) without reaching the merits;
• Remanded for further proceedings; and
• Recommended (without ordering) that the district court appoint counsel on remand given the case’s complexity and Farabee’s limitations.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

A. Discovery, Rule 56(d), and the “premature summary judgment” problem

• Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)
  The opinion relies on Celotex’s instruction that summary judgment should be granted only “after adequate time for discovery.” This is the Supreme Court anchor for treating pre-discovery summary judgment as exceptional rather than routine.
• Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511 (4th. Cir. 2021)
  Pledger is the principal Fourth Circuit template: where a pro se plaintiff is not properly advised and the record is undeveloped, courts should not enter summary judgment. Two specific takeaways are imported directly: (i) Rule 56(d) relief is “broadly favored” and should be “liberally granted”; and (ii) courts may excuse failure to file a formal Rule 56(d) affidavit when the litigant has otherwise put the court on notice that discovery is needed and the objections functionally substitute for the affidavit.
• Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121 (4th Cir. 2023)
  Shaw supplies the “fair notice” standard: a court abuses its discretion by granting summary judgment pre-discovery when it is on fair notice of disputes about the adequacy of the summary judgment record, especially when key evidence is in the defendants’ subjective knowledge or exclusive control. Farabee is explicitly aligned with Shaw’s logic and remedial posture.
• Harrods Ltd v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002)
  Harrods is cited (via Pledger) for excusing technical noncompliance with Rule 56(d) when the nonmovant is not at fault and has adequately informed the court that the motion is premature and more discovery is necessary. Farabee uses this to reject the defendants’ “no affidavit, no discovery” argument.
• Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1992) (Harris, J., concurring)
  Evans is cited for the general rule that summary judgment is appropriate “only after adequate time for discovery.” The concurrence uses it to underscore that this case is straightforwardly governed by ordinary practice, not an outlier.

B. The required content of pro se “Roseboro” notices

• Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975)
  Roseboro requires “fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule” before summary judgment is entered against a pro se litigant. Here, the Fourth Circuit found the district court’s notice practice materially inadequate in context: it did not meaningfully educate Farabee about what he needed to do to oppose summary judgment, and it never mentioned Rule 56(d) or how to seek discovery. The inadequacy compounded the error of deciding the case on an undeveloped record.
• Pledger v. Lynch (again)
  The court uses Pledger’s treatment of defective Roseboro notice as a multiplier: when a notice falls short and discovery is absent, the resulting summary judgment posture is especially unreliable.

C. Professional judgment, treatment claims, and why merits were not reached

• Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
  Youngberg supplies the substantive constitutional framework for claims by involuntarily committed persons regarding safety, freedom from restraint, and adequate care. It requires deference to the “professional judgment” of qualified professionals and asks whether the challenged decisions substantially depart from accepted professional judgment. Farabee does not decide the Youngberg merits; it holds that the discovery record was too thin to determine whether professional judgment was exercised (and thus whether qualified immunity might apply).
• Farabee v. Clarke, 967 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2020)
  The defendants argued Clarke had already rejected a “right to DBT.” The panel corrected that characterization, quoting Clarke’s recognition that Farabee sufficiently alleged Virginia “undertook the responsibility to provide him with adequate medical care” yet long denied him the treatment recommended by professionals. Clarke therefore supports—not forecloses—the need to test whether treatment decisions here reflect professional judgment.
• Farabee v. Yaratha, 801 Fed. App'x 97 (4th Cir. 2020) (and concurrence’s discussion)
  Yaratha is treated as factually and procedurally distinct: there the record contained testimony explaining why DBT’s risks outweighed benefits. Here, there was no comparable developed record, and Farabee alleged retaliatory withholding and disputed what was offered—issues that cannot be resolved without discovery.

D. Appointment of counsel (recommended, not mandated)

• Jenkins v. Woodard, 109 F.4th 242 (4th Cir. 2024)
  Jenkins is used to show how denial of counsel can deprive a pro se incarcerated litigant of a meaningful chance to conduct discovery; Farabee distinguishes Jenkins because Farabee was never given any discovery opportunity at all. Still, Jenkins supports the court’s practical concern that Farabee’s limitations will make discovery and expert development difficult.
• Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984) (rev’d on other grounds)
  Cited for the factors relevant to a pro se plaintiff’s subjective abilities (education, mental health, ability to present claims), supporting the recommendation to consider counsel.
• Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2021)
  Cited for the proposition that cases requiring proof of a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment (Youngberg-type claims) can be complex and counsel may be important—particularly to secure expert evidence.
• Riddick v. Barber, 109 F.4th 639 (4th Cir. 2024); Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2019); Shaw v. Foreman
  These cases are cited for the appellate practice of recommending appointment of counsel on remand after vacating premature summary judgment, especially where expert evidence and discovery are central.

E. Summary judgment factfinding limits (concurrence)

• Alexander v. Connor, 105 F.4th 174 (4th Cir. 2024) (Harris, J., concurring)
  The concurrence underscores that courts may not resolve credibility disputes or discount a nonmovant’s account merely because it is self-serving or uncorroborated at summary judgment—an admonition reinforcing why discovery was necessary before resolving contested factual narratives about treatment offers and retaliation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning is intentionally procedural and rests on three linked propositions:

1. Rule 56(d) is not a technical trap—especially for pro se confined litigants.
   The court reiterates that Rule 56(d) exists to prevent a party from being “railroaded” by summary judgment before it can obtain facts essential to oppose the motion. Because Rule 56(d) relief is “liberally granted,” and because the defendants’ evidence and motivations (including treatment rationales and alleged retaliation) were plausibly within defendants’ control, the district court should have allowed discovery before adjudicating summary judgment.
2. “Fair notice” governs: the district court was alerted that the record was insufficient.
   Farabee repeatedly told the district court discovery was needed—explicitly calling summary judgment “premature” and identifying needs like depositions, authentication, and expert development. Under Shaw and Pledger, that was enough to trigger the court’s obligation to treat the summary judgment record as potentially inadequate.
3. Inadequate Roseboro notice exacerbated the denial of a meaningful chance to develop the record.
   The notices warned Farabee to respond but did not meaningfully inform him how to oppose summary judgment, and (per the concurrence) never referenced Rule 56(d) procedures. Under Pledger, the failure to inform a pro se litigant about tools to obtain discovery is a key reason not to fault him for not filing a formal Rule 56(d) affidavit.

Because these errors undermined the integrity of the summary judgment process, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment without reaching substantive constitutional questions (including the Youngberg analysis and qualified immunity).

3.3. Impact

Although framed as an abuse-of-discretion reversal in a particular record posture, the decision has meaningful practical consequences in Fourth Circuit civil rights litigation:

• Stronger guardrails against “pre-discovery” summary judgment in pro se confinement cases.
  Farabee reinforces that when a pro se plaintiff flags the need for discovery and key information is controlled by defendants, district courts should not resolve the case on summary judgment without providing discovery time—regardless of whether a perfect Rule 56(d) affidavit is filed.
• Roseboro notices must do more than set a deadline.
  The decision, especially the concurrence, signals that a notice regime that omits any mention of Rule 56(d) can be inadequate when summary judgment is entertained before discovery.
• Youngberg-based claims often require expert development and institutional records.
  By highlighting the complexity of proving (or disproving) “professional judgment,” the opinion encourages district courts to treat expert discovery and full treatment records as central, not optional, to adjudicating psychiatric confinement claims.
• Qualified immunity cannot be cleanly decided where the “professional judgment” predicate is fact-bound and undeveloped.
  The court rejects an overly narrow framing (“no DBT for one month”) and signals that the correct inquiry is whether clearly established law requires adequate treatment necessary for the condition—an inquiry that may depend on factual findings about medical justification and decisionmaking.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Farabee v. Gardella is a procedural but significant Fourth Circuit decision that tightens the requirements for granting summary judgment against pro se confined plaintiffs before discovery. The court held that when a plaintiff repeatedly signals the need for discovery and the court is on “fair notice” that key evidence lies with defendants, Rule 56(d) protections must be meaningfully honored—even if the plaintiff does not perfectly comply with technical affidavit requirements, particularly where Roseboro notices do not explain how to seek discovery. The result—reversal, vacatur, and remand—preserves the principle that constitutional litigation involving institutional treatment and Youngberg “professional judgment” should not be decided on a thin, defendant-controlled record.