PPIA Does Not Preempt Statewide Bans on Lab-Grown Chicken: Product Prohibitions Are Not “Facilities” or “Ingredients” Requirements

I. Introduction

Upside Foods Inc v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026) addresses a first-wave conflict between federal food-safety inspection regimes and state legislation targeting “cultivated” (lab-grown) meat. Florida’s SB 1084, codified at Fla. Stat. § 500.452, broadly prohibits the manufacture for sale, sale, holding for sale, offering for sale, or distribution of cultivated meat in the state, backed by criminal penalties and licensing consequences for restaurants.

Upside Foods, a California-based producer of lab-grown chicken, obtained federal clearances: an FDA “no questions” letter following pre-market consultation, and USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) approvals including labeling and a Grant of Inspection, making Upside an “official establishment” under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). Upside sought a preliminary injunction in federal court, arguing that SB 1084 is expressly preempted by the PPIA’s provisions preempting non-identical state requirements concerning (i) “ingredients” and (ii) “premises, facilities and operations” of official establishments.

The district court denied preliminary relief. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit confronted threshold questions (mootness and cause of action) before reaching the core preemption issue: whether a categorical state product ban is, in substance, a forbidden “ingredient requirement” or “facilities/operations” requirement under the PPIA.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Mootness: The appeal from the preliminary-injunction denial was not moot despite (a) Upside filing an amended complaint after the denial and before the notice of appeal, and (b) the district court later dismissing Upside’s preemption claims in a separate interlocutory order.
  • Cause of action: Upside had a cause of action in equity to seek pre-enforcement injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of a purportedly preempted state law. The PPIA’s exclusive-enforcement clause, 21 U.S.C. § 467c, did not bar an equitable preemption action against state officers.
  • Merits (likelihood of success): Upside was unlikely to succeed on its express-preemption theories. Florida’s ban regulates an end product (“cultivated meat”), not the “premises, facilities and operations” of an official establishment, nor “ingredient requirements” for poultry articles prepared there.
  • Disposition: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction.

Notably, the court assumed without deciding—given the limited preliminary-injunction record—that lab-grown chicken is a “poultry product” covered by the PPIA, even though the USDA has repeatedly characterized cultivated poultry as regulated “poultry food products.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Mootness and interlocutory appellate jurisdiction

  • Keohane v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs. Sec'y and Powell v. McCormack: The court reiterated that Article III requires a live “legally cognizable interest” throughout the case.
  • Al Najjar v. Ashcroft: Mootness turns on whether the court can still provide “meaningful relief.”
  • Graham v. Att'y Gen., Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., and Ga. Muslim Voter Project v. Kemp: Examples of how preliminary-injunction appeals can become moot due to intervening events or final judgments.
  • Ohio v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, DeFunis v. Odegaard, ABN Amro Verzekeringen BV v. Geologistics Ams., Inc., and Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.: The court emphasized a practical, not formalistic, “any practical effect” approach to mootness.
  • Barber v. Governor of Ala. and Rosen v. Cascade Int'l, Inc.: Direct Eleventh Circuit authority that an amended complaint filed between an injunction order and appeal does not necessarily moot interlocutory review; appellate review typically looks to the record as it stood at the time of the order.
  • League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Johnson and Johnson v. 3M Co.: Reinforced that interlocutory review focuses on whether the district court erred “as the case stood,” and that amendments do not moot an appeal where the claim’s substance is unchanged.
  • Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., and Piambino v. Bailey (citing In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co.): Once an interlocutory appeal is filed, the district court cannot alter the status of the appealed aspects; if the appellate court issues a mandate, the district court must comply.
  • Hornady v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b): The district court’s non-final interlocutory orders remain revisable and therefore do not create the same mootness effect as final judgment.

2. Cause of action for preemption in equity

  • Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.: The defendants argued Armstrong foreclosed private enforcement; the court distinguished Armstrong and relied on Armstrong’s recognition that courts may enjoin state regulation where federal law “immunizes” the plaintiff.
  • Ex parte Young: The foundational basis for pre-enforcement relief to avoid forcing regulated parties to incur penalties before obtaining judicial review.
  • Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., and cited Supreme Court/Eleventh Circuit examples: The opinion treated equitable preemption actions as deeply embedded and routinely entertained.
  • Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury): Statutory text must be read in context; this controlled the interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 467c (exclusive federal enforcement) as not reaching state-officer enforcement of state law.
  • Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., Haywood v. Drown, Branch v. Smith, Maryland v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Rath Packing Co.: Preemption is a constitutional (Supremacy Clause) rule of decision and defense; express preemption clauses help define scope but do not convert a preemption defense into “private enforcement” of a federal statute.

3. Express preemption under “facilities” and “ingredients” clauses

  • National Meat Association v. Harris: Upside’s key authority; the Eleventh Circuit distinguished it as involving operational commands to slaughterhouses (onsite handling, purchasing, and euthanasia requirements), not a pure end-product ban.
  • Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry and Cavel Int'l Inc. v. Madigan: Sister-circuit decisions under the FMIA (a companion statute) holding that state bans on horsemeat were not preempted by analogous “facilities” language—supporting the Eleventh Circuit’s view that federal inspection does not force states to allow sale of a category of meat.
  • Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Québec v. Becerra: Ninth Circuit decision that a ban on foie gras produced by force-feeding was not an “ingredients” regulation; influenced the Eleventh Circuit’s distinction between physical components of a product and restrictions targeting a product category or production ethics.
  • Armour & Co. v. Ball: Illustrative of what “ingredient requirements” look like in practice (regulating components such as cereal, soya binders, milk, and fatty tissue), reinforcing that “ingredients” are understood at the recipe/component level rather than at the cellular-origin level.
  • Perrin v. United States and contemporaneous dictionary usage (Webster’s Third): The court used ordinary-meaning analysis for “premises,” “facilities,” “operations,” “ingredient,” and “requirement.”
  • In re Appling (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n) and Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.: The court used prior interpretive guidance for “with respect to,” selecting the meaning “direct relation to, or impact on” in this statutory context.
  • Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Scalia & Garner): The court invoked canons including noscitur a sociis and the surplusage canon to keep “premises, facilities and operations” meaningful and non-redundant, and to preserve work for the savings clause.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The appeal was not moot

The Eleventh Circuit rejected two mootness theories: that an amended complaint necessarily moots interlocutory review, and that the district court’s later dismissal of preemption claims eliminates “meaningful relief.” Relying on Barber v. Governor of Ala., Rosen v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., and Johnson v. 3M Co., the court held the operative question is whether Upside continued to seek substantively the same relief and whether the underlying allegations giving rise to the preliminary-injunction dispute changed meaningfully.

The court further emphasized that a district court cannot divest an appellate court of jurisdiction over an appealed matter by issuing subsequent orders affecting it (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co. and Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.). Unlike final judgment (which can moot a preliminary-injunction appeal because the preliminary phase has expired), a non-final interlocutory dismissal order remains revisable and cannot moot the appeal in the same way.

2. Upside had an equitable cause of action despite 21 U.S.C. § 467c

The central procedural fight was whether Upside’s request to enjoin enforcement of SB 1084 was an impermissible attempt to “enforce” the PPIA, barred by 21 U.S.C. § 467c (“[a]ll proceedings for the enforcement or to restrain violations of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States”). The court’s answer turned on context and on the nature of preemption:

  • Contextual reading of § 467c: The PPIA regulates poultry processors; “violations of this chapter” naturally refers to violations by regulated entities, not to state officers enforcing state law. Thus, § 467c reserves federal exclusivity over PPIA enforcement actions against violators of the PPIA—not over constitutional defenses (and pre-enforcement suits) against state statutes.
  • Preemption as constitutional defense: Drawing on Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc. and Supremacy Clause cases, the court treated preemption as a constitutional rule that displaces contrary state law—distinct from private enforcement of a federal regulatory scheme.
  • Armstrong distinguished: The court read Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. as rejecting a different kind of suit (attempts to compel state administration of a federal program in a particular way), while confirming the availability of injunctions where federal law “immunizes” a plaintiff from state regulation.

3. The PPIA did not likely preempt Florida’s cultivated-meat ban

(a) Facilities Provision: a product ban is not a regulation “with respect to premises, facilities and operations”

The court read the Facilities Provision as preempting state rules that have a direct relationship to a processor’s onsite processing environment—its “premises,” “facilities,” and “operations” at an “official establishment.” Several interpretive moves were pivotal:

  • Ordinary meaning + noscitur a sociis: “Premises” and “facilities” point to physical sites and installed instrumentalities; “operations,” read alongside them, is best understood as onsite operational conduct at the inspected establishment.
  • “With respect to” as limiting language: The court selected a “direct relation to, or impact on” meaning (from In re Appling and Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n), rejecting broader “incidental downstream effect” readings that would collapse the provision into redundancy and nullify the savings clause.
  • Savings clause preservation: A broad reading would preempt almost any state action touching poultry products, leaving little for 21 U.S.C. § 467e’s savings clause (“any other matters regulated under this chapter”) to accomplish.
  • Distinguishing National Meat Association v. Harris: California’s law in National Meat Association v. Harris dictated onsite handling/purchasing/euthanasia steps, effectively commanding facility operations. Florida’s SB 1084, by contrast, did not prescribe how to culture, process, or handle cells; it prohibited a category of end product in the state.
  • Alignment with Empacadora and Cavel: The Eleventh Circuit adopted the view that federal inspection regulation does not force states to allow the sale of a type of meat; it prevents states from imposing non-identical processing requirements if the product is sold.

On this reading, SB 1084’s ban may have economic consequences for Upside, but it is not a “facilities/operations” rule because it does not “reach into” the inspected establishment to impose different onsite requirements.

(b) Ingredients Provision: banning cultivated meat is not an “ingredient requirement”

Upside attempted to recharacterize SB 1084 as an “ingredient requirement” by arguing that cultivated meat contains “lab-grown cells” as an ingredient. The court rejected this as inconsistent with ordinary usage and statutory context:

  • Ordinary meaning: An “ingredient requirement” is a rule about essential component parts of a mixture/combination (e.g., additives, binders, preservatives)—not about banning a finished product category.
  • Statutory context: The PPIA’s usage of “ingredient” appears at the component/additive level (e.g., dyes, chemicals, preservatives; labeling “optional ingredients”), not at the cellular-origin level.
  • Comparative precedent: The court followed the reasoning of Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Québec v. Becerra and Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry that states may ban a category of meat product without thereby imposing an “ingredient requirement.”
  • Illustration from Armour & Co. v. Ball: Ingredient preemption cases typically involve specific component mandates or prohibitions (cereal, binders, milk, fatty tissue), reinforcing that Florida’s law is not of that type.

C. Impact

1. Doctrinal impact on food/agriculture preemption litigation

The opinion’s most consequential substantive rule is its clear distinction between (i) state laws that regulate how an inspected establishment must operate or what ingredients a product may contain, and (ii) state laws that ban an end product category from being sold in-state. Under this framework, express preemption clauses aimed at uniform inspection and processing standards do not automatically invalidate state bans on product categories—even where the federal government inspects and authorizes their interstate sale.

2. Practical impact on cultivated-meat regulation

  • State bans likely to survive PPIA express-preemption attacks: At least within the Eleventh Circuit, plaintiffs will face a steep climb arguing that a categorical prohibition is an “ingredients” or “facilities/operations” requirement.
  • Regulatory drafting incentives: States wishing to avoid preemption risk may prefer product prohibitions over operational mandates that dictate onsite handling, labeling formats beyond federal requirements, or processing methods—because the latter look more like National Meat Association v. Harris territory.
  • Federal/state tension remains: The opinion does not resolve broader questions about implied preemption or the scope of federal objectives for cultivated-meat commercialization; it only addresses these express-preemption clauses as applied to a ban.

3. Procedural impact: preserving pre-enforcement challenges and interlocutory review

The court’s treatment of mootness and equitable causes of action strengthens procedural pathways for regulated entities to seek pre-enforcement review, while also clarifying that exclusive federal enforcement clauses (like § 467c) do not necessarily block constitutional preemption suits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Preemption: When federal law displaces conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause. A party can raise preemption as a defense if a state tries to enforce a conflicting rule.
  • Express preemption: Congress sometimes writes a clause specifying what state laws are displaced. Here, the PPIA expressly preempts certain non-identical state “ingredient requirements” and “premises, facilities and operations” requirements for “official establishments.”
  • “Official establishment”: A facility operating under USDA inspection authorization (here, Upside’s Grant of Inspection), triggering the PPIA’s inspection and related uniformity rules.
  • Equitable pre-enforcement suit (Ex parte Young theory): A lawsuit against state officials to stop enforcement of a law alleged to be unconstitutional (including because it is preempted), brought before the plaintiff must risk prosecution.
  • Mootness: A case becomes moot if courts can no longer provide effective relief. The court emphasized practical effect over procedural technicalities.
  • “With respect to”: In this opinion, it means a direct relationship to the regulated subject (here, the physical premises/facilities/onsite operations), not merely an indirect economic effect.
  • Noscitur a sociis & surplusage canon: Tools of interpretation used to read associated words consistently and to avoid making statutory words redundant.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision establishes a significant boundary on PPIA express preemption: a state’s categorical ban on the sale/manufacture/distribution of cultivated meat is not, without more, an “ingredient requirement” or a “premises, facilities and operations” requirement imposed on an “official establishment.” The court also reaffirmed the availability of equitable pre-enforcement preemption suits against state officers, holding that 21 U.S.C. § 467c does not bar such actions, and clarified that interlocutory appellate review of preliminary-injunction denials is not defeated by an amended complaint or a later interlocutory dismissal order.

The net effect is to leave substantial room for states to enact product-category prohibitions in the cultivated-meat space while limiting states’ ability to impose non-identical operational or ingredient-component regulations on federally inspected establishments.