Potential-Claim Notice Must Be Given During the Policy Period, Not the Extended Reporting Period, to Preserve Coverage Under a Claims-Made Legal-Malpractice Policy (Sixth Circuit, Michigan Law)

1. Introduction

In Lauren Bridges v. Maxum Indemnity Company (6th Cir. June 29, 2026), the Sixth Circuit addressed contractual interpretation of two legal-malpractice insurance policies governed by Michigan law in the context of a claims-made-and-reported coverage dispute.

The underlying events began with a 2017 Alaska medical-malpractice case filed by Lauren Bridges on behalf of her minor child. Bridges’ Alaska case was ultimately dismissed in 2022 after alleged litigation failures by her Michigan counsel, McKeen & Associates, P.C. (McKeen). Bridges then asserted a legal-malpractice claim against McKeen. McKeen had maintained professional-liability coverage through three carriers—Maxum Indemnity Company (Maxum), StarStone Specialty Insurance Company (StarStone), and Landmark American Insurance Company (Landmark)—but each declined defense and indemnity. McKeen settled with Bridges and assigned to her its rights under the policies, and Bridges sued the insurers for declaratory relief and breach of contract.

The key issues on appeal were (i) whether notice of a potential claim given during an Extended Reporting Period (ERP) satisfied a policy provision requiring potential-claim notice “during the Policy Period” (Maxum), and (ii) whether an excess “follow-form” policy could be dismissed at the pleadings stage based on a retroactive-date exclusion in the followed primary policy (Landmark).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). As to Maxum, the court held that the policy unambiguously required notice of a potential claim to be provided “during the Policy Period,” not during the ERP; because McKeen’s potential-claim notice occurred after the Policy Period, the later actual claim could not be deemed made during the Policy Period and was therefore untimely and uncovered. The court further held that an endorsement’s inconsistent label (“Supplemental” vs. “Optional” ERP) was a scrivener error that did not create ambiguity affecting the notice condition.

As to Landmark, the court held that Landmark’s follow-form excess policy incorporated StarStone’s terms, including a retroactive-date exclusion barring coverage for wrongful acts occurring before May 2, 2019; the alleged malpractice occurred in 2018, so coverage was excluded as a matter of law. Bridges’ “prematurity/piecemeal adjudication” argument was rejected because it was not raised below and, in any event, unambiguous policy language is routinely construed at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Federal pleading and appellate practice framework

  • Booth Fam. Tr. v. Jeffries and Lindsay v. Yates: The court reiterated de novo review of Rule 12 dismissals and the requirement to accept well-pled factual allegations as true. This framing mattered because the dispute turned less on contested facts than on whether the policy text foreclosed coverage.
  • Berry v. U.S. Dep't of Lab.: The court relied on the rule allowing consideration of documents attached to and central to the complaint. Because Bridges attached the policies, the court could interpret them at the pleadings stage—critical to both Maxum’s notice condition and Landmark’s retroactive exclusion.
  • Kuhn v. Washtenaw Cnty.: Used for waiver principles where arguments not raised in an opening brief are deemed waived—relevant to Bridges’ failure to meaningfully challenge the retroactive-date reasoning.
  • Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't (quoting J.C. Wyckoff & Assocs. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.): The court declined to consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal (the “prematurity/piecemeal adjudication” theory).
  • In re Hood (quoting Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't): The “miscarriage of justice” exception did not apply because Bridges could have raised the issue below and did not.

Michigan insurance/contract interpretation rules

  • Rory v. Cont'l Ins. Co.: Anchored the court’s approach that insurance policies are contracts enforced as written when unambiguous—supporting strict enforcement of the notice condition and retroactive exclusion.
  • City of Grosse Pointe Park v. Mich. Mun. Liab. & Prop. Pool (Young, J., concurring): Emphasized beginning with the policy’s actual text to determine intent and enforcing clear language without rewriting coverage.
  • Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.: Supplied two key principles: read the contract as a whole and give harmonious effect to provisions; and construe ambiguities against the insurer only if true ambiguity remains after considering extrinsic evidence.
  • Rossow v. Brentwood Farms Dev., Inc.: Contract interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a question of law—supporting resolution on a motion to dismiss.
  • Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Nikkel, Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., and Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters: These cases define ambiguity and caution against manufacturing ambiguity. The Sixth Circuit used them to reject Bridges’ attempt to leverage a labeling inconsistency into ambiguity about notice timing.
  • O'Connor v. March Automatic Irrigation Co. (quoted in Klapp): If there is a true ambiguity, interpretation can be for the jury. The court’s point here was the opposite: there was no ambiguity to send to a factfinder.

Conditions precedent and notice consequences

  • Archambo v. Laws. Title Ins. Corp.: Provided the definition of a “condition precedent.” The court used this to characterize the Maxum notice requirement as a gating obligation: if unmet, no coverage obligation arises.
  • State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore: Cited for the proposition that failure to satisfy a condition precedent defeats a cause of action for coverage.

Scrivener’s error and “non-ambiguity”

  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Est. of Fortin and Irwin v. North: The court relied on these to distinguish scrivener errors from genuine ambiguity. The endorsement’s reference to “Supplemental” ERP and a nonexistent “Section V, paragraph 3” did not create conflicting meanings about notice timing in Section VII.B.
  • Schoening Inv. LP v. Cincinnati Cas. Co.: Though applying Kentucky law, it supported the analytical point that alleged ambiguities elsewhere cannot manufacture ambiguity in the specific provision being applied; the Sixth Circuit used this to keep the focus on Section VII.B’s clear notice language.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Maxum: “Potential claim” notice must occur during the defined “Policy Period”

The Maxum policy was a classic claims-made-and-reported design: coverage existed only for a “Claim” first made against the insured and reported to the insurer during the “Policy Period” (or certain ERPs). The policy also imposed, as a “condition precedent,” that the insured provide written notice of any “Claim” no later than 60 days after the end of the Policy Period.

The dispute turned on a saving clause: if, during the “Policy Period,” the insured became aware of a wrongful act that might reasonably be expected to lead to a claim and provided written notice of that wrongful act “during the ‘Policy Period,’” then any later claim arising out of that wrongful act would be deemed made during the Policy Period. That deeming provision can be powerful—it can “pull back” later claims into the policy year—but only if its strict prerequisites are met.

Here, McKeen did not provide notice of a potential claim until April 2020—after the Maxum Policy Period (May 2, 2018 to May 2, 2019)—even though it was within the purchased Optional Extended Reporting Period (July 2, 2019 to July 2, 2021). The Sixth Circuit treated the policy’s repeated phrase “during the ‘Policy Period’” as dispositive: the contract defined “Policy Period” precisely, and that definition did not include the ERP. Therefore, potential-claim notice during the ERP could not satisfy a clause that required notice during the Policy Period. The result was straightforward: no timely notice satisfying the condition precedent, no coverage.

Bridges attempted to create ambiguity by pointing to the endorsement’s terminology (“Supplemental Extended Reporting Period”) and its erroneous cross-reference to a nonexistent section. The court rejected this as a scrivener error that did not create an “irreconcilable conflict,” especially because (i) the endorsement plainly contemplated an elected-for ERP (matching the policy’s “Optional Extended Reporting Period” concept), and (ii) the notice provisions at issue did not turn on whether the ERP was labeled “Optional” or “Supplemental.” Even if the endorsement were imperfectly drafted, it did not alter Section VII.B’s requirement that potential-claim notice be given during the Policy Period.

(B) Landmark: follow-form excess coverage falls with an unambiguous retroactive-date exclusion

Landmark’s policy was a follow-form excess policy: it provided coverage “in accordance with the same terms, conditions and limitations of the Followed Policy,” which was the StarStone policy. The incorporated StarStone exclusion barred claims “based upon, arising out of… any Wrongful Act prior to the Retroactive Date.” The retroactive date was May 2, 2019.

The alleged wrongful act—McKeen’s failure to respond to summary judgment motions—occurred in 2018. That placed the claim squarely within the pre-retroactive-date exclusion. Bridges did not directly contest that coverage analysis in her opening brief, and instead argued that dismissal was premature because StarStone (the primary) had answered rather than moved to dismiss.

The court disposed of the “prematurity” argument on two independent grounds. First, it was forfeited because it was not raised before the district court. Second, even if considered, it failed because interpretation of unambiguous policy language is a question of law and may be resolved at the pleadings stage, particularly where the relevant policy documents are part of the complaint. The court also noted the practical point: if the followed policy language excludes coverage, then the follow-form excess carrier’s exposure is likewise defeated on the same terms.

3.3. Impact

  • Strict enforcement of “Policy Period” vs. ERP in reporting provisions: The decision underscores that ERPs extend only what the policy says they extend. If a policy requires potential-claim notice “during the Policy Period,” an ERP does not silently expand that window unless the contract expressly does so. For lawyers and brokers, this places heightened importance on aligning endorsement language and notice provisions so the ERP meaningfully preserves the intended “notice of circumstances” protection.
  • Scrivener errors will not easily create coverage: Minor drafting mistakes (terminology mismatches or incorrect internal references) will not create ambiguity where the operative coverage condition is otherwise clear. Policyholders seeking to invoke contra proferentem must still show a genuine conflict capable of competing reasonable interpretations of the relevant clause.
  • Follow-form excess carriers can win early on incorporated exclusions: Where the followed policy unambiguously excludes coverage (here, by retroactive date), a follow-form excess carrier may be dismissed at the pleadings stage, even if the primary carrier remains in the case. The court treated this as ordinary contract interpretation, not a fact-intensive inquiry.
  • Appellate preservation discipline: The opinion is also a cautionary procedural precedent: new theories about sequencing, piecemeal adjudication, or case management cannot substitute for a substantive response to an exclusion, and arguments not presented below face substantial barriers on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Claims-made-and-reported coverage: Coverage depends on when a claim is made and when it is reported to the insurer. Missing the reporting deadline can defeat coverage even if the alleged malpractice happened during the policy year.
  • Extended Reporting Period (ERP): An ERP is a “tail” that lets an insured report claims after the policy ends, but only to the extent the contract permits. It does not necessarily extend every notice-related clause—especially a clause that expressly requires notice “during the Policy Period.”
  • Notice of a potential claim (“notice of circumstances”): Some policies allow the insured to report a potential claim early; if done correctly and timely, later lawsuits can be treated as if made during the earlier policy period. Here, that protection existed only if the potential claim was reported during the Policy Period.
  • Condition precedent: A contractual prerequisite that must be satisfied before the insurer owes performance. If the condition fails (e.g., late notice where timely notice is a condition precedent), the insurer’s coverage obligation never arises.
  • Follow-form excess policy: An excess policy that generally adopts the terms and exclusions of an underlying “followed” primary policy. If the underlying policy excludes coverage on its terms, the excess policy typically does as well.
  • Retroactive date: A cutoff date used in professional liability policies: wrongful acts before that date are excluded even if the claim is made later during the policy period.
  • Scrivener error vs. ambiguity: A scrivener error is an obvious drafting mistake that does not reflect a genuine, competing meaning of the contract. Ambiguity requires language that reasonably supports conflicting interpretations of the operative provision.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision cements a practical rule for Michigan-governed claims-made professional liability coverage: when a policy states that potential-claim notice must be provided “during the Policy Period,” an Extended Reporting Period does not satisfy that requirement absent express policy language extending it. The court also reinforced that scrivener-level endorsement inconsistencies do not create ambiguity that can rewrite clear notice conditions. Finally, the opinion confirms that follow-form excess insurers can obtain early dismissal when incorporated exclusions—such as a retroactive-date bar—unambiguously defeat coverage, and it highlights the importance of preserving arguments in the district court and on appeal.