Post-Transfer Settlement Communications Are Generally Irrelevant to § 2232(a) Intent; Prior Asset Concealment Under the Same Forfeiture Judgment Is Admissible Under Rule 404(b)

Case: United States v. Christopher Switlyk (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2026) (per curiam, not for publication)
Statute: 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (removal of property to prevent seizure)
Primary topics: relevance (Rules 401–402), unfair confusion (Rule 403), hearsay/effect-on-listener (Rules 801–802), state-of-mind exception (Rule 803(3)), other-acts evidence (Rule 404(b)), harmless error

1. Introduction

Christopher Switlyk was tried in the Middle District of Florida for four counts of “knowingly disposing of and transferring property for the purpose of preventing and impairing the government’s lawful authority to take the property into its custody and control,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a). The charges arose after the government—seeking substitute assets to satisfy a forfeiture money judgment from Switlyk’s earlier federal case—obtained a preliminary order of forfeiture in November 2022. After learning his accounts were frozen and being told that paperwork would be sent, Switlyk transferred assets (including a Tesla and real property) to his father, including a Tesla title transfer backdated under penalty of perjury.

The appeal did not meaningfully contest the sufficiency of the government’s proof; it focused on evidentiary rulings:

• Exclusion of a February 2023 email from an AUSA in the forfeiture matter that defense characterized as a “threat” of prosecution.
• Exclusion (as hearsay) of the father’s testimony that an AUSA allegedly said on November 16, 2022, “if your parents can show documentation that they paid for these properties, I will take them off the list.”
• Admission under Rule 404(b) of evidence that in 2012 Switlyk buried valuable gold coins and silver bars during the earlier criminal case/forfeiture process.

The jury acquitted on two counts and convicted on two: Count III (Tesla transfer) and Count IV (Tampa property transfer). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court acted within its “considerable discretion” in (1) excluding the February 2023 “threat” evidence as irrelevant to Switlyk’s intent at the time of the charged November 2022 transfers and as likely to confuse the jury under Rule 403; (2) excluding the alleged November 16, 2022 “promise” statement, because even if framed as “effect on listener,” it was irrelevant as to the Tesla (transferred before the call) and as to the Tampa property carried a high risk of misleading the jury into taking it for its truth; and in any event, any error was harmless; and (3) admitting the 2012 burial of precious metals under Rule 404(b) because it was probative of intent and motive in a case where intent was central, not too remote given its connection to the same forfeiture judgment, and any prejudice was mitigated by limiting instructions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)

• United States v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2021)
  Anchored the standard of review: evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, which “allow[s] a range of choice.” This deference drove the affirmance—especially where the district judge excluded evidence as irrelevant/confusing and gave limiting instructions for Rule 404(b) material.
• United States v. Holley, 166 F.4th 139 (11th Cir. 2026); United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1992)
  These cases supplied the harmless-error framework. Even if exclusion of the “promise” statement were wrong, the panel emphasized the evidentiary record supporting intent (e.g., backdating the Tesla transfer under penalty of perjury; sequencing of the Tampa transfer) and concluded there was no reasonable likelihood of prejudice.
• United States v. Watkins, 42 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2022)
  Used to define the boundary of the right to present a defense: the defendant may present “crucial, relevant evidence,” but not evidence lacking a “logical relationship” to an element or defense. The panel leveraged Watkins to uphold exclusion of the February 2023 email: it did not bear on intent in November 2022.
• United States v. Rivera, 780 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2015)
  Supplied the general proposition that out-of-court statements offered for “effect on the hearer” are not hearsay. The panel acknowledged this pathway yet still affirmed exclusion on relevance/Rule 403 grounds.
• United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2010)
  Clarified Rule 803(3): the state-of-mind exception concerns the declarant’s state of mind, not the listener’s. This undercut any attempt to recast the AUSA’s “promise” as a hearsay-exception theory aimed at proving how the Switlyks felt or what they believed.
• United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2021)
  Did two major jobs: (i) allowed affirmance “on any ground” (relevance/403) even if the district court spoke in hearsay terms; and (ii) articulated the “primary risk” of effect-on-listener evidence—jurors may take it for its truth—especially where the statement bears on guilt/innocence.
• United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2017)
  Supported the proposition that statements illuminating the state of mind of a non-defendant can be irrelevant. The panel treated Switlyk’s father’s state of mind as largely beside the point and only cautiously entertained the idea that Switlyk might have been similarly influenced.
• United States v. Karpordelis, 569 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009)
  Reinforced the Eleventh Circuit’s “rule of inclusion” approach to Rule 404(b). This orientation made admission of the burial evidence more natural: if it probatively explains intent/motive, exclusion is the exception rather than the rule.
• United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007)
  Provided the three-part Rule 404(b) test. The opinion effectively walked through it: relevance to intent/motive; proof the act occurred; and Rule 403 balancing.
• United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1998)
  Dorsey identified Rule 404(b) balancing factors (similarity, time gap, need, and whether the issue is contested). Zapata supplied the critical doctrinal lever: a not-guilty plea makes intent material, permitting the government to use qualifying 404(b) evidence unless the defendant affirmatively removes intent as an issue.
• United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1995)
  Together, these cases defeated the “remoteness” objection: there is no bright-line temporal rule, and even 15-year-old acts may be admissible. Here the ten-year gap was softened by the functional connection: concealment and later transfers were both efforts (as the government argued) to frustrate collection under the same forfeiture judgment.
• United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1993)
  These cases supported reliance on limiting instructions to mitigate unfair prejudice from 404(b) evidence. The district court gave a contemporaneous limiting instruction, and the appellate court treated that as meaningful risk-reduction.
• United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005)
  Cited in the procedural backdrop regarding settlement evidence (Rule 408), reflecting the judiciary’s general caution about importing compromise negotiations into a criminal trial. While not central to the appellate holdings, it is consistent with the panel’s sensitivity to jury confusion and misuse of settlement-related communications.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Excluding the February 2023 “threat” email: relevance and Rule 403, not hearsay

The district court excluded evidence of an alleged AUSA “threat” made in February 2023 during forfeiture negotiations. On appeal, Switlyk framed the issue as hearsay and “effect on the listener” (i.e., intimidation into surrendering property). The panel recast the trial court’s rationale as primarily relevance and Rule 403 confusion:

• Relevance (Rules 401–402): The charged conduct occurred in November 2022. A statement made months later during settlement discussions does not make it more or less probable that Switlyk’s earlier transfers were done “for the purpose of preventing” seizure. Put differently, post hoc negotiation pressure does not retroactively illuminate the defendant’s earlier intent.
• Rule 403: The district judge emphasized that the timeline “doesn’t make any sense” for intent and would likely confuse jurors about what matters (the intent at the time of transfer). The panel treated that as a classic discretionary Rule 403 call.

A notable feature here is methodological: the panel declined to “broach” hearsay once it agreed the evidence was irrelevant/403-excludable. That move reinforces a practical appellate lesson—if relevance and Rule 403 suffice, hearsay disputes may become beside the point.

B. Excluding the alleged November 16, 2022 “promise”: hearsay labels vs. relevance/403 realities

The father testified that an AUSA said: “if your parents can show documentation that they paid for these properties, I will take them off the list.” The district court sustained a hearsay objection. On appeal, Switlyk argued it was offered for “effect on the hearer” (to show the Switlyks believed forfeiture would be nullified).

The panel’s reasoning proceeded in layers:

• Hearsay framework: Under United States v. Rivera, effect-on-listener can be non-hearsay; but under United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, Rule 803(3) does not admit statements to prove the listener’s state of mind.
• Affirmance on any ground: Relying on United States v. Elysee, the panel affirmed even if the trial court’s stated reason (hearsay) was imperfect, because exclusion was supportable on relevance and Rule 403.
• Count III (Tesla): irrelevance: The Tesla transfer occurred before the phone call in which the statement was allegedly made. That makes the statement incapable of showing intent at the time of the Tesla transfer.
• Count IV (Tampa property): high risk of misleading the jury: While the statement was temporally closer and could be argued to affect intent, the panel stressed the Elysee concern: jurors might take the statement as true (i.e., that the government actually would remove the property), rather than as merely explanatory of a subjective belief. That, in turn, could distort the trial into a referendum on what the AUSA “promised” rather than whether the defendant acted with the prohibited purpose.
• State of mind of a non-defendant: Echoing United States v. Jeri, the panel treated the father’s reaction as largely irrelevant, though it recognized Switlyk may have been present and thus could have been influenced too.
• Harmless error: Even assuming error, the panel found it harmless under United States v. Fortenberry because other evidence strongly supported intent—most notably the Tesla backdating under penalty of perjury and the transfer sequencing for the Tampa property.

The takeaway is not that “effect on listener” evidence is never admissible, but that when such evidence sits close to the merits and invites jurors to treat it for its truth (or to litigate collateral government conduct), Rule 403 provides a robust exclusionary basis.

C. Admitting the 2012 burial of gold and silver under Rule 404(b)

The most consequential evidentiary ruling for future cases is the approval of a prior-act concealment episode—burial of gold coins and silver bars during the earlier criminal case—as Rule 404(b) evidence to show intent/motive in a later § 2232(a) prosecution.

Applying United States v. Edouard and related precedent, the panel concluded:

• Non-character relevance: The burial evidence went to intent and motive—the “major issue at trial.” In a § 2232(a) case, the government must show purposeful action to prevent or impair seizure. Prior acts of hiding assets from forfeiture efforts can make it more probable that later transfers were similarly motivated, particularly where the defense claims an innocent explanation (here, that the father had a genuine financial interest).
• Sufficient proof: The act was “not in dispute,” satisfying the preponderance requirement.
• Rule 403 balance: Despite the ten-year gap, the evidence was not “too remote” given (i) similarity (concealment/frustration of forfeiture) and (ii) the connective tissue that it related to “the same forfeiture judgment.” The panel also emphasized the district court’s limiting instruction as a key prejudice-mitigation tool under United States v. Ramirez and United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza.

Critically, the panel treated the “same forfeiture judgment” link as a remoteness antidote: even older conduct can remain probative when it reflects an ongoing relationship between the defendant, the judgment, and efforts to keep assets beyond reach.

3.3 Impact

• For § 2232(a) prosecutions (and related obstruction/forfeiture-adjacent cases): The decision reinforces that intent at the time of transfer is the focal point. Attempts to introduce later settlement communications to reframe the case as government overreach may be excluded as irrelevant or confusing, especially when they invite timeline confusion.
• On “effect on the listener” strategies: The opinion is a cautionary template for Rule 403 exclusion of non-hearsay statements. Even if a statement is theoretically admissible to show its “effect,” courts may reasonably fear juror misuse (truth-taking) when the statement touches core questions of guilt or suggests official authorization/assurances.
• On Rule 404(b) in financial/asset cases: The affirmance strengthens the government’s ability to introduce prior asset-hiding episodes to prove intent/motive where the defendant claims innocent transfer rationales (e.g., family loans, nominee arrangements, repayment). The explicit acceptance that a ten-year-old act is not too remote—especially where tied to the same forfeiture judgment—may influence how district courts evaluate remoteness in long-running forfeiture/collection contexts.
• Trial management and appellate posture: The decision illustrates how appellate courts will often uphold exclusionary calls when the district judge articulates a coherent “jury confusion/timeline” rationale, and will frequently “save” rulings by affirming on any ground (relevance/403) and by harmless-error analysis.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (removal of property to prevent seizure): This statute targets conduct meant to keep property away from lawful government seizure. The key question is often the defendant’s purpose—did they transfer/dispose of the asset to prevent the government from taking it?
• Relevance (Rules 401–402): Evidence must make an important fact in the case more or less likely. A statement made months after the charged conduct often has little to say about what the defendant intended earlier.
• Rule 403 balancing: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it is likely to mislead or confuse jurors, waste time, or create unfair prejudice. Here, settlement communications risked turning the trial into a dispute about later negotiations instead of the earlier transfers.
• Hearsay vs. “effect on the listener” (Rules 801–802): A statement is hearsay if offered to prove what it asserts is true. If offered only to show it influenced someone’s actions or beliefs, it may be non-hearsay. But courts may still exclude it if jurors are likely to treat it as true anyway (a Rule 403 problem).
• State-of-mind exception (Rule 803(3)): This exception concerns the speaker’s then-existing state of mind—not what the listener believed after hearing it. It does not automatically admit a statement simply because it affected someone else’s beliefs.
• Rule 404(b) (“other acts” evidence): Prior bad acts cannot be used to prove “he’s the kind of person who would do this.” But they can be used to show intent, motive, knowledge, absence of mistake, etc. In asset cases, prior concealment can be relevant to whether a later transfer was innocently motivated or designed to frustrate forfeiture.
• Limiting instructions: Judges can instruct jurors to use certain evidence only for a narrow purpose (e.g., intent) and not to infer criminal character. Appellate courts often rely on such instructions to uphold admission of potentially prejudicial evidence.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Christopher Switlyk affirms a pragmatic evidentiary approach in § 2232(a) prosecutions: post-transfer settlement communications are typically poor proof of intent at the time of the charged transfers and may be excluded as irrelevant or confusing, while prior asset concealment tied to the same forfeiture judgment may be admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove intent and motive, even with a substantial time gap, particularly when limiting instructions are given. The opinion also underscores the appellate reality that many evidentiary disputes are resolved through the combined force of deference (abuse-of-discretion review), alternative-ground affirmance, and harmless-error doctrine.