Post-Termination Visitation Requires a Best-Interests Finding Under Amended Rule 15(b)(2)(A) and May Consider Younger Children’s Matured Wishes

1. Introduction

In re W.L., K.L., and G.L. (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. July 28, 2026) arises from a Mineral County abuse and neglect case involving Petitioner Father D.L. and his three children, W.L., K.L., and G.L. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) initiated proceedings in August 2023 alleging (1) educational neglect of W.L. and K.L. and (2) parental substance abuse after G.L. tested positive for cocaine at birth.

The central appellate dispute was not the termination itself (because Father did not timely appeal the termination order), but whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Father’s later motion for post-termination visitation. Father argued the circuit court improperly relied on the guardian ad litem’s report that the children did not want further visits and contended that the children were too young for their wishes to matter.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the July 21, 2025, order denying post-termination visitation.

  • Waiver/timeliness: The Court declined to review Father’s claims attacking the June 6, 2025, dispositional order terminating parental rights because Father failed to timely appeal that order. A later appeal from the post-termination visitation ruling could not revive untimely termination challenges.
  • Post-termination visitation standard: The Court held that the circuit court applied the correct governing standard—recently amended Rule 15(b)(2)(A) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings—and did not err in considering the wishes of W.L. and K.L. based on their maturity (despite being under fourteen).
  • Distinguishing disposition statute: West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(c)(6)(C), which requires consideration of the wishes of a child “14 years of age or older or otherwise of an age of discretion as determined by the court” regarding “permanent termination,” governs disposition, not post-termination visitation.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)

The Court began by anchoring the appellate framework: substantive rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal issues de novo. This standard mattered because Father’s remaining claim (denial of post-termination visitation) was discretionary and best-interests-driven; the Court’s role was to assess whether the circuit court’s decision was within the range of reasonable choices supported by the record.

Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re S.L., 243 W. Va. 559, 848 S.E.2d 634 (2020)

In re S.L. was pivotal on jurisdictional/timeliness posture. The Court reaffirmed that: “Filing a post- termination visitation motion does not extend the timeframe in which to appeal a final disposition order entered in an abuse and neglect matter.” Applied here, Father’s attempt to bundle termination arguments into an appeal from the later visitation order was barred. The Court treated this as a straightforward enforcement of appellate deadlines, emphasizing finality in child welfare litigation.

In re B.W., 244 W. Va. 535, 539, 854 S.E.2d 897, 901 (2021)

The Court cited In re B.W. to reinforce the consequence of missing the appeal window: failure to appeal the final dispositional order waives arguments about that order’s deficiencies. This strengthened the Court’s refusal to revisit improvement-period compliance and termination merits.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Two-track structure: termination appeal vs. post-termination visitation appeal

The Court separated Father’s issues into two categories:

  1. Termination-related challenges (improvement period completion, correctness of terminating rights): barred due to untimely appeal of the June 6, 2025, dispositional order under Rule 49 (abuse/neglect procedure) and Rule 11 (appellate procedure).
  2. Post-termination visitation challenge (denial of visitation after termination): properly before the Court because Father timely appealed the July 21, 2025, order.

This is more than a procedural technicality: it reflects a policy commitment to speedy permanency and litigation closure. Allowing post-termination motions to reopen termination appeals would undermine stability for children moving toward adoption.

B. Governing rule for post-termination visitation: amended Rule 15(b)(2)(A)

The Court treated amended Rule 15(b)(2)(A) as the controlling authority and quoted its core requirements:

  • The circuit court may grant post-termination visitation only if it finds visitation is in the child’s best interests.
  • The court must take into consideration:
    1. the guardian ad litem’s recommendation,
    2. if the child is of sufficient age or maturity, whether the child wishes visitation,
    3. other relevant evidence (including the nature of abuse/neglect and the existence of a bond).

Applying the rule, the Court approved the circuit court’s explicit reliance on: (i) the guardian’s recommendation, (ii) DHS and CASA agreement, and (iii) the children’s wishes—after a maturity finding grounded in their communications, lived experiences, and expressed concerns about parental stability.

C. Rejecting Father’s statutory analogy to termination disposition

Father invoked West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(c)(6)(C) to argue the circuit court should only give weight to children’s wishes at fourteen or older. The Court rejected the analogy on a categorical ground: the statute “controls disposition—not post-termination visitation.”

In effect, the Court clarified that post-termination visitation is governed by Rule 15(b)(2)(A)’s best-interests framework, which authorizes consideration of a child’s wishes when the child is “of sufficient age or maturity”—a flexible standard not tied to a fixed age threshold.

D. Record-based justification: why denial was within discretion

The Court emphasized record support for the circuit court’s best-interests finding, including:

  • Father’s ongoing alcohol use throughout the proceedings and refusal to acknowledge a substance abuse problem;
  • combative conduct toward service providers (including discharge from MCCC after becoming aggressive);
  • lack of recent contact (no visits since October 2024);
  • child-specific considerations: W.L. and K.L. had a bond but did not desire ongoing visitation; G.L. lacked a bond due to infancy at removal;
  • the permanency context: the court found continued contact would be “confusing” as the children moved toward adoption.

Under abuse-of-discretion review, these factors supported the conclusion that denial was not arbitrary and was consistent with Rule 15(b)(2)(A).

3.3. Impact

  • Procedural finality is reinforced: The decision underscores that parties must timely appeal dispositional termination orders; a later post-termination visitation motion cannot be used as an end-run around expired appellate deadlines.
  • Clearer doctrinal lane for post-termination visitation: The Court squarely centers amended Rule 15(b)(2)(A) as the operative test, reducing confusion between statutory disposition standards and post-termination visitation standards.
  • Children’s wishes are not age-locked: The opinion signals that circuit courts may credit younger children’s preferences when the court makes a reasoned finding of sufficient maturity, with the child’s lived experience and communications serving as evidence of that maturity.
  • Practice consequences: Lawyers should (i) calendar Rule 49/Rule 11 deadlines immediately upon entry of dispositional orders, and (ii) build a Rule 15(b)(2)(A) record—guardian recommendations, bonding evidence, harm/benefit analysis, and age/maturity evidence—when litigating post-termination contact.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Improvement period
A court-ordered window for a parent to complete services (e.g., treatment, parenting classes, drug screening) designed to correct conditions of abuse/neglect and enable safe reunification.
Dispositional order
The final order deciding the long-term outcome in the abuse/neglect case (e.g., reunification, guardianship, or termination of parental rights). It is immediately appealable and governed by strict deadlines.
Post-termination visitation
Contact between a parent and child after parental rights are terminated. It is not automatic; under Rule 15(b)(2)(A) it is permitted only if the circuit court finds it is in the child’s best interests after considering specified factors.
Best interests of the child
A child-centered standard focusing on wellbeing, stability, safety, and permanency rather than parental preference. In post-termination settings, permanency and emotional clarity often weigh heavily.
Waiver by untimely appeal
Missing the appeal deadline means the appellate court will not review claims about that order; the party is treated as having given up those arguments.
Abuse of discretion
A deferential appellate standard: reversal occurs only if the circuit court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable choices or is based on an erroneous legal standard.

5. Conclusion

In re W.L., K.L., and G.L. delivers two principal takeaways. First, a parent cannot resurrect termination-related claims through an appeal of a later post-termination visitation order; the failure to timely appeal the dispositional termination order results in waiver under the framework reaffirmed by In re S.L. and In re B.W.. Second, post-termination visitation is governed by amended Rule 15(b)(2)(A), which demands an express best-interests finding and permits consideration of a child’s wishes based on sufficient maturity—not a rigid age threshold. The decision thus strengthens procedural finality while clarifying the child-centered, maturity-sensitive analysis required for post-termination contact in West Virginia abuse and neglect cases.