Date: Aug 27, 2026

Post-Termination Limits: No § 49-4-606 Standing After Termination, and Post-Termination Visitation Requires a Timely Motion or Good Cause

1. Introduction

In re C.C.-1, C.C.-2, and A.C. is a memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirming the Circuit Court of Cabell County’s termination of Father C.C.-3’s parental rights. The abuse and neglect petition (filed February 2025 by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS)) alleged domestic violence, physical abuse, and emotional abuse, including reports that Father hit the children with objects, threatened dangerous conduct, and pointed a gun at the mother and children.

The appeal presented three central issues: (1) whether Father was wrongly denied an improvement period; (2) whether Father could seek to modify disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606 after termination; and (3) whether the circuit court erred by not addressing post-termination visitation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying an improvement period because Father explicitly refused to participate at disposition and thus did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was likely to fully participate. It further held that a person whose parental rights have been terminated by a final order lacks standing as a “parent” to move for modification of disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606. Finally, it held that Father’s post-termination visitation request was untimely under Rule 15(b)(2) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and, having failed to show “good cause” for late filing, Father was not entitled to relief.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

In re K.S., Syl. Pt. 1

The Court began with the appellate standards of review, quoting Syllabus Point 1 of In re K.S. (abuse of discretion for substantive rulings, clear error for factual findings, de novo for legal issues). This framing matters because Father’s arguments mixed discretionary calls (improvement period; termination) with legal questions (standing under § 49-4-606; interpretation of Rule 15(b)(2)).

In re Tonjia M.

Citing In re Tonjia M., the Court emphasized that a circuit court has discretion to deny an improvement period “when no improvement is likely.” This precedent directly supported the circuit court’s refusal to impose an improvement period on a parent who plainly stated he would not participate.

In re Cesar L., Syl. Pt. 6, in part

The standing question was controlled by Syllabus Point 6 (in part) of In re Cesar L., which holds that a person whose parental rights have been terminated by a final order does not have standing as a “parent,” under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606, to seek modification of disposition for the child as to whom rights were terminated. The Court treated this as dispositive and declined Father’s invitation to “modify existing law.”

Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Props, Ltd. and W. Va. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(7)

In a footnote, the Court explained why it would not address Father’s “motion for reconsideration” on the merits. It cited Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Props, Ltd. for how “motions for reconsideration” are typically analyzed in civil litigation (as Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motions depending on timing). But the Court then relied on W. Va. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(7), which states that Rules 59 and 60 do not apply to abuse and neglect cases. This combination underscored a procedural boundary: post-judgment mechanisms familiar in civil cases do not automatically exist in abuse and neglect proceedings.

In re J.N.-1 (memorandum decision) and Rule 15(b)

Father invoked In re J.N.-1 and Rule 15(b) to argue the circuit court failed to address post-termination visitation. The Court distinguished the case on timing and procedure: Father did not request post-termination visitation “until several days after” entry of the final dispositional order. Under Rule 15(b)(2), a motion should be made at the dispositional hearing or before entry of the final order; after entry, the court “may permit the motion upon good cause shown.” Because Father did not attempt to establish good cause in the circuit court, the Supreme Court found no error.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Improvement period: participation is a threshold requirement

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) and (3)(B) requires a parent seeking an improvement period to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is likely to fully participate. The Court treated Father’s own testimony as decisive: he confirmed he did not want to participate, would not take classes, and wanted to “move forward” with disposition despite the court offering more time to reconsider. On that record, the circuit court did not need to gamble on services that the parent promised not to undertake.

2) Disposition modification after termination: standing ends with a final termination order

Even though Father later claimed a “change of heart,” the Court applied a categorical standing rule from In re Cesar L.: once a final order terminates parental rights, the former parent is not a “parent” with standing to move for modification under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606. The decision thus treated the termination order as a legal status change that closes the § 49-4-606 pathway, regardless of later claimed willingness to comply.

3) Post-termination visitation: strict attention to timing and “good cause”

Rule 15(b)(2) creates a two-track procedure: (a) timely motion at disposition/before the final order; (b) after-entry motion allowed only if the court permits it for “good cause shown.” The Court’s reasoning was procedural and preservation-based: Father filed late and did not attempt to show good cause below, so the circuit court had no obligation to entertain the request as though it had been timely made.

C. Impact

Improvement periods will not be imposed on a parent who refuses to participate. The decision reinforces that the statutory “likely to fully participate” showing is not a formality; explicit noncooperation at disposition can be dispositive.
§ 49-4-606 modification is unavailable to terminated parents. By reaffirming In re Cesar L., the Court signaled that “change of heart” arguments do not reopen standing after a final termination order.
Post-termination visitation requests must be timely or supported by “good cause.” Litigants should expect strict enforcement of Rule 15(b)(2)’s timing structure; late requests require an affirmative, developed good-cause showing in the circuit court record.
Procedural tools from ordinary civil cases may not apply in abuse and neglect. The footnote discussion (Rule 81(a)(7) and Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Props, Ltd.) cautions lawyers against assuming that Rule 59/60-style reconsideration practice carries over into child welfare proceedings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Improvement period: A court-supervised period allowing a parent to receive services (e.g., classes, evaluations) to correct conditions of abuse or neglect. In West Virginia, it is not automatic; the parent must show they are likely to participate fully.
Disposition / final dispositional order: The phase where the court decides the long-term outcome (e.g., termination of parental rights, custody arrangements). A “final dispositional order” is the operative final order concluding disposition.
Standing: The legal right to ask the court for a particular form of relief. Here, once parental rights are terminated by a final order, the person no longer has standing as a “parent” to seek disposition modification under § 49-4-606.
Post-termination visitation: Contact with the child after a parent’s rights are terminated. Under Rule 15(b)(2), it must be requested at disposition or before entry of the final order; after that, the court may allow a motion only upon “good cause shown.”
Good cause: A legally sufficient reason for missing a deadline or seeking an exception to the ordinary procedure. The Court held that Father did not attempt to establish good cause for his late filing, so no relief was available.

5. Conclusion

The decision’s key lessons are procedural and status-based: a parent who openly refuses services cannot meet the statutory threshold for an improvement period; a final termination order eliminates standing to seek disposition modification under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606; and post-termination visitation requires a timely motion or, if late, a developed showing of good cause under Rule 15(b)(2). In the broader child welfare framework, the case underscores finality after termination and the importance of building an appropriate record—timely requests, preserved objections, and explicit showings required by rule.