Post-Taylor Resentencing: Courts May Reimpose the Same Aggregate Term After Vacatur of an Attempted Hobbs Act § 924(c) Count, and Anders Review Confirms No Nonfrivolous Sentencing Challenge

I. Introduction

United States v. Koren Jones (Third Circuit, May 14, 2026) is a nonprecedential decision arising from a multi-count federal prosecution for two completed armed robberies and one attempted armed robbery. The Government charged Koren Jones with three counts of Hobbs Act robbery/attempted Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Counts One, Three, and Five) and three associated firearm counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Counts Two, Four, and Six).

The key appellate issues were procedural and substantive: (1) whether defense counsel could withdraw under Anders v. California because no nonfrivolous issues existed; and (2) whether the district court’s resentencing—after a § 924(c) count fell away in light of United States v. Taylor—was reasonable, particularly given Jones’s post-sentencing rehabilitation and arguments invoking Pepper v. United States and Dean v. United States.

Although not binding precedent under the Third Circuit’s internal operating procedures, the decision is a useful roadmap for (i) how the Third Circuit evaluates Anders submissions, and (ii) what constitutes a nonfrivolous challenge to a below-Guidelines resentencing after partial vacatur of § 924(c) convictions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit (Judge Shwartz) granted counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California and affirmed the 324-month sentence. The court held:

  • Counsel’s Anders brief satisfied Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a) as explained in United States v. Youla, because it thoroughly reviewed the record, identified the only plausible issue (sentencing reasonableness), and explained why the issue was frivolous.
  • The sentence was procedurally reasonable: the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors under United States v. Tomko.
  • The sentence was substantively reasonable: it was below the Guidelines range and supported by the record, including the violence of the offenses and Jones’s rehabilitation efforts.
  • Jones’s pro se claims failed: the record did not support an alleged two-year agreement on the Hobbs Act counts; Pepper v. United States does not require a reduction for rehabilitation; and Dean v. United States permits but does not compel mitigation of predicate sentences due to § 924(c) mandatory minimums.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is anchored in three clusters of precedent: (1) Anders and Third Circuit withdrawal procedure; (2) “crime of violence” doctrine post-Taylor; and (3) federal sentencing review, including rehabilitation and § 924(c) interaction.

1. Anders withdrawal and appellate review framework

  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): The foundational rule permitting appointed counsel to withdraw if, after conscientious examination, the appeal is wholly frivolous—paired with a supporting brief to assist the court’s independent review.
  • United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001): Supplies the Third Circuit’s two-part inquiry: whether counsel satisfied the rule’s requirements and whether independent review reveals any nonfrivolous issue. The panel used Youla to limit its own deep-record review once counsel’s submission was adequate.
  • Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988): Cited for the court’s obligation to conduct independent review to ensure no nonfrivolous issues are missed when counsel seeks to withdraw.
  • McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988): Provides the definition of “frivolous” (no basis in law or fact), which the panel applied to conclude sentencing challenges lacked arguable merit.
  • United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022) and United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2000): These cases clarify what an adequate Anders brief must do: identify potentially appealable issues and explain why they are frivolous. The panel found counsel met these standards.

2. “Crime of violence” under § 924(c) after Taylor

  • United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022): The Supreme Court held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” for § 924(c). This was the pivot that led to vacatur of Jones’s § 924(c) count linked to attempted Hobbs Act robbery and to the resentencing now under review.
  • United States v. Stoney, 62 F.4th 108 (3d Cir. 2023): Confirmed completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence, preserving Jones’s other § 924(c) convictions (Counts Two and Four). This narrowed the resentencing to the consequences of losing only the attempted-robbery-linked § 924(c).

3. Sentencing procedure, reasonableness review, rehabilitation, and § 924(c)

  • United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc): The Third Circuit’s core procedural/substantive reasonableness framework. The court used Tomko to validate the district court’s Guidelines calculation and § 3553(a) analysis.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Supplies abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness and reinforces the deferential appellate posture toward sentencing.
  • United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc): Because Jones did not object to procedural reasonableness at sentencing, procedural challenges were reviewed only for plain error—raising the defendant’s appellate burden.
  • Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) and United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2008): Used to support the proposition that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable (Rita) and—by extension in some circuits—below-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable against a defendant’s claim the sentence is too high (Liddell). The panel relied on this logic to treat Jones’s below-Guidelines sentence as especially difficult to attack.
  • Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011): Jones invoked rehabilitation; the court emphasized Pepper permits consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation but explicitly does not require a reduction.
  • Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62 (2017): Jones argued the district court should have further reduced the non-§ 924(c) sentences to account for § 924(c) mandatory minimums. The panel underscored that Dean is enabling, not mandatory: the court may consider § 924(c) when sentencing predicates, but it need not reduce them.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Adequacy of counsel’s Anders submission

The Third Circuit treated the Anders question as gatekeeping. Applying Youla, Langley, and Marvin, the panel confirmed counsel identified the only facially arguable issue—sentencing reasonableness—and then explained why it lacked merit. Once that threshold was met, the court did not “scour” the record for other claims; instead, it focused its review through the lens provided by the adequate Anders brief, consistent with Third Circuit practice.

2. Procedural reasonableness

Under Tomko, procedural reasonableness turns on correct Guidelines calculation and meaningful consideration of § 3553(a). The panel found both:

  • Guidelines calculation: The district court correctly calculated a 360–390 month range (the final sentence was 324 months).
  • § 3553(a) consideration: The district court discussed seriousness of the offenses, deterrence, public protection, training/education, respect for law, just punishment, and disparities—satisfying the “meaningful consideration” requirement.

Because Jones failed to object below, the panel applied Flores-Mejia plain-error review to any procedural claim, making reversal even less plausible absent a clear and prejudicial mistake—which the panel did not find.

3. Substantive reasonableness

Substantive reasonableness is highly deferential under Gall and Tomko (the question is essentially whether no reasonable court would have imposed the sentence for the reasons given). The panel emphasized two facts:

  • Below-Guidelines sentence: At 324 months, the sentence was below the 360–390 month range; the court treated that as strongly indicative of reasonableness, citing Rita and Liddell.
  • Balanced rationale: The district court explicitly weighed the violence—shooting a customer, firing at a cashier, and a gun discharging during a struggle—against “significant” rehabilitation. The appellate court treated this as the paradigmatic discretionary balancing that appellate review does not reweigh.

4. The pro se arguments: plea “agreement,” rehabilitation, and Dean

The panel rejected each pro se claim as foreclosed by the record or the cited cases:

  • Alleged two-year agreement on Hobbs Act counts: The record reflected an agreed aggregate 324-month term earlier, not a two-year cap per count, and at resentencing the parties agreed the earlier 11(c)(1)(C) stipulation was no longer binding—freeing the district court to restructure sentences across remaining counts while arriving at the same total.
  • Rehabilitation under Pepper v. United States: The court recognized rehabilitation is relevant but stressed Pepper does not mandate a reduction.
  • Mitigation under Dean v. United States: The panel treated Dean as permission, not a directive. It also noted the district court effectively mitigated the § 924(c) impact by imposing below-Guidelines terms on the Hobbs Act counts (e.g., 84 months versus a 120–150 month range).

C. Impact

Even as a nonprecedential disposition, the opinion has practical significance in several recurring post-Taylor and post-resentencing contexts:

  1. Resentencing after partial § 924(c) vacatur: The decision reinforces that when one § 924(c) count is vacated (here, the attempted-Hobbs-Act predicate under Taylor), the district court may reassess the overall sentencing structure and still reimpose the same aggregate term—so long as it remains procedurally sound and substantively reasonable and the parties are no longer bound by any prior stipulated term.
  2. Limits of rehabilitation arguments: Defendants often treat post-sentencing rehabilitation as entitlement to a reduction. The opinion reiterates Pepper is permissive: rehabilitation can support a variance but does not compel one.
  3. Dean arguments are discretionary tools, not mandates: The panel confirms a common misunderstanding: Dean expands discretion but does not require offsetting § 924(c) mandatory time with reduced predicate sentences.
  4. Anders practice in the Third Circuit: The opinion is a template for adequate Anders briefing—identify the best issue, explain why it fails, and thereby focus the court’s review—while also signaling that below-Guidelines sentences supported by § 3553(a) discussion will be difficult to challenge nonfrivolously.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Anders brief”: A filing by appointed defense counsel stating that, after reviewing the record, counsel believes there are no arguable issues to appeal. Counsel must still identify potential issues and explain why they are frivolous, and the appellate court independently checks for nonfrivolous issues.
  • “Crime of violence” under § 924(c): § 924(c) adds mandatory consecutive prison time when a firearm is used during a qualifying “crime of violence.” After United States v. Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify, but completed Hobbs Act robbery still does in the Third Circuit (United States v. Stoney).
  • Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement: A plea agreement in which the parties propose a specific sentence (or range) that becomes binding if the court accepts it. Here, after the legal landscape changed and a count was vacated, the parties agreed the earlier 324-month stipulation was no longer binding, restoring broader sentencing discretion.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness concerns the steps (correct Guidelines range, considering § 3553(a), explaining the sentence). Substantive reasonableness concerns whether the final sentence is defensible given the reasons stated.
  • Plain error review: If the defendant did not object in the district court, the appellate court applies a stricter standard; the defendant must show a clear error that affected substantial rights and undermined the fairness of the proceeding.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Koren Jones confirms that, following United States v. Taylor and the vacatur of a § 924(c) conviction tied to attempted Hobbs Act robbery, a district court may resentence on the remaining counts and—even while considering rehabilitation—lawfully reimpose the same aggregate term, particularly where the sentence is below the Guidelines range and justified under § 3553(a).

The decision also underscores the limited reach of two frequently invoked sentencing authorities: Pepper v. United States does not require a reduction for rehabilitation, and Dean v. United States permits but does not compel offsetting § 924(c) mandatory minimums by lowering predicate sentences. Finally, it serves as a practical illustration of the Third Circuit’s Anders process under United States v. Youla and related cases, culminating in withdrawal and affirmance where no nonfrivolous issue exists.