Date: Mar 19, 2026

Post-Statutory Acknowledgments of Superior Title Can Defeat “Hostility” in Adverse Possession and Prescription

1. Introduction

Michelle A. Blechman et al. v. Donald Woodward is a boundary-area dispute between abutting neighbors in South Kingstown, Rhode Island. Michelle and James Blechman (plaintiffs) owned 31 Shortie Way (purchased January 2010). Donald Woodward (defendant) owned 41 Shortie Way (purchased October 2021). The contested strip—about 1,134.9 square feet—was undisputedly within Woodward’s deed description, but plaintiffs claimed they obtained (1) title by adverse possession, (2) title by acquiescence, or (3) a prescriptive easement, based on more than ten years of use and maintenance.

After a two-day bench trial, the Superior Court entered judgment for Woodward. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the trial justice erred by: (i) finding no hostile/adverse use by clear and convincing evidence; (ii) failing to analyze every adverse-possession element under G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1; (iii) rejecting acquiescence for lack of a ten-year recognized boundary; and (iv) dismissing the prescriptive-easement claim without adequate findings under Rule 52(a).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island (Suttell, C.J.) affirmed. The Court held that competent evidence supported the trial justice’s finding that plaintiffs failed to prove the essential element of hostility by clear and convincing evidence. The Court further held:

A trial justice need not analyze every element of adverse possession once one element (here, hostility) is dispositively lacking.
The acquiescence claim failed for lack of proof of a clearly recognized boundary marker for the required ten-year period.
Dismissal of the prescriptive-easement claim satisfied Rule 52(a) because hostility is also required for prescription; the adverse-possession hostility finding resolved it.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) Appellate deference to bench-trial factfinding and credibility

Clark v. Buttonwoods Beach Association, Quillen v. Macera: used for the standard that findings in a bench trial are not disturbed unless “clearly erroneous” or the trial justice “misconceived or overlooked material evidence,” and that the Court will not reweigh evidence where “competent evidence supports” findings.
Sepulveda as Trustee of 7 Half Mile Road Living Trust v. Buffum, Anton v. Houze: emphasized “great deference” to credibility determinations because the trial justice observed live testimony and demeanor—critical here because the dispositive hostility finding depended on whether the trial justice credited developer Ferland over James Blechman.

2) Substantive adverse-possession framework and “hostility”

Cahill v. Morrow: central to the Court’s treatment of purchase offers/inquiries. The plaintiffs argued that any inquiry to buy was irrelevant if made after title “vested.” The Court relied on Cahill’s key nuance: even after the ten-year period, “objective manifestations” that another has superior title—if not made to settle an ongoing dispute—remain “poignantly relevant” to whether the claimant’s possession was hostile during the statutory period.
DiPippo v. Sperling: provided the definitional formulation of hostility (“use inconsistent with the right of the owner, without permission asked or given”), and reinforced Cahill by approving reliance on post-period acknowledgments (there, a letter) as evidence undermining hostility.
Picerne v. Sylvestre: supplied the traditional statement that hostility implies denial of the owner’s title; even long, open possession is not adverse without such denial.
Tavares v. Beck: anchored the Court’s “objective manifestations” approach—hostility turns on outward conduct, not the claimant’s subjective belief or awareness of legal title defects.
Union Cemetery Burial Society of North Smithfield v. Foisy: reiterated the modern six-element test (actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, exclusive) and the clear-and-convincing burden, supporting the Court’s conclusion that failing one element defeats the claim.
McGarry v. Coletti: cited by plaintiffs for the proposition that the trial justice had to analyze all elements; the Court distinguished it as a case affirming the failure of particular elements (open and notorious), not establishing a requirement to address every element once one is dispositive.

3) Acquiescence doctrine and boundary-marker requirement

Urbonas v. Gullison, DeCosta v. DeCosta: stated the doctrine—adjoining owners are precluded from denying a boundary line recognized by both for ten years.
Pucino v. Uttley: supplied the two-part test: (i) a boundary marker existed; (ii) both parties recognized it for ten years.
Banville v. Brennan, Nye v. Brousseau, Acampora v. Pearson: framed acquiescence as mixed law and fact, and treated the “obviousness” and “notice-commanding” quality of a marker as fact questions. This supported deference to the trial justice’s finding that plaintiffs’ proposed “grass line” and “boulders/rock wall” did not satisfy the ten-year recognized-marker requirement.

4) Rule 52(a) findings; disposing of claims without exhaustive discussion

Wilby v. Savoie, Connor v. Schlemmer: set Rule 52(a)’s requirement for specific factual findings and separate legal conclusions, but also that findings need not be extensive.
Now Courier, LLC v. Better Carrier Corp., Broadley v. State: recognized that even brief findings suffice if they resolve the controlling and essential issues.
Donnelly v. Cowsill, Anderson v. Town of East Greenwich: supported the principle that trial justices need not make findings on every witness or issue when the decision enables “full understanding” without separate findings.

5) Prescriptive easement elements mirror adverse possession (minus exclusivity)

Drescher v. Johannessen, Hilley v. Lawrence: confirmed that a prescriptive easement requires actual, open, notorious, hostile, and continuous use under a claim of right for at least ten years. Because hostility failed, the Court held the prescriptive claim necessarily failed, validating dismissal without additional findings.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Hostility defeated by “objective manifestations” acknowledging superior title

The Court accepted the trial justice’s central factual determination: plaintiffs’ conduct objectively signaled recognition of the developer’s (EFC/Ferland’s) superior title, negating hostility. The trial justice relied on multiple indicia, including:

Ferland’s credited testimony that James inquired “a couple of times” about buying the Woodward lot before its sale to Woodward (i.e., between January 2010 and October 2021).
Evidence James sought permission to retrieve rocks from the Woodward property—suggesting the owner’s authority over the land.
Michelle’s observation of a property stake with a message indicating owner monitoring/objection, and her failure to contest it.
Conversations about planting trees near the boundary—though the Court treated any misstatement about whether “permission” was explicitly requested as harmless given the cumulative proof.

Importantly, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ “timing” argument about purchase inquiries by applying Cahill v. Morrow: even if an acknowledgment occurs after the statutory period, it can still be highly probative of whether the claimant’s possession was genuinely hostile during the period, especially where there was no ongoing dispute being settled.

2) No requirement to address every adverse-possession element once one is dispositive

Because adverse possession requires proof of all elements by clear and convincing evidence, failure of hostility ends the claim. The Court found no authority requiring a trial justice to proceed element-by-element after correctly concluding a dispositive element is missing.

3) Acquiescence failed on proof of a recognized boundary marker for ten years

The Court affirmed the finding that plaintiffs did not establish a sufficiently definite boundary marker recognized by both sides for ten years. The plaintiffs’ proposed markers were factually uncertain:

The “grass line” was undermined by early photographs and testimony suggesting grass was not visible as claimed.
The “boulders/rock wall” timing was unclear and James testified it was likely installed when Woodward’s construction began (post-October 2021), too late to supply ten years.

4) Rule 52(a) satisfied; prescriptive easement disposed of by the hostility finding

The trial justice’s decision expressly resolved the controlling factual issue (hostility) and held the remaining claims were “dispositive[ly]” denied. Because hostility is required for both adverse possession and prescriptive easement, the Court held the findings were adequate under Rule 52(a) and remand was unnecessary.

C. Impact

Reinforcement of a practical evidentiary rule: A claimant’s later-in-time conduct—such as inquiries/offers to purchase—may be used to infer non-hostile possession during the statutory period, unless tied to settling an ongoing dispute. This strengthens defendants’ ability to defeat “hostility” with post-period communications and “permission-seeking” behavior.
Trial strategy implications: Adverse possessors must anticipate that casual neighbor/developer communications (asking to buy, asking permission, acknowledging stakes) can be framed as concessions of superior title.
Boundary-by-acquiescence claims remain marker-driven: Vague “maintenance lines” (mowing/grass) without a clearly established, continuously recognized physical marker are vulnerable—especially when the opposing lot is vacant for part of the period, leaving little reciprocal “recognition” evidence.
Procedural efficiency under Rule 52(a): The Court signals continued tolerance for concise bench decisions where a single element resolves multiple claims, reducing incentives for remands based on “incomplete” findings when the dispositive issue is clearly addressed.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse possession: A way to obtain legal title by treating land like your own for at least ten years, but only if your possession is actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive, proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Hostility (in this context): Not personal animosity—rather, using the land in a manner inconsistent with the owner’s rights, without permission, in a way that objectively denies the owner’s title. Asking permission, seeking approval, or behaving like the other person is the true owner can defeat hostility.
Objective manifestations: Courts focus on what the claimant did (actions/communications), not what the claimant secretly believed about ownership.
Acquiescence: A boundary-fixing doctrine: if both neighbors treat a physical marker as the boundary for ten years, neither can later deny it—even if the deeds say otherwise. The marker must be sufficiently definite and recognized.
Prescriptive easement: Similar to adverse possession, but it gives a right to use the land (not ownership). It still requires hostile, open, notorious, continuous use for ten years.
Rule 52(a): In a nonjury trial, the judge must state findings of fact and legal conclusions. The findings may be brief if they resolve the controlling issues.

5. Conclusion

The Court’s affirmance in Michelle A. Blechman et al. v. Donald Woodward underscores a decisive point in Rhode Island property law: hostility can be negated by objective conduct that acknowledges another’s superior title, and that conduct may include post-statutory inquiries or offers to purchase (when not made to settle an ongoing dispute), as recognized in Cahill v. Morrow and DiPippo v. Sperling. The decision also clarifies that trial courts may efficiently dispose of interrelated property theories (adverse possession, prescription) through a single dispositive element, and that acquiescence demands concrete proof of a mutually recognized boundary marker for the full ten-year period.