Post-Remand Judicial Review May Raise Prior Remand-Order Jurisdiction, but Only if the New Petition Strictly Complies with NRS 233B.130(2)(a)

1. Introduction

This decision addresses a recurring procedural problem in Nevada administrative-law appeals: what happens when an agency case is remanded to the agency by the district court, and the losing party later seeks judicial review of the post-remand agency decision while also arguing that the first judicial-review proceeding (the one that generated the remand) was jurisdictionally defective.

The parties are (1) Charles Rocha, a former forensic supervisor at a state mental health facility operated by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and (2) DHHS. Rocha was terminated after an altercation with a patient. A hearing officer for the State of Nevada, Department of Administration Personnel Commission initially reinstated Rocha with back pay, but after DHHS obtained a remand from the district court directing application of a “client-abuse” standard, the hearing officer on remand affirmed Rocha’s termination.

Two core issues reached the Supreme Court of Nevada:

• Scope/vehicle issue: Whether a party may use a second petition for judicial review after remand (PJR II) to challenge the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the first petition for judicial review that produced the remand (PJR I).
• Jurisdictional-compliance issue: Whether Rocha’s PJR II invoked district court jurisdiction when it failed, in its caption, to name the Personnel Commission as a respondent as required by NRS 233B.130(2)(a).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court makes two principal holdings:

• Yes—PJR II can be the proper vehicle to attack jurisdictional defects in PJR I after remand. A party aggrieved after remanded agency proceedings may file a new petition for judicial review and may, within that proceeding, raise subject-matter jurisdiction challenges to the earlier district-court remand order.
• But Rocha’s PJR II was jurisdictionally defective and had to be dismissed. Because NRS 233B.130(2)(a) requires naming “the agency and all parties of record to the administrative proceeding” as respondents, and Rocha’s PJR II named only DHHS (not the Commission) in the caption, the district court lacked jurisdiction. An attempted amendment more than a year later was untimely and could not cure the defect under controlling Nevada precedent.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court’s merits denial of PJR II and remanded with instructions to dismiss PJR II for lack of jurisdiction. The court expressly declined to reach whether PJR I itself was jurisdictionally defective.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Nonappealability of remand orders; need for a second petition after remand

• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. O'Brien, 129 Nev. 679, 680-81, 310 P.3d 581, 582 (2013)
  This case supplies the general rule that a district court order remanding an agency matter is typically not an appealable final judgment “unless the order constitutes a final judgment on the merits and remands merely for collateral tasks.” Rocha uses this to frame why parties ordinarily must wait until the post-remand agency decision is reviewed and finalized by the district court before appealing further—i.e., why PJR II exists.

B. Permissibility of raising “jurisdiction of the first judicial review” in the second judicial review

• K-Kel, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Tax'n, 134 Nev. 78, 80-81, 412 P.3d 15, 17 (2018)
  The court relies on K-Kel to support two connected propositions: (1) after remand, the “exclusive means of judicial review” is a new petition for judicial review, and (2) within that later judicial review, a party may challenge the district court’s jurisdiction to have ordered the remand in the earlier proceeding. The Rocha court also invokes K-Kel later for the remedy point that when the petition is jurisdictionally deficient, “the district court's subsequent orders in that action are necessarily void.”

C. Subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time

• Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 179, 251 P.3d 163, 166 (2011)
  Rocha uses Landreth in two places: (1) to reject waiver (the district court was wrong to say Rocha waived jurisdictional objections to PJR I), and (2) to reject arguments that procedural posture (e.g., lack of cross-appeal) prevents review of jurisdiction. The court treats subject-matter jurisdiction as nonwaivable and reviewable “at any time.”

D. Strict statutory compliance as jurisdictional in NAPA petitions

• Washoe County v. Otto, 128 Nev. 424, 431-32, 282 P.3d 719, 724-25 (2012)
  The foundation for the court’s “mandatory and jurisdictional” reading of NRS 233B.130(2)(a). Rocha quotes Otto for the proposition that nothing in the statutory language suggests the requirements are anything other than mandatory and jurisdictional.
• Whitfield v. Nev. State Pers. Comm'n, 137 Nev. 345, 347, 492 P.3d 571, 574 (2021)
  The controlling case on the specific defect at issue: failure to name every required respondent in the caption deprives the district court of jurisdiction; and a late amendment after the filing deadline cannot confer jurisdiction. Rocha follows Whitfield and applies it directly to Rocha’s failure to name the Commission in PJR II.

E. Consolidation cannot create subject-matter jurisdiction

• In re Est. of Sarge, 134 Nev. 866, 870-71, 432 P.3d 718, 722 (2018)
  The court uses Sarge to correct the district court’s suggestion that consolidating PJR I and PJR II somehow solved PJR II’s jurisdictional defect. Consolidated cases retain separate identities and thus must each have their own jurisdictional basis.
• Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1977)
  Cited alongside Sarge for the same point: consolidation does not supply missing jurisdiction.

F. Appellate constraints when the district court lacks jurisdiction

• Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, 129 Nev. 343, 348 n.2, 301 P.3d 850, 853 n.2 (2013)
  Supports the court’s statement that if the district court lacks jurisdiction over PJR II, appellate review stops—“we look no further” to the merits, including the merits of the prior-jurisdiction argument about PJR I.

G. No cross-appeal required to argue alternative grounds for affirmance

• Ford v. Showboat Operating Co., 110 Nev. 752, 755, 877 P.2d 546, 548 (1994)
  Used to reject Rocha’s argument that DHHS needed to cross-appeal the denial of its motion(s) to dismiss PJR II. Respondents may raise arguments supporting the judgment even if rejected below.

H. Case-specific procedural anchor

• Rocha v. State, Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 82485, 2022 WL 1261341 (Nev. Apr. 27, 2022) (Order Dismissing Appeal)
  This earlier order explains why Rocha had to return to district court after remand: NRS 233B.150 permits appellate review only after the district court enters final judgment on the petition for judicial review.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why PJR II may include a challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction in PJR I

The court begins with administrative-review structure under NAPA. When a district court remands an agency decision, the remand order is generally interlocutory and not appealable. That creates a practical problem: a party who believes the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the remand order cannot immediately obtain appellate review. The court resolves this by confirming a procedural pathway:

• After the agency concludes remand proceedings and issues a new final decision, a dissatisfied party files a new petition for judicial review.
• In that new judicial review, the petitioner may challenge both (a) what happened on remand and (b) whether the district court had jurisdiction to remand in the first place.

The district court’s error, the Supreme Court explains, was treating Rocha’s jurisdictional argument about PJR I as “beyond the scope” and waived. Scope was broad enough (because the remand’s validity bears on the post-remand agency decision), and waiver is inapplicable to subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. Why the district court could not decide anything in PJR II

The court then pivots to a threshold point: to decide whether PJR I was jurisdictionally defective, the district court must first have jurisdiction over PJR II. The Supreme Court applies Nevada’s strict compliance approach to NRS 233B.130(2)(a):

• The petition must name “the agency and all parties of record to the administrative proceeding” as respondents.
• The Commission (whose hearing officer issued the decision Rocha challenged) was a required respondent.
• Rocha’s initial PJR II caption named only DHHS, so the petition did not invoke the district court’s jurisdiction.
• Under Whitfield, the defect cannot be cured by a late amendment after the filing deadline.

Because jurisdiction never attached, the district court’s subsequent orders—denying motions to dismiss, considering consolidation, and ultimately denying PJR II “on the merits”—were void and had to be vacated, with instructions to dismiss.

C. Rejection of Rocha’s procedural counterarguments

• “PJR I lacked jurisdiction so PJR II jurisdiction doesn’t matter”: Rejected because PJR II is the procedural vehicle to test PJR I’s jurisdiction; if PJR II fails jurisdictionally, the court cannot reach the merits of any argument within it.
• “No cross-appeal”: Rejected under Ford v. Showboat Operating Co., and independently because subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time under Landreth v. Malik.
• “Inadequate appendix”: Rejected because the record included the relevant orders and petitions sufficient to decide jurisdiction.
• “Consolidation cured the defect”: Rejected because consolidation cannot supply jurisdiction (In re Est. of Sarge; Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc.).

3.3. Impact

A. Practical impact on Nevada administrative appeals

This opinion solidifies a two-step framework that will shape post-remand litigation strategy:

• Expanded permissible issues in post-remand judicial review: Litigants may raise “backward-looking” jurisdictional attacks on the earlier judicial review that produced the remand—important in cases where the remand order was arguably void but unappealable at the time.
• Procedural strictness remains dispositive: Even meritorious jurisdictional challenges to an earlier remand will never be heard if the post-remand petition itself fails strict NRS 233B.130(2) compliance, especially correct captioning of all required respondents.

B. Incentives and risk allocation

• For petitioners (employees/claimants/licensees): The decision heightens the importance of naming the correct agency and all parties of record. Any omission risks outright dismissal with no merits review, even where fundamental rights (employment, benefits, licensing) are at stake.
• For agencies: The opinion reinforces a potent jurisdictional defense: scrutinize the caption immediately and move to dismiss, knowing that untimely amendments may be barred by Whitfield.
• For district courts: The opinion underscores that “scope” doctrines cannot override jurisdictional defects; the correct response to a defective PJR is dismissal, not merits review.

C. Doctrinal tension flagged by the concurrence

Justice Pickering’s concurrence highlights an ongoing debate: whether these statutory requirements truly limit subject-matter jurisdiction given Nevada district courts’ general jurisdiction under Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6, and whether fairness concerns—especially for self-represented litigants—support allowing post-deadline amendments. The concurrence indicates the court is constrained by Whitfield v. Nev. State Pers. Comm'n, implicitly inviting legislative revision or future doctrinal reconsideration.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Petition for judicial review (PJR)”: The lawsuit filed in district court asking a judge to review and potentially set aside an administrative agency decision under NAPA.
• “Remand”: When the district court sends the matter back to the agency for further proceedings (e.g., to apply the correct standard or to make additional findings).
• “Subject-matter jurisdiction”: The court’s power to decide the type of dispute presented. If it is missing, the court’s orders are treated as void.
• “Strict compliance” (in this context): A rule that the statutory prerequisites for judicial review must be followed exactly—particularly the requirement to name all required respondents in the caption—otherwise the district court has no jurisdiction.
• “Caption”: The formal case heading listing the parties. In Nevada NAPA practice, failing to list a required respondent in the caption can be jurisdictionally fatal.
• “Consolidation”: A procedural tool to manage related cases together. It does not merge the cases into one for jurisdictional purposes and cannot “fix” jurisdictional defects.

5. Conclusion

ROCHA v. STATE, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. establishes (and tightly cabins) an important post-remand review principle: a party may use a post-remand petition for judicial review to argue that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the earlier judicial-review proceeding that produced the remand. However, the court simultaneously reaffirms that such an argument will be heard only if the post-remand petition itself strictly complies with NRS 233B.130(2)(a), including naming the agency and all parties of record in the caption. Because Rocha failed to name the Personnel Commission in his PJR II caption and could not cure the omission after the deadline, the district court lacked jurisdiction and all merits rulings were vacated.

The broader significance is structural: Nevada continues to treat NAPA judicial review as a narrow, statute-controlled pathway where technical filing requirements can determine whether any judicial scrutiny occurs—an approach criticized in concurrence as potentially unfair and conceptually mismatched with general-jurisdiction courts, but presently compelled by existing precedent.