Post-Plea Jail-Contraband Conduct Justifies Denial of Acceptance of Responsibility; Directing a Courier Supports § 3B1.1(c) Supervision

1. Introduction

In United States v. Marcus Longus (4th Cir. May 15, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a 168-month sentence imposed on Marcus Deon Longus after he pleaded guilty to a drug-distribution conspiracy involving cocaine, cocaine base, and a heroin-fentanyl mixture. The appeal focused on three sentencing disputes: (1) drug quantity (whether the evidence supported at least 3.5 kilograms of cocaine), (2) the application of a two-level role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) (whether Longus supervised another participant), and (3) denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (whether post-plea misconduct—smuggling synthetic THC “K2” into jail—defeated acceptance).

Although the decision is unpublished and expressly “not binding precedent,” it is a clear synthesis of how the Fourth Circuit reviews and sustains sentencing findings when the district court grounds them in specific testimony, intercepted communications, and post-plea conduct.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that the district court did not clearly err in:

  • attributing at least 3.5 kilograms of cocaine to Longus based on intercepted calls and law-enforcement interpretation of coded language, including a disputed 500-gram cocaine purchase;
  • applying a two-level supervision enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) where a cooperating codefendant (CCD) undertook repeated New York “supply runs” at Longus’s direction, with Longus planning the trips and controlling the CCD’s actions; and
  • denying acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 because Longus engaged in post-plea criminal conduct by conspiring to smuggle K2 into jail, undermining any claim that he had withdrawn from criminal activity.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) United States v. Williamson

Williamson, 953 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2020), supplied the principal framework for drug-quantity findings in cases without a seizure: the sentencing court “shall approximate” drug quantity and has “considerable leeway,” including reliance on “uncorroborated hearsay” if it bears “sufficient indicia of reliability.” The Longus panel used Williamson to validate reliance on an investigator’s interpretation of coded calls and price information to identify the substance and estimate quantity.

2) United States v. Milam

Milam, 443 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2006), was cited for the government’s burden: proof of attributable drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. In Longus, the court treated the intercepted-call evidence and the officer’s testimony as meeting that preponderance threshold.

3) United States v. Slade

Slade, 631 F.3d 185 (4th Cir. 2011), was the defendant’s primary comparator on the role enhancement. Slade reversed a managerial enhancement where the record showed drug supply and even a driver, but lacked evidence that the defendant “controlled” others or “direct[ed] the terms of their sales,” and lacked indications the driver acted pursuant to managerial authority.

Longus distinguishes Slade on the evidentiary record: here, the CCD repeatedly followed Longus’s instructions on where to go and what to do, had no independent contacts, did not know what was in the packages, and was paid a small amount—facts supporting a finding of direction and supervision rather than mere parallel participation or buyer-seller dynamics.

4) United States v. Kellam

Kellam, 568 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2009), provided the multi-factor test for role adjustments under § 3B1.1 (decision-making authority, recruitment, planning, control over others, etc.) and reaffirmed clear-error review. The district court’s findings about recruitment of CCD, planning the New York runs, and control over the CCD’s actions mapped neatly onto Kellam’s factors, helping insulate the enhancement on appeal.

5) United States v. Bolton and United States v. Harris

Bolton, 858 F.3d 905 (4th Cir. 2017), and Harris, 890 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2018), anchored the acceptance-of-responsibility analysis: the defendant must “clearly” accept responsibility, the court weighs the “totality of the circumstances,” and the decision gets “great deference” on clear-error review. Longus applies these principles in a straightforward way—post-plea criminal conduct is powerful evidence that a defendant has not “withdrawn from criminal activity.”

6) Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., LLC

Longus argued that K2 possession is legal outside prison and thus should not negate acceptance. The panel rejected that factual/legal premise, citing Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., LLC, 117 F.4th 165 (4th Cir. 2024), for the proposition that “both naturally occurring and synthetic THC” are Schedule I controlled substances. The citation served a dual function: rebutting the defendant’s claim and reinforcing that the post-plea conduct was not merely “rule-breaking” but involved a controlled substance.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Drug Quantity: Reliability of Intercept Evidence and Officer Interpretation

The panel applied clear-error review and emphasized that sentencing courts may approximate drug quantity and credit reliable testimony interpreting coded drug communications. Longus conceded 3059.5 grams but contested whether an additional “half kilogram” discussed in a call was proven to be cocaine. The Fourth Circuit held the district court could credit the officer’s testimony that the “original purchase was a half kilogram of cocaine,” supported by contextual indicators such as price-per-gram discussions and the linkage between the 500-gram and later 250-gram transaction (“same thing from last time”). Adding the 500 grams pushed the total above 3.5 kilograms, sustaining base offense level 28.

2) Role Enhancement: Supervision Shown by Direction, Planning, and Information Control

For § 3B1.1(c), the question was not whether the conspiracy was large, but whether Longus exercised a qualifying leadership/managerial/supervisory role over at least one other participant. The panel relied on the CCD evidence: Longus recruited the CCD, orchestrated repeated trips, drove separately while directing the CCD’s movements, restricted the CCD’s access to contacts and information, and paid the CCD modestly. This pattern demonstrated real-world control and supervision—not merely supplying drugs or associating with others—making the case stronger than Slade.

3) Acceptance of Responsibility: Post-Plea Criminal Conduct as a Disqualifier

The district court treated the post-plea period as a test of genuine acceptance and found Longus “continued in” criminal activity by arranging a K2-smuggling scheme through recorded jail calls. The Fourth Circuit held this rationale fit squarely within § 3E1.1’s “totality” approach and the commentary factor concerning “voluntary termination of criminal conduct.” It also added an important clarification: even if an item were legal outside prison, smuggling it into jail may still be contraband and criminal, so legality “outside” would not necessarily rescue acceptance. Here, in any event, K2 was treated as a controlled substance.

C. Impact

While unpublished, Longus is likely to be cited for persuasive value in three recurring sentencing scenarios:

  • Drug-quantity approximation: It reinforces that intercepted communications, contextual pricing, and officer interpretation can satisfy the preponderance standard, especially when the defendant cannot show the information is “erroneous.”
  • § 3B1.1(c) supervision: It sharpens the boundary with Slade: supplying drugs or having help is not enough; repeated, directed courier activity with informational dependence supports a supervision finding.
  • § 3E1.1 acceptance: It underscores that post-plea misconduct—particularly new controlled-substance conduct—can independently justify denial of acceptance, even when the defendant pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and did not contest guilt.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Clear error” review: The appellate court does not decide the facts anew. It will uphold the district court’s fact findings unless left with a firm conviction a mistake was made—making detailed, record-based sentencing explanations hard to overturn.
  • “Preponderance of the evidence” at sentencing: A lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The government must show it is more likely than not that the quantity/role facts are true.
  • Drug “approximation”: If drugs were not seized (or seizure doesn’t reflect full scope), the court estimates quantity using reliable evidence—calls, ledgers, witness testimony, typical prices, and patterns.
  • Role enhancement under § 3B1.1(c): A two-level increase applies if the defendant directed, managed, or supervised at least one other participant. It can be proven through recruitment, trip planning, instruction-giving, and control over how another person carries out tasks.
  • Acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1: Pleading guilty helps but is not automatic. Continuing criminal conduct after the plea is strong evidence the defendant has not genuinely accepted responsibility.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Marcus Longus affirms a Guidelines sentence by applying deferential standards of review to well-supported district court findings. The decision illustrates that (1) reliable testimony interpreting coded intercepted calls can establish drug quantity by a preponderance, (2) directing and controlling a courier’s repeated supply trips supports a § 3B1.1(c) supervision enhancement (distinguishing United States v. Slade), and (3) post-plea criminal conduct—here, a controlled-substance smuggling scheme—can properly defeat acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 despite a guilty plea.