Post-Muldrow “Adverse Action” in Academic Assignments: No ADEA Liability Without Identifiable Harm to Terms and Conditions of Employment

Case: Bakul Dave v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026) (nonprecedential order)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Disposition: Summary judgment for the University affirmed; Rule 38 request denied for failure to file a separate motion; warning issued regarding abusive/frivolous filings.

1. Introduction

Bakul Dave, a tenured associate professor of chemistry at Southern Illinois University, sued the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). His claims arose out of events following his termination in 2014 (for alleged sexual harassment), his reinstatement in 2016 after arbitration, and a later termination in 2017 for failing to teach assigned courses.

The core disputes included (i) course assignments after reinstatement—especially Dave’s desire to regain CHEM 410-411—and (ii) the University’s decision to place him on unpaid administrative leave and ultimately discharge him after he did not report to teach CHEM 106 and CHEM 579. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit largely confronted briefing that did not engage the district court’s reasoning, but it addressed Dave’s residual ADEA theory that his course assignment reflected age discrimination.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University. Even assuming a department chair said he was “giving preference to younger faculty members,” Dave failed to produce evidence that the assignment decisions constituted an adverse employment action under the governing standard—i.e., an action causing “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” The court, applying the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, concluded that Dave showed no record evidence that he was made “worse off” in pay, benefits, position, or other job terms by being assigned CHEM 106 and CHEM 579 rather than his preferred course.

The court also denied the University’s request for attorneys’ fees and double costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 because the University did not file a separate motion as required, while warning Dave that abusive and frivolous filings may lead to sanctions, including a filing bar.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Paterakos v. City of Chicago, 147 F.4th 787 (7th Cir. 2025)
    Cited for the summary-judgment lens: the appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draws reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. This framing mattered because Dave’s evidentiary gaps (e.g., regarding the comparator professor) could not be filled by inferences untethered to record facts.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
    The district court evaluated Title VII claims under the familiar burden-shifting framework. While the appellate order does not re-walk the full McDonnell Douglas steps, it underscores that Dave’s proof failures (comparators, adverse action, causation) were dispositive at summary judgment.
  • Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016)
    Reinforces the Seventh Circuit’s insistence on a “holistic approach” to discrimination evidence rather than rigid categories. The district court used Ortiz to assess whether the totality of evidence allowed an inference of discrimination; the order signals that Dave’s record did not.
  • Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359 (7th Cir. 2022)
    Invoked for appellate briefing discipline under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A): a brief must present discernible arguments and supporting reasons. The court considered dismissal because Dave’s briefs largely alleged a “crime-fraud” conspiracy rather than legal error, but it still addressed the one minimally articulated ADEA point.
  • Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4th 460 (7th Cir. 2025) and Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869 (7th Cir. 2024)
    These cases supply the Seventh Circuit’s contemporary articulation of what an ADEA plaintiff must show at summary judgment: enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find an adverse action “because of” age. They also provide the court’s bridge to Muldrow on what counts as an “adverse” action—focusing on harm to identifiable employment terms/conditions.
  • Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024)
    The pivotal intervening authority. The order notes the district court relied on earlier “materially adverse employment action” precedent, but Muldrow “modified the standard” by rejecting a heightened threshold requiring “significant harm” or “materially adverse” effects. The Seventh Circuit applied Muldrow’s formulation—“some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment”—and its “worse off” framing to Dave’s assignment-based ADEA argument.
  • Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995)
    Cited for the court’s authority to sanction abusive or frivolous litigation conduct, including imposing fines and filing bars. This serves as an institutional warning: persistent baseless accusations and improper filings can trigger escalating restrictions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The “adverse action” requirement post-Muldrow

The court’s decisive move was to analyze whether Dave’s course assignment—teaching CHEM 106 and CHEM 579 instead of CHEM 410-411—was an actionable adverse employment action. Under Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc. (quoting Muldrow v. City of St. Louis), an action is adverse where it causes “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment,” and the inquiry includes whether the employee was made “worse off.”

Applying that standard, the court emphasized what the record did not show:

  • No evidence that the assignment changed Dave’s salary, benefits, position, or core employment status.
  • No evidence that the assignment exceeded the “normal scope of employment” for a faculty member or imposed a cognizable detriment in terms/conditions.
  • Affirmative evidence that the University attempted to mitigate preparation burdens: offering course materials and granting a fall semester without teaching duties.

The court thus treated the assignment as, at most, an internal allocation of duties without the required employment-term harm—even under Muldrow’s less demanding standard.

(b) Insufficient evidentiary foundation for age-discriminatory inference

Dave relied on an alleged statement by Chair Kinsel that he was “giving preference to younger faculty members.” Even assuming the statement occurred, the panel identified evidentiary gaps that prevented the case from reaching a jury:

  • The “record is devoid” of evidence about Dr. Moran’s age or qualifications—critical facts for evaluating whether “preference to younger faculty” had any concrete referent.
  • The University offered unrebutted context: Moran had taught CHEM 410-11 during Dave’s absence.
  • The mere fact that a younger professor teaches a course previously taught by an older professor does not, without more, establish age discrimination.

In effect, the panel treated Dave’s proof as too abstract: it lacked the objective employment harm and the comparative/causal grounding needed to convert a contested assignment decision into an ADEA violation.

(c) Appellate procedure and Rule 38

The University sought attorneys’ fees and double costs for a frivolous appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. The panel denied the request because Rule 38 requires a separate motion, which the University did not file. Still, the court issued a pointed warning to Dave that abusive and frivolous filings can lead to sanctions, invoking Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack.

3.3 Impact

  • Operationalizing Muldrow in reassignment/assignment disputes.
    Even though the order is nonprecedential, it illustrates how Seventh Circuit panels are applying Muldrow and Arnold: plaintiffs no longer must show “materially adverse” harm, but they still must identify concrete detriment to “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment. For faculty and similarly situated professionals, preference-based assignment grievances will remain difficult to litigate absent evidence of tangible employment-term harm (pay, rank, workload consequences tied to evaluation/tenure, loss of status, etc.).
  • Evidence discipline in discrimination cases.
    The decision highlights a recurring summary-judgment theme: conclusory allegations and generalized unfairness claims do not substitute for record evidence about comparators, qualifications, actual harm, and causal linkage.
  • Appellate conduct and sanctions risk.
    The panel’s warning underscores that persistently abusive allegations and “notice” filings accusing opponents of crimes can trigger sanctions and filing restrictions, even when the court refrains from imposing Rule 38 relief due to procedural defects.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Adverse employment action” (post-Muldrow): Not every workplace disappointment qualifies. The plaintiff must show the employer did something that caused some real harm to an identifiable job term or condition (e.g., pay, benefits, status, duties in a way that makes the employee “worse off”).
  • “But-for” causation (ADEA): Age must be the determinative reason for the challenged action—not merely one factor among others—though it can be proved through circumstantial evidence.
  • McDonnell Douglas framework: A common method of proving discrimination indirectly: the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case; the employer offers a non-discriminatory reason; then the plaintiff must show that reason is pretextual.
  • Ortiz “holistic approach”: Courts should consider all evidence together to decide whether discrimination is a reasonable inference, rather than sorting proof into rigid “direct” vs. “indirect” boxes.
  • Rule 38 sanctions (Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38): An appellate court may award fees/costs for a frivolous appeal, but the requesting party must comply with procedural requirements—here, filing a separate motion.

5. Conclusion

Bakul Dave v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University reinforces a practical boundary after Muldrow v. City of St. Louis: while plaintiffs need not show “material” or “significant” harm, they must still show that a challenged reassignment or duty allocation caused concrete harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment. In the academic setting presented, dissatisfaction with course assignments—without evidence of diminished pay, benefits, status, or other demonstrable worsening—did not constitute an adverse action under the ADEA. The order also serves as a procedural reminder that Rule 38 relief requires a separate motion and as a conduct warning that abusive, conspiratorial filings can lead to sanctions and filing restrictions.

Note: The Seventh Circuit labeled the disposition “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” citable only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1; its analytical value lies primarily in how it applies intervening Supreme Court authority (Muldrow) and recent Seventh Circuit formulations (Arnold) to a reassignment dispute.