Post–Matter of S-S-F-M- Rule: Domestic-Violence PSGs Defined by Harm Are Not Cognizable; Vague Anonymous Threats Usually Fail Nexus

Case: Berlyn Maryrenis Espinoza-Reyes v. Todd Blanche (Acting U.S. Attorney General)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date: July 16, 2026
Disposition: Petition for review denied (unpublished)

1. Introduction

The petitioner, a Guatemalan national, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection based on (i) severe domestic abuse by a former partner and (ii) threats she attributed to gang-linked retaliation connected to her father-in-law’s anti-corruption/anti-gang politics. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her testimony credible but denied relief; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.

The Sixth Circuit addressed two core asylum defects: (1) whether the petitioner’s proposed gender-based “particular social groups” (PSGs) were legally cognizable, and (2) whether she proved the required nexus between the threats and a protected ground (imputed political opinion or family-based PSG). The court also rejected a due process claim and enforced waiver/forfeiture principles for withholding/CAT issues.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Standards of review and “final agency decision” framing

• Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland: supplied the baseline—legal questions de novo, factual findings under substantial evidence—structuring how the court separated “cognizability” (legal) from “nexus” (factual).
• Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland: reinforced deference to the agency when findings are supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.”
• Ceraj v. Mukasey (quoting Marku v. Ashcroft): emphasized reversal only when evidence “compels” the contrary conclusion—critical to rejecting petitioner’s nexus theory as not compelled.
• Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch and Juan Antonio v. Barr: confirmed the court reviews the BIA as the final agency determination when it issues a separate opinion, while also looking to the IJ to the extent adopted.

B. Asylum nexus doctrine (motive, not mere causation)

• Patel v. Bondi: framed asylum as requiring a nexus between feared harm and protected status.
• Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland: supplied the “some evidence” of motive formulation and the “one central reason” standard, later echoed in the court’s nexus assessment and due-process prejudice discussion.
• Cruz-Guzman v. Barr: underscored that nexus is about persecutor motive, not simple causation.
• Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr: provided the quoted articulation of “at least one central reason.”
• INS v. Elias-Zacarias: required “some evidence” of motive and imposed the “compel” threshold for overturning agency factfinding—central to rejecting speculative inferences about who sent the threats and why.
• Marku v. Ashcroft: reiterated that having a political opinion (or protected status) is not enough; the record must suggest persecution “because of” that opinion/status.

C. Particular Social Group (PSG) cognizability and the “harm-defined” bar

• Gonzales-De Leon v. Barr: restated the PSG test (immutable characteristic, particularity, and social distinction).
• Reyes Galeana v. Garland: supported de novo review when the BIA’s PSG decision turns on a legal question.
• Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334-36 (A.G. 2018) ("Matter of A-B- I"): supplied the operative rule that a PSG must exist independently of the asserted harm; groups cannot be defined primarily by victimization or the inability to leave created by harm/threats.
• Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) and Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) ("Matter of A-B- III"): provided the historical arc—A-R-C-G- recognized a domestic-violence PSG; A-B- III vacated A-B- I and directed use of pre-A-B- I precedent.
• Matter of S-S-F-M-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025): decisive intervening authority; it reinstated A-B- I (and its overruling of A-R-C-G-), leading the Sixth Circuit to treat the A-B- I circularity principle as governing.
• Juan Antonio v. Barr: petitioner invoked it for domestic-violence PSG recognition; the court limited it, emphasizing it involved a narrowing “race-based distinction” (indigenous Mayan) and marital-status nuances not present here, and noting the Attorney General’s later overruling of A-R-C-G- reduces the persuasive force of Juan Antonio’s reasoning on this point.
• Kante v. Holder: supplied the Sixth Circuit’s “longstanding precedent” that social groups may not be circularly defined by the fact of suffering persecution.
• Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland: supported rejecting “property”-type PSG formulations as lacking a narrowing characteristic other than risk of persecution, and later supported the due-process point that agencies need not reach other elements once a fatal flaw exists.
• Linares-Campos v. Garland, Alvarado v. U.S. Att'y Gen., Garcia-Ventura v. Barr, Lucero-Rocano v. Bondi: out-of-circuit reinforcement that “women viewed as property” PSGs are typically rejected as amorphous, subjective, or harm-defined.
• Tomas-Miguel v. Barr: used to explain why country reports documenting widespread violence do not automatically establish “social distinction” for the claimed PSG.

D. Nexus and “vague anonymous threats” as insufficient circumstantial proof

• Pablo-Sanchez v. Holder: key Sixth Circuit comparator; the court refused “inferential leaps” from vague/anonymous threats to a protected-ground motive.
• Navarrete-Paredes v. Ashcroft and Valensuela-Ortega v. INS: reinforced that threats without linkage evidence do not establish nexus.
• Rosa-Mejia v. Garland and Myftari v. Mukasey: cited to support skepticism toward speculative nexus theories.

E. Due process in removal proceedings; agency need not address every issue

• Mapouya v. Gonzales: set out the “full and fair hearing” requirement and the need to show “actual prejudice” that materially affected the outcome.
• Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch: confirmed de novo review of due-process claims.
• INS v. Bagamasbad: foundational rule—when one dispositive ground defeats relief, the agency need not decide other issues.
• Palucho v. Garland: reaffirmed that the BIA need not discuss and rebut every piece of evidence; it must make its rationale clear enough for judicial review.
• Aoraha v. Gonzales and Pilica v. Ashcroft: supported the presumption that the agency reviewed the evidence absent a specific showing to the contrary.

F. Waiver/forfeiture of withholding and CAT issues on petition for review

• Gamas-Vicente v. Blanche: controlled the outcome—if the BIA deems issues waived for inadequate briefing and the petitioner does not challenge that waiver finding in the opening circuit brief, the petitioner forfeits review.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. PSG analysis: the court treats “harm-defined” groups as legally defective

The court accepted (as controlling after Matter of S-S-F-M-) the Matter of A-B- I principle that a PSG must exist independently of the persecution claimed. It then characterized both proposed gender-based PSGs as circular:

• “Unable to leave” was treated as a condition created by harm or threatened harm (i.e., the defining feature was the abuse itself).
• “Treated as property” was treated as an injury descriptor rather than an independently defining social boundary recognized by society.

The opinion also narrowed the reach of Juan Antonio v. Barr, emphasizing (i) that case’s additional narrowing characteristic (indigenous identity), and (ii) the marital-status context absent here (the petitioner was not married to the abuser). Thus, the court declined to extend Juan Antonio to more generalized domestic-violence PSG formulations.

B. Nexus analysis: timing + content + anonymity defeated motive inferences

Even assuming cognizable family-based PSGs or an imputed political opinion theory, the court held substantial evidence supported the BIA’s “too speculative” nexus finding. The threats:

• occurred years after the father-in-law’s political activity and two years after the husband fled;
• did not mention politics, the father-in-law, or the family;
• were anonymous and uncorroborated; and
• included an insult (“old bitch”) that did not, on this record, compel an inference of political motive.

Relying on INS v. Elias-Zacarias and Pablo-Sanchez v. Holder, the court treated the petitioner’s theory as requiring “inferential leaps” beyond what circumstantial evidence can sustain under the compel-to-reverse standard.

C. Due process: no obligation to decide non-dispositive elements; no prejudice shown

The court applied INS v. Bagamasbad to reject the argument that the BIA had to decide whether past harm rose to persecution or whether fear was objectively reasonable once it found dispositive failures (non-cognizable PSGs and lack of nexus). It also found no prejudice because the petitioner did not identify specific evidence the agency ignored, consistent with Palucho v. Garland and Mapouya v. Gonzales.

D. Withholding/CAT: waiver finding must be challenged, or review is lost

The court enforced Gamas-Vicente v. Blanche: when the BIA deems claims waived for lack of meaningful challenge and the petitioner does not contest that waiver determination in the opening appellate brief, the petitioner forfeits review of those claims.

3.3. Impact

• Domestic-violence asylum claims in the Sixth Circuit: The decision signals a restrictive posture toward PSGs framed around “inability to leave” or “viewed as property,” especially after Matter of S-S-F-M- reinstated Matter of A-B- I. Applicants will likely need PSG formulations that (i) are not defined by victimization and (ii) are supported by evidence of societal recognition as a distinct group.
• Country conditions evidence: General reports of widespread violence and impunity may be insufficient to prove “social distinction” for a particular claimed PSG without evidence showing the society recognizes that subset as distinct (the opinion’s use of Tomas-Miguel v. Barr captures this evidentiary gap).
• Nexus proof in political/family retaliation theories: The opinion continues a Sixth Circuit trend that anonymous or vague threats—without content linking them to politics/family and without corroboration—rarely compel a motive finding, limiting claims built mainly on belief or speculation about who threatened the applicant.
• Appellate practice: The court’s strict application of Gamas-Vicente v. Blanche highlights the importance of challenging BIA waiver rulings explicitly in the opening brief or losing review of withholding/CAT claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Particular Social Group (PSG): A protected “group” for asylum purposes. It must be clearly defined, based on an immutable or fundamental trait, and recognized by society as a distinct group (not just a collection of people who were harmed).
• Circular (harm-defined) PSG: A group defined by the persecution itself (e.g., “women who can’t leave because they are abused”). The court treated such definitions as invalid because the “group” would not exist apart from the abuse.
• Social distinction: Not “visibility” in the literal sense, but whether the society in question perceives the claimed group as a distinct social unit.
• Nexus / “one central reason”: The applicant must show the persecutor targeted her because of a protected ground, and that protected ground was a central motive—not incidental or speculative.
• Substantial evidence review: The court does not reweigh facts; it upholds the agency unless the record compels the opposite conclusion.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture (in practice here): If the BIA says an issue was not meaningfully argued (waived) and the petitioner does not contest that ruling on appeal, the court treats the issue as lost (forfeited) and will not reach the merits.

5. Conclusion

Espinoza-Reyes confirms (in the Sixth Circuit’s post–Matter of S-S-F-M- landscape) that domestic-violence PSGs framed in terms of “inability to leave” or “being treated as property” are vulnerable as harm-defined, and that generalized country conditions do not automatically establish social distinction. It also reinforces that nexus cannot rest on speculative attribution of vague, anonymous threats to political or family motives, and it underscores a procedural lesson: failure to contest the BIA’s waiver finding in the opening circuit brief will bar review of withholding and CAT claims.

Note: The opinion is “Not Recommended for Publication,” but it provides a clear snapshot of how the Sixth Circuit is applying Attorney General and circuit precedent to PSG and nexus issues, and how strictly it enforces issue-preservation rules on petition for review.