Post-Mahmoud Limits on Yoder: School Vaccination Mandates Do Not Trigger “Same-Character” Parental Free-Exercise Strict Scrutiny

I. Introduction

Miller v. McDonald (2d Cir. June 30, 2026) addresses whether New York’s repeal of a religious exemption to its school immunization law violates the Free Exercise Clause and, separately, whether it infringes Amish parents’ parental free-exercise rights recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder. The plaintiffs—Amish parents, Amish community schools, and a representative of Amish schools in New York—challenged New York Public Health Law § 2164 after the State audited their schools, found noncompliance, and imposed substantial fines.

The case returned to the Second Circuit after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Second Circuit’s prior judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025). On remand, the core question became whether Mahmoud expanded Yoder in a way that would require strict scrutiny for New York’s vaccination requirement notwithstanding that it is a neutral and generally applicable law.

Key Issues

  • Free Exercise: Is § 2164 non-neutral or not generally applicable because it retains a medical exemption but not a religious exemption?
  • Parental free-exercise under Yoder/Mahmoud: Does conditioning in-person school attendance on vaccination impose a burden “of the same character” as the burdens in Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mahmoud v. Taylor, thus triggering strict scrutiny even if the law is neutral and generally applicable?

Parties

  • Plaintiffs-Appellants: Joseph Miller, Ezra Wengerd, Jonas Smucker, Dygert Road School, Pleasant View School (Twin Mountain School), Shady Lane School.
  • Defendant-Appellee: James V. McDonald, Commissioner of Health of the State of New York (official capacity).
  • Defendant (not at issue on appeal): Betty A. Rosa, Commissioner of Education (dismissed for lack of standing; not appealed).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit (per curiam) affirmed dismissal of the complaint. It held:

  1. § 2164 is neutral and generally applicable. The statute does not target religion, and the legislative record did not plausibly show hostility attributable to the legislature as a whole. The medical exemption does not create unconstitutional favoritism for comparable secular conduct and does not establish an individualized-exemptions regime under Fulton.
  2. Mahmoud does not change the result under Yoder. Even if the vaccination requirement burdens religious practice, it is not a burden “of the same character” as the educational/formation burdens in Yoder and Mahmoud. Therefore, strict scrutiny under the Yoder/Mahmoud pathway does not apply.

Because plaintiffs conceded rational-basis review is satisfied (immunization reduces disease), the Free Exercise claim failed once the law was deemed neutral and generally applicable.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Baseline Free Exercise Framework: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws

  • Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990): The opinion relies on Smith for the rule that the Free Exercise Clause does not require religious exemptions from “valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability,” warning that strict scrutiny for every incidental burden would invite “constitutionally required religious exemptions” from many civic obligations, including “compulsory vaccination laws.”
    Miller treats this as the default rule and frames the plaintiffs’ arguments as attempts to move the case out of Smith’s domain (by showing lack of neutrality/general applicability, or by invoking the special Yoder/Mahmoud doctrine).
  • United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982): Quoted through Smith to emphasize that religious belief does not generally excuse compliance with neutral laws.
  • Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) and Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61 (2021) (per curiam): These supply the strict-scrutiny trigger and the “comparable secular conduct” comparator principle. The court uses them to reject plaintiffs’ claim that the medical exemption is a comparable secular accommodation.
  • Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021): Central to the individualized-exemptions argument. Miller applies Fulton to ask whether § 2164 “invites” officials to decide which reasons are “worthy of solicitude.” The court holds New York’s medical exemption is constrained by objective medical standards and does not confer broad discretion to grant exemptions for any reason.
  • Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025): The remand driver. The Second Circuit treats Mahmoud as reaffirming the general Smith rule for neutral, generally applicable policies, while also clarifying that Yoder can require strict scrutiny when a burden is “of the same character” as in Yoder.

2. Vaccination Mandates as Historically Upheld

  • Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) and Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922): Invoked to situate vaccination mandates within a long-standing tradition of constitutional acceptance (adult smallpox vaccination; school-entry vaccination certificate). They function as background legitimacy for the State’s public health interest and as doctrinal context that vaccination mandates are not novel constitutional outliers.
  • Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam): Supports the proposition that New York could constitutionally require vaccination for school attendance and could exclude unvaccinated children during outbreaks.
  • We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) and Kane v. De Blasio, 19 F.4th 152 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam): Reinforce rational-basis review for neutral vaccination mandates and reject the claim that medical exemptions automatically create Free Exercise infirmity.
  • We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, 76 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2023): The controlling analogue. The district court and Second Circuit treat it as effectively dispositive on neutrality/general applicability when a state repeals a religious exemption while keeping a medical exemption. The opinion borrows its key reasoning: medical and religious exemptions are not comparable because the medical exemption serves (rather than undermines) the public health goal “to the greatest extent medically possible.”
  • Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2022): Used for permissible judicial notice of legislative history and record materials, and referenced in addressing medical-exemption administration. Plaintiffs’ attempt to turn Goe’s “authority to grant” language into a Fulton problem is rejected: accepting or requesting supporting information is not the same as deciding which “reasons” are solicitude-worthy.

3. Neutrality and Legislative Motive/Record

  • Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020) (per curiam) and Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014): Contrasts with § 2164: those cases involved targeting or singling out religious practice; § 2164 is facially religion-neutral and applies broadly.
  • Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. 617 (2018) and M.A. v. Rockland County Department of Health, 53 F.4th 29 (2d Cir. 2022): Used to show when statements by officials can indicate religious animus—typically in adjudicative/enforcement settings or where a small set of decisionmakers directly controls the challenged action. The court distinguishes legislative-floor statements from statements by a small adjudicatory body.
  • United States v. Suquilanda, 116 F.4th 129 (2d Cir. 2024) and Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 594 U.S. 647 (2021): Provide the conceptual basis for not attributing isolated comments to an entire legislature and for rejecting the notion that legislators vote merely at sponsors’ behest.
  • F.F. ex rel. Y.F. v. State, 66 Misc. 3d 467 (Sup. Ct. 2019), aff'd sub nom. F.F. v. State, 194 A.D.3d 80 (3d Dep't 2021): Supports the view that repealing a religious exemption does not itself prove targeting of religion, and that a small fraction of legislators’ statements does not “taint the actions of the whole.”

4. Pleading/Procedure Standards

  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Provide the plausibility standard governing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
  • Brokamp v. James, 66 F.4th 374 (2d Cir. 2023) and Vatore v. Comm'r of Consumer Affs., 83 N.Y.2d 645 (1994): Cited for using contemporaneous interpretation and legislative materials in discerning statutory intent.

5. The Yoder/Mahmoud Line: Parental Free Exercise and “Same-Character” Burdens

  • Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972): The foundational case recognizing an Amish parental free-exercise right to an exemption from compulsory attendance beyond eighth grade where state schooling would undermine Amish religious formation.
  • Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025): Clarifies that Yoder is not limited to compulsory-attendance statutes; strict scrutiny applies when a law imposes a burden “of the same character” as Yoder—i.e., one that “substantially interfer[es] with the religious development” of the child and threatens to undermine parental religious inculcation.
    Miller adopts this “character” test but holds a vaccination condition is not that kind of interference.
  • Mirabelli v. Bonta, 607 U.S. 492 (2026) (per curiam): Treated as confirming that Mahmoud can extend beyond curriculum. But the Second Circuit reads Mirabelli as still involving school conduct that displaces parental authority (alleged concealment of a child’s social transition), unlike vaccination requirements which do not regulate belief formation or conceal information.
  • Perry v. Marteney, 172 F.4th 315 (4th Cir. 2026): Persuasive post-Mahmoud authority distinguishing vaccination laws from Yoder/Mahmoud burdens: vaccination is a public health measure, not ideological or formative interference in a child’s religious development. The Second Circuit aligns itself with that reasoning.
  • Kondilis v. City of Chicago, 160 F.4th 866 (7th Cir. 2025) and Grimsby v. Pan, No. 5:25-cv-01575, 2025 WL 2829502 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025): Additional post-Mahmoud support for treating vaccination mandates and related measures as outside the Yoder/Mahmoud “same-character” strict-scrutiny pathway.
  • Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001): Used to dispose of “hybrid-rights” framing: the Second Circuit reiterates it does not apply heightened scrutiny merely because a free-exercise claim is paired with another constitutional interest, and instead evaluates plaintiffs’ parental claim through the Yoder/Mahmoud standard.
  • Mahmoud v. McKnight, 102 F.4th 191 (4th Cir. 2024), Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), and Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008): Cited to show the pre-Mahmoud landscape that often confined Yoder to its facts; Mahmoud rejected that narrow view.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Free Exercise: Why § 2164 Stays in the Smith Framework

(a) Neutrality

The court begins with the law’s face: § 2164 does not single out religion, regulate religious practice as such, or impose religion-specific disabilities. It simply requires immunization for school attendance subject to a medical exemption. It also refuses to treat the legislative act of repealing a religious exemption as proof of anti-religious targeting, echoing We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development and F.F. ex rel. Y.F. v. State.

On alleged hostile statements in legislative debates, the court requires a plausible basis to attribute the statements to the legislature’s enactment as a whole. It distinguishes:

  • Adjudicatory/enforcement contexts (e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission) where a small body’s statements can undermine the fairness of a particular decision; and
  • Legislative contexts where isolated remarks by a few lawmakers do not readily establish that the statute was enacted “because of” hostility to religion.

Using United States v. Suquilanda and Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., the court emphasizes a separation between individual legislator speech and collective legislative intent absent allegations showing those statements meaningfully influenced the body.

(b) General Applicability

The plaintiffs’ principal general-applicability theory was that allowing medical exemptions while denying religious exemptions treats comparable secular conduct more favorably. The court rejects this via a two-part explanation anchored in We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development:

  1. Not comparable in relation to the State interest: Medical exemptions cover children who cannot safely be vaccinated; extending medical exemptions does not contradict the State’s goal of maximizing immunization “to the greatest extent medically possible.” Religious exemptions, by contrast, expand the population of unvaccinated students and increase outbreak risk.
  2. Different scope/duration: Under regulations, medical exemptions are tied to a “specific immunization,” require adequate documentation, are time-limited, and must be reissued annually. The old religious exemption functioned as a broad, generalized exemption from vaccination requirements over the course of school admission.

The plaintiffs’ attempt to narrow the risk comparison to the Amish population (arguing their communities are small and isolated) fails because the State’s outbreak concern included clustering of unvaccinated children in particular schools. The plaintiffs’ own allegations—nearly all Amish schoolchildren unvaccinated and educated together—mirror the “cluster” risk the legislature highlighted in response to the measles outbreak.

(c) No “Individualized Exemptions” Problem

Plaintiffs also argued the medical exemption creates discretionary, case-by-case decisionmaking that “invites” officials to pick which reasons matter. Applying Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the court holds New York’s scheme is cabined by:

  • objective medical standards (contraindications/precautions consistent with ACIP or other recognized evidence-based standards);
  • documentation requirements that must specify the contraindication and duration; and
  • limited school authority to request additional support, not to grant exemptions for non-medical reasons.

Allegations of inconsistent exemption rates between schools, without context about student medical profiles, do not plausibly transform a standards-bound medical exemption into the type of open-ended discretion condemned by Fulton.

2. The Yoder/Mahmoud Claim: The Opinion’s Key Post-Mahmoud Contribution

The remand forced the court to confront the scope of Mahmoud v. Taylor. The Second Circuit accepts Mahmoud’s doctrinal move: strict scrutiny can apply “regardless of whether the law is neutral or generally applicable” if the burden is “of the same character” as in Wisconsin v. Yoder.

But it draws a firm line around what “same character” means. In the court’s telling, Yoder and Mahmoud involve state action that threatens to shape, displace, or undermine a child’s religious development through the schooling environment:

  • Yoder: compulsory exposure to “worldly influences” through additional formal schooling undermining Amish religious formation.
  • Mahmoud: refusal to allow opt-outs from normative classroom instruction that pressures children toward views at odds with parental faith.

By contrast, § 2164:

  • does not regulate curriculum or instruction;
  • does not require affirmation of belief;
  • does not expose children to state-selected messages hostile to religion;
  • does not enlist school officials to displace parental religious formation;
  • instead imposes a health-and-safety condition on in-person attendance to reduce communicable disease spread.

The plaintiffs’ argument that vaccination is “more burdensome” than exposure to books fails because Mahmoud asks about kind (character), not degree (severity). The court’s reasoning is reinforced by:

  • Mirabelli v. Bonta, read as still focusing on displacement of parental authority (concealment of information central to upbringing), which § 2164 does not do; and
  • Perry v. Marteney, adopting the distinction that vaccination mandates are public health measures, not “ideological indoctrination.”

C. Impact

1. Clarifying the Post-Mahmoud Boundary

The opinion’s most significant forward-looking effect is its operationalization of the Mahmoud “same character” test: strict scrutiny under Yoder/Mahmoud is reserved for laws that substantially interfere with a child’s religious development through educational formation or displacement of parental authority in that formation. Public-health conditions on school attendance—even if they incidentally burden religious practice—are not treated as “same-character” burdens.

2. Preserving the Smith/We The Patriots Architecture for Vaccine Mandates

By reaffirming that repealing a religious exemption does not itself create non-neutrality, and by rejecting “medical exemption equals comparable secular preference” arguments, Miller strengthens the Second Circuit’s framework from We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development for states that:

  • require vaccination for school attendance;
  • retain tightly regulated medical exemptions; and
  • decline to provide religious exemptions.

3. Litigation Consequences

The decision makes it harder, at the pleading stage, to convert vaccination objections into:

  • an animus-based neutrality challenge (without plausible allegations tying hostility to enactment);
  • a general-applicability challenge based on medical exemptions (given the “not comparable” rationale); or
  • a Yoder/Mahmoud strict-scrutiny claim (absent educational-formation interference in kind).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Neutral” and “Generally Applicable”

  • Neutral: the law does not target religion—either on its face or through a hostile enactment process.
  • Generally applicable: the law does not give secular conduct a pass while burdening religious conduct, and it does not give officials open-ended discretion to grant exemptions based on which reasons they like.

2. Rational Basis vs. Strict Scrutiny

  • Rational basis (easy for government): the law must be rationally related to a legitimate interest (here: preventing outbreaks).
  • Strict scrutiny (hard for government): the law must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. This applies when laws target religion or are not generally applicable, and (post-Mahmoud) in Yoder-like “same-character” parental free-exercise burdens.

3. “Comparable Secular Conduct”

A secular exemption is “comparable” to a religious practice only if it undermines the government’s interest to a similar degree. The court held medical exemptions are not comparable to religious exemptions because medical exemptions are designed to protect children who cannot safely vaccinate—without substantially undermining the goal of maximizing vaccination where medically possible.

4. “Individualized Exemptions”

A law becomes constitutionally suspect if it lets officials decide, case-by-case, which reasons for not following the law deserve exceptions. New York’s medical exemption is treated as standards-based (anchored in medical contraindications and documentation), not a discretionary, values-based exemption system.

5. The Yoder/Mahmoud “Same-Character” Burden

After Mahmoud, strict scrutiny can apply even to neutral laws if they substantially interfere with a child’s religious development in the way that compelled schooling or compelled exposure to normative instruction did in Yoder and Mahmoud. Miller holds vaccination requirements are different in kind: they regulate school entry conditions for public health, not religious formation.

V. Conclusion

Miller v. McDonald reaffirms that New York’s school immunization requirement—without a religious exemption but with a regulated medical exemption—remains constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause as a neutral and generally applicable law subject to rational-basis review. The decision’s principal doctrinal contribution is its post-Mahmoud clarification: the Yoder/Mahmoud strict-scrutiny pathway turns on the character of the burden—interference with children’s religious development through educational formation or displacement of parental authority—not merely the burden’s severity. On that view, vaccination mandates remain outside the Yoder/Mahmoud “same-character” category, keeping most such challenges within the traditional Smith framework.