Post-Lopez-Martinez Cancellation Review: Hardship Determinations Are Reviewable as Mixed Questions, but Underlying Facts (and Unexhausted Legal-Standard Claims) Are Not

1. Introduction

Gabriel Teodoro-Regules v. U.S. Attorney General (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2026) concerns a petition for review from a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denial of cancellation of removal for a nonpermanent resident under INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

The petitioner, a Mexican national who entered the United States without inspection, sought cancellation based on claimed “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his two U.S.-citizen sons if he were removed to Mexico. He relied on, among other things: (i) his back injury; (ii) one child’s chest bone abnormality and eye condition; (iii) asserted limitations on education and healthcare in Mexico; and (iv) general country-conditions concerns.

The key appellate issues were not only whether the hardship standard was met, but also whether the Eleventh Circuit had authority to review the agency’s determinations given the INA’s limits on judicial review and the petitioner’s exhaustion obligations.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review.

  • Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: challenges that were, in substance, purely factual disputes with the IJ’s findings (e.g., the seriousness of the child’s medical issues and the petitioner’s back injury).
  • Dismissed for failure to exhaust: the argument that the IJ applied the wrong legal standard by improperly elevating the petitioner’s burden of proof (because this “core issue” was not presented to the BIA).
  • Denied: the “reasoned consideration” challenge (the IJ’s decision was detailed and the BIA adopted it) and the merits challenge to the hardship determination (substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that hardship did not rise to the statutory level).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Jurisdiction and the reviewability of cancellation denials

  • Patel v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Used for the framework that courts generally lack jurisdiction over factual challenges in discretionary-relief decisions, but retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law. The panel relied on this distinction to dismiss factual disputes over medical severity and functional limitations.
  • Wilkinson v. Garland and Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Central to the opinion’s post-2024 structure of hardship review. The panel treated the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” inquiry as a reviewable mixed question while emphasizing that underlying factual determinations remain unreviewable. This is the doctrinal hinge for the split disposition: some claims dismissed, others reviewed.
  • Jimenez-Galicia v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Cited for the instruction to “look hard” at how a petitioner frames issues, to determine whether the court truly has jurisdiction (i.e., to detect factual challenges disguised as legal ones).
  • Farah v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Cited for de novo, sua sponte jurisdiction review.

B. Exhaustion after Santos-Zacaria (claims-processing, not jurisdiction)

  • Santos-Zacaria v. Garland: Recognized for the proposition that statutory exhaustion is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar. The panel nonetheless enforced exhaustion because the government timely invoked it.
  • Kemokai v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Provided the mechanism for applying the exhaustion rule when asserted by the government.
  • Indrawati v. U.S. Att'y Gen., Jeune v. U.S. Att'y Gen., and Montano-Cisneros v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s pragmatic articulation of exhaustion: the petitioner must raise the “core issue” with enough information for the BIA to correct error, but need not use precise legal terminology.
  • United States v. Brown and Yee v. City of Escondido: Used to distinguish between (i) being limited to the “precise arguments” made below (generally not required once an issue is preserved) and (ii) failing to present a sufficiently distinct “core issue” at all.

C. Reasoned consideration doctrine

  • Jeune v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and Seck v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Provided the governing definition—whether the decision shows the agency “heard and thought and not merely reacted.”
  • Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Illustrated what suffices for reasoned consideration (basic facts, relevant authority, and identifiable grounds for denial).
  • Zheng v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Cited for de novo review of legal questions, including reasoned-consideration claims.
  • Gonzalez v. U.S. Att'y. Gen. and Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Cited for the scope of review when the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision (review extends to the IJ’s reasoning to the extent adopted).

D. Standard of review (substantial evidence) and hardship content

  • Adefemi v. Ashcroft and Al Najjar v. Ashcroft: Supplied the articulation of substantial evidence review and the “record compels reversal” threshold.
  • Laguna Rivera v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Reiterated the high bar for overturning fact-dependent agency determinations.
  • Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo: Noted in the opinion’s discussion of deference debates; the panel stated that, notwithstanding Loper Bright, hardship review proceeds under substantial evidence in line with Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen..

E. BIA hardship precedents applied to the facts

  • Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga: The foundational articulation that the hardship standard is “high,” beyond ordinary consequences of removal, but not “unconscionable.” The IJ cited and applied this framing; the Eleventh Circuit treated it as governing.
  • Matter of Correa: Cited for the point that inferior medical facilities abroad, standing alone, do not establish the requisite hardship.
  • Matter of J-J-G-: Quoted for the requirement, when hardship is health-based and the qualifying relative will relocate, that the applicant show (i) a serious medical condition and (ii) inadequate reasonable availability of appropriate care in the country of removal.
  • Matter of Andazola-Rivas and Matter of Recinas: Cited as part of the broader body of BIA precedent defining and exemplifying the statutory standard.
  • Flores-Alonso v. U.S. Att'y Gen.: Quoted (as incorporated via Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen.) for the idea that hardship must be substantially beyond what ordinarily results from removal.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The jurisdictional sorting: legal/mixed questions vs underlying facts

The court’s first move was classification. The petitioner challenged how the IJ evaluated the severity of medical conditions and the functional consequences of his back injury. The panel treated these as attempts to re-litigate factual determinations, which the INA bars courts from reviewing in cancellation cases. Those arguments were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the INA’s discretionary-relief review bar as interpreted through Patel v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and clarified for hardship review by Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and Wilkinson v. Garland.

B. Exhaustion: “core issue” preservation has limits

The panel distinguished between (i) the petitioner’s preserved argument that the evidence met the hardship standard and (ii) a distinct claim that the IJ applied the wrong legal standard by improperly increasing the burden of proof through demanding expert documentation. Because the petitioner’s BIA brief argued essentially “the IJ misapplied the hardship requirement to my facts,” but did not present “the IJ used an incorrect legal standard/burden,” the court held that the latter “core issue” was unexhausted and dismissed it under the claims-processing exhaustion rule described in Indrawati v. U.S. Att'y Gen., Jeune v. U.S. Att'y Gen., and enforced via Kemokai v. U.S. Att'y Gen..

This is a practical boundary line: broad disagreement with a hardship conclusion may preserve the hardship question, but it does not automatically preserve a separate contention that the IJ used an incorrect burden or incorrect legal test.

C. Reasoned consideration: adoption plus detailed IJ reasoning suffices

The petitioner also argued the agency failed to consider evidence or perform adequate factfinding. The court treated this as a reasoned consideration claim and rejected it, emphasizing the IJ’s detailed oral decision, the IJ’s express statement that it considered evidence cumulatively (even if not individually discussed), and the BIA’s adoption of that analysis. Under Jeune v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att'y Gen., that combination demonstrated that the agency “heard and thought.”

D. Merits review: substantial evidence supports the no-hardship conclusion

Where jurisdiction existed to review the hardship determination as a mixed question, the court applied substantial evidence and held the record did not compel reversal. The IJ’s key rationale aligned with BIA standards: the child’s medical issues were described as requiring monitoring rather than demonstrating a serious condition with unavailable care in Mexico (consistent with Matter of J-J-G-), and asserted lower living standards and generalized adverse conditions were insufficient without more (consistent with Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga and Matter of Correa).

3.3 Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is a clear application of the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Wilkinson v. Garland and post-Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen. approach and is likely to influence litigation strategy in three ways:

  1. Argument framing is outcome-determinative for jurisdiction. Petitioners must separate reviewable “hardship standard application” arguments from barred factual disputes; the court will “look hard” to reclassify factual arguments as jurisdictionally barred.
  2. Exhaustion requires presenting distinct “core issues,” not merely the bottom-line disagreement. If the intended claim is “wrong legal standard/burden,” it must be fairly presented to the BIA, even if a general hardship challenge was raised.
  3. Medical-hardship claims must be built to match BIA elements. Under Matter of J-J-G-, applicants should expect focus on (i) seriousness of the condition and (ii) specific, condition-tailored evidence about availability of adequate care in the country of removal if the child relocates.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Cancellation of removal (INA § 240A(b)(1))
A form of discretionary relief that can allow certain nonpermanent residents to remain in the United States if they satisfy statutory prerequisites (including continuous presence, good moral character, and no disqualifying convictions) and prove a demanding hardship requirement to certain U.S.-based relatives.
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
A heightened hardship threshold focused on qualifying relatives (here, U.S.-citizen children). It is more than the typical disruption of relocation, reduced income, or lower services that often follow removal. Under cases like Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga and Matter of J-J-G-, the inquiry is cumulative, but the bar is intentionally high.
Jurisdiction stripping and “questions of law”
The INA limits courts’ ability to review discretionary-relief denials. Courts can still review legal issues and certain mixed questions, but not disputes that merely contest what the facts are (or how the IJ weighed them).
Exhaustion (INA § 242(d)(1))
Generally, the petitioner must give the BIA a fair chance to address an issue first. After Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but it is commonly enforced when the government raises it.
Reasoned consideration
A requirement that the agency’s decision show it actually evaluated the claim and evidence. It does not require discussing every document, but it must be coherent and responsive enough to permit judicial review.
Substantial evidence
A deferential review standard. The court affirms if the agency’s decision is reasonably supported by the record; reversal occurs only if the record compels the opposite result.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s disposition in Gabriel Teodoro-Regules v. U.S. Attorney General underscores a practical, litigation-shaping rule set for cancellation cases: courts may review the hardship determination as a mixed question under Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and Wilkinson v. Garland, but they will dismiss attempts to repackage factual disputes as legal claims; they will enforce exhaustion to bar distinct legal-standard theories not presented to the BIA; and they will reject reasoned-consideration challenges where the IJ’s explanation is detailed and the BIA adopts it.

On the merits, the decision reiterates that generalized difficulties of relocation, diminished opportunities, and non-severe or monitor-only medical issues—without condition-specific proof of inadequate care—typically will not meet the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” threshold under Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, Matter of Correa, and Matter of J-J-G-.