Post–Loper Bright “Particular Social Group” in the Eleventh Circuit: Perez-Zenteno’s Factors Remain Binding and Broad “Perceived Wealth” Groups Are Not Cognizable

Case: Maria Mejia Ponce v. U.S. Attorney General
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: June 23, 2025

1. Introduction

This published Eleventh Circuit decision addresses how federal courts in the circuit should evaluate “membership in a particular social group” (PSG) asylum claims after the Supreme Court’s elimination of Chevron-type deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. Petitioners Maria Fatima Mejia Ponce (and Walter Esteban Cruz Mejia) sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. The panel (Jordan, Lagoa, and Tjoflat, JJ.) wrote only on asylum and summarily denied the petition as to other issues.

The central dispute was whether the Eleventh Circuit should “take a fresh and unencumbered look” at the statutory phrase “particular social group,” and accept petitioner’s proposed broad definition. Relatedly, the case tested whether a wealth-adjacent group—Honduran business owners “perceived as having wealth” and targeted for threats/extortion by gangs—could qualify as a PSG.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court denied the petition for review. Although acknowledging that Chevron deference “is no more” after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the panel held it was bound by the circuit’s prior alternative holding in Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General, which—on de novo review—required that PSGs be interpreted using “discrete and measurable factors as immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness.”

The court rejected (1) petitioner’s proposed general definition of PSG (“two or more describable, distinctive, or distinguishable humans sharing common characteristics that can be referred to in the aggregate”) because it ignored the Perez-Zenteno factors, and (2) petitioner’s specific claimed PSG (Honduran business owners perceived as wealthy and targeted by gangs) as too broad and indeterminate.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Foundational BIA PSG doctrine

  • Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985): The opinion recounts the BIA’s long-standing definition of PSG as a group sharing a “common, immutable characteristic” that members cannot change (or should not be required to change). The court uses Acosta as the baseline against which later “particularity” and “social distinction” elaborations developed.
  • Matter of M-E-V-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) (quoted through Eleventh Circuit precedent): Introduced/clarified that a PSG must be “defined with particularity” and “socially distinct within the society in question.” The panel cites it as part of the settled administrative framework, though it ultimately resolves the case by reliance on circuit precedent rather than by re-adopting BIA standards through deference.
  • Matter of L-E-A, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (BIA 2017) (L-E-A I), overruled by Matter of L-E-A, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) (L-E-A II), reinstated by Matter of L-E-A, 28 I. & N. Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021) (L-E-A III): Cited for the proposition that “members of an immediate family may constitute a particular social group,” and to show the doctrinal volatility in PSG adjudication at the agency level. The panel uses these citations illustratively rather than as the decisive rule of decision.

B. Chevron deference and its removal

  • Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 469 U.S. 837 (1984): The opinion notes the circuit previously deferred to the BIA’s reading of PSG under Chevron. This sets up petitioner’s argument that the court should now interpret PSG without Chevron constraints.
  • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): The key methodological shift—“Chevron-type deference is no more.” The panel relies on Loper Bright for that proposition, but also highlights Loper Bright’s express statement that it does not call into doubt prior decisions that relied on Chevron, while simultaneously declining to decide the full stare decisis effect of the circuit’s prior Chevron-based holdings because petitioner’s claim fails on other grounds.

C. Binding Eleventh Circuit PSG doctrine—pre- and post-Loper Bright

  • Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006) and Gonzalez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016): The panel cites these as examples of cases where the Eleventh Circuit found the BIA’s PSG interpretation reasonable and deferred. They supply historical context but are not the operative holdings applied here.
  • Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General, 913 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2019): This is the opinion’s cornerstone. The panel treats Perez-Zenteno as having already performed the kind of “plenary statutory review” petitioner requested, and as binding the circuit to interpret PSG with reference to “discrete and measurable” factors: “immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness.” The panel also draws a parallel between petitioner’s broad proposed group and the “sweeping” group rejected in Perez-Zenteno.

D. Alternative holdings as binding precedent

  • United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920 (11th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that alternative holdings bind “just like singular ones.”
  • Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 (1948): Quoted to reinforce that when a judgment rests on multiple determinations, each determination is precedential. This supports the panel’s move: even if Perez-Zenteno included an “even without deference” discussion, that alternative holding is still binding.

E. Persuasive out-of-circuit authority on “wealth” PSGs

  • Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d. Cir. 2007): Used as an analog to show the administrability problem with “wealth” as a PSG boundary marker. The Eleventh Circuit adopts the practical concern articulated there: defining membership by “wealth” risks requiring a “sociological analysis” of perception and status without workable limiting principles.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: (1) identify the controlling interpretive methodology after Loper Bright, and (2) apply binding circuit precedent to the proposed PSG formulations.

  1. Methodology after Loper Bright: The panel accepts that Chevron deference no longer applies, but emphasizes that existing circuit precedent remains binding unless and until overruled by the en banc court or the Supreme Court. The panel underscores that Perez-Zenteno already conducted de novo review and articulated interpretive factors for PSG analysis.
  2. Binding effect of Perez-Zenteno’s “no deference” analysis: The panel characterizes Perez-Zenteno as having an alternative holding—reaching the same result even without deference. Under United States v. Files and Massachusetts v. United States, that alternative holding binds later panels. Therefore, any post–Loper Bright PSG interpretation in the Eleventh Circuit must “account for, consider, and apply” the Perez-Zenteno factors: “immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness.”
  3. Rejection of petitioner’s broad definitional proposal: The court rejects the proposed generic definition of PSG (“two or more describable, distinctive, or distinguishable humans...”) because it fails to incorporate the required factors. In other words, the court refuses to treat “groupness” alone as enough; PSG must be meaningfully narrowed by criteria that make the group identifiable, bounded, and coherent in a way relevant to asylum law.
  4. Rejection of petitioner’s specific proposed group (“perceived wealth” business owners): The court finds the group “too broad” and unworkable, citing three practical defects: (a) no monetary threshold or financial criteria for membership, (b) no indication of group size in Honduras, and (c) no standard for measuring outsiders’ “perception” of wealth (or perception of membership). The absence of these limiting principles makes the proposed PSG comparable to the overbroad “sweeping” group rejected in Perez-Zenteno.

3.3. Impact

This decision’s practical doctrinal impact is less about creating a brand-new PSG test and more about stabilizing Eleventh Circuit practice after Loper Bright:

  • Post-Chevron continuity via circuit precedent: Even though Chevron deference has been eliminated, PSG litigation in the Eleventh Circuit will continue to be constrained by Perez-Zenteno’s de novo interpretive factors unless altered en banc or by the Supreme Court.
  • Heightened attention to administrable boundaries: The opinion signals that proposed PSGs must contain concrete, reviewable limiting principles. Groups defined by indeterminate social perceptions (e.g., “perceived wealthy”) face an uphill battle absent clear criteria that make membership measurable and not amorphous.
  • Litigation strategy shift: Petitioners cannot rely on Loper Bright alone to expand PSG recognition; they must either (a) distinguish their group under the required factors, or (b) seek en banc reconsideration of Perez-Zenteno.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Asylum and “refugee” status: To qualify for asylum, a noncitizen must fit the statutory definition of “refugee,” including showing persecution “on account of” a protected ground such as “membership in a particular social group.”
  • “Particular social group” (PSG): PSG is a category meant to cover certain groups not captured by race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. Courts and the BIA require more than a loosely described population; the group must be defined in a way that is meaningfully bounded.
  • Chemistry of tests: immutability vs. perception: “Immutability” refers to traits one cannot change (or should not be forced to change). “Perceived wealth” depends on fluctuating, subjective judgment, which makes group membership difficult to define and consistently adjudicate.
  • Chelvron deference and Loper Bright: Chevron was a doctrine telling courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright ended that. But ending Chevron does not automatically erase existing appellate precedent, especially where a prior case also decided the issue without deference.
  • Alternative holding: If a court gives two independent reasons for its result, each reason can be binding precedent in later cases. That principle is what allows Perez-Zenteno’s “even without deference” analysis to control here.

5. Conclusion

Maria Mejia Ponce v. U.S. Attorney General clarifies that, in the Eleventh Circuit, the demise of Chevron deference after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo does not open the door to an expansive, minimal-constraint definition of “particular social group.” Instead, the circuit remains bound by Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General, which requires PSG analysis to incorporate “discrete and measurable” factors—“immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness.”

Applying those constraints, the court rejects a PSG defined around Honduran business owners “perceived as having wealth” and targeted by gangs, reasoning that the group is too broad and lacks workable, objective boundaries. The decision is a strong signal that post–Loper Bright PSG claims in this circuit will turn on careful, cabined group definitions with administrable membership criteria—not on generalized vulnerability to criminal predation.