Post–Loper Bright “Best Reading” Rule: INA “Conviction” Requires (1) Foundational Criminal-Procedure Protections and (2) Criminal Sentencing

I. Introduction

Wong v. Blanche (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2026) arises from the removal proceedings of Kwok Sum Wong, a lawful permanent resident admitted in 1979. The Department of Homeland Security charged Wong as removable under INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been “convicted of two . . . crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMTs) not arising out of a single scheme: (1) a 2005 New Jersey “disorderly persons” theft-by-deception offense (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-4), and (2) a 2006 New York second-degree forgery offense (N.Y. Penal Law § 170.10).

The central issue on remand was narrow but consequential: whether Wong’s guilty plea to New Jersey theft by deception constitutes a “conviction” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). The Second Circuit previously denied relief by deferring under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded “in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.” On remand, the court applied Loper Bright’s instruction that courts must independently determine a statute’s “best reading,” without agency deference.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. It held—without deferring to the BIA—that the “best reading” of “conviction” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), as relevant to “a formal judgment of guilt,” is a judgment that: (i) is reached in a criminal proceeding providing the minimum constitutional protections required to impose criminal penalties, and (ii) subjects the accused to a criminal sentence (i.e., punishment that includes, at least, authorized criminal penalties).

Applying that rule, the court concluded Wong’s New Jersey theft-by-deception disposition qualifies as a “conviction” because the offense is prosecuted with core constitutional criminal-procedure guarantees and is punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and a fine—classic criminal sentencing authority—regardless of whether Wong ultimately received only a fine.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The deference pivot: from Chevron to Loper Bright

  • Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council: The prior Second Circuit decision (Wong v. Garland, 95 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2024)) deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of “conviction.” That framework controlled the earlier outcome.
  • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo: The remand’s engine. The court treated Loper Bright as eliminating judicial permission to defer to agency statutory interpretations “simply because a statute is ambiguous,” requiring instead the court’s own determination of the “best reading” using “all relevant interpretive tools.”
  • Wong v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 432 (2024): The Supreme Court’s vacatur-and-remand order concretized the obligation to revisit the statutory question under the new interpretive regime.

2. The INA “conviction” architecture: integrating “formal judgment” and “withheld adjudication”

  • Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.: The court relied heavily on Puello to read § 1101(a)(48)(A) as a two-part definition designed to treat “run-of-the-mill” convictions and deferred/expunged dispositions uniformly for immigration purposes. Puello supplied the key structural move: although § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i)-(ii) textually defines “conviction” where adjudication is withheld, those provisions illuminate what Congress understood “conviction” to entail—namely, a guilt determination through criminal process and a sentence/punishment component.
  • Wellington v. Holder: Cited to exemplify state expungement procedures, reinforcing Congress’s 1996 intent (as described in circuit precedent) to prevent state mitigation devices from controlling federal immigration consequences.

3. Federal meaning, state labels, and the uniformity principle

  • United States v. Turley and Jerome v. United States: These cases anchored the canon that federal statutory meaning does not ordinarily depend on state law absent a “plain indication” of incorporation. The court used them to reject Wong’s invitation to make “conviction” turn on how New Jersey labels “disorderly persons” offenses.
  • Saleh v. Gonzales: Directly supported the proposition that whether someone has been “convicted” for purposes of federal immigration law is a question of federal law, even when the predicate offense is state-defined.
  • Arizona v. United States: Emphasized immigration as a domain of federal governance affecting “the entire Nation,” reinforcing why Congress would not be presumed to delegate definitional control to disparate state classification systems.
  • Russello v. United States and Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Cox: Employed to rebut Wong’s “collateral consequences” theory: if Congress meant to embed state collateral-disability regimes into “conviction,” it would have said so.

4. Text-first interpretation and statutory context

  • Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Env't Prot. Agency, Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, and Sturgeon v. Frost: These cases framed the method: begin with text, read in context, and interpret the provision in light of the whole statutory scheme.
  • Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.: Supported use of structural cues such as headings (and contextual signals) to confirm that “conviction” is inherently criminal in nature.

5. Constitutional criminal-procedure baselines defining “criminal proceedings”

  • Apprendi v. New Jersey and In re Winship: Supplied the “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement as the defining hallmark of criminal guilt adjudication.
  • United States v. Norris: Used to equate a guilty plea with a conclusive guilt determination—after which “nothing is left but to render judgment.”
  • The court enumerated foundational protections with citations including: Cole v. Arkansas (notice), Coffin v. United States (presumption of innocence), Barker v. Wingo (speedy/public trial; also compulsory process via footnote), Hemphill v. New York (confrontation), and Denezpi v. United States (double jeopardy principles).
  • Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell (quoting Hicks v. Feiock): Cited for the core proposition that criminal penalties cannot be imposed absent the protections that distinguish criminal from civil adjudication.
  • Lewis v. United States, Scott v. Illinois, and United States v. Smith: These were used to clarify that certain rights (jury trial, counsel, grand jury indictment) attach only in subsets of cases; their absence does not make a proceeding non-criminal.

6. Applying the test to New Jersey theft-by-deception proceedings

  • Avila v. Att'y Gen.: Provided a concrete description of New Jersey disorderly persons prosecutions: the State must prove elements beyond a reasonable doubt and defendants have rights including confrontation, speedy/public trial, notice, compulsory process, and protection against double jeopardy—satisfying the opinion’s “foundational protections” prong.
  • Smith v. Doe: Cited for the characterization of incarceration as the “paradigmatic” restraint, supporting the conclusion that authorized jail time signals criminal sentencing even if not imposed.
  • Doe v. Pataki: Used to underscore punishment as a basic goal of criminal law, reinforcing sentencing as the second necessary component.

7. Procedural and issue-narrowing precedents

  • Vasquez v. Garland: Cited to confirm de novo review of legal questions post-Loper Bright.
  • JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.: Used to deem forfeited Wong’s arguments regarding the CIMT determinations (not briefed on remand).
  • The opinion referenced the case’s prior administrative and judicial path including In re Kwok Sum Wong, A036 850 251 (B.I.A. Mar. 20, 2018), Kwok Sum Wong v. Barr, In re Eslamizar, and the BIA’s precedential decision Matter of Wong, which the Second Circuit ultimately declined to adopt as binding interpretive authority, though it agreed with the BIA’s outcome.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Methodological reset under Loper Bright: The court treated statutory interpretation as an independent judicial duty, using “all relevant interpretive tools” rather than Chevron’s reasonableness-and-deference framework.
  2. Textual anchor—“formal judgment of guilt” is inherently criminal: Starting with § 1101(a)(48)(A), the court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of “conviction” (including reference to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY) and the INA’s repeated pairing of “convicted” with “crime” confirm that the statute is speaking about criminal guilt.
  3. Structural inference from § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i)-(ii): Although (i)-(ii) formally define “conviction” where adjudication is withheld, the court—following Puello—treated those provisions as revealing the essential elements Congress associated with convictions: a guilt determination through criminal process plus punishment at sentencing. The two categories differ primarily at the “entry of judgment” step, not in the underlying criminal nature of the proceeding.
  4. Defining the criminal-proceeding prong via constitutional baselines: The court tied “criminal proceeding” to the minimum constitutional protections required before the state may impose criminal penalties, centering on proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the core suite of trial rights that historically distinguish criminal adjudication.
  5. Defining the sentencing prong via punishment authority: A “formal judgment of guilt” must culminate in criminal sentencing—i.e., an authorized imposition of punishment. The court treated the authorized possibility of incarceration as a decisive signal of criminal punishment.
  6. Rejecting state-label and collateral-consequence tests: Wong’s proposed approach—turning on state classification and state collateral consequences—failed because the INA does not incorporate state definitions, Congress sought uniform federal immigration consequences, and the statutory text speaks in terms of “punishment” rather than collateral disabilities.
  7. Application to New Jersey “disorderly persons” theft by deception: Because New Jersey must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, must provide core constitutional protections, and may impose jail time (up to six months) and a fine, Wong’s disposition qualifies as a “conviction” under the court’s “best reading.”

C. Impact

  • Post-Loper Bright immigration adjudication in the Second Circuit: The decision models how courts will resolve INA interpretive questions without Chevron—by crafting and applying an independent “best reading,” while still considering agency reasoning as persuasive at most.
  • State “non-criminal” labels will rarely control: Offenses that states label as “violations,” “infractions,” or “disorderly persons” offenses may still be INA “convictions” if the prosecution is criminal in the constitutional sense and results in criminal sentencing authority.
  • Two-pronged framework likely to recur: Future cases disputing whether a disposition counts as a “conviction” under § 1101(a)(48)(A) will likely litigate (i) whether the proceeding carried foundational criminal safeguards (especially beyond-a-reasonable-doubt adjudication) and (ii) whether the judgment involved criminal punishment/sentencing authority.
  • Practical removal consequences: The ruling strengthens the government’s ability to rely on low-level state dispositions as “convictions” for removability triggers where the INA turns on conviction status (including CIMTs and aggravated felony provisions), even when the penalty imposed is modest.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Conviction” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)
A federal immigration definition. It is not limited by what a state chooses to call the offense. In this opinion, a “formal judgment of guilt” counts when it comes from a constitutionally criminal-type proceeding and leads to criminal sentencing/punishment authority.
“Foundational criminal-procedural protections”
Core constitutional safeguards that separate criminal from civil adjudication—especially proof beyond a reasonable doubt, notice, confrontation, compulsory process, speedy/public trial, and protection against being tried twice for the same offense.
“Criminal sentencing” / “punishment”
The court’s focus is on criminal penalties the judge is empowered to impose (not merely collateral consequences like voting or firearm restrictions). The authorized possibility of incarceration strongly indicates criminal punishment.
Chevron deference vs. the “best reading” approach
Under Chevron, courts often deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Under Loper Bright, courts must interpret statutes themselves and adopt what they conclude is the best interpretation, not the agency’s preferred one.

V. Conclusion

Wong v. Blanche operationalizes the post-Loper Bright regime in immigration law: the Second Circuit independently construed “conviction” in § 1101(a)(48)(A) and held that a “formal judgment of guilt” qualifies when it (1) follows a proceeding with minimum constitutional criminal-process protections and (2) results in criminal sentencing authority/punishment. Applying that rule, the court held Wong’s New Jersey theft-by-deception disorderly persons offense is an INA “conviction,” and it therefore denied his petition for review.