Date: Aug 7, 2026

Post-Hunter Enforcement of Sentence-Appeal Waivers: Only “Obvious” Miscarriages of Justice Void the Waiver

1. Introduction

In United States v. Evan Graves (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a wire-fraud defendant’s challenges to (i) the validity of his guilty plea based on alleged inadequate Rule 11 warnings regarding restitution and forfeiture, (ii) the district court’s order authorizing forfeiture of real property as substitute assets to satisfy a money judgment, and (iii) whether the forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.

The case arose from fraudulently obtained loan proceeds (with restitution owed to the Small Business Administration) and a criminal forfeiture money judgment of $1,355,600. The central procedural issues were the adequacy of the plea colloquy under Rule 11, and whether Graves’s sentence-appeal waiver barred appellate review of his substitute-asset forfeiture argument—especially in light of the Supreme Court’s new decision in Hunter v. United States (2026).

2. Summary of the Opinion

Rule 11 plea colloquy: The court affirmed. Even if the colloquy could have been clearer about the distinction between restitution and forfeiture, the plea agreement expressly covered both, and the colloquy established Graves reviewed and understood the agreement. No plain error.
Substitute-asset forfeiture findings: The court dismissed this challenge as barred by the sentence-appeal waiver. The waiver was knowing and voluntary, and the claim did not fall within the exceptions. The panel noted Hunter v. United States and concluded that enforcing the waiver would not produce the sort of “obvious” miscarriage of justice required to override a waiver.
Eighth Amendment excessive fine: The court affirmed. Applying circuit precedent, forfeiture was not “grossly disproportional” to the offense, particularly where the amount tracked the fraud proceeds and was below the maximum fine authorized by statute.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Rule 11 / Plain-Error Review of Pleas

United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited for the proposition that due process requires a guilty plea be knowing and voluntary, and for the applicable approach when assessing Rule 11 compliance on appeal. It framed the panel’s insistence on examining the whole colloquy and record.
United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 2014): Provided the Eleventh Circuit’s four-part plain error test, which governed because Graves did not object below.
United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003): The key Rule 11 “core concerns” case—(1) absence of coercion, (2) understanding charges, (3) awareness of direct consequences. The panel relied on Monroe to hold that omissions in form do not require reversal if the colloquy and record, in substance, satisfy these core concerns.
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004): Used (via footnote) to underscore prejudice: Graves did not argue that but for the alleged Rule 11 deficiency he would have rejected the plea, which is typically necessary to show substantial-rights harm in plea-colloquy challenges.

B. Forfeiture as Part of the Sentence and Appeal Waivers

Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995): Established that criminal forfeiture is part of the defendant’s sentence—an important premise enabling the court to treat forfeiture challenges as falling within the scope of a sentence-appeal waiver.
King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2022), abrogated on other grounds by Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026): Cited for de novo review of waiver validity/scope and to situate Hunter as the new controlling Supreme Court authority (at least on some aspect relevant to waiver doctrine).
United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2008): Reinforced that an appeal waiver is enforceable if knowing and voluntary.
United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993): Provided the Eleventh Circuit’s classic waiver-enforcement framework and the government’s burden: either specific questioning about the waiver or a record showing understanding.
United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2020): Supplied the “touchstone” language—waiver is valid if clearly conveyed the defendant gives up the right to appeal under most circumstances—and clarified the court need not list every exception during the colloquy.
Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026): The panel treated Hunter as adding a narrow safety valve: waivers are unenforceable when enforcement would produce a miscarriage of justice, i.e., leaving an obvious egregious error in place that undermines public confidence. Graves did not invoke Hunter (it issued after briefing), but the panel nonetheless stated his claim did not meet Hunter’s “high bar,” further supporting dismissal.

C. Mandatory Forfeiture, Restitution, and Excessive Fines

United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2003): Provided the standard of review: de novo review of whether forfeiture is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
United States v. Brummer, 598 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam): Anchored the court’s statement that when forfeiture is authorized under § 2461(c), the district court has no discretion: it must order forfeiture.
United States v. Hernandez, 803 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam): Central to rejecting Graves’s “double recovery” theme. Hernandez explains restitution and forfeiture serve different purposes: restitution compensates the victim; forfeiture punishes the defendant.
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2015): Supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s three-factor proportionality test for Excessive Fines Clause challenges, which controlled the outcome.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Rule 11: Restitution and Forfeiture Warnings (Plain-Error Lens)

Rule 11 requires advising a defendant of the court’s authority to order restitution and its obligation to impose applicable forfeiture. Graves argued the plea was invalid because the colloquy did not “properly” explain those obligations—especially the difference between restitution and forfeiture.

Applying plain-error review, the panel focused on Rule 11’s “core concerns” from United States v. Monroe. Graves did not contest coercion or understanding of the charge; he attacked only awareness of consequences. The panel held that, in substance, Graves was adequately informed because:

He confirmed he reviewed the plea agreement and initialed/signed it.
The agreement expressly stated both restitution (mandatory) and forfeiture applied.
The agreement clarified forfeiture does not satisfy restitution (they are additive, not interchangeable).

The court thus treated the plea agreement—confirmed understood in open court—as curing any lack of verbal precision in the colloquy, consistent with Monroe’s “substance over form” approach. The Dominguez Benitez footnote further reinforced the absence of prejudice: Graves did not assert he would have gone to trial had the distinction been explained differently.

B. Substitute-Asset Forfeiture Challenge Barred by Waiver

Graves next argued the district court failed to make required findings to forfeit real property as a substitute for the money judgment. The panel did not reach the merits because it found the claim within the scope of Graves’s sentence-appeal waiver, and the waiver was knowing and voluntary under United States v. Bushert and United States v. Boyd.

Notably, the panel treated forfeiture as a sentencing component (per Libretti v. United States), so it fits naturally within “sentence” waiver language. The district court’s colloquy conveyed that Graves was giving up the right to appeal except in narrow circumstances (including an Eighth Amendment claim), and Graves said he understood.

The opinion then incorporated Hunter v. United States as a newly announced Supreme Court limitation: even a valid waiver cannot be enforced if it would cause a miscarriage of justice by leaving in place an obvious error undermining public confidence. Although Graves did not brief Hunter, the panel stated his argument did not approach that threshold, so the waiver remained enforceable.

C. Eighth Amendment: Forfeiture Not “Grossly Disproportional”

Finally, the panel rejected the Excessive Fines Clause challenge. It emphasized statutory structure: wire fraud authorizes a maximum fine, and forfeiture is mandated by statute when authorized (citing United States v. Brummer). It also rejected the notion that paying both restitution and forfeiture is inherently excessive, relying on United States v. Hernandez to distinguish their purposes.

Applying United States v. Sperrazza:

Class-of-persons factor: Graves conceded he is within the category targeted by the forfeiture regime.
Other authorized penalties: The forfeiture amount ($1,355,600) was below the maximum statutory fine calculated as twice the gross gain ($2,711,200), supporting proportionality.
Harm caused: The forfeiture tracked the fraud proceeds (“the amount that he gained through his fraud and no more”) and the offense caused direct loss to the SBA—making it proportionate to the gravity of the offense.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is significant in three practical ways:

Post-Hunter waiver litigation: The opinion signals that Eleventh Circuit panels will read Hunter v. United States narrowly. A defendant seeking to bypass an appeal waiver must identify an error that is not merely arguable or even serious, but obvious and system-legitimacy-threatening. Routine forfeiture-process objections are unlikely to qualify.
Rule 11 compliance through the record: The court reaffirmed that a plea agreement’s explicit restitution/forfeiture provisions—confirmed understood during the colloquy—can satisfy Rule 11’s “direct consequences” concern even if the judge’s oral explanation is imperfect.
Excessive-fines defenses in fraud forfeitures: The opinion demonstrates the continued force of Sperrazza: forfeiture equal to proceeds and below the statutory maximum fine will be difficult to characterize as “grossly disproportional,” even when restitution is also imposed.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Restitution: A compensatory order requiring the defendant to repay the victim’s losses. It is aimed at making the victim whole (here, the SBA).
Forfeiture: A punitive remedy requiring the defendant to surrender proceeds (or property derived from proceeds) of the crime to the government. It is part of the sentence and serves punishment/deterrence goals. It does not “credit” restitution unless a statute provides otherwise.
Substitute-asset forfeiture: When directly traceable criminal proceeds are unavailable (spent, transferred, etc.), the government may seek forfeiture of other assets to satisfy a forfeiture money judgment, subject to statutory requirements. In this case, the merits were not reached due to the appeal waiver.
Sentence-appeal waiver: A plea-agreement provision in which the defendant gives up most rights to appeal the sentence. Courts enforce it if made knowingly and voluntarily. After Hunter v. United States, even a valid waiver may be unenforceable in the rare case where enforcement would preserve an obvious and egregious error that undermines confidence in the judiciary.
Excessive Fines Clause (“gross disproportionality”): The Eighth Amendment prohibits punitive financial sanctions that are grossly out of proportion to the offense. The Eleventh Circuit applies the Sperrazza factors to determine proportionality.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Evan Graves reinforces three core points: (1) Rule 11 challenges often fail under plain-error review where the plea agreement clearly discloses restitution and forfeiture and the defendant confirms understanding; (2) forfeiture is part of the sentence and is therefore commonly covered by sentence-appeal waivers—now further buttressed by the Supreme Court’s narrow “miscarriage of justice” limitation in Hunter v. United States; and (3) forfeiture equal to fraud proceeds, especially when below the statutory maximum fine, is unlikely to be deemed an excessive fine under United States v. Sperrazza, even when restitution is also imposed.